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ABSTRACT.
The dissertation examines the dynamics of rural economic struggle within the 
reserves and on white commercial farms. The supply of farm labour during the 
period 1915-1955 can be seen as an equation with a number of variables. Black 
pastoral communities in southern Namibia sought to retain control over their land 
and their labour. In contrast, the administration sought the division of land amongst 
a new wave of white immigrants and the recruitment of local black pastoralists as 
farm labourers.
The ‘state apparatus’ available to enforce legislation in the early years of South 
African rule was initially weak and local labour control depended largely on the 
relationship between individual farmers and their workforce. The mobility of stock 
was essential to black pastoralists and denser white settlement increased the 
constraining influence of cartographical reserve borders. The State described these 
as ‘labour reserves’ and effectively prevented the emergence of black farmers who 
might rival their white neighbours. Yet case studies of the Bondelswarts and 
Berseba reserves show how economic differentiation influenced the shape of political 
resistance.
The pattern of rapid white settlement in southern Namibia was initially inspired by 
a political, rather than economic agenda. The drought of 1929-1934 was a turning 
point in the economic history of the region. The subsequent transformation of the 
white farming community into the primary source of revenue within Namibia was 
strongly linked to the successful expansion of the karakul industry in southern 
Namibia. The alienation of land and the increase in the quantity and quality of 
white farmers stock was a crucial factor in the detrimental revision of the terms of 
employment of local workers on farms. The growing prosperity of white farmers 
in the region resulted in a change in the composition of the labour force with 
increased reliance upon migrant labour from northern Namibia.
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Introduction.
If there are many gaps in the existing historiography of Africa, there are veritable 
chasms in that of Namibia. Comparative literature from neighbouring countries 
such as South Africa can provide some theoretical insights into the processes at 
work within Namibian history, but must not dictate the assumptions that are made 
about it. Namibian history has been shaped by a unique pattern of events which are 
in many ways distinct from those that formed neighbouring states. The priority for 
historians of Namibia must be to recover and organise the primary evidence that can 
be used to reconstruct Namibian history.
The inadequacy of material covering the period from the occupation of the country 
by South African troops in 1915 up to the launch of the armed struggle by SWAPO 
in 1966 is one of the most apparent chronological weaknesses of the historiography. 
Geographically history has also tended to focus on the more populous northern 
region, with some work on the central region, but very little about the very different 
experience of the southern region. The chronological and geographical focus of this 
dissertation will aim to shed light on these shadowy areas of Namibian history.
The chronological span of the dissertation commences with the defeat of the German 
colonial forces (and their replacement by the colonial forces of the Union of South 
Africa). The work focuses particularly on the subsequent twenty years during which 
the dispossession of the black pastoralists of southern Namibia was most evident. 
The exclusion of black pastoralists from the land and their difficulties in gaining 
access to credit and markets on an equitable basis stifled the emergence of black 
commercial farmers in southern Namibia.1 The severe drought that struck the 
region in the late nineteen-twenties and early nineteen-thirties can be seen as a 
pivotal point in the work. The drought was followed by a second surge of territorial 
expansion by the white farming community and the adaption of the long-distance 
migrant contract labour system to act primarily in their interests. The thesis follows 
the story through to 1955 when the minimal length of contracts was increased by
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50% (from 12 to 18 months) and the responsibilities of the ‘Native Affairs’ 
Department in the territory were transferred to the ‘Bantu Affairs Department’ in 
the Union.
Southern Namibia has a distinctive ecological identity (little work seems to have 
been done on similar districts of the Cape such as Namaqualand and Gordonia) that 
makes it particularly appropriate for a regional study. The regional character of 
southern Namibia is forged by the arid nature of the climate in the region and the 
consequent environmental constraints that have dictated a predominantly small stock 
pastoral economy. In southern Namibia there is virtually no ‘Putting the Plough 
to the Ground’ and therefore it provides an interesting comparison to existing studies 
on agriculture in South Africa, such as the collection of essays edited by Beinart, 
Delius and Trapido.2
The central themes that run through the history of southern Namibia in the period 
covered are the struggles that surrounded the issues of land and labour. Black 
pastoralists sought to revive their autonomy after the intense, but brief, ‘moment’ 
of German colonial rule. The aspirations of these rural communities were countered 
by the aims of the new South African administration. The state apparatus aimed to 
sponsor an initially rapid wave of white settlement, predominantly from the Union, 
and to stabilise the white farming community.
The rural struggles of the period thus centred on the attempts of the state to 
undermine black pastoralism and to channel the local black population into work on 
white farms. The historian’s partiality for the dramatic has perhaps obscured the 
long term nature of the local population’s reluctance to be conscripted as a rural 
proletariat. The reserves became increasingly incredible as the foci of pastoral 
ambition, but a number of strategies were developed which facilitated evasion of, 
or at least engagement with, the process of labour recruitment and control. Land 
and labour were the two determining variables in the equation of economic power 
and prosperity in the region.
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The theoretical basis behind the empirically rich substance of the dissertation lies 
in the substantial literature that exists concerning the regulation and control of the 
labour supply in South Africa. The argument popularised by Wolpe and Legassick 
in their articles of 1974 was that South African society was constructed to suit the 
needs of a capitalist economy dominated by the white minority. 3 The black 
population was to be cast in the role of the labour force to fuel white capitalist 
endeavour. The recent history of South Africa can thus be condensed into the view 
that ”... capital secured the labour-power it required”.4 The state apparatus was 
harnessed by white capitalists to secure the flow of cheap black labour to meet their 
needs. The aim was to be the transformation of dangerously independent peasants 
into an economically dependent proletariat. The territorial segregation applied 
nationally by the 1913 ‘Native Land Act’ ensured the ‘reservation’ of areas of land 
in which the rights of ‘peasants’ to continue farming were to be guaranteed.
The essential paradox, however, was that these ‘reserves’ would be sufficient to 
allow the maintenance and reproduction of the workforce by providing sufficient 
produce for the subsistence of women and children. They would however, be 
insufficient to enable the residents to meet all the financial demands placed upon 
them through internally generated income. The application of taxes payable in 
money would force the majority of able-bodied men into the cash economy as waged 
migrant workers.
The limits placed on the quality and quantity of land provided to small black farmers 
would hamper any attempts to ‘escape’ the obligation to seek waged labour by 
workers able to develop their own commercially successful farming businesses. The 
productive capacity of the reserves could thus be calculated as an indirect subsidy 
to the employers of migrant workers enabling them to pay wages lower than would 
have otherwise been necessary to ensure (in crudely economic terms) the 
reproduction of their labour force.
The argument has been extremely influential on subsequent writers. SWAPO in 
their official history of Namibia describe a straightforward process of
11
proletariani sation:
... the peasants have been impoverished to force them to work for wages ... 
the resulting rural reserve army of labour has been used, together with 
totalitarian labour controls, to keep the wages of all black workers at 
starvation levels.5
However this form of analysis has also been substantially criticised for its 
"exaggerated functionalism".6 The concept of a monolithic white capitalist 
structure with unitary labour requirements simplifies history to the extent of 
clouding rather than clarifying the nature of the capitalist state. On the farms of 
southern Namibia, for example, a need existed for semi-skilled, experienced sheep 
farmers as well as manual labourers and there were considerable differences in wage 
levels.
Urban industry, white farmers and large mining companies needed labour in 
differing numbers and with levels of stability and skill that varied over time. 
Change within one sector could influence the flow of labour to others. The 
differing labour requirements led to a degree of economic competition between the 
segments of the white capitalist community which was consequently reflected on the 
political agenda.7 The dynamics of this competition in Namibia was most overtly 
visible in the struggle between the mining and agricultural sectors for influence and 
control in the organisations responsible for the recruitment and distribution of 
contract labourers.
The might of the state in crushing overt resistance and the general theoretical basis 
of the analysis has, perhaps, also cloaked the extent to which the black population 
were able to resist coercion at a local level. The theory therefore fails to explain 
or acknowledge regional and local differences in the response of black communities 
and fails to adequately integrate the often distinct responses of the varying economic 
and social strata within a community to external pressures.
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The focus on the local character of the conflict between the forces of capital and 
labour raises questions about the nature of resistance. Social history has raised the 
possibility of "Resilience as Resistance".8 The explanation was that the initial form 
of resistance was often neither violent nor organised, but was reflected in individual 
decisions and choices. The elevation of the fact that black workers, unsurprisingly, 
generally made economically rational decisions to the status of ‘resistance’ is 
debatable. The point is that where workers were able to find any flexibility within 
the system, they used this to negotiate or obtain the most advantageous deal possible 
and to ‘escape’ or ‘avoid’ the most damaging demands of their employer and of the 
state. The continuing attempts by individuals to find the optimum economic option 
available reflected persistence, rather than resistance.
The argument can be presented in more concrete terms by examining the actions of 
farm workers. The collection of oral testimonies presented by Keegan has, perhaps, 
provided the best insight into the daily struggle of black workers engaged in the 
rural South African economy.9 If an agreement was weighed in the balance and 
found wanting, in comparison with the terms offered by a neighbouring farmer, a 
farm worker might be able to move. One South African farm worker described 
this as ‘jumping the fence’, a term which suggests that whilst workers recognised 
the restrictions that they faced they were also aware of the opportunities at times of 
labour shortage to play the labour market to obtain improvements in their pay and 
conditions. Individuals sought a position that allowed them the greatest control over 
the process of accumulation.
The pastoral context of southern Namibia created a different emphasis to that found 
in mixed or purely agricultural regions. Yet, like the ‘peasants’ that feature in 
Bundy’s influential study, black pastoralists sought the best available opportunity to 
accumulate and preserve stock.10 Werner’s doctoral thesis on the ‘Herero’ 
reserves of Central Namibia has provided one of the few attempts to examine this 
dynamic in a pastoral Namibian context.11 Werner’s use of the term ‘self- 
peasantisation’ to explain the process is problematic in its use of theoretical terms, 
however the thesis is one of the few works that highlight the degree of internal
13
differentiation within the reserves of the ‘Police Zone’. Werner describes the arena 
of struggle as the efforts of mobile black pastoralists to restore and preserve as far 
as possible their social and economic independence and resist conscription as an 
immobilised proletariat (the replacement of stock by wages). Yet just as there were 
conflicts of interest between the competing sectors of white capital, there was also 
no monolithic black response. The recognition of economic differentiation within 
the black community facilitates explanations of the differing political responses to 
their experiences.
The cracks of diversity that are lost beneath the wall paper of macro-economic 
theory are important. The local conflicts between economically differentiated 
groups were (and are) central to the understanding of particular historical events, 
political phenomena and regional differences in response. Beinart and Delius argue 
that:
... the view from above neglected the question of the extent to which 
agriculture should be analysed in terms of a larger number of regional 
political economies each distinguished by marked differences in ecology, 
class structure, ethnic composition, access to markets and linkages to other 
forms of production.12
The challenge is to unravel the regional political and economic pattern that was 
formed in southern Namibia by the different strands reflecting the aspirations and 
power of various interest groups. One of the few attempts to apply this approach 
in the Namibian context can be found is a thought provoking, but frustratingly brief 
paper by Pearson on the Rehoboth Rising of 1925.13
The shape of the Namibian economy was distinctly different from that of South 
Africa with the contribution of the commercial farming sector being far more 
significant to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In South Africa by the mid-1940s 
manufacturing industry had overtaken mining as the largest contributor to the 
GDP.14 In Namibia in the mid-1940s the contribution made by the commercial
14
farming sector was still more than triple that of the manufacturing and mining 
sectors combined!15 The economic significance of the commercial farming sector 
and especially the karakul sheep farmers of southern Namibia during the 1940s is 
central to understanding the differences between the operation and application of the 
migrant labour system of Namibia and that of South Africa.
The reserves of the region were established with the direct aim of stabilising the 
rural workforce required by local white farmers. The primary destination for 
labourers leaving the reserves of southern Namibia was to be neighbouring farms, 
rather than distant mines. The failure of the reserve network of southern Namibia 
to ‘deliver’ the labour supply to the local white farming community provides an 
ideal case study of the operation and limitations of the state system of labour 
regulation and control. Whilst the alienation of land by white settlers made the 
maintenance of the black pastoral economy increasingly unviable, the state had 
persistent problems in directing the flow of labour from the southern reserves to the 
white farms which were experiencing particular difficulties obtaining sufficient 
labour.
The establishment and operation of a system of labour recruitment in Northern 
Namibia has been one area of Namibian history that has aroused considerable 
academic interest and it has been the subject of stimulating work by Gordon, 
Clarence-Smith and Moorsom.16 The work has tended to focus on the source areas 
for this labour and the role that it played within the mining economy. Long-distance 
migrant labour, in the Namibian context, also played a major role on white 
commercial farms once the supply of local black labour proved inadequate. The 
material in this thesis will help to highlight the importance of the agricultural sector 
as a labour destination.
The thesis will provide a detailed study of a region during a period of considerable 
change. Change should be understood in both chronological and sychronical terms. 
The process which might be dubbed the ‘proletarianisation of the pastoralist’ can be 
charted in chronological terms that reflect the constraints placed upon the black
15
pastoral economy and the struggle of local workers to retain the maximum degree 
of control over their labour. The reason that the impact of economic change on 
local communities was not uniform must be understood in spatial terms. Attention 
will, therefore, also be given to local differences between the resources available to 
different communities and the vertical and horizontal differentiation within them.
STRUCTURE.
The dissertation has been divided into six chapters. The first chapter provides an 
outline of the legislative framework created by the South African administration in 
Namibia and the German foundations upon which it was constructed. The chapter 
will also look at the apparatus that was available to implement and enforce 
legislation and describe the patchwork of reserves that emerged over the period 
covered by the dissertation.
The second chapter concentrates on the economic experience of the inhabitants of 
southern Namibia. The importance of stock mobility will be stressed and the 
manner in which closer white settlement increased the constraining influence of 
cartographical reserve borders. The chapter will consider the impact of various 
factors such as the introduction of grazing fees and repercussions of drought on the 
local economy within the reserves. The chapter will also explain the emergence of 
increasing differentiation amongst stock-holders within the reserves from 1935.
Chapter three will consider the political consequences of some of the shifts in 
economic patterns upon the inhabitants of the reserves in southern Namibia. The 
changing motivation for ‘resistance’ and the structural roots of internal political 
disagreements will be considered. Two case studies of particular disputes (in the 
Bondelswarts and Berseba reserves) will also be examined to help clarify the role 
of different economic groups within a community in the context of opposition to the 
administration.
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The second half of the dissertation will lead the reader beyond the reserves and onto 
the rural farms in the districts that surrounded them. Chapter four will describe the 
pattern of white settlement in southern Namibia and place this within the context of 
state incentives and subsidies provided for white settlers. The chapter will argue 
that the early programme of settlement sought to address a political, rather than 
economic agenda. The transformation of the white farming community into the 
primary source of revenue within Namibia will be explained and linked to the 
successful expansion of the karakul industry in southern Namibia. The mounting 
alienation of land and increase in the quantity and quality of white farmers’ stock 
was to be a crucial factor in the detrimental revision of the terms of employment of 
local farm workers.
The role of locally recruited farm workers on white farms will be considered in 
chapter five. It will be argued that the bargaining power of these workers was 
comparatively strong in the early years of South African rule due to the weakness 
of the mechanisms of control, the labour shortage, and the poverty of the white 
stockowners entering the territory. The changes in pay and conditions provided to 
local workers over time will be explained. The most important variable considered 
will be the decreasing tolerance for workers’ own stock on white farms and the 
crucial role that this played in the dispossession of the local population.
The final chapter will consider the long distance migrant labour system operated by 
SWANLA. It will demonstrate the growing importance of this organisation in 
meeting the needs of white farmers. The chapter will consider the type of workers 
employed in this manner and the role that they played on the farms. The poor pay 
and conditions available for farm labourers led long distance migrant workers to 
avoid recruitment as farm labourers or use it as a means of gaining access to more 
lucrative employment. The chapter will show the way in which the system was 
reformed to gain greater control over the supply of labour to the farming 
community.
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SOURCES.
The State Archives in Namibia contains a rich and well organised collection of 
official correspondence and documentation that provided the core material used for 
this dissertation. The independence of the Republic of Namibia on 21st March, 
1990 ensured that previous problems that some researchers had in gaining access to 
files have been removed. Annual Reports by the Administrator of the Territory 
provided a useful overview of the period, but were supplemented by the reading of 
district reports compiled annually by district magistrates and ‘native affairs’ officials 
(when in post). Reserves were sometimes provided with superintendents or welfare 
officers who also provided regular monthly reports on the economic and political 
affairs within individual reserves. Individual police posts also sent regular reports 
to the officer commanding their division (the whole southern region fell within the 
Keetmanshoop Division).
The documentary material available in the Archives is voluminous, but has to be 
handled with care. The predominant voices in the material are those of white 
officials, the voices of black women farm workers or poor white settlers are faint. 
The transient nature of some posts and limited efficiency of the administration meant 
that one had to be wary of official estimates and assumptions masquerading as facts.
A number of paths were taken in search of the missing voices in the history. The 
files of court cases heard by district magistrates provided one source of black 
opinions, whilst the minutes of reserve board and reserve meetings were another. 
Yet the views expressed in evidence such as this were highly structured by the 
context and the audience to which speeches were being made. A string of 
convictions for stock theft offenses, for instance, meant that the early lengthy 
statements of the accused were reduced to uniform confessions of guilt or silence.
I was able to conduct a number of oral interviews with former farm workers and 
reserve residents which provided a useful insight into their perceptions. The 
correspondence of farmers was more prolific and their concerns were at times raised
18
by local farmers’ associations. The recorded oral testimony given to specific 
commissions such as the Land Settlement Commission of 1934 was another useful 
source. The search for these diverse buried voices was time consuming, but 
necessary to shape and add flesh to the skeleton provided by official accounts.
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CHAPTER ONE: CREATING LABOUR RESERVES, THE
LEGISLATION OF CONFINEMENT.
INTRODUCTION
White settlers in many parts of the world have used the principle of ‘reserves’ to 
justify their appropriation of vast areas of land from the indigenous black 
population. Demarcated areas, it was claimed were reserved for the use of the 
black occupants - who would thus have their land protected from unscrupulous 
traders and some of their own acquisitive leaders. The colonial discourse stressed 
the positive advantages to a black population of colonial land policy. The 
establishment of reserves in Namibia, however, was not simply an altruistic 
measure. The argument for the establishment of reserves in Namibia rested heavily 
on the needs of the local labour market.
The evolving debate over the function of the reserves in the context of the broader 
social and economic aims of the administration provides the focus for the first 
section of this chapter. The debate demonstrates a clear shift in emphasis over time. 
The initial pattern of reserves inherited from the German colonial regime was one 
that reflected the legacy of the anti-colonial war of 1904-1907. The military 
administration that initially managed the territory after the German defeat stressed 
the importance of reserves as a means of controlling the internal movement of the 
black labour force and providing areas in which black stockowners could be 
concentrated. The difficulty was to obtain a sufficient balance between the measures 
necessary to encourage black people to move into a reserve (rather than an urban 
area) and the economic pressures required to push them out of the reserve to work 
in sectors of the white controlled economy where there was a labour shortage.
The function of reserves within the apparatus of control over the labour force was 
one that became increasingly clear over the early decades of the South African 
occupation. The reserves became destinations to which ‘surplus people’ might be
22
assigned. The reserves became reservoirs. Reservoirs which were to contain 
squatters expelled from the farms of white settlers, black stockowners who were 
squeezed off Crown Land in order to allow it to be sold to white settlers and those 
who were expelled from urban areas following the tightening up of legislation in 
1932.
The first half of the chapter will describe the major relevant legislation, outline the 
administrative structure set up to monitor the reserves and describe the geographical 
expansion of the reserve network and the local legislative differences between the 
reserves of southern Namibia. The key pieces of legislation which were used to 
‘capture’ the black workforce were those that restricted movement, imposed 
financial obligations, and enforced contracts of employment. The legislation 
covering the reserves was thus a component of a broader administrative policy to 
manage the supply of black labour to the key white controlled sectors of the 
economy.
The qualification that must be made is that the machinery available to enforce the 
legal apparatus of control and direction was initially inadequate and the scope for 
evasion considerable. In the second half of the chapter the administrative structures 
used to supervise the black population will be described and the weaknesses of these 
structures, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, will be highlighted. The 
implication is that the management of the reserves was in fact dependent on the co­
operation of local community leaders. The demands placed upon the appointed 
reserve leaders can be drawn from official notices that describe their duties and 
which clearly define them as agents of the administration, although many seemed 
to perform their duties with reluctance.
The diversity in the scale and natural resources of the reserves was considerable, 
a fact that had important repercussions on the pastoral viability of each. Southern 
Namibia was also distinguished by the existence of two reserves whose inhabitants 
had greater rights than in any other reserves. The communities had obtained 
agreements with the previous German regime and claimed exemption from demands
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placed on other reserves. The Berseba and Bondels reserves were able to avoid the 
payment of grazing fees for over two decades by claiming special rights negotiated 
with the German colonial regime and recognised by its successor. The differences 
were of more than parochial interest. The local factors which mitigated or 
exacerbated the impact of particular legislative measures were an important variable 
that should contribute to any explanation of chronological and socio-political 
differences between the reactions of various communities.
THE RESERVE AND LABOUR POLICY OF THE GERMAN COLONIAL 
REGIME.
A brief summary of the legislation introduced by the German colonial regime is 
necessary for two reasons. Firstly, the legislative framework established by the 
Germans created the land and labour policy that was inherited by the new 
administration. Secondly, the German regime’s efforts to enforce legislation 
revealed difficulties of labour control and assumptions that continued under South 
African rule. The relatively recent occurrence of large scale primary resistance, for 
example, fuelled a reluctance to countenance homogeneous large scale reserves 
which might facilitate the regeneration of resistance.
Drechsler argues that the decision of the German colonial authorities to establish 
reserves in Namibia was a response to pressure from the Rhenish Missionary 
Society.1 The state, he claims, preferred to establish reserves under its control 
rather than have the missionaries gaining influence over more independent 
communities. Reserves were accordingly established in the so-called ’Police Zone’. 
‘Imperial Decree of 10 April, 1898 Pertaining to the Establishment of Reserves for 
Natives in the Protectorate of South West Africa’ resulted in the creation of one 
reserve in central Namibia and one in southern Namibia (the latter being provided 
for the Witbooi community). The majority of the black population of Namibia, it 
should be noted, remained outside the Zone (in Northern Namibia) beyond the reach 
of effective German control. The introduction of the reserves within the Police 
Zone was intended to deflect criticism of the rapid alienation of land by white
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settlers and concessionary companies. Drechsler points out that the resulting 
reserves were limited in size and that the Decree excluded from the reserves all 
farms that had been purchased by settlers or any ‘... that settlers might be interested 
in buying’.2 The reserves were in no way to interfere with German plans to 
develop Namibia as a white settler colony based on the development of white 
ranching.
The outbreak of prolonged armed resistance to German colonial rule from 1904 to 
1907 led the Germans to drastically revise their policy regarding reserves. ‘Imperial 
Decree of 26 December 1905 Pertaining to the Sequestration of Property of Natives 
in the Protectorate of South West Africa’ allowed the authorities to seize the land 
previously reserved as ‘Hereroland’ and to redefine it as Crown Land, the property 
of the state. A similar decree enacted on 8 May, 1907 converted the other reserve 
‘Namaland’ into Crown Land. Over half a century was to pass before these titles 
would be resurrected as a means of dividing a black proletariat, rather than unifying 
scattered pastoralists. The removal of black rights to land was a consequence of the 
German military victory; however it is clearly also served the broader long-term 
aims of German policy within the colony.
A senior official in the German Colonial Office, Dr Paul Rohrbach, the 
Commissioner for Settlement gave a precise summary of Germany’s plans for the 
territory. Rohrbach wrote, in 1904, that:
The decision to colonise South-West Africa could after all mean nothing else 
but this, namely, that the native tribes would have to give up their lands on 
which they had previously grazed their stock in order that the white man 
might have the land for the grazing of his stock.3
The reserves as a form of ‘national property’ were seen as presenting a potentially 
dangerous base for political organisation within the colony. The economic 
autonomy that might be possible for black pastoralists in the reserves was also seen 
as a hinderance to the primary function of making them ‘serviceable’ to the ‘white
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races’.
The confiscation of the reserves established by the Imperial Decree of 1898 was part 
of the Germans security agenda. The few communities that were allowed to retain 
their land were those who remained loyal to the regime during the 1904-1907 war. 
The priority was to destroy any form of political organisation or common identity 
which might form the basis for the organisation of renewed opposition to the 
German regime.
The Germans planned the fragmentation of communities and the forced dispersal of 
the black population to serve as a labour force for white employers. Tecklenburg, 
the Deputy Governor of South West Africa proposed, in 1905, that:
... any form of tribal organization would be eliminated and the treaties 
concluded with the former tribes annulled. The natives would be settled on 
individual werfs in proximity to the places of residence of the whites. Those 
living on such werfs will serve as labourers to individual farmers ... Werfs 
in outlying areas not subject to police control will not be tolerated. They 
would only provide a nucleus keeping alive memories of the tribal system 
and land ownership.4
The destruction of the reserves was aimed at removing the possibility of any form 
of independent black political or economic organisation.
The dispersal of the communities of central and southern Namibia was accompanied 
by the proclamation of three directives on the 18th August, 1907 that contained a 
number of repressive measures designed to prevent the reconstruction of autonomous 
black communities. The directives put a ban on black ownership of land and cattle, 
restrictions on small stock and introduced a rigorous pass law.
The pass law was designed to help the German security forces effectively monitor 
the distribution and movement of the black labour force. The law stipulated that all
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black residents were to carry a metal badge and a ‘dienstbuch’ (service book) 
providing the details of their contract. The only exceptions to this provision were 
children under the age of seven. The apparatus of rural labour control relied upon 
the incorporation of white farmers as functionaries with considerable legal powers. 
Black workers were told that:
They must always carry this badge and have to produce the same to any
Polife-official (sic) as well as to any European demanding the producing of
same (my emphasis).5
The law did much to equate the position of whites with that of the police and, in 
rural areas, would have given farmers the powers to intercept and question black 
workers leaving neighbouring farms. The introduction of the new laws 
complemented a scheme encouraging discharged German soldiers to settle on farms 
in rural areas. The post-war settlers were clearly seen to have a security role in 
maintaining control over rural areas.
The efficiency of the system in managing the black labour force has been questioned 
by both Bley and Drechsler. Bley claims that the existence of a competitive labour 
market encouraged both employers and employees to evade the regulations and 
controls on the movement of labour.6 The shortage of black labour that resulted 
from the rapid expansion in the number of white farms and the massive number of 
black deaths resulting from the 1904-1907 war meant that they were able to find 
new employers and concentrate in particular districts, at the expense of farmers in 
other more unpopular ones.
The draconian laws may have been tempered by a degree of successful evasion, yet 
the judicial system served to reinforce the authority of employers over their 
workers. An analysis of the cases bought before the German courts of the six 
administrative districts covering southern Namibia over a fifteen month period (1st 
January, 1913 to 31st March, 1914) indicates the extent to which the criminal law 
was used as a substitute for industrial relations to punish black workers.7 Of the
27
858 offences committed and tried in the region during the period covered, 336 (39 
percent) involved cases bought against black workers who were charged with the 
crimes of ‘Insolence’, ‘Disobedience’, ‘Negligence’, ‘Laziness’ or ‘Refusal to 
Work’. The ability of patrolling police officers and even employers to dispense 
instant justice at the workplace for such ‘crimes’ suggest that the number recorded 
and punished before a court echo a far greater number that went unrecorded. The 
cases reflect the brutality of the system, but, also suggests the refusal of conscripted 
black labour to work willingly.
Bley suggests that the Germans were considering the reintroduction of scattered 
reserves at the time of the Union invasion, in an attempt to geographically stabilise 
the shifting workforce. The German Secretary of State, Demburg, argued that the 
policy was failing to tie black workers to white farms and might have even more 
disastrous long-term consequences. Demburg felt that it was failing to provide the 
necessary conditions for the expansion of the black labour force at a sufficient pace 
to meet the needs of the influx of white settlers. Demburg recognised that:
We therefore are forced to improve living conditions for the natives, in order 
to preserve them as a labour force both for present needs and as a healthy 
new generation in the future.8
The motivation for new reserves would be a desire to stabilise, and ensure the 
reproduction of, the black labour force. World War One intervened before these 
plans had produced any practical results.
THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION. 1915-1920
The Union operations against the German forces in Namibia led to considerable 
disruption. The absence of male white farmers on active service, for example, 
provided opportunities for many farm workers to escape. The impact of the brief 
military operations was particularly significant in southern Namibia. The first
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report on the administration of the territory noted that:
... with the approach of the Union Forces from the South the German troops 
cleared the whole of the Southern area as far as Keetmanshoop of all native 
inhabitants, and took them North as far as Grootfontein, Otavi, etc.9
The additional disruption to the farming economy created by this dispersal of the 
black labour force and resulting confusion made it inevitable that the new military 
administration would retain legislation designed to enforce controls over black 
mobility and conscript black labourers to work for white employers.
Within weeks of accepting the German surrender in the north of the country, 
E.H.L. Gorges, the first Administrator of the territory, circulated a Memorandum 
detailing the labour policy for the territory:
Every able bodied Native [is] to be self-supporting and in employment 
somewhere, or else be treated as a vagrant. It is undesirable to force natives 
to any particular employer, but provided they are given their choice 
compulsory service should be insisted on. Any Natives unable to obtain 
employment should be referred to the Office where labour requisitions from 
Government units are dealt with [My emphasis].10
The significance of the Memorandum is the extent to which it confirmed the 
assumptions of the previous German colonial regime that the black population were 
to be forced to play a particular, subservient, role in the economy. The assumption 
would not be shared by black stockowners who falsely equated the German defeat 
with liberation from their previous economic bondage.
The motivation for the insistence on the incorporation of the black population into 
the economy as a labour force remained similar to that of the Germans. 
Economically autonomous black communities were perceived as idle and even a 
potential threat, being beyond the control of the frail administrative structures. The
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solution was to deal with the black residents of the territory in martial style. 
Gorge’s Memorandum warned officers that:
... there is always a tendency on the part of idle Natives to concentrate in 
towns, locations, unoccupied farms or uncontrolled cattle posts, and these 
places should be raided periodically.11
The priority was to regain control over the local black labour force, thus land 
inhabited by black pastoralists was deemed unoccupied and uncontrolled.
The policies implemented by the Union military administration with regards the 
black population of the newly conquered territory were predictably influenced by 
those prevalent within South Africa at that time. The new Administrator’s first 
Annual Report acknowledged that ‘native policy’ had been based on that of the 
Transvaal, rather than the Cape.12
The reality however was that the military administration made few changes to the 
existing German legislation:
Subject to a few necessary alterations in the interests of servants, the 
German laws relating to natives are being applied so far as circumstances 
permit. On paper these are not unfavourable to the native.13
The new administration did make two significant changes regarding the pass law and 
corporal punishment.
The motives for the selective reforms came both externally and internally. The 
primary reason for the amendment of the laws relating to corporal punishment was 
an external one. The occupation of the territory by Union troops did not mean that 
the post-war fate of Namibia was clear. It remained conceivable that the territory 
could be returned to Germany as part of a negotiated peace settlement.
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The Union were therefore anxious to demonstrate the faults of German colonial rule 
and stress the liberal nature of their own policies. The Administrator explained the 
position plainly at a conference in 1917 attended by all the magistrates and senior 
police officers in the territory:
We hope to keep the country which is a very valuable asset for the Union, 
and all our plans have that object in view ... We must not do anything 
during our present tenure to prejudice our position.14
The issue which the authorities seized upon to demonstrate the unsuitableness of 
Germany as a colonial power was corporal punishment. An official Circular of 28th 
October, 1915 quoted from Paragraph 111 of a German Imperial Decree dated 22nd 
April, 1896. The Decree prescribed corporal punishment for offences ranging from 
idleness and insubordination to desertion, but the main criticism was the fact that 
it:
... contemplates the summary informal infliction of punishment, without any 
regular form of trial.15
In crude terms the law had given police patrols the authority to whip workers whom 
employers complained about. The new military governor demanded that all cases 
should be dealt with according to formal criminal procedure, before magistrates.
The evidence of cases of assault and maltreatment of black workers were wrapped 
up in the notorious ‘Blue Book’ published in 1918 which catalogued a series of 
violent incidents from the period of German rule.16 The corollary of the German 
treatment of black workers was alleged to be seen in the policies of the new 
administration. In his preface to the Blue Book, Gorges claimed that:
... our officials afford protection to all and assist every labourer to secure 
fair treatment and a fair wage.17
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The assertion was that labour contracts would be mutually acceptable and no longer 
dependent upon the use of force and fear to retain labour. An explicit contrast was 
made between the new approach and the conditions prevalent under German rule, 
when:
... natives were compelled to work for any master selected for them by the 
Police.18
The maintenance of an adequate black labour force on white farms had been 
dependent on the rule of fear:
Theoretically, of course, they could terminate their contracts by giving 
notice, but in practice they dared not do so.19
The proposed curbs on physical compulsion were however negated by the retention 
of laws attempting to control the mobility of the black labour force.
Changes were made to the laws governing the freedom of movement of the black 
population of the territory, but these reforms were mainly cosmetic or designed to 
actually increase the efficiency of the state Apparatus. The system used to register 
the work force had been changed by 1916:
The registration of natives and the wearing of brass badges round the neck 
or on the wrist have been abolished, and a Pass Law substituted [my 
emphasis].20
The new Pass Law, based on South African legislation retained the key tenets of the 
German law:
The two main principles of the German Law - that every native must carry 
a means of identification and be in employment unless he has visible means 
of support - remain in force.21
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The new regulations did have two innovatory clauses that extended the number of 
people who were given exemptions. The Administrator pointed out that:
...the law is applied only to males above the age of fourteen years, and to 
females above that age resident in urban areas. Females living outside towns 
are not required to carry passes.22
Boys between the ages of seven and fourteen were no longer required to carry 
identity documents, but more significantly the new laws gave rural black women a 
freedom of movement that was denied to men. The prospect existed that this new 
freedom might prompt an influx of women into urban areas in search of better 
opportunities.
The new pass system created three distinctive forms of pass. The most common 
were ‘Passes for Employed Natives’ which operated as a contract of employment 
between a black worker and his white employer. The second type were ‘Passes for 
unemployed persons to seek for work’, issued for a strictly limited period of time 
by the police to ‘unemployed’ black workers. Whilst the German police had been 
able to conscript workers on behalf of particular farmers or other white employers, 
under the military administration this authority rested in the district magistrate. 
However the end result appears to have been the same.
Failure to accept employment during the period granted on the temporary pass 
would be indoor as a worker being ‘wilfully dilatory’ in finding employment. 
Action could then be taken to force a labourer into waged employment as:
... an employer can be indicated and if he refuses to engage himself he can 
be prosecuted under the Vagrancy Laws. Before sentencing natives under 
the Vagrancy Laws, Magistrates are required to give the offender an 
opportunity of taking employment in preference to undergoing 
imprisonment.23
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The strong element of compulsion in the legislation was blunted by two factors.
The first was the continuing labour shortage, particularly in the most disrupted 
regions of southern Namibia. If workers were still compelled to work they were 
able to exercise a greater degree of choice over where they worked. Workers used 
their increased mobility to move towards more familiar or attractive areas. The 
consequence was that some regions faced a worse labour shortage than others. The 
second mitigating feature was the introduction of a third form of pass, one that 
granted a ‘Certificate of Exemption from Labour’. Exemption Certificates were 
granted to the old and disabled, but also to those owning at least ten large or fifty 
small stock24. The introduction of these Certificates and relaxation of the 
restrictions on movement and choice of employment aggravated the two problems 
which had led the Germans to consider the establishment of reserves.
The first problem was that any increase in the freedom of movement of the labour 
force tended to increase the number of localised labour shortages and increase 
demands from white farmers for stricter controls to ensure a ‘fairer’, more even, 
geographical distribution of labour. The second problem was that once black 
stockowners were able to accumulate stock the question arose of where they should 
keep them. If they lived on a white farm their stock could be a cause of friction 
and disputes with the owner. Yet encouragement of white settlement by the 
authorities meant that they discouraged the occupation of vacant Crown Land by 
black stockowners.
Officials from the Union argued that the establishment of reserves in the various 
districts of Namibia would provide an incentive for workers to remain there and 
provide a controlled environment in which the accumulation of black stock could be 
monitored and managed. The informal policy of the military administration was to 
allow certain farms to be used for this purpose. Wealthier black stock owners were 
able to obtain temporary grazing licences on unoccupied farms.
The Secretary to the Protectorate explained the two primary considerations behind
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the policy:
Since the occupation of this territory it has been the endeavour to locate the 
natives who are too old to work, or who are exempted from the operations 
of the native laws, on farms specially set aside for them. It is considered 
necessary to do this as a large number of them working on private farms 
find the owner unable to allow grazing for their stock, thus the already 
deficient supply of labour is still further decreased by the native clearing out 
into the Desert or squatting on vacant Crown Land in order to maintain his 
cattle.25
The Secretary (who was the official in charge of ‘Native Affairs’ in Namibia) felt 
reserves were necessary to stabilise the labour force. ‘Labour reserves’ it was 
claimed would provide black workers with an incentive to remain in districts 
predominantly intended for white settlement.
The lack of adequate provision for black workers who, because of old age or 
sickness, were unable to find work also presented difficulties. The Secretary argued 
that reserves could be used to reduce the demands made on the administration by 
this group as:
... the old and infirm are able to maintain themselves on these reserves 
instead of living in the locations in the towns depending upon pauper rations 
from the Government.26
Limited investment in the creation of reserves, to which the ‘unproductive’ element 
of the black urban population might be removed, would provide a cheaper 
alternative.
The award of control over Namibia (as a ’C’ Class Mandate of the League of 
Nations) to the Union of South Africa, acting on Britain’s behalf, on 17th 
December, 1920 meant that further practical steps could be taken to formalise and
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consolidate the ‘ad hoc’ network of reserves that had come into existence during the 
period of military administration. The urgency of the administrations concerns 
about the need to rationalise the informal patchwork of reserves that had developed 
over the five years of military rule was immediately apparent. Just four days after 
the confirmation of their authority over the territory (ie. on 21st December, 1920) 
the retitled ‘Secretary for South West Africa’ appointed a Commission to investigate 
the whole question of ‘native reserves’.
THE NATIVE RESERVES COMMISSION OF 1921.
The Native Reserves Commission of 1921 acts as a landmark in the development 
of the role of the reserves in the context of the broader labour market. The details 
of the exact geographical extent and location of the reserves will be dealt with in a 
later section, the aim here is to discuss their function in a broader policy context.
The concept of reserves was not new to the Union Government and they 
recommended that the reserve policy should follow that based on the Beaumont 
Commission and Land Act (No. 27 of 1913) in the Union. The broad political 
principle underscoring this policy was one of racial separation or ‘segregation’. The 
‘Native Reserves Commission’ of 1921 consisted of just two members. The two 
man Commission submitted its report in June, 1921 and four more members were 
then appointed to discuss its initial recommendations.27 The Commission was 
entrusted with two central aims:
a) To secure contentment and welfare of the natives as far as possible, and 
to establish certainty to the whites as to permanent places of abode of the 
natives. [My emphasis]
b) To tighten up Native Administration in order to prevent vagrancy and 
idleness.28
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The Commission, mindful of these two aims, was responsible for the demarcation 
of suitable sites for reserves, but ‘suitability’ was not the only consideration that 
influenced the Commission in making its choices. The Union Government was 
clear that the principle of total segregation should be the paramount goal of the 
reserves policy and explained that:
... the Acting Prime Minister is of opinion that the South-West Africa 
Administration should divide the country roughly into what will ultimately 
become native areas and European areas respectively, then to apply the same 
policy as in the Union.29
In theory the reserves of Namibia were to represent merely an extension of the 
system already deemed to be operating successfully within the Union.
Whilst ‘suitability’ was, therefore, a factor in the location of reserves, equal 
importance was given to the principle of ‘segregation’. Drew and Kruger explained 
how this principle had influenced their selection of sites:
We have studiously avoided the creation of ‘black islands’ in the various 
districts, and for this reason have selected large areas in outlying parts of the 
country.30
The local black population were consternated to discover that the land claims of 
German farmers were respected over and above their own. The political principle 
of racial segregation guided the positioning of reserves far more than the recognition 
of any historical antecedents for black land claims.
The Administrator’s Report for 1920 contains a famous quote asserting that, in 
Namibia:
The native question ... is synonymous with the labour question.31
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The local black population was conceived by the authorities purely in terms of its 
labour function within the settler economy serving, in particular, the needs of white 
farmers. Thus, whilst recognizing the political compulsion behind the siting of 
reserves, one must also recognise the economic incentives for the creation of 
permanent reserves.
The predominant view of the reserves was that they were to be an instrument of 
control. Reserves were to be an essential element of the apparatus that was required 
to enable the administration to effectively monitor the accumulation of stock by 
black stock-owners, recruit black labour and regulate the geographical distribution 
of the black labour force. In a competitive labour market, restraints on the mobility 
of the local labour force were introduced to protect the interests of the white 
community. The reserves were to perform a number of functions:
Labour reserves.
The reserves were presented as a direct administrative response to complaints by 
white farmers. The shortage of black farm labour would be dealt with:
... by tightening up control in such reserves as are established and in town 
locations.32
The Commission argued that the lack of ‘effective control’ over the occupants of the 
existing reserves was:
... bound to affect the labour conditions of a district.33
The implication was that effectively run reserves would maximise the supply of local 
black labour in a district. Supervision would be assisted by the consolidation of the 
scattered farms that had initially been occupied by black stockowners into a number 
of larger reserves. The reserves could be situated to ensure that each district
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retained a reserve of local workers.
Controlling the black pastoralists.
The reserves would reduce the threat of direct economic competition with white 
farmers posed by black stockowners in rural areas. The Administrator stressed the 
economic motivation for the rationalisation of the reserve network:
Early demarcation of such reserves, which is in contemplation, would greatly 
facilitate and render more effective the proper registration and branding of 
all native-owned stock.34
The confinement of the animals of black stockowners to reserves would facilitate the 
measurement of herd and flock sizes and the subsequent taxation of black farmers.
The fact that in a pastoral economy herders might, if unrestrained, roam many miles 
with their animals in search of grazing or useable water holes meant that a method 
was needed to control their movements. The establishment of reserves enabled the 
state to ‘capture’ the pastoralists and integrate them into a capitalist economy. The 
reserves would provide the administration with the means of measuring the wealth 
(in stock) of black farmers and thus the ability to extract a proportion of it.
Reserves were to be an essential part of the apparatus being constructed to maintain 
control over the accumulation of stock by black pastoralists and confine their 
mobility to prevent them ‘clashing against white interests’ [My emphasis].35 The 
existence of reserves would serve as a justification for limitations on the number of 
black stock that could be held on a white farm and on the access to farming land 
given to black stock owners. The large numbers of black stockowners who were 
grazing their animals on Crown Lands (and who were classified as ’squatters’) could 
be cleared off the land and moved into the reserves. The Crown Land could then 
be offered as ‘vacant’ farm lots for purchase or lease by white settlers.
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Reducing the factor costs o f black farm labour
The local black labour force was able to use the shortage of labour to obtain 
permission for their own animals to be granted grazing rights on their white 
employer’s farm as a condition of their labour contract. The cost of accommodating 
the, often considerable, herds and flocks of black workers must be seen as an 
additional factor of production raising the ‘cost’ of black labour to white farmers.
The Commission recognised the particular problems created by workers’ stock in 
Namibia:
In this Territory owing to water difficulties and the fact that grazing easily 
becomes trampled out - especially within the neighbourhood of wells and 
boreholes - Europeans naturally object to natives with stock settling on their 
farms, large as the latter are, and the necessity for reserves is perhaps 
greater than in the Union.36
The establishment of reserves where workers’ ‘surplus’ stock could be sent would 
reduce the cost of labour to white farmers.
The problems o f urban areas.
The administration operated on the principle that it was undesirable to have a black 
urban population that was ‘surplus’ to that required for ‘providing for domestic and 
similar essential services’. It was argued that:
... they are liable to contract, or infect others with diseases which spread 
rapidly, and in any case they generally deteriorate physically and morally, 
besides embarrassing the white population in regard to the use of 
commonages and water.37
The fact was that municipalities were unwilling to provide adequate sanitation in
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black locations whilst the limited communal facilities encouraged the rapid spread 
of any epidemics.
The complaints about health were symptomatic of other complaints about 
drunkenness, prostitution and laziness which were directed by white residents 
against the black urban population. The removal of unemployed, old and sick 
members of the urban black population was considered to be the simplest way of 
removing (at least from sight) these various social problems. The reserves were an 
essential corollary to urban removals, if people were to be removed there had to be 
a place that one could remove them to !
Reproducing the black labour force.
The reserves were deemed necessary to ensure the reproduction of a healthy local 
black labour force:
"During the war period nothing concerning permanent allocation of ground 
could be done, though even the comparatively few Government farms, which 
in the emergency were granted by our Administration as temporary reserves, 
were much appreciated by natives entitled to such accommodation, and 
healthy well-nourished children bom during that period are now to be 
observed there, representing potential labourers of the future fMv 
emphasis].38
The biological view of the reserves was that they were necessary evils to guarantee 
the continued breeding of a work force. The link between the reserves and 
maintaining birth rates was rarely put so crudely, but derived from a persistent 
strand of the discourse of officials. District reports were rife with reports of the 
degeneration of urban blacks and concern over birth rates.39
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THE EVOLUTION OF RESERVE POLICY.
The five economic incentives for the creation of reserves were recognised by the 
administration. Indeed the administration had to justify their creation in economic 
terms in order to overcome the opposition of white farmers who feared that the 
creation of permanent reserves would drain their farms of labour. The reserves 
were conceived as labour reserves, not tribal homelands. Indeed the point was 
repeatedly made that the criteria upon which the reserves were designed were 
economic, rather than cultural.
Herbst, the Secretary for the Protectorate, had specifically pointed this out in 1921:
These Reserves are not the same as the areas known as Native Reserves in 
the Union: they merely consist of farms set aside in each district ... and 
there is no intention of creating reserves to which tribes could remove 
themselves and thus restore their old tribal methods of living under their 
Chiefs (my emphasis).40
The 1921 Commission itself explicitly stated that the reserves were being 
established to accommodate *... natives belonging to more than one tribe’ [my 
emphasis].41 The reluctance to provide a distinct geographical base for the 
reconstitution of pre-colonial political identities and organisations was probably a 
direct consequence of the comparatively recent use of such units to mobilise 
resistance to German rule.
The mapping of reserves was seen as a necessary concession to the demands of the 
local population for the return of land confiscated from them during the German 
military operations:
The Natives, who of course had been the original owners of the land which 
had as a result of war been confiscated by the German Government, cut up 
into farms and sold or allotted to Europeans, had formed the expectation that
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this Administration as the natural result of the war would similarly confiscate 
German owned farms and thus the Natives would recover the lost land and 
homes previously occupied by them.42
The administration recognised the need to produce some response to the demands 
for the return of land, but resisted the repeatedly articulated demands for the 
recreation of ‘tribal areas’:
Almost without exception each section asked for the allotment of the old 
tribal areas, in which vested rights had accrued and the utmost difficulty was 
experienced in making them realise the utter impossibility of complying with 
such a request.43
The ‘vested rights’ of blacks, many of whom seen their land taken away less than 
a decade previous to the German defeat, were considered to carry less weight than 
the claims of those that had displaced them. The policy that the revival of 
geographically and politically distinct identities should be confounded was a 
symptom of the continuing fear of the white community of a black uprising. 
Territorial claims were treated with suspicion as were attempts to revive ‘tribal’ 
institutions.
The philosophy behind the reserves policy pursued in Namibia therefore differed 
significantly from that found within South Africa where it was argued that ‘tribal’ 
institutions should be strengthened and incorporated into the administrative 
structures to facilitate effective supervision of the reserves. The Report of the 
Native Economic Commission, published in 1932, presented an influential synopsis 
and advocacy of Union policy:
Granted that it is essential to change much in the social system of a primitive 
people before they can be civilized, such change is brought about more 
easily, and with least harm to them, if the advanced ideas of the civilised 
race are grafted to the deep-rooted stock which already exists.44
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The Commission concluded that:
Where the tribal institutions are still a vital force ... the policy should be to 
strengthen these and to make them centres of progress from within.45
The Commission’s argument was one that gained advocates within the ‘Native 
Affairs’ Department in Namibia. By 1936, Hahn, the highly respected Native 
Commissioner stationed in Ovamboland in northern Namibia argued that the system 
used in South Africa and in northern Namibia should be extended to the Police 
Zone:
I think an urgent necessity in the South is the establishment of a system akin 
to the tribal council system which is proving so effective here in 
Ovamboland ... The late German policy was to destroy completely any 
system because they were afraid of it politically. I do not think that we need 
have any fears whatever in this direction.46
Hahn’s view was that the administration could build a reciprocal relationship with 
those in authority in the reserves. In return for official support against opposition 
the local rulers could be used as a cheap means of enforcing legislation within the 
reserves.
Legislative steps were taken in 1939 to set up ‘tribal trust funds’ to revive the 
authority and influence of ‘tribal’ institutions, but little change was apparent. Lord 
Hailey found, in 1945, that the reserves still differed considerably from those found 
in South Africa:
The reserves... are not in the true sense tribal reserves ... they have not 
been proclaimed in the name of particular tribes and their residents are still 
on occasion moved from one reserve to another. Moreover, an African 
tribesman previously resident outside a reserve cannot take up residence in 
it by right; he needs the sanction of the officer in charge.47
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Mr Neser, the recently appointed ‘Secretary for South West Africa’, told Hailey that 
Namibia’s reserves:
... have never had the true character of tribal areas. They have ... mixed 
tribal elements.48
Neser was eager to build up distinct ‘tribal’ identities within the reserves and 
superimpose a structure of ‘tribal’ authority and identification above that of the 
fragmented local reserve boards. Evidence of Neser’s commitment to a 
transformation of the basis of the reserves can be found in the speeches he made to 
meetings held in the reserves. In May, 1947, for example, the minutes of a meeting 
held in the reserve of Waterberg East recorded Neser’s proposals:
He would like things to develop so that each tribe would have a headquarters 
... They must be a Nation having a seat somewhere. He did not want them 
scattered over different reserves so that he did not know where the people 
really were.49
The need to reconstruct ‘tribal’ identities and authority was increasingly the 
primary reason given to justify the existence of the reserves. The reserves were 
presented as the means of preserving cultural identities, rather than a local labour 
supply. The reconstruction of the administration’s aim was such that, by 1960, an 
official handbook claimed that the reserves had been established:
With a view to the reconstruction, as far as practicable, of tribal organization 
(my emphasis).50
The government was anxious to use the Odendaal Commission’s Report to oppose 
the principal of ‘a single multiracial central authority’.51 The conclusions of the 
Odendaal Commission were the logical consequence of the evolution in official 
thinking about the role of the reserves.
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THE CHRONOLOGY OF LABOUR CONTROL
The legislation and guidelines that were of major significance to the black 
population of the Police Zone can be divided into six main categories. The first, 
legislation dealing with the creation of the reserves themselves and their 
administration, will be covered later in this chapter. The black population were 
subjected to constraints in five other crucial economic areas.
Limits on the freedom o f movement.
Proclamation 25 of 1920 concerning Vagrancy combined with the general pass law 
(contained in Proclamation 11 of 1922) to ensure that the administration was able 
to exercise firm control over the movements of the black population. The 
Proclamations continued many of the controls over black mobility that had been 
found in German legislation and operating under the subsequent military 
administration.
The Vagrancy law, for instance, gave any "owner or occupier of land” (my 
emphasis), the right to challenge anyone "found wandering abroad" and possessing 
"no visible lawful means or insufficient lawful means of support". Vagrants could 
be punished with up to three months imprisonment. Trespassers on farms could 
also face imprisonment or a fine of up to five pounds (the equivalent of about ten 
months wages for a farm worker).52 Workers who had enough animals to satisfy 
the authorities that they had sufficient means of support could fall foul of the general 
pass law contained in Proclamation 11 of 1922. The pastoral mode of production 
pursued by most black stockowners meant that the restrictions that this placed on 
movement were significant in economic, as well as social terms. Proclamation 11 
of 1922 also restricted the number of families allowed to reside on any white farm 
(without a special permit) to ten. In 1928, Proclamation No. 11 narrowed the limit 
further to just five black male workers.
The laws restricted the freedom of workers to find their own employers and
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restricted workers’ bargaining power. The unemployed were dependent upon passes 
to allow them to travel to seek work and officials were able to specify the time and 
area in which the search was to take place. The measures could therefore be used 
to limit the movement of black labourers and control the labour market.
Mechanisms for the control o f black labour.
The idea that the reserves might provide a ‘refuge for vagrants’ was a claim made 
repeatedly by white residents. The accusations were repeatedly denied by officials, 
but they were also constantly reminding staff directly responsible for the supervision 
of reserves that they should persuade healthy, unemployed black workers to take up 
jobs. The 1928 ‘Report of Natives Reserves Commission’ took the accusation so 
seriously that they recommended that only those who obtained a certificate (signed 
by both the magistrate and local Native Commissioner) stating that they were "over 
55 years of age" should be allowed into the reserves.53 The recommendation was 
not implemented, but the suggestion that the reserves should act merely as old 
peoples homes indicated the reluctance of officials to countenance pastoralism as an 
economic option for the local black population in the reserves.
The regime continued to seek ways of limiting the number of young and able bodied 
who could stay in the reserve, particularly during periods when the white farming 
community complained of acute labour shortages. The labour shortage of the early 
1950s for example led to official intervention to increase pressure on the reserves 
to provide workers. A Circular sent to all officials supervising reserves in 1950 
argued that:
There is really no place in a Reserve for ‘won’t works’, ie. those who live 
on the assets or labours of others, and if they will not go out to work or 
assist in the development of the Reserve they should be ordered to reside at 
spots that are the least attractive and where the chances of their living on 
their relatives and friends will be minimised.54
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A Government Notice was actually issued in 1952 that authorised reserve 
Superintendents to order any black resident who he considered was leading an ‘idle 
existence’ to take up employment.55
The restrictions placed upon the mobility of the black labour force were not just 
those found in legislation. An official Report from 1937 admitted that an informal 
‘gentleman’s agreement’ existed to prevent workers from the Police Zone taking the 
more lucrative jobs in the mining industry:
... it was decided that the requirements of the Mines should be met as far as 
possible from beyond the Police Zone and, in return for this concession, a 
gentleman’s agreement was arrived at, that the mining industry would refrain 
from recruiting within the Zone. The Railways were left to recruit their 
labour from the Union.56
The labour market was manipulated to restrict the choice of the black residents of 
the Police Zone in order to satisfy the demand of white settlers - and in particular 
the demands for action to tackle the shortage of black farm labour.
Proclamation 34 of 1920 established the regulations regarding contracts of service 
between ‘Masters and Servants’ with particular reference to the relationship between 
farmers and their workers. The Proclamation did not consider it necessary to insist 
on an official presence for written or even oral contracts of up to twelve months to 
be binding. An official witness was only required for contracts that were to last 
from one to five years (the maximum legal length for a written contract).
The delicate position of a black farm worker’s family was confirmed by Clause 11 
which stipulated that upon the death of a male worker during a contract, his wife 
and children should be given one month to leave the farm. The implication was that 
the families of workers who had spent many years working for the same farmer 
might suddenly find themselves homeless and forced to leave the farmer’s property. 
Workers who carried out their duties ‘carelessly or negligently’ or who were
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disobedient could be prosecuted under the criminal law. Such prosecutions were 
lumped together under a ‘Masters and Servants’ category in the annual returns 
presented by magistrates. The punishment for a first offence consisted of a one 
pound fine or up to a month in prison, a second transgression could result in a fine 
of up to three pounds or up to six months in prison with hard labour and "with or 
without solitary confinement and with or without spare diet”. The second degree 
of punishment was applied immediately to herders for a variety of crimes, including 
that of losing stock through neglect.
Controls on black stockowners.
The legislation which attempted to constrain the bargaining power of the labour 
force was supplemented by legislation that sought to regulate and limit the 
accumulation of wealth (in the form of stock) by black pastoralists. The initial 
priority was to acquire accurate information about the number of animals held by 
black stockholders. ‘Native Stock Brands Proclamation No 15 of 1923’ enforced 
the free, but compulsory, branding of animals. The identification of the individual 
ownership of each horse and cow over six months old was necessary before 
individuals could be taxed according to the size of their herd. The dipping of small 
stock for scab also provided the authorities with the opportunity to compile stock 
registers.
The Proclamation removed the right of individual black stockowners to own 
personal branding irons. All those who possessed private branding irons were 
required to surrender them to the superintendent of their reserve within three months 
of the promulgation of the Proclamation.57 The Proclamation was partly geared 
to deal with white assumptions that black stockholders in the reserves were using 
their irons to acquire ownership of stray animals, but it also allowed the white 
Superintendents in reserves to monitor the accumulation and distribution of black 
stock. The intervention may have also been intended to serve as an obstacle to 
black stockowners who hoped to distribute a large number of animals amongst their 
extended family as a means of avoiding qualifying as an individual to pay a higher
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rate of taxation.
Government Notice No. 68 of 1924 introduced an incremental system of grazing 
fees (see Table 1).
Table 1: Scale of Grazing Fee for Reserves, 1924.58
Large Stock. From 1 to 25 ... 2d per head per month
From 26 upwards ... 3d ”  ”
Small Stock. From 1 to 100 ... l/4d per head per month 
From 101 upwards ... 1/2 d ” ”  "
The Notice represented a marked increase in the rate of fees being levied. The 
charges for grazing in temporary reserves and locations had previously (since 1st 
January, 1918) been fixed at 2d per head (regardless of herd size) for Large Stock 
and 2d per ten Small Stock.59 Under the new regulations 2d would only pay the 
monthly fees due on eight animal whilst the scale of fees payable on small stock 
(goats and sheep) doubled if a black stockowner assembled a flock of more than 100 
animals. The system can be contrasted with the payments made by white settlers 
who were obliged to make fixed contributions to pay off the purchase price of their 
farm regardless of the number of stock that they had running on the farm.
In January 1927 the Administrator addressed a conference attended by all the 
magistrates in Namibia. The conference assembled the most senior officials 
responsible for ‘Native Affairs’ in each district and allowed the Administrator to 
review the effectiveness of the new legislation and issue guidelines to his officials.
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The Administrator commented extensively on the failure of the existing level of 
grazing fees to:
... achieve the object in view, which is to increase the number of labourers 
available for farm work.60
The Administrator suggested three measures that would inhibit the development of 
a class of wealthy black stock farmers, whilst forcing poorer black workers to work 
for white farmers, rather than for black relations. He proposed:
That only owners of a certain number of stock should be allowed to live in 
the reserve; natives with a smaller number, although they may still be 
permitted to regard the reserve as their homes, must be out of them for at 
least 8 or 9 months in the year.61
The Administrator provided guidelines that rights of residency in the reserves should 
only be given to those owning at least 150 units of stock. The threshold set was 
significantly higher than the ten large stock or fifty small stock that was taken as 
sufficient to show adequate ‘visible means of support’ under the Vagrancy Laws.
The second instruction given by the Administrator was that ‘... grazing fees be 
steepened’. The instruction was directly aimed at limiting the accumulation of stock 
by black pastoralists within the reserves. The Administrator proposed a new 
staircase of fees (see Table 2) On paper the new rates seemed to suggest that black 
farmers would now be able to pay a lower rate of tax on flocks of up to 150 goats, 
in contrast to the previous tax threshold of 100 goats. However the proposed 
minimum number of units required before a black stockowner could gain entry into 
a reserve would mean that anyone granted entry would have to pay the higher tax 
rates on part of their flock. The more serious impact was on black cattle owners 
who faced an increase of l/2d per animal on the first fifteen and a massive £1 .3/4d 
increase in the charge per animal for the next ten. The Administrator pointed out 
in his Annual Report for the year that different rates could also be used as a tool to
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encourage changes in the type of stock kept in the reserves.62
Table 2: Proposed Scale of Grazing Fees for Reserves, 1927.63
1 to 150 units l/4d per unit per month
151 to 300 units 3/8d ” ” ”
from 301 upwards l/2d ” ” ”
The final suggestion, and the one that most blatantly demonstrated the anxiety of the 
administration regarding the emergence of independent and competitive wealthy 
black farmers in the reserves, was that there should be a reduction in the maximum 
number of animals that each individual black stockholder was allowed to own. The 
size of black herds and flocks were already limited to 300 small stock and 100 large 
stock (or 1300 units). The Administrator proposed that this limit should be reduced 
further to 250 and 50 (or 750 units) respectively.64
The stock choices of local black pastoralists were restricted by the difficulties they 
faced in gaining access to stock markets, but were also not simply motivated by 
commercial concerns. The reluctance to switch brands was related to the higher 
costs involved and higher risks run. The purchase of breeding stock, for example, 
required capital or credit. Black pastoralists were also reported to be reluctant to 
rear new stock brands which they felt:
... were not acclimatised and which they felt were less immune from drought
and sickness and would perish.65
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Variations in the enforcement of grazing fees could also be uneven. The tariff 
charged for European stock grazing on Crown Land was reduced to one-third the 
level charged in the reserves during the drought of the early 1930s.66
The tightening legislative screw on black stockowners in the reserves served two
purposes. The difficulties faced by black farmers who attempted to sell their 
animals meant that they were often forced to seek employment in order to meet the 
fees levied on their stock, whilst the regulations and sliding scale of fees made the 
accumulation of stock wealth difficult. The Administrator admitted that, by 1937, 
the grazing fees paid by the residents of Namibia’s reserves involved:
... the payment of much heavier sums than under the Union native taxation 
system ... [with the result that]... the natives are compelled to obtain cash 
to meet the fees either by sale of their stock or by working or sending
members of their families out to work.67
In the next two years the administration imposed grazing fees on the final two 
reserves (both in southern Namibia) that had used the argument of historical 
privilege to avoid payment previously. Government Notice No. 167 of 1938 set 
grazing fees for Berseba reserve. The final loophole in the system was closed with 
the passing of Government Notice No. 136 of 1939 which set grazing fees for 
payment by the residents of the Bondels reserve.
The maximum stock levels for black stockowners normally permitted in the reserves 
had been fixed at 100 large stock or 300 small stock (limitations which were 
particularly harsh upon the predominantly small stock reserves of southern 
Namibia). In Soromas, one of the reserves in southern Namibia, the restrictions on 
black stockowners were made even tighter. Government Notice No. 62 of 1941 
imposed a ceiling on the number of livestock per owner in Soromas of 15 Large 
Stock and 100 Small Stock.68 The scale of grazing fees was amended in 1934 and 
by 1946 had been qualified to encourage stock changes (see Table 3).
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The fees incorporated measures designed to improve the quality of stock held on the 
reserves by reducing the size of goat herds and number of Scrub Bulls through the 
use of retributive tax bands. A special low rate of fees was applied to flocks of 
sheep with black owners. The lowest tax band for goats and cattle had also been 
broadened in order to increase the number of stock that could be held before a 
higher rate of grazing fees was triggered.
Table 3: Scale of Grazing Fees for Reserves, 1946.
LS [Large Stock] 1 to 50 2d per head per month 
51 upwards 3d ”  ” ”
Scrub bulls 4d ”  ”
SS [Small Stock] Sheep Id per month per lot of 5.
1 to 200 goats l/4d per head per month.
201 upwards l/2d
69
y y  y  y
Measures concerning the financing o f the reserves.
The ‘Native Reserves Trust Funds Administration Proclamation’, No. 9 of 1924, 
had established the right of every reserve to have a trust fund into which grazing 
fees would be paid to assist with the development of the reserve. The justification 
of high grazing fees thus became the fact that the money was being used in the long­
term interests of the residents of the reserve. The reserves that were established by 
the administration were covered by the Proclamation, but the few reserves that had 
survived from the German period had to be initially persuaded to pay grazing fees 
to support their trust funds on a voluntary basis.
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Official reluctance to subsidise reserve development and the impact of the 
subsequent drought and recession led to the decision that from 1932 any future 
‘development’ in the reserves would have to be paid for purely by monies 
accumulated in the relevant trust fund.70 Yet it was generally local white officials 
rather than the residents’ reserve boards who made decisions about the use of these 
development funds, indeed spending decisions were often made against the advice 
of the reserve residents. The ‘Native Reserves Fencing Proclamation’, No. 12. of 
1926. obliged reserve funds to bear half the cost of any fencing erected between a 
reserve and a farm by the neighbouring farmer.
The Administrator’s Annual Report for 1937 summarised the philosophy behind 
these financial measures:
In the earlier years the Administration did spend substantial sums out of the 
general revenue for the purpose of developing the water supplies, but it is 
of opinion (sic) that to continue this policy would not be in the interests of 
the native population. The knowledge that they must depend on themselves 
is in itself a useful lesson ... The Administration is. therefore, opposed to 
making grants for accelerating the development of the reserves as much in 
the interests of the natives themselves as of the European. At the same time 
it holds that it would be unfair to burden the European section of the 
population with further taxes for native development [my emphasis].71
The reduction in the funding by the state of development in the reserves was 
translated into a necessary lesson to the black community in the importance of the 
Protestant Work Ethic. However the final sentence betrays the fact that the 
administration was, in fact, also acting in response to lobbying from the franchised 
white community for a reduction in their tax burden.
The next notable change in the official policy on the funding of the reserves was 
marked by Proclamation No. 23 of 1939 which provided for the establishment of 
‘tribal trust funds’. The Herero were the first target group for this innovatory idea
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with seven being sent to South Africa in the same year:
... to give them an insight into the working of the Council system in the 
Union in view of the contemplated introduction of such a system into South 
West Africa.72
Yet whilst the ostensible aim of the new law was to reconstruct common ‘tribal’ 
identities over the broad geographical area covered by the scattered reserves, the 
impact was to encourage political division on an ethnic basis within the reserves. 
The implementation of the Proclamation was delayed until after the end of World 
War Two; however the reconstruction of ‘tribal’ identities was also encouraged by 
the convening of annual ‘tribal’ meetings for representatives from the towns and 
reserves of the Police Zone.73 The date at which these meetings first started is 
a matter of some dispute. The Odendaal Report of 1964 claimed that:
... annual meetings of the people have been held ever since 1947 for the 
Herero, Nama and Damara.74
Olivier claims that the first Herero gathering took place in 1950 and the first Nama 
meeting only in 1953.75 However the notification and minutes of a meeting to be 
held in Keetmanshoop on 22nd November, 1951 suggest that the first official 
meeting of the Nama took place on that date.76
Restrictions placed on the black urban population.
The final category of legislation that must be considered is that concerned with the 
regulation of black residents living in urban areas. ‘Natives (Urban Areas) 
Proclamation’, No. 34 of 1924, applied the restrictions on black urban residence 
that were already common in the Union, making permanent resident’s status 
dependent on a lengthy (ten or fifteen years) period of urban residence and 
employment. Legislation could also be used to place further restrictions on the
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entry of black workers to urban areas during periods of recession and drought. The 
most significant example of the use of this mechanism was the application of the 
Amendment of Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation, No. 4 of 1932, (Section 11). 
The Proclamation resulted in a number of Government Notices restricting the entry 
of black workers into towns.77 The legal restrictions on admission to urban areas 
were supplemented by a more dubious use of the administrative structures to stem, 
and indeed reverse, the drift of black workers into urban areas.
The authorities were especially concerned about the use black women were making 
of their freedom from the pass laws. A Circular sent to every district in Namibia 
in 1932 dealt specifically with this subject and provided advice on the way in which 
officials could tackle the ‘problem’:
Well-founded complaints have been made that women from the reserves 
proceed to urban areas where they become demoralised and detribalised and 
never return to their parents or husbands. Consequently passes should not 
be issued to them to proceed to such areas unless the circumstances are very 
exceptional. In this way it should be possible to reduce the number of 
female entrants to the urban areas very considerably for there is a general 
opinion amongst them that they are under a legal liability to carry passes and 
of this idea they should not be disabused.78
The policy was simple - where the law did not exist it could be assumed to exist. 
Women were to be refused the passes that they didn’t need.
The direct relationship between the drive to restrict black migration to urban areas 
and the distribution of the black population between the towns, reserves and white 
farms can be found in a simple comparison of the figures for the Police Zone in the 
years 1930 and 1935 (see Figure l).79 The percentage of the black population that 
were categorised as living in urban areas dropped from 26 percent to 17 percent as 
the black urban population was squeezed out.
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The legislative apparatus established by the administration introduced the laws 
necessary to manage the labour market. The laws, however, if necessary, were not 
sufficient. The ability of the administration to control the local labour force was 
also dependent upon the size and efficiency of the security and administrative 
structures that were set up to operate and enforce the system. The final section of 
this chapter will focus on the reserve network and those that administered it. The 
system can be broken into three components. Firstly one must consider the 
geographical extent and location of the reserves. Secondly the role of the white 
administrative hierarchy and finally the role of the local black leadership.
THE SPREAD OF THE RESERVE NETWORK.
When the South Africans took over control of Namibia they found that seven black 
communities in the Police Zone were still in possession of land which they had been 
granted under German Treaties. Of these seven only two, Berseba and Bondels, 
were situated in southern Namibia. However these two combined to make up 77 
percent of the small areas of land that blacks still retained rights over in the Police 
Zone in 1915. Large amounts of land were also effectively occupied by black 
communities north of the Police Zone, but these fall outside the scope of this study.
The Treaty of Peace and South West Africa Mandate Act, No. 48 of 1919, of the 
Union guaranteed that land in Namibia set aside as ‘native reserves’ could not be 
sold or removed from the occupants without the permission of the Union 
Parliament. Native Administration Proclamation No. 11 of 1922 granted the 
Administrator the right to establish and set aside additional reserves and confirmed 
the rights of those living in areas granted to them under German treaties. The 
residents of reserves such as Bondels and Berseba who retained rights gained under 
earlier agreements with the Germans were able to use these to resist and delay the 
imposition of new regulations within their reserves.
The extended Native Reserves Commission of 1921 made a series of 
recommendations about farms that could be set aside as reserves or for future use
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by black farmers. Many of the new reserves did not contain natural watering holes 
and occupation had to be delayed whilst boreholes were dropped and sufficient 
supplies of water located. The confirmation of permanent rights to new areas of 
land did not finally come, therefore, until 1923. Government Notice 122 of 1923 
included two schedules. The first confirmed the land rights granted to the residents 
of six areas by the German Government, this excluded the two smallest areas in the 
northern central district of Outjo, but included an additional area at Soromas near 
Bethanie in the south. The second schedule established six new reserves in the 
Police Zone, two of these, Tses and Neuhof, were in southern Namibia.
Over the next twenty-seven years seven more reserves were added. Only two of 
these, Gibeon and Warmbad, were in the South. The position of all the reserves in 
the Police Zone by 1955 can be seen on Map l .80 The full details of the expansion 
of the 7 reserves in southern Namibia can be found in Table 4.81 By 1951 the total 
extent of the southern reserves, with the addition of Warmbad in the far south, had 
reached 1,101,478 hectares and they were scattered over five districts containing 
14,988,888 hectares of land suitable for farming.82
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Ml Namibia - showing reserves in the 
Police Zone and main urban areas, 1955
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South Africa
Key to resaves in the Police Zone
1. Aminuis
2. Berseba
3. Bondels
4. Eastern
5. Epukiro
6. Franzfontein
7. Gibeon
8. Neuhof
9. Okombahe
10. Otijihorongo
11. Otjimbingwe
12. Otjituo
13. Ovitoto
14. Rehoboth
15. Soromas
16.Tses
17. Warmbad
18. Waterberg
61
TABLE 4: The Expansion of the Reserves of Southern 
Namibia.
Reserve
BERSEBA
Original
Size Government Notice.
c. 575,000 ha. Gk. 122/1923 and Gk 237/1930
BONDELS
Original c. 174,505 ha. Gk. 122/1923 and Gk 237/1930
SOROMAS
Original
Extension
8,212 ha. 
8,618 ha. 
6,743 ha.
Gk. 122/1923 and Gk 237/1930 
Gk. 8/1928 
Gk. 485/1951
NEUHOF
Original 20,500 ha. Gk. 122/1923
TSES
Original
Extension
229,929 ha. 
24,666 ha.
Gk. 122/1923 
Gk. 61/1935
GIBEON
Original 38,782 ha. Gk. 44/1924
WARMBAD
Original 14,523 ha. Gk. 122/1951
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THE MANAGEMENT OF THE RURAL LABOUR FORCE.
The military administration that occupied Namibia in 1915 found a situation of 
confusion following the recent conflict. Despite the brevity of the military operation 
in Namibia much of the black population, especially of southern Namibia, had been 
dislocated and large numbers of stock had been moved over vast distances by the 
retreating Germans or killed to feed the soldiers of the opposing armies. The first 
task of the army was to restore some degree of order and organisation to the 
country.
The situation was judged to have stabilised sufficiently by the end of the year for 
the number of officers assigned to deal with ‘native affairs’ to be reduced and 
control to be passed to the military magistrates based in each district.83 The white 
superstructure of the ‘Native Affairs’ Department had three layers. The first 
consisted of the Senior Officials responsible for ‘Native Affairs’ in the central 
administration, the second those responsible at the district level and the lowest those 
with direct supervisory duties over specific reserves.
The second strata of the structure was the one that, potentially, had the greatest 
ability to implement change. The judicial powers of district magistrates seemed to 
give them a central role in the implementation of policy, however the effectiveness 
with which they could institute change was hampered by two weakness. The first 
was the lack of co-operation between the judiciary and the police and the second the 
lack of adequately trained and experienced personnel.
A number of court cases were brought against police officers in the first few years 
of Union rule, demonstrating both an initial willingness to rein in the police, but 
also the tendency of the police to continue with previous working practices - 
including the measured assault of black workers. In one letter to the Administrator 
in 1917 the Crown Prosecutor listed 19 separate cases of police assault.84 The 
suspicion remained strong that for each reported case there were many that went 
unreported. The difficulty of movement for black farm workers over the long
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distance to the magistrate’s office made complaint physically difficult. Official 
visits to farms took the form of infrequent police patrols, yet the association of the 
police with the infliction of ‘instant justice’ made it unlikely that workers would risk 
reporting minor assaults to them.
The Administrator warned a conference of senior policemen in 1917 that he had 
little confidence in the ability of the police to keep their actions within the law:
I am very much afraid that I have been living in a fool’s paradise for the last 
twelve months. Cases of ill-treatment are taking place but about them one 
seldom receives a proper report at headquarters ... It is not right that the 
very people on whom I rely to look after things should take the law into 
their own hands, and the attitude of the Constabulary leaves me very 
uneasy.85
The Administrator went on to criticize the calibre of his officials, and complained 
that:
... a great many of the officials employed in the Magistrates’ Offices are 
entirely untrained ... the Staffs are weak.86
Military magistrates (who after the end of the period of military rule were replaced 
by civilian magistrates) were the most senior officials in each district. The effective 
application of regulations and supervision of the police was dependent upon the 
action of these officials. The consistent and fair interpretation of the laws by 
magistrates in court cases was also central to any attempt to engender black 
confidence in the legal system, yet the rapid turn-over of officials in this key 
position was high and unlikely to encourage such consistency.
The magisterial office at Maltahohe provides a clear example of the problem of 
maintaining continuity in the key post in the district. In the period from 17th 
September, 1915 to 1st February, 1932 there were fourteen different magistrates in
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Maltahohe, the equivalent of a change every fourteen months. The District Record 
Book noted that the magistrate’s office was then removed from Maltahohe for fifteen 
years, during which time cases were heard in neighbouring courts or by a visiting 
Special Justice of the Peace. On 18th June, 1947 a magistrate returned to 
Maltahohe with an additional dual role as the ‘Native Commissioner’ for the district. 
Ten different officials held this post from this date up to 30th November, 1964. 
The rate of change remained high, with on average a new magistrate every 21 
months with few magistrates staying in the district for more than two years.87
The weakness of this lack of consistency in the administration at the district level 
was recognised as a serious impediment to the effective implementation of 
legislation. Hahn, one of the most experienced ‘Native Affairs’ officials in the 
country complained in 1936 that the unstable nature of the middle tier of 
administration was a fundamental weakness:
Magistrates frequently change office and with their coming and going the 
policy changes is at the best a spasmodic affair.88
The tempo of change in Maltahohe may be an extreme example. It was a 
particularly small rural seat and may, accordingly, have held little attraction or 
prestige for ambitious magistrates. However a long serving official, Olivier, made 
a more general evaluation based on his own extensive experience:
The average duration of a magistrate in a given district is 4 years after which 
he is usually transferred to South Africa and replaced from that place [My 
translation].89
The return of the majority of magistrates to South Africa after a single posting in 
Namibia must have given it the image of the Magisterial equivalent of a military 
‘tour of duty’. The temporary nature of the Magisterial strata of the administration 
meant that they had only a brief time in which to familiarise themselves with a 
district and win the confidence of the residents. The police, in contrast, were often
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locally recruited and permanently based in a particular district. The gap between 
the two layers of the administration seems to have been initially emphasised by a 
tendency for the magistrates to be English-speaking South Africans, whilst the police 
were recruited locally and seem to have been mainly Afrikaans or German-speaking.
The weaknesses of the vital middle stratum of the administration increased the 
importance of the strength of direction given by senior officials and the influence 
of the most junior officials at a local level. However the apparatus established to 
deal with the black (majority) of the population of Namibia was inadequate to its 
task. The state apparatus became ‘overdeveloped’ in the extent to which it 
abrogated the powers that might have been exercised by local black community 
leaders, but ‘soft’ when it came to the depth of the administrative machinery 
constructed to take over those powers.
The Treaty of Peace and South West Africa Mandate Act of 1919 had delegated 
responsibility for the administration of Namibia to the Governor-General of South 
Africa. The responsibilities included that of ‘Native Affairs’. After the end of 
military rule these powers were exercised by the Administrator, the senior 
government official in Namibia. Under the Administrator, the chief executive 
officer, entitled the ‘Secretary for South West Africa’ bore direct responsibility for 
‘Native Affairs’ and the additional title of ‘Chief Native Commissioner’.
The post was first filled by the transfer of the Resident Commissioner in 
Ovamboland to Windhoek in 1921. The combination of the posts of Secretary and 
Chief Native Commissioner resulted in an excessive workload and led to the 
appointment of an Additional Native Commissioner who devoted his whole time to 
‘Native Affairs’. Superintendents were appointed to take direct responsibility for 
the larger reserves. The only one to be stationed in a reserve in southern Namibia 
in 1921 was posted to the politically sensitive Bondelswarts reserve in Warmbad 
district. The magistrate alone bore direct responsibility for supervision of the 
reserves in the other southern districts.90
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The constitution of 1926 established an electoral system for the white community 
and a ‘whites only’ Legislative Assembly with limited powers, but kept ‘Native 
Affairs’ firmly under the direct control of the Administrator. Native Administration 
Proclamation No. 15 of 1928. granted the Administrator the powers of the 
"Supreme Chief of the Natives". The definition of these powers included the power 
to recognize, appoint or remove any chiefs or headmen and the power to define 
‘tribal’ areas and move ’tribes’ from one area to another. The absolute power of 
the Administrator over the affairs of the black population was justified as his right:
... to exercise all political power and authority held and enjoyed by any 
supreme or paramount native chief.91
The Administrator tended to spend little time exercising these extensive powers, but 
instead left much of the work to his Chief Native Commissioner.
The criticism of officials in the field was that the administration gave ‘Native 
Affairs’ a low priority - abolishing the post of Chief Native Commissioner, for 
example, during the recession of the early thirties.92 Senior officials insisted that 
even minor decisions should not be made without their authority and demanded the 
completion of regular written reports on the reserves. It was said, however, that 
they were not in touch with the demands of the black population or local difficulties 
faced by more junior officials as they rarely ventured out of Windhoek, preserving 
a rather detached and formal relationship with the black community.
The most succinct description of these frustrations can be found in a letter from 
Hahn in Ovamboland to Trollope (who was the ‘Assistant Native Commissioner’) 
in 1936. Hahn complained that:
For some reason or other the ‘powers that were’ thought it expedient to 
abolish the system of a whole-time Chief Native Commissioner ... however, 
I must say that, as you presume, the step of abolishing the post was, I 
believe, dictated largely by the necessity for economy.93
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Hahn criticised the combination of the job of Chief Native Commissioner with that 
of Secretary for South West Africa, pointing out the problems that this created in 
the case of the current postholder, Mr Courtney Clarke:
At present this personal touch on the part of the Chief Native Commissioner 
with the magistrates, Superintendents of Reserves and Natives is practically 
non-existent. Mr. Clarke rarely finds a opportunity to visit the reserves and 
to hold representative tribal meetings with the natives. For information as 
to the work done in each reserve he has to rely almost entirely on reports by 
superintendents who are comparatively junior officials.94
The aloofness of the senior responsible officials and temporary duration of the 
magistrate’s tours of duty meant that the information provided by the junior officials 
based in the reserves acquired a heightened importance in influencing the policy­
making process.
The officials on the ground in the reserves may have provided the primary source 
of information to the administration, yet their numbers remained small. By 1939 
there were 16 permanent reserves in the Police Zone; six of these were located in 
southern Namibia. The location of these and the Magisterial boundaries in the 
region are shown clearly in Map 2.95 The direct supervision of these reserves was 
carried out by ten full-time ‘Welfare Officers’ (one covered Berseba and Tses and 
another Bondels) and a number of part-time staff. A Welfare Officer was stationed 
on a part-time basis in Gibeon, whilst Neuhof and Soromas were visited on an 
irregular basis by Special Justices of the Peace stationed at Maltahohe and Bethanie 
respectively.96
The fragility of the ‘Native Affairs’ Department - which covered the entire black 
population of Namibia, both in the Police Zone and in the north of the territory - 
can be shown by reference to its staffing levels in 1946. After thirty years of rule 
and the establishment of 24 separately administered reserves within and beyond the 
Police Zone the entire staff consisted of just ‘27 Europeans and 94 Natives’.97 The
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Police were sometimes used to carry out tasks such as the branding and dipping of 
stock in the reserves. The division of labour relieved the pressure on the under- 
resourced ‘Native Affairs’ Department, but increased the burden of work carried by 
the Police. The total size of the South West African Police force, in 1946, was 
itself surprisingly small. A total of just 248 white and 169 black police officers 
were based in Namibia, a country larger in area than Britain and France 
combined.98
The South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act, Act No. 23 of 1949, removed the 
power of the Administrator to draw up legislation on a number of issues (including 
‘Native Affairs’) and transferred it to the South African Parliament, although a few 
of his powers were restored in 1951. In 1954 the small ‘Native Affairs’ Branch of 
the South West African Administration ceased to exist altogether. The South West 
Africa Native Affairs Administration Act (No. 56 of 1954) transferred responsibility 
for ‘Native Affairs’ in Namibia to South Africa. Its former duties became the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Bantu Administration and Development from 1st 
April, 1955."
The primary distinction between the whites in junior management positions in the 
department was that between those classified as Superintendents (and later as 
Welfare Officers) and those who were known as Native Commissioners. 
Superintendents lived and worked in a reserve, whilst Native Commissioners were 
responsible for all matters concerning the black residents of a particular district. 
The latter post was initially combined with that of magistrate in many districts.
The responsibilities of the ‘Native Commissioners’ were multiple and set out in an 
instruction entitled "Duties assigned to Native Commissioners and Assistant Native 
Commissioners by the Minister of Native Affairs in Terms of Section two (2) of Act 
No. 38 of 1927". The duties included assisting with the recruitment of labour, 
supervising the efficient collection of taxes, investigating any complaints made 
against officials, convening quarterly meetings of the residents of the reserves and 
producing an annual report on ‘Native Affairs’ within each district. The Native
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Commissioners were intended to take a key role in enforcing legislation relating to 
the land issue and gathering intelligence about possible political agitation amongst 
the black population.
The enforcement of the laws relating to squatting, over-crowding and over-stocking 
was seen as one of the most serious duties to be carried out by ‘Native 
Commissioners’:
They should recognize that one of the most important and difficult of their 
duties is the efficient and tactful administration of the laws and regulations 
relating to land.100
The political sensitivity of the issues arising from the demands of black stockowners 
for access to more land was also recognized:
These regulations ... are regarded by many natives as irksome and an 
infringement of their ancient rights and privileges.101
The Native Commissioners were also given the important role of detecting and 
monitoring any signs of political agitation amongst the black population, being 
ordered to:
... report to the Chief Native Commissioner any attempts to stir up strife, 
discord, dissatisfaction, enmity or disloyalty amongst the members of the 
tribe or between the chief and members of his tribe or between natives and 
the Government.102
The definition of the role of the Native Commissioner in terms more appropriate to 
a functionary in the security apparatus, than the welfare branch of the 
administration, makes it less surprising that in many districts the post was combined 
with that of local magistrate. Black residents were, theoretically, to take their 
complaints about mistreatment to the very man who might well earlier have
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sentenced them under the Masters and Servants legislation.
The combination of the two posts also raised doubts about the degree of familiarity 
that Native Commissioners could obtain with the problems facing the black 
population in their district. Hahn pointed out in 1936 that magisterial duties were 
given a far higher priority by officials than their dual position of district Native 
Commissioner:
The Magistrates are, of course, Native Commissioners but how often does 
one see minutes or reports from them in their capacity as Native 
Commissioners signed as such. This alone shows that, because of their 
many other duties, they cannot give the time and attention to purely Native 
Affairs work.103
Officially the Native Commissioners were only obliged to visit the reserves once 
every three months to attend the quarterly meetings at the reserve and, once formed, 
the concurrent, meetings of the reserve board. One of these meetings served as the 
annual meeting and, where possible, was attended by the ‘Chief Native 
Commissioner’ or ‘Additional Native Commissioner’.104
The main burden of responsibility for the implementation of policy within the 
reserves, therefore fell upon the shoulders of the Superintendents/Welfare Officers 
actually living in the reserves who were in daily contact with the black residents. 
The Welfare Officers were responsible for controlling the flow of workers in and 
out of a reserve through the issue of permits, providing monthly reports to the 
‘Chief Native Commissioner’ via the district ‘Native Commissioner’, to allot 
residential sites, brand stock, collect grazing fees and other sums to be paid into the 
reserve trust fund, administer the native reserve regulations (as set out in 
Government Notice No. 68 of 1924) and:
... in conjunction with the Native Reserve Board assist the natives in making 
improvements in the Reserve.105
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The Welfare Officer thus had considerable powers within the reserve. The authority 
to judge the right of admission of applicants to the reserve, to collect taxes and to 
‘initiate’ expenditure from the reserve fund gave considerable scope for patronage 
in favour of particular individuals or groups or discrimination against others.106 
The qualifications and suitability of those appointed as Welfare Officers was 
questionable. Welfare Officers were appointed who were unable to speak the 
language of the black residents of the reserve whom they were responsible for, 
whilst no specialised training was given prior to appointment until the 1950s.107 
The job of Welfare Officer was considered to offer poor pay, poor career prospects 
and social isolation. A senior official recognised, as late as 1946, the 
unattractiveness of the post:
Position of Welfare Officer is anomalous and their prospects poor...
The initial pay would have to be raised to say £35 instead of £25 in order 
to get men who could rank as III grade clerks.108
Even granted this increase it was felt that the salary would only be sufficient to 
attract young and unmarried men "who would not be suitable".
The lack of sufficient inducements to attract the usual calibre of officials employed 
in the ‘Native Affairs’ Department meant that special measures had to be taken to 
fill the posts in Namibia:
They are engaged on the nomination of the Public Service Commission in 
the Union, on special rates of pay, which reflect the fact that they have not 
as a rule the qualification prescribed for holding a post in the Native Affairs 
Department, namely, the passing of the civil service lower law examination 
or its equivalent.109
Officials were therefore appointed who would not have been considered sufficiently 
qualified to hold an equivalent post within South Africa.
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The low level of investment in the white administrative structures that were 
established to monitor the affairs of the reserves was linked to efforts to encourage 
a layer of black leaders within the reserves. The aim was not to revive the old 
leadership, but rather to incorporate a new generation of leaders in a system of rule 
in which they provided a cheap means of controlling the black residents of the 
reserves:
As the connecting link between the European officials and the natives, 
headmen, elected by the people, are appointed by the Government and 
receive a small salary. They are responsible for the good behaviour of the 
people, settle civil disputes amongst them, represent any grievances they 
may have and are in fact, the substitute for the old native chiefs. As a rule 
they are assisted by a council of the leading natives [my emphasis].110
Legislation made it very clear that the new black leaders should see their role 
limited to that of administrative agents rather than political leaders.
The legislation concerning the role of the new headmen and reserve boards seemed 
contradictory. On the one hand it seemed to enable the election of popular leaders, 
whilst on the other paying them a salary as government workers. The duties that 
the leaders were expected to carry out were primarily designed to facilitate control 
and taxation of the reserves, rather than allowing the leaders to represent and 
promote the wishes of the people. Strict restraints were put on the political 
involvement of the new headmen:
They shall not become members or take any part in the affairs of any 
political association or any association whose objects are deemed by the 
Administrator to be subversive of or prejudicial to constituted Government 
or good order.111
The responsibilities given to the headmen were detailed in Government. Notice No
68. of 1924 which provided guidelines for the management of the reserves. The
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reserves were to be divided up into wards, where necessary, by the magistrate and 
each ward placed under the control of a ‘headman’. A Government Notice of 1929 
identified six main areas of duty assigned to black leaders (see Table 5).112
Table 5: Summarised Duties of Reserve Headmen.
1) to help compile a register of tax payers.
2) to encourage the dipping of stock.
3) to advise on the allotment of land and prevention of
squatting.
4) the prevention and detection of crime and reporting of unlawful
meetings.
5) the supply of labour
6) to report the presence of strangers/strange stock,
One of the key functions of the headmen was to try and exercise effective control 
over the distribution and ownership of stock within the reserves. The temptation for 
black owners to distribute their animals amongst their relations as a way of avoiding 
high rates of grazing fees could only be curbed by the incorporation of local black 
residents with the necessary knowledge to frustrate such schemes. One of the 
regulations the headmen were to enforce was, accordingly, the rule that:
... no person shall keep or cause to be kept within a reserve any animal 
unless he be the bona fide owner or the person having the lawful custody 
thereof.113
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The headmen in each reserve were to meet regularly at meetings of the reserve 
board. The boards were intended to supersede the existing political structures 
within communities. The establishment of a reserve board in Berseba in 1928, for 
example, was to replace the existing ‘Raad’ (Council) of seventeen appointed by the 
Captain.114 The primary purpose of the meetings of the reserve board was to 
make decisions concerning the distribution of funds from the reserve trust fund. 
The boards consisted:
... usually of the headman ... and not more than six other adult male natives, 
who are required either to be domiciled in the reserve concerned or to 
possess substantial interests therein. The members are elected by their 
fellow residents [my emphasis].115
The legislation sought to incorporate the wealthier residents of the reserve into the 
administration. However, ironically these were the very residents that were likely 
to be most adversely effected by the efficient enforcement of the legislative 
restrictions on stock. Board members might well have had their own economic 
motives for performing their supervisory duties with reluctance.
The identification of black leaders with the government meant that there was a clear 
risk that they would become alienated from their followers. The choice leaders 
faced was that of attempting to enforce unpopular legislation at the risk of losing 
their credibility as community leaders or, alternatively, reflecting the opposition of 
their communities to legislation at the risk of losing their job. The majority of 
leaders were reluctant to take the latter risk with the result that by 1946 the Annual 
Report for the territory was forced to conclude that:
Board members have little or no influence with their followers and with a 
few exceptions are not much of assistance to the authorities in the 
administration of the reserves.116
The administrative role given to black leaders in the reserves gave them authority
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without power. However the administration argued that the limited managerial role 
given to the boards was:
... designed to meet present requirements for the acquisition by natives of 
training and experience in the problems of administration, ... [and provided] 
... sufficient indication of the Administration’s readiness to grant the 
indigenous inhabitants some form of participation in the administration of 
their own affairs.117
The scope for gaining experience through the boards was surely exaggerated. The 
boards met irregularly, financial decisions were subject to the agreement of the 
Welfare Officer and the boards themselves were limited in size.
CONCLUSION
The reserve system in Namibia was established as an element in a broader state 
strategy to capture and geographically stabilise the black labour force. Legislation 
was formulated that inhibited the ability of black stockowners to compete effectively 
with the wave of white immigrant farmers. The powers given to the state were 
considerable. However the administrative structures built to enforce them were 
weak.
The implication was that the legislation had a gradual, rather than immediate, 
impact and that reserves (at least initially) had the potential to nurture economic 
activity that might evade the full supervisory weight of the dtate. However the 
division of land intrinsic to the reserves policy in Namibia and the tightening police 
restrictions on the mobility of labour meant that hopes of black autarky would be 
short-lived. The next chapter will chart the impact of the legislation on the reserves 
of southern Namibia by examining in detail the economic experiences of the black 
stockowners within the reserves.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE ECONOMY OF THE RESERVES, 1915- 
1955.
INTRODUCTION.
A network of reserves had been established, throughout southern Namibia by 1924. 
Yet these reserves failed to completely achieve their role of recruiting and regulating 
the flow of labour to the surrounding farming area. The aim of this chapter will be 
to examine the internal factors and within the reserve economy that contributed to 
the disruption of this intent. The chapter will utilise evidence taken from the 
experiences of the residents of five of the principal reserves in southern Namibia - 
three comparatively large reserves (Berseba, Bondels and Tses) and two smaller 
reserves (Gibeon and Soromas) . 1
The establishment and maintenance of reserves in southern Namibia was designed 
to achieve two economic goals. The reserves were to provide a permanent reservoir 
of labour to service the surrounding farms and provide a storage space for the 
surplus stock of those employed on the farms. Reserve residents, however, had 
their own economic agenda. Black stockowners wanted to use the reserves to 
rebuild their economic independence or at least gain an economic base that was 
sufficiently strong to enable them to enter the labour market with some discretion. 
The storage and supply functions of the reserves were thus inherently contradictory.
White farmers feared the pastoral potential of the reserves and the competition that 
they might face from black pastoralists. The accumulation of black pastoralists had 
to be constrained and controlled. The prospective prosperity of black stockowners 
depended upon parameters of mobility and development that changed over time to 
their disadvantage. The German policy of land alienation and stock dispossession 
was less vigorous in impact on southern Namibia than in central Namibia. Southern 
Namibia was sparsely settled during the German colonial period and contained the 
largest areas that remained ‘reserved’ for black stockowners. Land alienation
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proceeded at a particularly fast pace in southern Namibia following the South 
African occupation in 1915. The consequence was rapid restriction of the mobility 
of black pastoralists in the region. The area of land to which black pastoralists had 
access shrank with increasing competition for the resources within the limited 
dimensions of the reserves. The commercial viability of the stock within the 
reserves was therefore dependent on investment in the development of the livestock 
economy. Black pastoralists had to accumulate stock of sufficient quality and 
quantity to enable them to have a marketable surplus. The application of grazing 
fees, development of water resources, fencing of reserves, control of stock 
diseases, breeding and quality control of stock and access of animals to stock 
markets were all key elements in deciding the commercial combativeness of the 
reserve residents.
The economy of southern Namibia in the South African colonial period was, in both 
communal and commercial farming areas, based on pastoralism. The erratic and 
discrepant pattern of precipitation within the region combined with the rarity of 
permanent surface water to make mobility an essential ingredient for successful 
farming. Wellington’s rainfall figures for southern Namibia for the period 1883 
to 1960 cover 77 years, of which 34 were described as ‘drought’ years . 2  The Long 
Term Agricultural Policy Commission of 1948 argued that flood and drought should 
be accepted as ‘normalities’ in Namibia and reached the pessimistic conclusion that:
... no cycle or secular change can be worked out on the available data that
will have any value in the planning of farm management. 3
The Commission advised that inadequate rainfall and drought should be anticipated 
and strategies developed accordingly.
The difficult environmental constraints on pastoral farming played an important role 
in shaping political and economic affairs.
Political rivalry in the pre-colonial years reflected the economic realities of the 
region, with conflicts being centred less on claims for land ownership than on
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disputes over access to water holes and pasture. Territories were not measured 
according to rigid cartographical boundaries, but rather areas within grazing distance 
of a number of water holes periodically visited by the livestock of a particular 
community. 4
The predominance of small stock in southern Namibia was a direct and rational 
response to the ecological limitations of the region. Cattle were simply more 
vulnerable to drought and the general scarcity of open water. Cattle needed to drink 
water every 2 to 3 days, which restricted them to pasture within 15 kilometres of 
the nearest water hole. In contrast goats could healthily survive for up to 5 to 6  
days and thus gain access to pasture within a 30 kilometre radius of a water hole. 
In addition goats were able to digest a wider range of vegetation and were thus able 
to make optimum use of the limited flora available in the region . 5
The rigid land divisions introduced by white settler farmers in southern Africa 
created environmental problems. Wilson reports that, as early as 1785, a visiting 
scientist noted that in South Africa:
... pastures suffered more from Dutch farmers who were settled than from 
Khoikhoi who moved continually. 6
Yet it was the pastoralist who was to bear the blame for environmental deterioration 
in much of the colonial literature. Black pastoralists were cast in the role of 
environmental villains, one writer arguing that:
... the nomad is not so much the ‘son of the desert’, but its father . 7
Mobility and livestock accumulation were not perceived by the majority of colonial 
commentators as crucial components in the survival strategy of pastoralists within 
arid ecosystems. Resistance to policies which restricted stock accumulation or 
confined mobility was presented as the irrational product of traditional conservatism.
88
The struggle for freedom of access to pasture and water holes can be seen as the 
core economic motivation behind the 1904-1907 War against the German colonial 
regime. Mayor, a German missionary provided the following diagnosis of the 
conflict:
As long as the people could still freely move with their cattle, no friction 
occurred. But the land owners finally made use of their right and often 
asked them to stay within their boundaries. These were drawn so narrow, 
however, that the natives grew afraid . 8
The confiscation of vast areas of land previously used by black pastoralists was to 
be the most significant consequence of the German victory in the War. One 
significant regional distinction was the fact that land alienation was less absolute in 
southern Namibia than it had been in central Namibia. The land of the Berseba 
community was not confiscated as the inhabitants remained ‘loyal’, whilst special 
concessions were extracted by the Bondelswarts. The appropriation of land and 
restrictions on livestock ownership were never as easy to enforce as they were to 
pronounce, however the measures certainly had a profoundly damaging impact on 
the pastoral economy of black communities. The South African occupation resulted 
in the removal of these measures and increase in the area of land officially set aside 
for the exclusive use of black pastoralists.
The chronology of dispossession in southern Namibia should be contrasted with that 
in South Africa. The decline of the peasantry in South Africa was charted through 
the second half of the nineteenth century. A general consensus seems to have been 
reached by historians that by 1920 the black peasant economy in South Africa had 
been so underdeveloped that it had ceased to pose any significant economic threat 
to the commercial farming sector. 9 An official report recognised the fact that 
hostile economic measures had been used to inhibit the development of successful 
black farming. The few aspirant black farmers who were able to purchase land 
before the passage of the 1913 Land Act were forced to pay prices far in excess of 
those paid by their white counterparts for similar acquisitions. 1 0 The emphasis on
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possession of land in South Africa contrasted with the primary concerns of black 
pastoralists in southern Namibia which was access to land.
The mapping of boundaries in southern Namibia was less important than the 
effective policing of those boundaries. It would also be premature to date the 
destruction of the black pastoral economy in southern Namibia as early as 1920. 
The modest nature of white settlement, confusion generated by the fighting of 1915, 
subsequent relaxation of restrictive measures and sheer volume of unsold land 
available led to a period of optimism and expansion amongst black pastoralists. In 
1917 1,475 of the 1,733 grazing licences issued to stockholders grazing on crown 
land were issued to black, not white, pastoralists. The period was one of stock 
recovery, not regression.
The 1920s saw a massive influx of aspirant white farmers, but the poverty of many 
of the new settlers meant that the decade was still one in which access to land and 
labour was contested, with black pastoralists in southern Namibia retaining a 
relatively strong negotiating position. As in Zimbabwe the determining factor in the 
competition was the ability of the colonial regime to exclude blacks from equal 
access to land and to markets. In Zimbabwe under the colonial regime farms were 
sold to blacks, but at inflated prices, so that by 1925 only 14 had black owners. 11 
In Namibia black stockowners relied primarily on their ability to exchange their 
labour for grazing rights in order to gain access to land outside the boundaries of 
the reserve. Dispossession must therefore by related to shifts in their negotiating 
strength within labour contracts.
The fact that the borders of the reserves were becoming increasingly impermeable 
for residents wishing to find alternative grazing for their stock placed considerable 
stress on black stockowners. However the administration also developed more 
direct means to regulate the accumulation of stock within the reserve. The measures 
were to include limitations on the total number of stock that might be owned by any 
one individual within certain reserves and restrictions on the number of animals that 
could enter a reserve with a new resident, but taxation was designed to provide the
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most effective mechanism of control.
The fact that any reserve resident with 50 small stock or 10 large stock could obtain 
a Certificate exempting them from compulsory work, meant that some form of 
taxation was necessary to ensure that these residents would still need to leave the 
reserve and seek waged employment. The main difference between the tax structure 
in South Africa and that imposed on Namibia was that the latter reflected the 
strongly pastoral nature of the Namibian reserves. Wealth amongst traditionally 
mobile communities was better measured in stock than in huts. Consequently it was 
grazing fees, on an escalating scale relating to the size of the herds and flocks 
owned by each individual that were the most important form of taxation in the 
reserves of southern Namibia.
The introduction of grazing fees was to mark a major increase in the financial 
burden being placed upon the black stockowner by existing forms of taxation, such 
as dog tax. Grazing fees were introduced from 1st January, 1918 in the majority 
of farms recognised as temporary reserves. Few reserves officially existed at this 
time and many black stockowners were grazing their stock on vacant land. The 
uncertainty of the situation meant that the distribution of stock remained fluid and 
the most practical form of taxation was on the basis of monthly grazing licences. 
The rate of grazing fees charged in the reserves was however significantly cheaper 
than that being paid by most black stockowners on Crown Land. The cost of 
running a flock of 100 goats on Crown Land was 2s.6d per month, compared with 
only ls.5d for running the same flock in a reserve. The aim was obviously to 
concentrate black stockowners within the reserve areas. The difference became less 
significant for black pastoralists with larger flocks. The owner of a flock of 500 
goats paid 10s. in a reserve, and lls.lO d for hiring grazing on Crown Land . 12
Wealthy black stockowners might feel justified in paying for better grazing outside 
the reserves during difficult periods. However their ability to do so rested on two 
preconditions - the ability to gain access to such land and the necessary capital to 
pay the relatively high charges. Courtney-Clarke (the Secretary for South West
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Africa) admitted in 1937, that stockowners in Namibia faced a far higher level of 
taxation than their counterparts in South Africa13. The level of the monthly 
grazing fees was, however, to remain frozen in Namibia until 1954 when the rate 
was doubled. The escalating scale of grazing fees was intended to discourage the 
accumulation of stock, but also served to encourage the distribution of stock within 
the community in order to evade the higher tax brackets, thus strengthening the 
social and political networks of the wealthier individuals within the reserves.
The interests of wealthier stock owners who gained exemption and access to the 
limited resources of the reserves were in preserving those resources by restricting 
entry to the reserve and in using the distribution of their assets and influence over 
development plans within a reserve to build a political power base. The fact that 
reserves were communal meant that conflict in arid regions often centred around the 
question of access to water. Leaders in neighbouring Botswana were able to direct 
the sinking of boreholes to localities that would assist their own clientage 
network14. A period of drought would aggravate conflicts over water-holes and 
increase the tendency for individuals to seek exclusive access to water-holes. 15 
The internal economic development of the reserves equally involved decisions that 
were heavy with political implication.
The extended drought of the early 1930s was a critical period. The closer 
occupation of land under the restocking schemes for white farmers that followed the 
drought resulted in a rapid increase in the number keeping high quality karakul 
sheep. Goats accompanying workers from the reserves became less welcome and 
the boundaries between reserves and surrounding farms were closely enforced and 
enfenced. Whites occupied and excluded black stockowners from the land on which 
they had fallen back in case of need. The corollary of this was to be a growing 
problem with ‘overstocking’ in the reserves themselves.
The accumulation of stock was one of the primary survival mechanisms adopted by 
pastoralists in arid climates. The necessity is to ensure that even if severe losses are 
experienced a sufficient number of animals remain to provide a ‘basic herd’. A
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basic herd would be the minimum size necessary to provide for the subsistence 
needs of the owner and that was capable of reproducing itself. The maintenance of 
a ‘basic herd’, even during a succession of drought years was essential for the food 
security of the community that it supported:
... stock accumulation, however exhausting of grazing resources, is a 
sensible insurance policy designed to build up capital assets and to offset the 
deleterious effects of future lean years. It is no more irresponsible, and 
often indeed a great deal less selfish than other forms of capitalistic 
speculation. 16
The risks of concentrating stock in one area could also be reduced by dividing a 
flock for care amongst members of the extended family scattered over a wide area.
Initially wealthy stockowners in the reserves were able to 
use the insatiated demand from white settlers for labour to spread their flocks 
between family members working on farms. Black farm workers were able to 
negotiate access for a number of stock as part of their contract, a device that could 
also sometimes be used as a means of moving stock when grazing in the reserve 
became sparse. However as farmers would often themselves be experiencing 
difficulties maintaining their stock during periods of drought, the range of options 
available to stockowners in the reserves became increasingly restricted.
The South West Africa Commission, reflecting on the devastating losses suffered 
by the occupants of the reserves during the severe drought of the early 1930s, 
conceded that the administration’s reserve policy had contributed to these losses:
The establishment of reserves and the introduction into the Territory of 
fencing laws, have somewhat restricted their liberty of movement, therefore 
diminishing their resistance, according to their habits of life, to the periodic 
droughts. 17
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The concession can be linked to the concern already expressed that overcrowding 
of the reserves in South Africa would escalate the three perils of irreparable 
ecological damage, increased squatting and uncontrollable black urbanisation. It 
was even predicted that if the present trends continued the reserves would be 
transformed into deserts. 18 Hyperbole was used in the Namibian context to justify 
economic constraints on reserve pastoralists:
... in view of the prevalent diseases of stock, the contraction of markets for 
pastoral products, and the diseases which ravaged the Natives themselves, 
the Administration had to choose between their reasonably constrained 
survival or allowing them to become extinct. 19
Black stockowners had been rhetorically presented with a choice between dearth and 
death.
The attempt to resurrect autonomous economic and political pastoral communities 
was broken by the rigours of the drought and restrictions on pastoral mobility of 
black stockowners. The next two decades saw the increasing economic stratification 
of the reserves between a small minority striving to preserve their resources and 
accumulate stock within the confines of the reserves and the vast majority. The 
latter increasingly sought to escape the reserve, yet evade their scripted role as a 
reliable rural proletariat supplying the surrounding farms with labour. The 
economic struggle of the reserves was thus a dual one. The majority were either 
elderly or using the reserve to help them determine the terms of their engagement 
within the labour market, whilst the minority retained their pastoral ambitions.
By the late 1930s there was a significant improvement in both the economy and 
climate of southern Namibia. The restraints placed upon the mobility and 
accumulation of black stockowners and negligible amount of state support for the 
development of pastoralism within the reserves meant that the emergence of a 
successful strata of commercial black farmers in southern Namibia was stymied.
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The reserves became increasingly peripheral to the economic ambitions of young 
workers in southern Namibia who sought to benefit from urban economic 
opportunities during World War Two. Pastoral prosperity was confined to a few 
families within each reserve and those that they supported. Exclusion from the 
reserves left the local population with the choice of seeking urban employment or 
the accommodation of stock on white farms in exchange for labour. The rise of 
both these trends in the early 1950s fuelled pressure for an expansion of the area 
provided as reserves, pressure that was to culminate in the publication of the 
Odendaal Plan in 1964.20
THE SPATIAL CONTEXT OF THE RESERVES.
The Berseba and Bondelswarts communities retained comparatively large areas of 
land dating from agreements made during the German period (see chapter one). 
The reserves established by the South Africans in southern Namibia were on a 
smaller scale. The economic viability of both the larger reserves was diminished 
by the new regime. The stockowners of Berseba lost a large section of their land 
which was purchased by the administration to create a new reserve, Tses, and a 
number of farms for white settlers. The Bondelswarts community faced wholesale 
stock losses twice within the first seven years of South African control. One 
community lost land and the other lost livestock.
The Germans had feared that the fiercely independent Bondelswarts would join the 
invading South African forces in 1914. When the Germans retreated they therefore 
razed the Bondelswarts’ homes to the ground and loaded virtually the entire 
community on a train to the north. The few men that were not packed onto the 
trucks, were forced to drive their stock north ahead of the advancing Union forces. 
The aim was to ensure adequate supplies of meat and milk for the German forces, 
whilst depriving the Union forces of a convenient local source of the same.
The consequence of the forced migration of such a concentrated flock confined to
95
a narrow route, without sufficient pause or dispersal for grazing, was the devastation 
of the Bondelswarts’ stock:
... during the trek the animals died wholesale and only a small percentage 
of the stock which originally started on their journey from Kalkfontein were 
saved. 21
The new administration recognized that the Bondelswarts had ‘... lost practically 
everything’ . 2 2 They had been perhaps the greatest economic victims of the short 
campaign in Namibia, and looked to the victors for compensation from the stock 
seized from the vanquished. A Bondelswarts delegation travelled to Windhoek 
following the German defeat to lobby for the return of their land and compensation 
for the stock lost during transportation. 23
The administration offered them no land and offered compensation that only met a 
fraction of their stock losses. The military magistrate estimated that the 
Bondelswarts lost 15,227 small stock and 123 cattle during World War One. One 
out of every twelve animals lost were replaced. The inadequacy of the 
compensation offered to the Bondelswarts converted a wealthy community into a 
poor one and was the first in a series of grievances that the community accumulated 
against the new authorities. 2 4 Five years later the Bondelswarts were still 
petitioning the South African Prime Minister for further compensation. 25
The Bondelswarts were determined to preserve their pastoral economy, upon which 
the wealth of the community had been built for decades, but suffered a further blow 
to the recovery of their flocks when all their animals were confiscated as a result 
of the 1922 Bondelswarts Rising. The Administrator’s official report on the Rising 
claimed that the 12,470 small stock, 700 donkeys and 800 large stock captured 
during the Rising consisted largely of animals seized from neighbouring farmers by 
the Bondelswarts. 2 6 Yet there is evidence that contests this view and suggests that 
the Bondelswarts own flocks had increased significantly.
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The Attorney-General in his earlier internal report claimed that the stock seized:
... formed only a portion of the total number owned by them . 2 7
At least 3,000 small stock had been received in compensation, 600 had survived in 
the South and 3,400 more arrived with Jacobus Christiaan and his followers in 
1 9 1 9  28 suggests that natural increase may even have enabled flocks
to recover to their pre-war levels. The white Superintendent of the reserve later 
recalled counting 30-40,000 small stock during a stock count in the reserve during 
1922.29
The administration returned the Bondelswarts stock at the end of the ‘rebellion’, but 
claimed that drought, scab and poverty had led to heavy losses during their custody. 
Only 2,415 sheep and goats, 712 cattle and 691 donkeys were handed back to the 
Bondelswarts. 3 0  The Bondelswarts lost over 80 percent of their small stock as a 
direct result of the 1922 Rising, having previously lost over 90 percent of their 
stock in 1915. Small stock levels in the reserve would not pass 12,470 again until 
1950.
The poverty of the community after the Rising was such that some residents had to 
be issued with rations (71b mealie meal and 31b of meat per week) to save them 
from starvation. 31 The exploitation of the reserve’s resources by white farmers 
(dealt with at greater length later in this chapter) and extreme poverty of the 
residents meant that the rate of consumption exceeded that of reproduction. The 
few surviving stock were returned to the reserve in November, 1922, yet by August 
of the following year the local magistrate was reporting that many of the returned 
animals had been eaten . 3 2 Only 709 small stock remained in the reserve by 
September, 1924.33
The German defeat had raised hopes that black stockowners would once again be 
able to graze their flocks over a wide area. Land, it was widely believed, would 
be taken from the vanquished Germans and returned to the original users. The
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situation seemed particularly hopeful in southern Namibia which had been relatively 
sparsely settled under German rule (see Table 6 ).
TABLE 6: Land Alienation in the Southern Districts, 1913.34
District Suitable as No. of Extent Percent
farm land (ha). Farms*. in ha. remaining.
Gibeon 4,650,000 92 1,217,729 74
Maltahohe 1,937,700 60 917,711 53
Bethanien 1,855,000 31 405,235 78
Keetmanshoop 1,832,087 34 601,511 67
Hasuur 1,825,622 52 722,499 60
Warmbad 2,888,479 36 907,465 69
* Excludes farms within area owned by German companies.
The size of the small reserves, such as Krantzplatz and Soromas, placed clear 
physical limits on the accumulation of stock. Yet the inadequate size of the reserves 
could be offset in some cases where a reserve’s location enabled its residents to 
stray beyond its boundaries without attracting official attention. The extent of all 
the reserves in the first two decades of the South African occupation were not 
determined strictly by the geographical boundaries found on a map, but by the
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boundaries of enforcement. Bondels reserve in Warmbad district bore the full brunt 
of the wave of poor white immigrants from the Cape, whilst the stockowners of 
Berseba reserve had easier access to unoccupied Crown Land.
The inadequacy of the administrative apparatus, the weakness of the police force and 
the fact that many farms around Berseba reserve (particularly in the mountainous 
area known as the ‘Swart Rand’) remained unoccupied by white farmers made it 
easier for stockowners to leave the reserve surreptitiously in search of pasture. In 
1922 the police, looking for the residents of Berseba reserve, were told by the 
community’s leader:
... that all his people are concentrating on the Swart Rand, and that some of 
them have actually crossed the Gibeon border, as that was the only place 
where it had rained and there was available grazing for their stock. 35
The assumption that farms neighbouring reserves suffered high rates of stock theft 
may explain the reason that these farms were often purchased belatedly. As late as 
1930 a number of farms adjoining Berseba remained unsold (See Map 3).
The Bondelswarts occupied land that enabled them to accumulate stock with the 
minimum of interference from officials or white farmers. An influx of refugees 
from the Richterfeld in the Cape with their stock after 1915 increased the demand 
for pasture. The land attached to the Mission Station at Heirachabis proved 
popular, whilst others moved onto unoccupied farms in the district. The fact that 
the Bondels had recent (pre-1906) memories of ownership claims over a far larger 
area of land than the 175,000 acres falling within the officially demarcated reserve, 
meant that they felt quite justified in making use of land beyond the borders of the 
reserve.
The formation of the reserves at Gibeon, Neuhof, Soromas and Tses was an 
administrative attempt to clear Crown Land of black stockowners following the 
spontaneous occupation of vacant farms by black stockowners during and
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immediately after the campaign against the German forces. The creation of the 
reserve at Gibeon provides a good example of the way in which the concentration 
of flocks previously dispersed over a wide area had a damaging impact.
The military magistrate for Gibeon district encouraged black stockowners to 
concentrate their stock on a farm near the town of Gibeon, called ‘Freistadt’ . 3 6  
The farm was treated as a ‘reserve’ from 31 December, 1918 with residents paying 
grazing fees. 3 7 The residents were soon complaining that the farm was too small 
to allow them to successfully accumulate animals. Twenty-nine black stockowners 
were sharing the farm by the beginning of 1919. The small farm (4,841 hectares) 
was overcrowded, being used by 3,114 small stock and 61 large stock. 3 8 Generous 
estimates of the carrying capacity of the land in the district suggest that a farm of 
at least 14,500 hectares would have been required to sustain such stock numbers. 3 9  
The consequence of the concentration was a rapid deterioration in the quality of the 
animals, placing black stockowners at a disadvantage if they wished to compete in 
the market place with white farmers. 4 0
The residents’ complaints led to an order that they should move (in October, 1919) 
from Freistadt to a larger farm at Witbooisvlei (10,400 hectares). The residents 
argued that, whilst larger, the new farm had an inadequate water supply and that 
they would have to buy salt due to the dietary shortcomings of the grazing . 41 The 
move was carried out reluctantly, but the community continued to seek an 
alternative. The Chair of the 1921 Commission set up to propose the location of 
permanent reserves suggested that the community moved to Tses. However a group 
sent by the community to visit Tses declared the farm unviable as:
... there is no grazing for their stock and the only water obtainable is that 
which results from rain - there is no permanent supply, and ... the land 
consists solely of stones. 4 2
The stockowners sought land in sufficient quality and quantity to meet their pastoral 
ambitions. A series of deputations visited the local magistrate in Gibeon and the
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Secretary for South West Africa in Windhoek. Eventually, in 1923, a delegation met 
the Administrator himself and presented a petition carrying a request:
... that farms may be given us for our own property for life . 4 3
The stockowners sought farms within a large reserve that would stretch along the 
Fish River from Kameelhaar to Jakalsfontein and across to Rietmond in the north 
(See Map 4). The campaign was partially victorious. In 1924 a permanent reserve 
was proclaimed at Gibeon, but excluding the town and on a far smaller scale than 
had been envisaged by the delegation. The administration simply reverted to an 
earlier proposal for expanding the old reserve at Freistadt by adding a neighbouring 
farm (See Map 4)44. The new reserve was not sufficient to satisfy the 
accumulative ambitions of the stockowners, 41 of the 130 stockowners registered 
on the reserve during 1924-1926 left to seek better conditions and the average flock 
size of those that remained fell drastically. 45
Complaints from black stockowners about the damaging consequences of 
concentrating their stock in inadequate reserves were pervasive. The residents of 
Soromas demanded and obtained a meeting with the Administrator as early as 
December, 1922 to complain about the paucity of the grazing . 4 6  Despite their 
efforts Soromas became the permanent reserve for Bethanie district in 1923, 
although the local magistrate admitted that it was:
... not adequate for the purpose. At the present time it is just a sandy
waste. 4 7
Tses reserve was created with the aim of draining the black stockowners from the 
surrounding Crown Land in Keetmanshoop district, however the pastoral potential 
of the new reserve was also greeted with scepticism by its intended occupants.
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The pastoralists local knowledge of the district led their spokesperson to claim that 
at Tses:
... the grass only grew after good rains and was even then of a temporary 
nature and the area very stony. 4 8
The Chair of the ‘Native Reserves Commission’ dismissed this opinion having had 
‘a favourable report’ from Colonel Kruger, one of the Commissioners and argued 
that:
... it seemed unnecessary for me to visit the area or to inquire further into 
Native representations. 4 9
The community view was to prove the more prophetic. The new reserve had 
inadequate supplies of water to provide for the large numbers of stock that were 
expected to move onto it. Following a personal visit to Tses reserve in 1932 the 
Assistant Secretary gave his scathing opinion that:
The Tses reserve is totally unsuitable for its purpose and why it was ever 
selected is a mystery to me. All the best farms were cut out and allotted to 
Europeans and what was absolutely worthless was constituted as a 
reserve. 5 0
Once again the rapid concentration of stock on inadequately developed land was 
fatal.
The statistics available for the early years of the reserve were viewed with 
scepticism by the authorities, but perhaps this was partly due to the fact that they 
suggested that there had been massive stock losses in the first three years of the new 
reserve’s life. The magistrate estimated that, by 1925, 44,000 small stock and
3,000 large stock were contained within Tses, yet by 1927 the figures had dropped 
to 15,906 and 2,624. Whilst the earliest figure seems to have been speculative the
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impression of a dramatic drop in the number of animals living in the reserve seems 
to be corroborated by more detailed evidence. One of the wealthier stockowners, 
Gideon Matundu, saw his flocks of 926 sheep and goats reduced within two years 
to just 2 0 0  in number. 51
The boundaries of the reserves became more rigid as they were increasingly ‘fenced 
in’ during the 1920s by surrounding white commercial farms. The smaller reserves 
such as Gibeon and Soromas were too spatially constricted to support any significant 
number of black pastoralists. The size of the larger reserves such as Tses, Bondels 
and Berseba gave them greater pastoral potential, once water supplies were secured. 
The Administrator admitted that, as late as 1929, the size of the larger reserves 
made it impossible to control the entry and exit of the residents . 5 2 Ironically 
development also made the larger reserves seem more desirable to surrounding 
white farmers. A resolution was actually passed by the Legislative Assembly 
(representing the minority white franchise) in 1941 unsuccessfully calling for the 
closure of the ‘absolutely worthless’ Tses reserve and its subdivision into farms for 
white farmers. 53
MOBILITY AND CONSTRAINT .
Mobility and Control.
The mobility of animals was a crucial element of the pastoral economy. The 
constraint of the freedom of movement by black pastoralists from the reserves was 
dependent upon the efficiency of the mechanisms of control within and around the 
reserves and the proximity and number of white farmers in the surrounding district. 
The legislation of stock control was not applied evenly. Historical precedent meant 
that the residents of Berseba and Bondels reserves did not officially require permits 
to remove stock from their reserves, unless they planned to cross a district 
border. 5 4 Yet if freedom of movement was necessary for pastoralists operating in 
underdeveloped reserves, it was not sufficient. Black stockowners needed not only 
to be able to move, but also to have somewhere they could move to.
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The initial frustration of officials attempting to control the movement of black 
pastoralists with inadequate resources was evident in the Annual Report of the 
military magistrate at Warmbad in 1917:
The machinery provided for the preservation of law and order in this District 
is disgracefully inadequate and unsatisfactory... There are only 18 men in 
the whole District available for police duty and they have an area of nearly
13,000 square miles to patrol, in addition to 300 miles of border between 
this District and the Union, and it is altogether impossible for so small a 
force of more or less incompetent and inexperienced men to effectually 
control such an area . 55
The force was therefore unable to adequately interview black stockowners:
... squatting on Crown Land in different parts of the District. 5 6
Within the reserves the monitoring capabilities of the administration were also 
limited. The first official count of the animals in the largest reserve in southern 
Namibia, Berseba, that was considered reliable was only carried out in 1929 - 
fifteen years after the first occupation of the area by Union forces.
The inadequacy of the resources available within the reserves meant that the ability 
to cross boundary lines and utilise grazing beyond the confines of the reserve was 
often crucial to black stockowners trying to sustain their flocks. The stockowners 
living in Soromas reserve in 1926, for instance, ran 123 large stock and 753 small 
stock within the reserve, but owned a far greater number (226 and 1,720) on land 
outside the reserve . 5 7 The ability of reserve residents to move their stock outside 
the reserve was to become increasingly constrained during the period of rapid white 
settlement in southern Namibia that took place during the 1920s.
Constraint
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White land settlement had a restrictive impact on the practices of black pastoralists. 
The geographic location of the Bondels reserve meant that its residents were the first 
to suffer the consequences of white immigration and land alienation. A comparison 
of two maps showing the extent of white land occupation in 1911 and 1921 reveals 
the rapidity and scale of the process (see Maps 5 and 6 ). The settlers who 
purchased three farms bordering the reserve in 1923 found them occupied by local 
stockowners. The Attorney-General reported that:
Notwithstanding proper enquiry and proof of their misconception [by a 
surveyor] they defiantly remained where they were and police measures 
became necessary to ensure their removal. 58
The constraints imposed by boundaries became apparent once the use of seasonal 
grazing and water points beyond the cartographical edge of the reserve became 
redefined as trespass. The threat posed to the community’s pastoral economy by 
confinement was identified as one of the key causes of the Bondelswarts Rising of 
1922.59 The ‘Secretary for South West Africa’ acknowledged the damage caused 
by land settlement to the prospects of pastoral economy based in the Bondels 
reserve:
What hit them hard was, of course, the land policy. In the Bondelswarts’ 
days and the German days, all the ground round about was unoccupied, and 
they could wander round with their stock from place to place; when grazing 
and water were scarce, they had no difficulty in finding it round about 
elsewhere. When these farms were all given out to Settlers, the position 
became entirely different; they became hemmed in and restricted to their 
own Reserve; and, of course, in no time, the grazing gave out... the grazing 
and water are such that they are sufficient in normal times, but, when you 
get three, or four or five years drought, there is no grazing at all, and they 
have to trek. Well, there was no land to which they could trek . 6 0
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A direct correlation was noted by the ‘Native Commissioner’ for the territory 
between the decline in the quality and quantity of the Bondelswarts stock and the 
encirclement of the reserve by farms occupied by white farmers. By 1929 he 
doubted that the resources available within the reserve would be sufficient to enable 
flocks to recover to their former levels. 61
The system prioritised the needs of the aspirant white farmers above those of black 
pastoralists. Attempts to improve the viability of Tses reserve in 1928 by adding 
three neighbouring farms was defeated when it was discovered that they had already 
been occupied by white farmers. 62 The occupation of farms gave no security of 
tenure to black pastoralists. The Tses case revealed a contrasting set of values. 
The local magistrate noted the clash of interests over the use of one of the farms, 
but concluded that:
It is ... impossible to turn Europeans off the farm to make way for
natives. 63
The increasing density of white farmers on the land gave them the power to control 
stock movements by black pastoralists. The residents of Tses reserve were given 
official permission in 1928 to trek with their animals to vacant Crown Land on the 
fringe of the Kalahari to save their animals from drought. However the farmer 
occupying the farm through which they would have to pass to reach the fresh 
pasture refused them entry . 64
Almost half (81) of the 167 listed black stockowners in Tses reserve in 1928 owned 
over 100 small stock and/or 20 large stock. The wealth of black stockowners, 
despite their losses over the previous years, rivalled that of many of the recent poor 
white immigrants. Josef Katzuminanini, for example, kept a herd of 22 cows and 
flocks of 279 sheep and 385 goats. The total stock figures for Tses reserve in 1928 
were 18,500 small stock and 2,487 large stock giving an average of 228 small stock 
and 30 large stock per head. 65
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The accumulation, or even survival, of black pastoralists’ animals depended on their 
access to land beyond the reserves - either on the diminishing sections of Crown 
Land or by negotiating access to land controlled by white farmers. The magistrate 
at Bethanie admitted that large numbers of stock would have ‘died from starvation’ 
if he had not given their owners permission to graze their animals on land outside 
Soromas reserve during 1924.66 The wealthier black stockowners were able to 
obtain grazing licences, but only on a temporary basis. Black stockowners from 
Soromas reserve were able to hire grazing on Uims and Brakwasser farms, for 
example. 6 7
The temporary nature of their occupation seriously impeded the prospects of 
wealthier black stockowners establishing themselves as independent propertied 
farmers. Development work such as the building of a permanent well at Uims by 
the temporary occupants failed to convince the administration that they should have 
any permanent rights to the farm . 68 The official policy that even empty farms 
bordering the reserve, such as Schwarzkuppe, should only be used by residents as 
a temporary measure meant that black pastoralists lacked the security of tenure, 
enjoyed by their white counterparts, over much of the land that they used during the 
1920s.69
BLACK PASTORALISTS. WHITE FARMERS.
Barriers to mobility and access to land created obstacles for black pastoralists based 
on communal land, whilst the emergence of black farmers with individual property 
rights was stymied. The ‘reserves’ were supposedly reserved for black 
stockowners, yet at times it seemed as if the pastoral communities had been given 
property without the means of exercising control or enforcing their rights over their 
land when faced with the competing interests of white farmers.
The Berseba Territory under the German Regime provides one of the earliest 
examples of the intersection between a capitalist interpretation of property rights and 
a more flexible concept of boundaries of allegiance. The ‘Kapitaen’ at Berseba,
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Goliath, ‘sold’ 21 identified farms to another wealthy resident, David Christian Izak, 
on 11th January, 1909.70 Izak provided a single horse in exchange for the 
farms . 71 The interpretation put on the exchange by the two men was very 
different, one claiming it had commercial roots and the other that the land would 
remain essentially communal. Goliath saw it as signifying a bond of allegiance, 
claiming to a Commission of Inquiry in 1922 that:
I sold the ground on the advice of my elder raadsleden so that David Izak 
could protect me later. 7 2
Goliath therefore claimed the right to reclaim the farms (19 in 1913 and the 
remaining 2 in 1919) when he no longer felt he could rely on Izak’s support. 7 3  
Izak presented the purchase, very differently, describing it as a calculated financial 
investment:
I bought this ground for myself and family to live on because I was told by 
traders that it would be better to buy ground as later other people would 
come in and get the ground from Chief Goliath. 7 4
Izak realised the commercial value of the land, renting out Tses Farm to Klukowski, 
a white farmer, for an annual rent of £12. The revival of Izak’s claim to land rights 
over the farms in 1922 also indicated his commercial acumen. The disputed farms 
made up a considerable proportion of the land which the administration proposed 
to buy for £12,909 16s.3d. in order to create the new Tses reserve and some 
additional farms for white settlers. 7 5 The renewed agitation by Izak at this time 
was surely not coincidental, but would have been linked to the hope that he might 
be able to claim part of this purchase price as compensation for the farms that he 
had lost. Goliath had received half the rent obtained by Izak, yet popular resentment 
at the alienation of grazing land within the Berseba Territory and resentment at the 
individual profit being accrued seem to have motivated him to seek the return of the 
land . 7 6
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The disagreement over the basis of the land deal resulted in a simmering feud that 
survived beyond the 1922 Commission of Inquiry and split the community for 
decades to come. The broader significance of the Commission was its conclusion 
that ‘intertribal sales of land’ would not be recognised by the administration. 7 7  
The decision reflected the harsher views about black land ownership that had been 
embodied in the 1913 Land Act in the Union. However the refusal to countenance 
individual property rights even within the areas reserved for black stockowners may 
also have been a response to the need to maximise the number of black stockowners 
that the reserves could contain and the need to protect poor white immigrants from 
the competitive threat that black farmers would have posed.
The purchase of a large portion of the Berseba Territory was justified by the 
authorities as a means of preventing the residents becoming the victims of a familiar 
cycle of debt and dispossession. Izak had leased out farms, whilst Goliath had 
arranged for the transfer of a 12,000 hectare farm to a trader in 1916 to settle a 
£600 debt. 7 8 The land purchase, it was argued, would liberate the community 
from their debts, whilst maintaining access for black stockowners to the majority of 
the land. Fifty-five percent of the payment of £12,909. 16s.3d made to the Berseba 
community in 1921 was immediately swallowed up by the demands of eight local 
white traders for the settlement of outstanding debts. 7 9  Yet the forced resettlement 
of black squatters on the land meant that the community did lose control over it, 
whilst land containing water holes that played an important role in grazing patterns 
was set aside as white farms. The decision that all the money would be placed into 
a communal Trust Fund meant that it could not be used as collateral by individual 
black stockowners seeking to buy their own farms.
Reserve borders were crudely defined by widely distanced cairns, with fencing of 
the extensive farms only becoming common during the 1940s. Numerous border 
disputes resulted from the efforts of black stockowners to evade and of white 
farmers to invade the reserve borders. However despite the physical fragility of the 
boundary markers it was black stockowners who paid the heaviest penalties for 
infringing them, whilst numerous cases existed where reserve residents received no
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compensation where farmers had illegally used their land for years . 8 0  The 
movement of one beacon on the edge of the Berseba reserve added 100 hectares to 
a neighbouring farm, yet it took sixteen years of protest before the error was 
corrected . 81
The cost for black stockowners whose stock strayed onto a neighbouring farm was 
heavy with farmers impounding or even confiscating stray stock. 8 2 The payment 
of these penalties was deeply resented by black stockowners. The fact that white 
farmers owned their own branding irons, whilst their possession by black 
stockowners was forbidden fuelled suspicions that farmers were claiming stray stock 
and adding them to their own flocks and herds. 83
The determination of the new regime to support the white farming community 
during the first decade of the occupation meant that their interests received 
preference even when this created a conflict of interests within the perimeters of the 
reserves themselves. Once again the Bondels reserve suffered the most. The 
Bondelswarts’ stock were decimated during the World War One campaign in 
Namibia and the South African forces chose to utilise their ‘reserve’ to 
accommodate the thousands of animals that they had rounded up during their 
operations. Thousands of ‘loot stock’ (1,500 cattle alone) were herded into the 
reserve . 84 The community which had suffered such grievous stock losses 
themselves were allowed to consume milk from the animals, but the animals were 
returned to their owners, including German farmers, following their demobilisation. 
The benefits to the residents seemed negligible whilst they complained that the 
concentration of animals finished off grazing that their own flocks required . 85
The dramatic reduction of the Bondelswarts flocks following the 1922 Rising created 
a further grazing opportunity that was used to the benefit of white farmers. In 1926 
the Executive Council agreed that flocks belonging to white farmers in the drought- 
stricken Cape district of Kenhardt would be allowed to trek into Namibia with their 
stock. 86 Officials claimed that the reserve escaped a period of poor rain fall that 
affected southern Namibia and the northern Cape from 1924. It seems more likely
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that the collapse of stock levels within the reserve had actually protected the pasture 
after it had become exhausted in surrounding areas. The argument was given that 
the hire of the reserve to white farmers could provide an essential source of income 
to the impoverished reserve. A temporary Trust Fund was established in August, 
1927 and by the end of the year farmers had contributed £135 19s. in grazing fees 
to the Fund.87
The entry of the farmers was neither as controlled, nor as beneficial as the figures 
might initially suggest. It was reported that the farmers had:
... warned the Superintendent at Dreihoek that if they were not given grazing 
they would be forced to trespass rather than allow all their stock to die of 
starvation.88
The farmers bought an excessive number of animals into the Bondels reserve with 
serious environmental consequences. A list of the 29 farmers using the reserve in 
December 1927 showed that they possessed 24,250 head of small stock alone and 
when the animals belonging to residents were added the total reached 29,373.89 
The evidence suggests that during the peak use of the reserve the figures may have 
climbed even higher.90 The maximum carrying capacity of the reserve in 1927 
was estimated locally to be 25,000 sheep and 2,000 large stock91. The figures 
suggest that the farmer’s stock would have left little pasture for the residents own 
stock. A reporter from The Star newspaper confirmed this implication when he 
visited the reserve, reporting:
... the influx of great droves of cattle and sheep belonging to European 
farmers, which having picked the veld bare, are removed to fresh 
pastures.92
The Bondels reserve had been used to save the flocks of white farmers, but this had 
destroyed much of the vegetation within the reserve. The purchase of animals by 
residents working on the Mines and Railways swelled the number of small stock in
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the reserve (from 5,123 in 1927 to 11,576 in 1929), yet as the reserve itself slid into 
a prolonged drought its ability to support these new flocks had been seriously 
weakened. By the end of the year the majority of the residents were reported to 
have been reduced to subsistence levels, generally owning no more than five to 
fifteen goats.93 A survey, during 1929, of the sixty pupils at the school at Wortel 
in the reserve found that only six had eaten during the day.94 Little tangible 
evidence could be found that the majority of the residents had benefited 
economically from the fees paid by the farmers.
Officials later alleged that reserve leaders had colluded with this process. The 
removal of the reserve’s Welfare Officer for seven years (1928-1935), as an 
economy measure, had, it was claimed, allowed farmers to use bribery to obtain 
grazing rights for their flocks within the reserve.95 The widely voiced accusations 
were not pursued, but suggests the existence of conflicts of interest within the 
reserve. The ability of a resident Welfare Officer to prevent such incursions was 
also questionable. The fact that six public roads crossed the Bondels reserve meant 
that rain in the reserve attracted an immediate influx of farmers with their stock. 
Early rains in the reserve following the drought of 1946 led a particularly large 
number of farmers to enter the reserve. The Welfare Officer complained that:
... these farmers are worse than locusts and the Welfare Officer has all his 
time occupied to shase (sic) after these people trying to save some of the 
grazing for the Hottentots. If some of the roads can be closed to the 
trekkers a lot of native stock can be saved yearly from dying.96
This stood in marked contrast to the difficulty faced by black stockowners if they 
sought alternative pasture outside the reserve. The Welfare Officer recognised the 
inequality of the system:
The natives are very unfortunate that they cannot trek with their stock when 
there is no grazing for they have to carry a pass and the farmers will shase 
(sic) them where ever they go and no body will help them with grazing.97
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The reserves served to confine, rather than protect the occupants and their livestock 
and provided one of the structural mechanisms that prevented the transition of black 
pastoralists into black farmers during the 1920s and early 1930s. Spatial obstacles 
to expansion were matched by financial barriers.
THE IMPACT OF GRAZING FEES ON THE RESERVES.
The introduction of grazing fees in the reserves by the military administration from 
1918 was designed to achieve two goals. The first was a limit to the number of 
animals owned by any individual within a reserve and the second to compel the 
residents to take up waged labour on neighbouring white farms. The second aim 
would only be achieved if the residents were unable to meet the demands made on 
them by other means (such as by urban employment or the sale of stock) and if 
farmers were able to pay an adequate wage in cash. The two largest reserves in 
southern Namibia claimed historical rights that enabled them to successfully contest 
the right of the state to impose grazing fees upon them. These factors meant that 
grazing fees remained flawed as a tool for labour recruitment, especially in the 
period up to 1930.
The limitation of stock accumulation within the reserves by individuals was initially 
of minor importance as wealthier stock owners were able during the early 1920s to 
retain access to other land either through a grazing licence on Crown Land or by 
a ‘squatting’ agreement with a white farmer. The fees became more significant 
towards the end of the 1920s when drought produced a concentration of stock in the 
reserves and legislation extended grazing fees to the remaining two reserves making 
all stock liable for taxation.
The administration made its first attempt to impose grazing fees in Berseba reserve 
in August, 1928 asking the leaders to support a ‘voluntary’ levy. David Goliath 
argued that the fees asked were too high and that the community should only pay 
a half rate. The request was refused as the ‘Native Commissioner’ feared that the
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negotiation of a reduced level of grazing fees by a community would set a 
dangerous precedent.98
The impact of grazing fees was twofold. Wealthier stockowners redistributed their 
stock to avoid falling within the higher tax bracket. The Superintendent noted that:
those ... who rearly (sic) possess a large number of stock, has got them 
devided (sic) into small flocks under the care of others who have none, and 
thus supports several families by providing them with milk and slaughter 
stock.99
The distribution of stock was bound to complicate the question of ownership and 
responsibility for grazing fees. The strategy, combined with the inability of the 
majority of the surrounding white farmers to provide cash wages (see Chapter Five), 
meant that the level of tax arrears steadily rose. Within a year arrears had reached 
£163 17s.7d and the administration had been forced to comply with Goliath’s 
original proposal and half the level of payments due.100
The fact that the residents of the Bondels reserve, the Warmbad commonage and the 
mission farm at Heirachabis all enjoyed free grazing meant that they were able to 
escape the full weight of taxation and use the bulk of their income to expand their 
flocks. One of the unintended impacts of the introduction of grazing fees in many 
of the reserves was an influx of population to those areas where grazing fees were 
not levied, such as the Bondels reserve or the mission farm at Heirachabis. The 
population of Heirachabis, for instance, had been swollen by 1926 by the arrival of 
an additional seventy families with their stock.101
The administration was forced to respond to the claims of farmers that such ‘tax 
havens’ as the Bondels and Berseba reserves were acting as sponges that absorbed 
the local labour force to the detriment of the white farming community. 
Government Notice No. 239 of 1930 announced the voluntary application of grazing 
fees upon the community, following the earlier introduction of fees in Berseba
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reserve. The introduction of fees seemed to be a direct response to continuing 
settler concern that the Bondels reserve was serving as a shelter for the unemployed. 
The need to make payments conveniently coincided with a decision by the Mining 
Companies to cease the recruitment of labour in the reserve, increasing the pressure 
on residents to acquire the necessary cash through farm labour.102
The final loophole in the network of grazing fees in southern Namibia was plugged 
by Government Notice No. 5 of 1942 which applied grazing fees to the Location at 
Warmbad.103 The Notice had been provoked by an alarmed report by the local 
magistrate that a pattern had emerged of stockowners moving to the Location to 
avoid compulsory work on development projects and the grazing fees levied in the 
Bondels reserve.104
DROUGHT AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PASTORAL ECONOMY.
Drought is endemic to southern Namibia, but the pattern of drought becomes 
disastrous when there is a succession of two or three years of bad rainfall. The 
devastating drought of the early 1930s hit hard and early in the South, 1929 was 
described as the:
... most disastrous one experienced in the history of the Berseba tribe.105
as it followed a three year chain of poor rain in the reserve. The smaller reserves 
with restricted access to alternative grazing were the ones that felt the impact of 
drought most immediately and severely. Half the animals in Gibeon reserve, for 
instance, were alleged to have died in the drought by 1929, whilst it was claimed 
that 40 percent of all the small stock in Tses reserve had died as a result of the 
drought as early as 1928.106
The impact of the drought on the reserve economy was negative in a number of 
different ways. The expulsion of farm workers with any substantial number of stock
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from surrounding white farms increased the pressure on resources in the reserves. 
The inability of many white farmers to pay the remaining workers in anything other 
than kind also had a knock on effect on the ability of reserve stockowners reliant on 
contributions from relatives working on farms to meet their grazing fees. One 
member of the Gibeon reserve board asked in 1931 whether, as farm wages were 
being paid in the form of goats, grazing fees could also be paid in kind. The 
request was turned down - deferral of payment might be considered, but substitution 
would not be.107 The weakening of stock also made it extremely difficult to find 
a market for animals and dried up the supply of milk, an important component of 
the local diet.
One of the most visible economic indicators of the impact of the drought and the 
difficulties residents were facing in obtaining a monetary income was the rapid 
accumulation of grazing fees arrears throughout the reserves during the early 1930s. 
The register for the Berseba reserve revealed that 97 percent of all its stockowners 
were in arrears with their payments by 1930 and the wealthiest stockowners were 
those owing the largest sums.108 The voluntary payment of grazing fees in 
Bondels reserve was abandoned after just four months in 1931 when debts of £173. 
18s.6d had already accrued and only reintroduced after the drought had broken.109
The drought and concurrent depression crippled the stock market, but also had a 
catastrophic impact on stock levels within the reserves. The residents of Tses 
reserve lost 63 large and 871 small stock in the reserve as a direct result of the 
drought in the first three months of 1933 alone.110 The residents of the Bondels 
reserve had been reduced to just 765 small stock and 201 large stock by May, 1934 
and most of these animals had recently arrived with three newcomers. The average 
flock size of the remaining 67 stockowners in the reserve was just 12 animals.111
The exhaustion of the resources available in the Bondels reserve due to overstocking 
at the start of the drought and the relatively dense and early white settlement of the 
surrounding district meant that stockowners confined to the reserve suffered 
particularly heavy losses. The Bondels reserve was to suffer its third devastating
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economic blow within twenty years. One wealthy stockowner known as Tieties was 
reported to have seen flocks estimated at 1,700 animals prior to the drought reduced 
to just 37 goats by 1934.112 The local magistrate recognised that stock levels in 
the reserve had fallen to sub-subsistence levels:
The majority of the residents of this Reserve do not own any stock at all.
How, and on what they exist is a miracle to me but the least I can say is that
their plight must be a terrible one.113
The magistrate was forced to arrange for the distribution of paupers rations within 
the reserve to prevent the community from starving to death.
The gathering of grazing fees during the drought proved as difficult as the collection 
of payments due from white farmers. The concentration of stock in the reserves had 
left the owners liable to pay large grazing fee bills, but the concentration and 
consequent death of many animals had also removed the means to meet these debts. 
The residents of Soromas reserve contributed just Is. (one shilling) in grazing fees 
in the entire period from October, 1932 to July, 1935 and arrears rose to £197 
Is.2d114. The administration was forced to write off substantial debts. In 
February, 1935, for example, the administration agreed to discount £2,337 8s.5d 
of arrears owed by stockowners in Tses reserve. An indication of the scale of the 
arrears and collapse of stock levels can be found in the fact that the sum would have 
been sufficient to pay the grazing fees charged that month for the surviving stock 
in the reserve (315 large and 3,576 small stock) for over 29 years !115
The options available to black stockowners were extremely limited during the 
drought. The majority lacked the capital to pay for grazing and desperately sought 
‘work for grazing’ arrangements with white farmers.116 The drought made such 
agreements hard to secure and stock concentration in the reserves led to rising stock 
deaths and debts. The residents of the Bondels reserve were reported to be walking 
over 100 miles to the Orange River in their efforts to find work and pay their 
grazing fees117. The few wealthier stockowners had the option to hire grazing,
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but the conditions were harsh and the survival of their stock still not guaranteed. 
One of the wealthier stockowners from Gibeon reserve secured grazing on a farm 
in Rehoboth district, but had to pay the owner 20-30 goats for the short period he 
used the farm. The owner of a small subsistence flock would not have been able 
to afford this level of payment.118 The wealthier black stockowners were forced 
to pay inflated charges to secure grazing outside the increasingly congested and 
denuded reserves, to pay excess for access.
The crisis facing white farmers led the administration to make extra land available 
to them at reduced rates. White farmers were given access to vacant Crown Land 
and charged a reduced rate of grazing fees at just seven and a half pence per 
hundred small stock. In contrast a wealthy stockowner in the reserve was paying 
grazing fees of two shillings and one pence (twenty-five pence) for his first hundred 
small stock and four shillings and two pence (fifty pence) for his second 
hundred119. A white farmer grazing two hundred sheep on Crown Land would 
therefore pay just fourteen pence in grazing fees, whilst a black stockowner grazing 
the exact same flock in Gibeon reserve was charged seventy-five pence. The 
injustice was apparent, but the grazing fees were not amended until the 23rd April, 
1934, by which time the drought had passed and the residents of the reserve had 
compiled substantial debts.
The difficulty of finding and paying for grazing was aggravated by the difficulties 
of reaching it. Three black stockowners from Tses trekking towards Rehoboth were 
forced to pay £1 10s. (the equivalent of three months pay to a farm worker at 
contemporary local rates) in order to cross just one farm on their journey. The 
journey would force them to cross dozens of farms. Once again it was only the 
wealthiest black stockowners who could afford to move their animals; the three 
stockowners were travelling with 332 cattle and 3,036 small stock.120 By the end 
of April, 1934 41 of the wealthiest stockowners in Tses reserve had moved with 
their stock to Rehoboth.121 The Superintendent of the Tses reserve carried out an 
analysis of his grazing fee register in September, 1934 and discovered that of the 
282 stockowners that had been listed in 1928, 81 had left the reserve and 121 of
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those that remained in the reserve had lost practically all their animals122. Many 
of those who had left the reserve, understandably, showed little inclination to return. 
The majority of those that had moved to the Rehoboth Gebiet moved from there to 
different reserves (at Ovitoto and Otjimbingwe) further north, and only nine chose 
to return to Tses.123
The minority who moved their animals were forced to pay heavily for water and 
grazing and still lost many animals in payment and from the rigours of trekking and 
the drought. Gideon Matundu left Tses reserve with 73 large stock and 260 small 
stock and travelled to the Rehoboth Gebiet. However by the time he left there for 
the Ovitoto reserve he had only 21 large and 80 small stock left.124 The direct 
result of the drought was to push many of the stockowners who had been able to 
claim Exemption Certificates as owners of over 50 small stock below the safety 
threshold. Andries Keyster, a Gibeon reserve board reported that his 60 head of 
small stock had been reduced to just 5 by 1934.125
The evidence suggests that the internal result of the prolonged drought was increased 
differentiation. An analysis can be made of the flocks belonging to twenty of the 
wealthiest stockowners in Berseba reserve in 1930 at the start of the drought in the 
reserve and in 1935 after its end. The results are summarised in Table 7.
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TABLE 7. A comparison of the flock size of the wealthiest residents 
in Berseba Reserve, 1930 and 1935.126
Stockowner. Small stock.
1930 1935
Anton Kairorwe 122 210
Langman Tjito 524 451
David Vries 700 416
Diedrik Vries 54 234
Daniel Karolus 217 163
Edward Izaak (old) 1284 532
Amon Tobias Amon 991 958
Jeremias Windstaan 870 961
Jeremias Kahuka 255 440
Jonas Oarum 185 206
Jacob Kapsido 221 159
Lukas Tsumbe 253 192
Paul Kahuka 417 339
Eduard Kahuka 364 538
Eduard Izaak Jnr. 39 344
Saul Kahuka 365 617
Diedrik Izaak 50 133
David Ch. Izaak 16 105
Andreas Kabuka 300 279
Andreas Matinga 40 134
TOTAL 7267 7411
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The figures show a slight increase in the number of animals held by the twenty 
stockowners, indeed the increase of under 2 percent over a five year period seems 
unremarkable. However if one considers the broader pattern of stock levels in the 
reserve the statistics are cast in a totally different light. In 1930 the total number 
of small stock in the Berseba reserve were numbered at 30,600. In 1935 this figure 
had fallen by over 34 percent to just 20,079.
The statistics represent a substantial concentration of stock in the hands of the 
wealthier members of the reserve. If the stock belonging to all twenty-eight of the 
stockowners included in the 1935 list is computed the total number of small stock 
in their flocks adds up to 9,142. If we calculate that there were 653 stockowners 
in the reserve at the time we arrive at some startling conclusions. In 1935 just 4 
percent of the stockowners in the reserve owned over 45 percent of the small stock. 
The figures suggest that the poorer stockowners had been forced to leave the reserve 
during the drought and to work on neighbouring farms, whilst the richer 
stockowners were able to remain. Yet the population of the reserve did not 
substantially decline over the period, in fact the adult population even rose slightly.
The solution to the dilemma that this seems to create can be found by placing the 
statistics in a broader context. The fact that the total adult population of the reserve 
remained fairly static concealed a substantial shift in the composition of that group. 
The evidence suggests that the poorer stockowners were pushed out of the reserve 
by the stock losses that they sustained during the drought, they may even have 
passed some of their animals on to richer relatives remaining in the reserve. An 
influx of people who had been removed from urban areas would have created an 
influx to balance the exit of poorer residents and explain (at least in part) the 
relative stability of the population. The statistics for Keetmanshoop district show 
that the black urban population fell from 1,720 in 1929 to 1483 in 1934, whilst the 
rural population increased dramatically.127
The impact of the drought had been to concentrate the remaining stock in the hands 
of a smaller group of stockowners. The result was a substantial increase in the
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degree of economic differentiation within the reserves. A larger number of black 
stockowners saw their flocks reduced to levels that were barely sufficient for 
subsistence and became dependent upon external means of support. Bondels 
reserve, the hardest hit by the drought, was impoverished with those lacking family 
support moving to Warmbad, "... on the verge of extreme starvation".128
The administration issued 500 goats to the residents, but divided between 200 
destitute families they proved to be more of an addition to the diet than the 
economic reconstruction of the community.129 The few wealthier stockowners 
who had been able to move and save at least some of their animals were in a more 
advantageous position. Two black stockowners who entered the Bondels reserve in 
1936, for instance had over 700 goats each.130 Eighteen individuals in the reserve 
owned 57 percent of the livestock. The remainder were divided between a further 
182 owners. Thus, whilst the richest eighteen owners had flocks that contained an 
average of 192 animals, the majority had, on average, just fourteen animals.131
RECOVERY AND RESTRICTION.
The drought had exposed the difficulties of pursuing a pastoral ambition within the 
reserves and forced a large number of the poorer residents to enter employment 
outside the reserve. The population of the Bondels reserve had shown a male 
majority in 1931, but by the end of the decade the men resident in the reserve were 
outnumbered by double the number of women.132 The irony was that whilst the 
administration tried to maintain the economic subsistence base for black workers 
within the reserves, the workers demonstrated a reluctance to invest in the dubious 
economic potential of the reserves.
Workers from the reserves working on the Railways were to have one third of their 
wages deducted and sent to the reserve to purchase goats. However by 1939 it was 
reported that:
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"The deferred pay scheme is unpopular ... Hottentots in Railway employ 
move from place to place and gang to gang to get lost sight of and to escape 
the contributions.133
The strategy suggested a shift in the economic aspirations of the residents of the 
reserve. The majority of the residents seemed to no longer believe that the reserve 
provided a realistic opportunity for them to establish themselves as independent 
stock farmers.
The recovery of black pastoralists’ flocks in the late 1930s faced restriction. 
Soromas reserve provides the best example of the way in which the expansion of 
black pastoralists was thwarted. Stock recovery started early in the reserve with a 
steady increase in the number of small stock within the reserve throughout the 
period 1931-1939.
Residents were told by the ‘Chief Native Commissioner’ at the end of 1938 that ‘... 
the people here have become too rich’, and he warned that the growing number of 
stock on the reserve could ‘... spoil the ground and the grazing for future 
generations’.134
A survey of the 86 black stockowners in Soromas reserve in June, 1939 revealed 
that 58 had over 100 small stock and/or 20 large stock. The stockowners owned, 
in total, 12,989 small stock and 873 large stock. The average flock size had 
accordingly risen to over 150.135 By the end of the year the number of small 
stock had reached a peak of 15,677. One might suggest that for the first time in the 
reserve a substantial number of the stockholders seemed to have reached a level 
from which they might hope to sustain an independent economic existence. Yet the 
problem of ‘overstocking’ could be seen from two angles - the result of too many 
animals or too little land.
Stockowners in Soromas reserve argued as early as 1936 that their pastoral success 
required an expansion of the land which they could utilize for their flocks. Yet two
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farms suggested as possible additions to the reserve were both later sold to white 
settlers.136 The failure to expand the land available to the stockowners resulted 
in an environmentally dangerous level of overstocking, by 1939 it was estimated that 
Soromas reserve contained 1,300 cattle and 6,700 goats more than it could be 
expected to sustain, and stock levels were continuing to rise.137 The Special 
Justice of the Peace based at Bethanie argued that an expansion of Soromas reserve 
was both necessary and justified:
When it is remembered that an average farm in this District carries not more 
than 2,000 small stock and say 30 large stock on 10,000 hectares, it will be 
realised that the Reserve is chronically overstocked. Yet the number of 
stock is not excessive for the support of the population.138
The strain placed upon the reserves by stock expansion in the reserves at the end of 
the 1930s was not, however, only due to the natural recovery of flocks. In March, 
1938 all licences allowing black stockowners to graze their flocks on Crown Land 
had been cancelled.139 Stock that had been grazing on Klipdrift to the west of 
Bethanie, for example, were evicted140. The number of animals in Soromas 
reserve actually leaped from 264 large and 4,894 small stock in 1937 to 496 and 
10,233 respectively in 1938. Rapid jumps in stock numbers such as this caused 
considerable harm to the reserve’s pastoral resources. Ecological damage was 
matched by rising friction between the residents and the owners of the, largely 
unfenced, farms bordering the reserve.
The official reaction to the pressure on the resources in Soromas reserve was to seek 
ways of reducing the stock, rather than to increase its size. It was proposed that the 
existing limit of 300 small stock per owner in the reserves should be halved or cut 
to a third in Soromas. Calculations showed that a limit of 150 small stock per head 
would lead to a reduction of 1,200 stock belonging to 17 owners. A limit of 100 
would remove 2,300 small stock belonging to 29 owners. The fact that there were 
only 106 stockowners listed in the reserve meant that the lower limit would force 
over 27 percent of the stockowners into a forced sale of their stock. The policy was
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clearly one that would favour the local white farmers who would buy the animals 
in forced sales, rather than the black stockowners whose farming ambitions were 
being curbed. The only alternative proposed by the administration was that the 
community should abandon the reserve altogether (so that it could be used as white 
farmland) and move to another larger reserve further north.
The community refused to abandon their land and so Government Notice No. 62 of 
1941 accordingly set a maximum stock level for the reserve of either 15 large stock 
or 100 small stock (with 1 large stock being equivalent to 10 small stock).141 
However the environmental collapse of the reserve had been such that the 
enforcement of the regulation was hardly necessary. The Administrator, in his 
Annual Report for 1941, claimed that:
The application of this regulation [No 62.] at the present time caused no 
hardship, as stock losses have been so heavy that only one or two individuals 
had more than the prescribed maximum.142
Despite this assurance a local official reported, eighteen months later, 27 residents 
still had flocks that exceeded the new limits.143 The fact once again suggests the 
concentration of stock possession. The Administrator was however correct that the 
overuse of the reserve had made its occupants vulnerable. Statistics show that 
2,114 small stock died as a result of drought and disease in Soromas reserve during 
the years 1943-1945.144
When stock levels recovered again (in 1951) Government Notice No. 62 of 1941 
was invoked once again. All families in possession of over 100 small stock were 
given six months to dispose of the excess.145 The emphasis on the family, rather 
than the individual seems to have reflected the growing official awareness of the 
practice of stock distribution to evade the higher brackets of grazing fees and, 
presumably, the extremely low permissable levels of accumulation in Soromas.
Tses reserve provided a further example of the way in which the increase in stock
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levels in the reserve following the forced removal of black stockowners from 
alternative grazing was linked to the enforcement of stock limits within the reserve. 
The population of the reserve almost doubled between 1935 and 1939 and good 
rains helped to sustain the swelling flocks. Tses reserve contained 38 stockowners 
by February, 1940 who owned more than the maximum number permitted by the 
authorities.146
The enforcement of the 300 limit in the reserve (by Government Notice No. 169 as 
amended by Government Notice No. 117 of 1939) was coupled with a campaign of 
prosecutions against those in arrears with their grazing fees. The magistrate noted 
that those who were rich would be prosecuted first.147 Restrictions were also 
placed on those wishing to enter the reserve. Jonas Katjerungu was told, in June, 
1939, that he could only enter the reserve if he sold 116 of his 216 small stock flock 
first148 The reduced access to alternative grazing for black stockowners meant that 
he had little choice but to reduce the size of his flocks. By the end of the year a 
total ban had been placed on any further black stockowners moving into the 
reserve.149 Attempts to reduce the size of flocks incited efforts to conceal stock. 
When the administration tried to impose maximum flock sizes on the residents of 
Tses reserve again, in 1952, the stock figures fell. However the Police and officials 
strongly suspected that animals were being distributed and concealed during stock 
counts.150
The restrictions on stock accumulation and access to grazing made it extremely 
difficult for individual black stockowners to successfully compete with their white 
neighbours. The regulations seemed to mark a abrupt end to the process of 
increasing differentiation within the reserve. Yet the restrictions also meant that the 
small numbers of comparatively elite stockowners in each reserve were given a 
major interest in controlling the entry of new stockowners into a reserve. The 
intervention was likely to encourage the nourishment of exclusive parochial 
community identities by the small black stockowning elite within each reserve whilst 
destroying the pastoral hopes of the poorer majority. The lack of opportunity to 
gain access to the reserve combined with the tightening squeeze on workers’ stock
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on white farms left young black stockowners with poor prospects, forcing them to 
reduce their stock and seek their economic fortunes in urban areas rather than on 
the land. Youthful pastoral ambition was stifled.
THE STOCK MARKET.
The accumulation of stock by individual black stockowners in a reserve was not in 
itself sufficient to make them prosperous. The social benefits of stock increase were 
a motivation, but the ability of black stockowners to also benefit commercially 
depended upon their access to the market and their ability to sell their stock at fair 
prices. The criteria applied to the selection of stock by reserve residents were often 
different to those used by the administration. They were sceptical for instance of the 
value of animals that they felt were vulnerable to disease or drought, and allegedly 
rejected merino sheep because of the costs of dipping.151 The allegiance to goats 
with ’no commercial value’ puzzled officials, but they were hardy and edible and 
other stock would only be valuable if surplus could be sold at satisfactory prices. 
Black pastoralists complained about the limited marketing opportunities available to 
them, about the way in which sales were organised and about the prices offered at 
those sales. Inadequate investment and circumscribed markets were unlikely to 
inspire commercial livestock enterprise.
The difficulty facing reserve residents wishing to sell excess animals as their flocks 
expanded during the late 1930s was that the local white farming community often 
provided the only marketing opportunity and were able to take advantage of the 
periodical pressures placed upon the residents. The residents of Soromas reserve 
sought 15s. for hamel sheep at a local sale in 1937, but found that the assembled 
farmers would only offer 8s. to 10s.152 The evidence suggests that local farmers 
were able to form cartels and control the prices offered to black stockowners at the 
auctions arranged in the reserves. The refusal of black stockowners to sell stock 
and to pay grazing fees was at times a result of their refusal to sell their animals at 
prices that they perceived to be unjust.
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Alpheus Karea, a wealthy stockowner at Tses reserve complained in 1938 that 
buyers were keeping their prices artificially low. The stockowners had been under 
pressure to sell and thus remove their old kapaters. Karea asked the administration 
to impose an acceptable minimum price at these sales.153 The wealthier 
stockowners refused to part with their stock at prices that they felt had been falsely 
deflated.
The belief of reserve residents that sale prices were fixed by purchasers was rarely 
acknowledged by officials. However in 1945 the Welfare Officer at Tses admitted 
that he had problems persuading residents to bring their animals to the official 
auctions as:
...if  I do organise a small sale of the few animals that are available, I will 
have only the few local buyers whom we had for the last ten years and who 
are all pals, and who are precisely the people who wrecked a sale, by 
forming a ring, that was organised by my predecessor at Vaalgras.154
The failure of the authorities to intervene and prevent the price-rigging at sales at 
Tses meant that stockowners might only sell their animals if forced to by the threat 
of prosecution under the grazing fees legislation. The failure of the auctions could 
then be blamed on the intransigence of the prospective sellers or the inferior nature 
of the animals offered. The difficulty of obtaining fair prices for their stock was 
constantly stressed by residents at reserve meetings. Gerhard Groenewald of 
Berseba reserve complained at a meeting in 1949 about a recent stock sale that:
... had not been a success as there was no competition amongst the buyers 
(only two) attending it.155
The justification for organising auctions of stock in the reserve was that no 
individual black stockowner would wish to sell a sufficiently large number of stock 
at any one time to attract buyers. A larger sale would attract buyers from a wider 
area and produce better prices for the black stockowners. However Hans Jager
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explained at a meeting in Tses reserve in 1956 that:
The residents are dissatisfied with the price that we got for our goats at the 
auction ... Why can’t we sell our sheep outside ? (my translation)156
Yet the prices obtained at stock sales had increased significantly during the early 
1950s. A stock sale in Gibeon reserve in 1951 had resulted in the sale of 27 cattle 
for a total of £405 and of 321 goats for £963, similar prices were obtained for cattle 
the following year whilst the price obtained for goats rose on average from £2 to 
£3 per head157. Only seven years early a sale in the reserve had resulted in the 
sale of 486 goats for just £261. 19s.6d. and 28 large stock for £197. 17s.6d158. 
The average price for goats had thus more than doubled over the period. The 
restrictions on entry to the reserve seemed to be providing the basis for the 
concentration of wealth within the reserve and the consolidation of a small group of 
black commercial farmers. Yet whilst only the minority profited directly, the ability 
to accumulate and distribute stock meant that a number of dependent relatives could 
also be maintained within the reserves by wealthier black stockowners. The 
increasing prosperity of the reserves, therefore, related to changes in the flow of 
local labour to the white farms of southern Namibia.
Quality control was often used as the excuse for the low prices offered for stock 
from the reserves, yet the residents faced considerable difficulty in improving their 
breeding stock. The white farming community of southern Namibia were able to 
restructure their farms after the drought to concentrate on karakul sheep, yet reserve 
residents found it hard to obtain good quality breeding stock. The cost of a karakul 
ram for breeding purposes was quoted at £15 in 1934, the equivalent (at 
contemporary prices) of a farm workers whole wage for over two years or the sale 
of over 30 goats.159
The price of breeding stock was prohibitive to poorer stockowners whilst those with 
the necessary capital were forced to obtain animals of inferior quality from local 
farmers.160 black stockowners did not receive the advances and advice enjoyed
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by the many white farmers who wished to develop karakul flocks. Indeed the 
production of karakul pelts in the reserves was discouraged as it was argued that:
... it might influence the overseas market adversely161
As late as 1954 sixteen stockowners in the Tses reserve were still petitioning the 
administration to make available good quality karakul rams to them for purchase so 
that they could improve the quality of their karakul flocks and avoid having to buy 
the low quality animals that they complained were still offered for sale to them by 
local farmers.162
The local magistrate sought to place a ceiling on the accumulation of stock by the 
wealthiest stockowners. In 1952 an attempt was made to reduce the size of all the 
flocks of small stock in the Tses reserve to the statutory maximum of 300. The 
following year the Welfare Officer at Tses reported that once again the distribution 
of stock was being used as a means of evading the law:
When the stockowners had to reduce their small stock to 300 last year, they 
were cross with me although they were glad afterwards when they found that 
they can register the excessive stock in the name of relations and therefore 
the stock was never reduced in the Reserve and are more now than before 
due to the good lambing season (sic).163
The redistribution of stock would result in the construction of a complex maze of 
economic and social relationships. The division of stock raised questions about 
ownership of the milk, of the skin of animals that died and of any progeny produced 
by animals on unofficial loan to another member of the family.
DROUGHT AND DIFFERENTIATION IN THE RESERVES. 1940-1955.
The obstacles on the path to prosperity meant that during the 1940s stock in the
134
reserves became concentrated in the hands of a diminishing number of stockowners. 
The residents of Bondels reserve became divided into two divergent groups. The 
first consisted of the few residents wealthy enough to use the reserve as an 
economic base and the second, the majority who were extremely poor, and often old 
or sick. By 1942 four or five of the residents had reasonably large flocks, but the 
majority still had meagre flocks with less than twenty animals. A sign of 
modernisation was the fact that two of them had built up flocks of over two hundred 
karakul ewes.164
A sharp drop in the number of stock on the reserve in 1943 was ascribed to drought 
and the fact that the reserve had been completely surrounded by white farms - 
restricting stock mobility.165 The fall was a precursor of the decimation of the 
reserve’s flocks during the severe drought of 1946 when the reserve received no 
rain at all.166 Over half the small stock grazing in the reserve died during the 
drought of 1945-1946 (the number in the reserve fell from 11,411 to 5,668). The 
Administrator argued that the drought was ‘. . . a  blessing in disguise’ as it reduced 
the number of animals in many of the reserves which, walled in by white farms, had 
reached the limit of their capacity. He also felt that the drought would perform a 
useful function if it:
... forced some of the stock owners to take up employment outside the
Reserves.167
The three reserves that suffered most in the drought were all in the south - Tses, 
Gibeon and Berseba. The drought produced a spectacular drop in the number of 
animals in the reserves of southern Namibia between 1945 and 1947. Stock 
numbers in Tses reserve had by 1947 fallen to 1934 levels, the worst year of the 
prolonged drought of the early 1930s. The drought was so severe that practically 
all the surviving cattle in the reserve were removed to the Aminuis reserve. The 
pressure on reserve residents to gain cash did not mean that they were going to 
work on surrounding farms. One magistrate reported, in 1947, that:
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Many are flocking to the towns in search of work but will not go to the 
surrounding farmers who are clamouring for labourers.168
The movement of people out of the reserve produced less a distribution of labour 
amongst white farmers, than an increase in the black urban population. One feature 
of this movement was the large number of women who were noted to have left the 
reserves and moved into the towns in search of employment.169
The 1946 drought was followed by a succession of years of good rainfall during 
which the stock in the reserves increased dramatically. The increase was evident 
even in Bondels reserve. In 1948 only one stockowner had over five hundred 
animals in his flock, by 1950, the majority of stockowners had over one hundred 
small stock and eight had over five hundred animals.170 Reserve residents were 
reported to be buying substantial numbers of animals from neighbouring farmers 
during 1951 and 1952, further increasing the numbers of stock in the reserve.171 
By 1954 it was reported that a few of the wealthiest stockowners had even 
purchased cars172. The annual or bi-annual stock sales that were held in the 
reserve were dominated by this handful of the wealthiest stockowners.173
The improvement in the economic condition of the reserve led to renewed 
complaints from white farmers that the reserve had become too comfortable and was 
used to harbour those that deserted their jobs on farms in the district illegally.174 
The cause of the farmers’ frustration was that the slight improvement in the 
conditions in the reserve allowed workers to refuse work on farms when the pay and 
conditions offered were insufficient. There is some evidence that the wealthier 
members of the community were prepared to use their wealth to shelter poorer 
relatives from exploitation.
The Welfare Officer at the Bondels reserve described the practice succinctly in his 
Monthly Report for May, 1956:
It is almost daily, here, that farmers leave the reserve empty-handed because
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the inhabitants are simply too choosy. It is with a kind of malicious pleasure 
that young ‘natives’ tell you that they herd their father’s livestock although 
the fathers are completely capable of taking care of their livestock 
themselves (my translation).175
Whilst the legislative mechanisms and comparative advantage of white farmers 
combined to squeeze workers out of the Bondelswarts reserve and onto the farms 
in the district, the community continued to struggle to retain its economic 
independence.
One financial legacy of the drought was that once again the Tses Trust Fund which 
relied on the income derived from grazing fees went bankrupt. As of the 31st 
March, 1949 it had a debit balance of £45, in contrast to a sizeable credit balance 
of £3,932 at the end of 1945. The crash of the Fund could be blamed on an 
extensive capital investment programme to fence the reserve and sink boreholes in 
an attempt to locate additional water sources within the reserve. The fencing 
projects alone cost £3,211 in 1947.176 The administration blamed the problem on 
the reluctance of the reserve residents to pay grazing fees. However the reserve 
board provided an alternative perspective claiming that:
The expenditure on boreholes which had caused them to run into debt was 
not really their fault as they did not ask for them and had even protested 
against having so many sunk but no notice had been taken of these 
protestations.177
The lack of consultation over the way in which money collected from the 
community was spent was bound to diminish the enthusiasm of people for paying 
their grazing fees.
The wealthiest stockowners in the reserves were able to take some advantage of the 
karakul boom after World War Two. Thirteen of the wealthiest residents of Tses 
reserve were reported to have acquired karakul flocks of 100-400 sheep by
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1949.178 The sale of karakul pelts and wool was soon the main source of revenue. 
The karakul farmers of Tses and Berseba sold £5,500 worth of pelts and £750 worth 
of wool in 1950 alone. The sum constituted two thirds of the total revenue raised 
by residents of the reserve in that year, but had been generated by a very small elite 
within the reserve population. The economic situation was likely to reduce each 
reserve to the domains of a few wealthy families and their many poorer dependents.
THE RESERVES AND SELECTIVITY IN THE LABOUR MARKET.
The residents of the reserves consistently sought to use them as a base from which 
they could go to take up work on a selective basis. The residents were more likely 
to leave the reserves in the early period under study when land was vacant or when 
white farmers were more willing to share their grazing. Farm labour in prosperous 
years was generally the least desirable of a range of options, and supply varied 
between the districts in relation to the range of alternative employment opportunities 
on offer. The preference of the occupants was clearly to seek semi-skilled work on 
temporary contracts to gain the necessary money to pay grazing fees, but allowing 
them to return to the reserve and build up their own flocks, ultimately to the level 
where they would no longer be required to leave the reserve. Farm labour by the 
1940s seldom offered either the remuneration or access to pasture that might serve 
the interest of black stockowners based in the reserves.
The Bondelswarts’ reluctance to work on white farms was perceived by some 
officials in stereotypical terms as laziness, but was rather a product of their 
determination to remain economically independent. Yet this image and their history 
of armed resistance made some employers reluctant to employ them At the 
beginning of 1924 it had been reported that:
... the Railways and Mines appear to be of the same opinion that these
Natives are not suitable for their work.179
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However in June and August, 1924 there was a breakthrough with the employment 
of 38 men on six month contracts on the railways. The pay and conditions 
compared markedly with those available on local farms. In September, 1924 the 
magistrate was reporting that local farmers were paying their workers with food and 
were seldom able to pay cash wages, often giving the workers ‘an old ewe goat’ 
which would be valued at just 2s. or 3s. in the market in Windhoek.180 In 
contrast to this monthly ’wage’ for farm workers, those with contracts to work on 
the railway were given food and Is.3d to ls.6d per day.181
The consumption of stock did compel the residents of the Bondels reserve to seek 
work, but they were still able to exercise an element of choice, and farm work was 
generally regarded as the least preferable in a range of work options. In 1929 a 
visiting reporter from The Cape Argus described the residents’ view that:
... the withholding of their labour is a passive protest against a set of 
conditions which is operating to their detriment.182
Officials were convinced that there was actually large-scale illegal emigration from 
1922 onwards by black workers from the district into South Africa in search of 
better pay and conditions.183 A direct correlation existed between the ebb and 
flow of reserve stock numbers and the supply of farm labour to local farms.
Reserve residents explored a range of alternative employment opportunities. The 
expansion of stock numbers in Berseba reserve, for instance, during the early 1940s 
was accompanied by greater selectivity about the type of work that residents would 
leave the reserve to do. The local magistrate noted, in 1944, that:
The only jobs on farms they are prepared to do is shearing. When the 
shearing season is over they wait for the fish season to commence at 
Luderitz.184
Shearing teams were able to exercise a degree of choice in their selection of
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employers and avoid lengthy contractual obligations to farmers. The Welfare 
Officer pointed out that even the economic attractions of the fish factories were 
balanced against the alternative economic options:
The Fish Factories at Luderitz required 160 labourers for the season which 
is now on. I could however, only supply them with 66. Here I beg to point 
out, that it is not a question of their not being labourers in the Tses and 
Berseba Reserves but they are unwilling to go to Luderitz. They claim that 
they can earn more money by shearing sheep in the District.185
The workers at Berseba made rational economic choices to enable them to obtain 
the necessary capital to meet the demands of the state and sufficient time in the 
reserve to build up their own flocks.
The Soromas reserve provided an inadequate ecological base for a thriving pastoral 
economy during the 1940s. Yet residents consistently sought and found alternatives 
to working on the farms in the district of Bethanie. In 1948 many were employed 
as a drought relief measure by the Public Works Department in the town of 
Bethanie, but others found work at the Lime Works at Buchholzbrunn.186 Whilst 
some organised seasonal work as sheep shearers, other travelled to the coast and 
worked, during the Crawfish season, in the factories there.187 By 1949 the 
magistrate at Bethanie was blaming these factories for the labour shortage on farms 
in his district188.
CONCLUSION.
The administration was able effectively to retard and inhibit the growth of a black 
pastoral economy, but its mechanism of control was too weak to ensure that the 
labour squeezed out of the reserves exclusively served local white farmers. Black 
pastoralists were not rich within the reserves, but in the early years of South African 
rule they were little poorer than many of the immigrant white settlers. The potential 
of the reserves to provide a base from which a class of commercial black farmers
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might emerge was, however, not fulfilled.
Black pastoralists were denied the mobility and access to pasture that was the 
prerequisite for survival. Immobility and the lack of development funding meant 
that the reserves were unable to sustain the large number of black stockowners who 
sought to utilise them. The reserves would only ever be able to support a small 
number of large stock owners; a broader-based pattern of stock accumulation would 
have required better access to land, credit and the market.
The failure of the reserves to provide a viable base for all ambitious black 
pastoralists created tensions that fuelled internal social and political disagreements.
The grinding drought of the late 1920s and early 1930s exposed the fragile nature 
of the access that black stockowners had to grazing beyond the reserve borders. 
Conflicts arose as stockowners tried to maintain some control over the entry of stock 
into the reserves and the ruling families in each reserve tried to protect their power 
base. The changing economic pattern also made it inevitable that those working 
beyond the reserve boundaries would promote a new agenda of concerns. The 
political dynamics connected to these economic changes will be the subject of the 
next chapter.
141
NOTES - CHAPTER TWO.
1. The Neuhof Reserve in Maltahohe was extremely small and for many years 
contained only a small handful of people whilst the Hoachanas Reserve initially fell 
within the District of Rehoboth and therefore beyond the boundaries of this study.
2. Wellington, J.H. South West Africa and its Human Issues. Clarendon Press. 
Oxford. 1967. p43.
3. Long Term Agricultural Policy Commission. 1948. quoted in Curry, F. The 
Land Policy of the South African Government in South West Africa. 1915-1939. 
MA. SOAS. 1967. p2.
4. Gauerke, E. The Population Groups of South West Africa. Parts 1 and 2. 
Afrikaans-Eeutsche Kulturgemeinshchaft. Windhoek. 1978. p24.
5. Baxter, P. (ed) Property. Poverty and People: Changing Rights in Property and 
Problems of Pastoral Development. University of Manchester. Manchester, (n.d.) 
p57.
6. Wilson, M. "The Hunters and Herders" in Wilson, M & Thompson, L. The 
Oxford History of South Africa. Vol.l OUP. London. 1969. p41.
7. Reifenberg (1953) quoted in Monod, T, Pastoralism in Tropical Africa. OUP. 
London. 1975. p56.
8. Mayor quoted in De Vries, J. Mission and Colonialism in Namibia. Ravan 
Press. Johannesburg. 1978. pl69.
9. See Bundy, C. 1979 and Wolpe, H. 1972.
10. Union of South Africa, Report of Native Economic Commission. 1930-1932 
Government Printer, Pretoria. UG 26. 1932. p28.
11. Palmer, R. "The Agricultural History of Rhodesia" in Palmer, r. & Parsons, 
N. The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. University of 
California, Berkeley. 1977. p237
12. LoN AR. 1925 p27.
13. Quoted in First, R. South West Africa. Penguin. Harmondsworth. 1963. pl50.
14. Peters, P. "Struggles over water, struggles over meaning: Cattle, water and 
the State in Botswana". Africa. Vol. 54 (3) 1984 p42.
15. Parson, J. "Cattle, class and the State in Rural Botswana" JSAS. Vol. 7 (2) 
1981. p236-255. p243.
142
16. Lewis, I. "The dynamics of nomadism: prospects for desentarization and 
social change". Ch. XIV in Monod, T. (Ed) Pastoralism in Tropical Africa. OUP. 
London. 1975. p428-429.
17. Union of South Africa. Report of South West Africa Commission. 
Government Printer. Pretoria. UG. 26. 1936. p74.
18. Union of South Africa, Report of Native Economic Commission. 1930-1932 
Government Printer, Pretoria. UG 26. 1932. pl3 and pl6.
19. Union of South Africa. Report of South West Africa Commission. Government 
Printer. Pretoria. UG. 26. 1936. p74.
20. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs, 1962- 
1963. RP. No. 12/1964.
21. O/C NA Dept to NC. 22nd September, 1915. ADM 46 - 599
22. AR. LoN. 1923. UG. 21-’24. pl6.
23. Bondelswarts Deputation to Major Herbst. 30th June, 1917. ADM 105 - 3353.
24. The Administrator refers to "... over 3,000 goats" having been provided as 
compensation, suggesting pre-war stock levels of at least 36,000. Contemporary 
goat prices suggest that one would have expected nearer 4,000 goats for the £2,000 
spent by the administration on compensation. The Military Magistrate claimed that 
2,960 goats were purchased and distributed between 333 black stockowners using 
£1,700 obtained by selling 400 cattle that had trekked with the Bondelswarts north 
to Tsumeb during the campaign. Mil. Mag. Warmbad to Secretary 
Protectorate.24th June, 1916. ADM 46-599. ‘Memorandum by the Administrator 
of South West Africa on the Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the 
Rebellion of the Bondelswarts’ p8. UG 16 - ’23. Rex vs. Hendrik Joseph LKW 
1/1/1 - 37/16
25. Mag. Warmbad to Sec. Prot. 13th September, 1920. ADM 105 - 3353.
26. Memorandum by the Administrator of South West Africa on the Report of the 
Commission appointed to enquire into the Rebellion of the Bondelswarts. p8. 4th 
April, 1923. UG. 16 - ’23.
27. Attorney-General to Admin. 29th November, 1923. p6. SWAA - A 388/1 vol.3
28. In August, 1919 Jacobus Christian returned with 40 followers and many stock. 
In October, 1919 a further 252 people crossed the Orange River border and 
travelled to the Reserve with 2,400 small stock, 172 donkeys and 120 dogs. 
‘Report of the Administrator on the Bondelswarts Rising, 1922’. p2. Cape Town. 
UG 30 - ’22. 1922. Lt. Jordan, 1st Reg. MC to Mil. Mag. Warmbad. 7th August, 
1919. ADM 105 -3353.
143
29. "In 1922 bv. het ons hier ’n klomp vee gekry wat ek help tel het op Heib; daar 
was so tussen die 30,000 en 40,000 stuk gewees, en u sou verbaas gewees het om 
die veld daar te sien." Ahlers, F. Evidence. 17th September, 1935. KSW 4 vol.33 
pl981.
30. Mag. Warmbad to NC. SWAA - A 158/26 vol. 1
31. AR. LoN. 1923 pl7.
32. Mag. Warm to NC. 13th August, 1923. SWAA - A158/26 vol.l
33. Monthly Report. Bondels Reserve. 30th September, 1924. SWAA A 158/26 
vol. 1.
34. ‘General Statement of State of Ownership of Land as at 1st April, 1913’, 
Imperial Survey Administration. Windhuk. Director of Surveys. Annex. N. in 
Schneider (Senior Officer, Lands Board) ‘Memorandum on The Administration of 
Crown Land Within the Late Protectorate of German South West Africa’ 21st 
March, 1922. LANG 35 - 68.
35. SWAP to Mag. Gibeon. 5th July, 1922. SWAA - A 396/8
36. Mil. Mag. Gibeon to Sec. Prot. 11th November, 1918. SWAA - A 158/6
37. Sec. Prot. to Mil. Mag. Gibeon 31st December, 1918. SWAA - A 158/6 vol. 
1.
38. Mil. Mag. Gibeon to Sec. Prot. 15th January, 1919. SWAA - A 158/6 vol. 1.
39. Mag. Mar. to CNC 17th February, 1939 LMG 3/1/28 - 2/1/2/6
40. Mr Smit who leased the neighbouring farm of Kranzplats in 1918 had only 21 
cattle. Mil. Mag. Gibeon to Sec. Prot. 15th January, 1919. SWAA - A 158/6 vol. 
1.
41. Mil. Mag. Gibeon to Sec. Prot. 13th October, 1919. SWAA - A 158/6 vol.l
42. Mag. Gibeon to Sec. SWA 30th April, 1923. SWAA - A 158/6 vol. 1.
43. Isaak Witbooi et al. to Admin. Undated. 1923? SWAA 1122 - A158/6 vol.l
44. The new reserve consisted of Freistadt and the old adjoining farm of 
Falkenhorst. Two portions of Falkenhorst had been made available for lease as 
separate farms (Kranzplats and Schwarzdom) and these were both included in the 
new reserve.
45. The total number of small stock on the reserve in 1926 was 6,159 and the 
average flock size of the remaining stockowners just sixty-nine. Native Reserve. 
Grazing Fee Register. (1924-1926) LMG 5/4/2
144
46. Sec SWA to Mag. Bet. 12th December, 1922 SWAA - A460/3
47. Mag. Bet. to NC 25th September, 1924. SWAA - A 158/5
48. ’Berseba Hottentot Reserve and Tribal Affairs’. NC to Sec. SWA. 30th 
November, 1921. SWAA - A 217.
49. ’Berseba Hottentot Reserve and Tribal Affairs’. NC to Sec. SWA. 30th 
November, 1921. SWAA - A 217.
50. ‘Endorsement made by Assistant Secretary on Annual Report on Native Affairs 
by Magistrate, Keetmanshoop.’ 12th May, 1933. SWAA 1430 - A 217/10 vol. 2.
51. Mag. Keetmanshoop to NC. 11th August, 1926. SWAA 1429 A217/10 vol.l
52. Minutes. Permanent Mandates Commission. 14th Session. 9th Meeting, quoted 
in Windhoek Advertiser. 16th June, 1929.
53. Memo. ’Resolusie . . . ’ 12th May, 1941. SWAA A217/1 vol.3.
54. WO Tses & Berseba to NC. Keetmanshoop. 27th October, 1937. SWAA A 
217/1 vol. 3
55. AR. Warmbad. 1917. ADM 106 - 3370/2
56. Mil. Mag. Warmbad to Sec. Prot. 19th February, 1918. ADM 157 - W41.
57. Mag. Bethanie to NC. 12th November, 1926. SWAA A 158/5.
58. ‘Uitschot’, ‘Welgelegen’ and ‘Plankieskop’ Farms. Attomey-Gen to Admin. 
29th November, 1923. SWAA - A388/1 vol. 3
59. Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the Rebellion of the 
Bondelswarts. p8. para 28. Cape Town. UG 16 - ’23. 1923
60. Herbst (Secretary for South West Africa, 1917-1923) to SWA Commission 
p2683. KSW 5.
61. "... as the land has been taken by Europeans their stock has decreased greatly 
in numbers, and owing to being confined to restricted areas they are seldom in good 
enough condition to yield a sufficient supply of milk for their owners sustenance 
throughout the year.” NC to Sec. SWA 31st October, 1929. SWAA 1155 - A 
158/26/1
62. Zaris had actually been sold to AJ and W. Liebenberg. Daberas Pforte had 
been sold to two prospective white farmers acting in partnership, but had been 
returned when they had been unable to locate an adequate source of water on the 
farm. Klein Daberas had been leased to three white farmers with 1,300 small stock 
and 32 large stock. Mag. Keetmanshoop to NC. 11th December, 1928. SWAA 1429 
- A 217/10 vol.l. 1928 Farm Directory p 457.‘Tses Native Reserve’. NC to Sec.
145
SWA. 26th October, 1928. SWAA 1429 - A 217/10 vol. 1.
63. Mag. Keetmanshoop to Administrator. 14th December, 1928. SWAA 1429 
A217/10 vol. 1
64. ‘Tses Native Reserve’. NC to Sec. SWA. 26th October, 1928. SWAA 1429 - 
A 217/10 vol. 1.
65. ’Tses. Arrears. As December, 1928’ SWAA 1430 - A 217/10 vol.2.
66. AR. Bethanie. 1924. LAR (sic) 9 - 3/7.
67. Mag. Bet. to NC 25th September, 1924. SWAA - A 158/5. & SWAP Bet. to 
Mag. Bet. 12th May, 1923. SWAA - A 460/3.
68. Sec. SWA to Mag. Bethanie. 12th December, 1922. SWAA - A460/3.
69. Letter dated 26th May, 1926 quoted in Bethanie ARG 9 - 15/3/21.
70. Mag. Keetmanshoop. to Sec. SWA. 24th June, 1922. LKE 3/1/21 - 2/1/20/3.
71. The 21 farms were listed as: - 1. Nomes. 2. Tses. 3. xara-gye /gaus. 4. 
/Aub.Igaos. 5. ! Nau-dausab. 6. "Khom-//narib. 7. ! Noros. 8. /Jnub. 9. Zam- 
gur’-/gam. 10. !Hus. 11. IOrtsis. 12. IIKhorobes. 13. Tomerob. 14. IIKhan- 
IIKhanti. 15. IIHao-!ati. 16. IAe-Inus. 17. !Hu-IIhuis. 18. ! Geirob. 19. Ao- 
Ikhams. 20. Khoi-IIKhox !nab. 21.IAnoxati. Abschrift. 16th December, 1913. 
LKE 3/1/21 - 2/1/20/3
72. Investigation of complaint by David Christiaan Izak held at Keetmanshoop. 6th 
June, 1922. LKE 3/1/21 - 2/1/20/3
73. Investigation of complaint by David Christiaan Izak held at Keetmanshoop. 6th 
June, 1922. LKE 3/1/21 - 2/1/20/3.
74. Investigation of complaint by David Christiaan Izak held at Keetmanshoop. 6th 
June, 1922. LKE 3/1/21 - 2/1/20/3
75. Berseba Hottentot Reserve and Tribal Affairs. 30th November, 1921. NC to 
Sec SWA. SWAA A217
76. Mag. Keetmanshoop to Sec. 24th June, 1922. SWA. LKE 3/1/21
77. Mag. Keetmanshoop to Sec. 24th June, 1922. SWA. LKE 3/1/21
78. Ernest Routh. Statement. 20th October, 1919. SWAA - A 217/1.
79. Memo. ’Vide Secretary’s Minute dated 24th March, 1922’. SWAA - A 217/1.
80. It was reported that a windmill built and used by Mr Rabinowitz of Naruchas 
had stood on Bondels Reserve for over 25 years, whilst Mr Oberholzer of
146
Swarthoek had chased black stockowners away in his motor car from land which it 
materialised was within the official boundaries of the reserve. AR. Super. Bondels. 
1947. LKW 3/4/2 - 2/16/3.
81. The example was Paradies Farm. NC. Windhoek to Mag. Keetmanshoop. 13th 
September, 1928. LKE 3/1/22-2/9/6.
82. The farmers concerned were named as Blaauw, Piet le Grange and Mans 
Kennedy. Mag. Mar to Admin. 19th September, 1950. LMG 3/3/3 - N2/13/2/40 
vol.l
83. Minutes. Annual Meeting. Krantzplatz. 29th November, 1948. SWAA - A 
158/98 vol 1.
84. NA Dept, to NC. 14th December, 1915. ADM 46 - 599.
85. ’Native Affairs Occurrence Book’ Warmbad. 28th December, 1917. LKW 
5/1/4
86. Executive Council Meeting Minutes. 14th July, 1926. SWAA 2/5.
87. ARNA. Warm. 1927 LKW 3/1/3 - 3/5
88. Mag. Warm to Sec SWA 19th March, 1928. SWAA 1968 - A 413/2
89. ‘Grazing in Bondels Reserve’. 11th October, 1927. SWAA 1968 - A 413/2.
ARNA, Warmbad. 1927. LKW 3/1/3 - 3/5
90. Mag. Warm to Sec SWA 19th March, 1928. SWAA 1968 - A 413/2
91. AR NA. Warmbad. 1927. LKW 3/1/3 - 3/5
92. ’Bondelswarts Tribe Starving’. Star. 26th October, 1929. SWAA - A158/26. 
The allegations made in this article were vigorously denied by the administration, 
but defended by the reporter as accurate. See subsequent article ‘The Bondel’s 
Reserve’, The Star, contained in file SWAA 1155 - A 158/26/1
93. "Daar het suspieie bestaan dat sekere van die Bondels Voormanne geld ontvang 
van trekkers vir oorstaning en weiding op die Reservaat." SWAP, Kalkfontein South 
to SWAP, 5th May, 1930. Windhoek. SWAA - A 158/26 vol.3
94. Mag. Warm to NC. 4th November, 1929. SWAA 1155 - A158/26/1
95. Mag. Warmbad to CNC. 15th February, 1940. SWAA A460/17.
96. Quarterly Report. WO Bondels. 31st March, 1947. LKW 3/4/1 - 2/15/6
97. Quarterly Report. WO Bondels. 31st March, 1947. LKW 3/4/1 - 2/15/6
147
98. ’Vergadering gehou deur Mnr T. Edwards Naturelle Kommissaris te Berseba 
op 31 Augustus 1928’. SWAA A460/8
99. Super. Berseba to Mag. Keetmanshoop. 25th June, 1929. LKE 3/1/22 - 2/9/9
100. Monthly Report - Super. Berseba to Mag. Keetmanshoop. 30th June, 1929. 
LKE 3/1/23-2/10/4
101. Mag. Warm to Sec SWA. 8th August, 1926. SWAA A158/26 vol. 1
102. Statement of Mag. Warmbad to SWA Commission. Mag. Warmbad to Sec. 
SWA. 16th September, 1935. SWAA - A158/26 vol. 5
103. Mag. Warmbad to CNC. 18th January, 1943. LKW 3/4/2 - 2/16/3.
104. Mag. Warmbad to CNC. 22nd August, 1941. SWAA - A 158/26 vol. 5.
105. NAAR. 1929. SWAA - A 73/10.
106. ’Tses Native Reserve’ NC Edwards to Sec SWA. 26th October, 1928. SWAA 
1429 A 217/10 vol.l
107. Minutes of Reserve Board. 10th October, 1931. LMG 3/1/27 2/1/2/6.
108. Old Eduard Isaac owned 166 large stock and flocks of 1,284 small stock and 
owed £33. 6/- lOd. The names of 653 stockowners in Berseba were provided in a 
list giving the position regarding the payment of grazing fees in the reserve as of 1st 
April, 1935, 637 of these were also on the list of debtors from 1931. ‘Arrears 31st 
August, 1931 Berseba’. SWAA 1433 - A 217/16. ‘Arrears as of 1st April, 1935’. 
SWAA 1435 - A 217/22.
109. Sec. SWA to Admin. 7th February, 1934. SWAA A 158.26 vol.4
110. Report dated 28th March, 1933 quoted in Memo. ’Tses Native Reserve’ to 
Assist. Sec. SWA. SWAA 1430 - A 217/10. vol. 2.
111. ’Stockowners in Bondels Reserve’. Mag. Warmbad to Sec. SWA. 28th May, 
1934. SWAA - A 158/26. vol. 4.
112. Mr F. Ahlers. Evidence to the SWA Commission. 17th September, 1935. 
pl983. KSW 4 vol. 33.
113. Mag. Warmbad to Sec. SWA. 28th May, 1934. SWAA - A 158/26. vol. 4.
114. Act CNC to Mag. Keetmanshoop. 18th June, 1935. SWAA - A 158/5.
115. Monthly Report. Super. Tses to Mag. Keetmanshoop. 28th February, 1935. 
SWAA 1430 - A 217/10 vol. 2.
148
116. " Verskillende naturelle het hulle al aan blanke plaas eienaars gaan verhuur om 
sonder betaling te werk mits hulle net hul vee dan sodoende kan aan die lewe hou." 
Report dated 28th February, 1933 quoted in Memo. ’Tses Native Reserve’ to Assist. 
Sec. SWA. SWAA 1430 - A 217/10. vol. 2.
117. 75 obtained work again for the Railway, although a clear sign of the economic 
depression was the fact that their wages had dropped to just lOd per day, 35 were 
still at Vioolsdrift working on the Irrigation Project in September, 1935. Aspeling. 
Evidence to SWA Commission. 16th September, 1935. KSW 4 - Vol. 32. See also: 
Mag. Warm to Sec. SWA SWAA - A 158/26 vol. 4.
118. Gaap Pieter, the stockowner, had a flock of two or three hundred small stock, 
fifty cattle and ten horses. Mag. Gibeon to NC. 1929. LMG 3/1/27 - 2/1/2
119. Mag. Mariental to Sec SWA 8th March, 1934. LMG 3/1/27 - 2/1/2/6
120. J. Neumann, Farm Sommerau to Sec. SWA. 26th June, 1933. LKE 3/1/51 
2/6/10
121. Reports dated 28th March and 30th May, 1933 quoted in Memo. ’Tses Native 
Reserve’ to Assist. Sec. SWA. SWAA 1430 - A 217/10. vol. 2.
122. ‘Tses Native Reserve - Outstanding fees’ SWAA 1430 - A 217/10 vol. 2 
Super. Tses to Mag. Keetmanshoop. 6th September, 1934. LKE 3/1/51 - 2/6/10.
123. Mag. Rehoboth to Mag. Keetmanshoop. 28th June, 1934. LKE 3/1/51 - 
2/6/ 10.
124. Mag. Rehoboth to Mag. Keetmanshoop. 28th June, 1934. LKE 3/1/51 - 
2/6/10. & ’Tses. Arrears. As December, 1928’ SWAA 1430 - A 217/10 vol.2.
125. ’Deputation of Witbooi Hottentots from Gibeon Native Reserve’ 28th August, 
1934. Minutes SWAA - 158/6 vol.2
126. ‘Arrears’ 31st August, 1930. SWAA A 217/16. Appendix to Inquiry Re: 
Diedrich Goliath. 1st November, 1935. SWAA A460/8.
127. ARNA. 1929 Keetmanshoop. LKE 3/1/42 -17/11/3 and NAAR. 1934. LKE 
3/1/45 - 2/13.
128. Mag. Warmbad to Sec. SWA. 12th December, 1934. SWAA - A 158/26 vol. 
4.
129. Mag. Warmbad to Sec. SWA. 12th December, 1934. SWAA - A 158/26 vol. 
4.
130. ‘Historiese Oorsig van die Bondelswarts’ ARG 8 - 15/3/2 p26.
131. ‘Historiese Oorsig van die Bondelswarts’ ARG 8 - 15/3/2 p26
149
132. WO Bondels to NC. 12th June, 1939.SWAA - A158/26 vol.5
133. Mag. Warm to CNC 27th June, 1939. SWAA - A158/26 vol.5
134. Minutes. Annual Meeting. Krantzplatz. 4th December, 1938. LMG 3/1/28 - 
2/1/2/6.
135. ’Oorsig oor die klein en grootveegetale ... in die Kranzplatz Reserwe in die 
maand Juni 1939’ LMG 3/1/28 - 2/1/2/6.
136. Zacharias Katjerungu raised the issue. Minutes. Annual Meeting Gibeon. 4th 
December, 1936. SWAA - A 158/98 vol. 1
137. Mag. Mariental. to CNC 17th February, 1939 LMG 3/1/28 - 2/1/2/6 The 
local JP argued th a t"... the maximum number of stock which the Reserve can carry 
in good and bad years is 5,500 small stock and 300 large stock. This is taking into 
account farm Groot Swartkop [Schwarzkuppe], which the natives are allowed to use: 
with the addition of Groot Swartkop the area of the Reserve is 23,573 hectares" 
Special JP. Bethanie. to Mag. Keetmanshoop. 20th November, 1940. SWAA - A 
158/5/1
138. Special JP. Bethanie to Mag. Keetmanshoop. 21st June, 1940. SWAA - A 
158/5/1
139. SWAP. Bethanie. to Mag. Keetmanshoop. 12th March, 1938.
140. Special JP. Bethanie to NC. Keetmanshoop. 17th July, 1940. SWAA - A 
158/5
141. Bethanie. ARG 8 - 15/3/7
142. AR on SWA. 1941. SWAA 912 - A 73/221.
143. Mag. Bethanie to CNC. List attached to letter. 28th June, 1943. SWAA - A 
158/5/1.
144. ‘Stock owned by Natives . . . ’ 31st August, 1946. SWAA Sl/4/2. Quarterly 
Return. Special JP. Bet to Mag. Keetmanshoop. SWAA 1122 - A 158/5
145. Mag. Bethanie. to CNC. 2nd September, 1952. SWAA 1122 - A 158/5/2
146. Monthly Report. Welfare Officer. Tses. February, 1940. SWAA 1430 - A 
217/10 vol. 2.
147. The Magistrate added the following annotation to the letter - "Welfare Officer 
informed to prosecute rich natives first who are in arrear with fees". WO Tses to 
NC. Keetmanshoop. 27th November, 1939. LKE 3/1/51 2/6/10
148. CNC to De Villiers, NC. 7th June, 1939.LKE 3/1/51 2/6/10 and Mag (same 
as NC) to CNC 9th June, 1939. LKE 3/1/51 2/6/10
150
149. AR LoN. 1939. pl59. para 1008
150. "Ek het ook so ’n klein klagtetjie van die Polisie dat die mense nie hulle vee 
op die bestemde plekke hou vir die vee-tellings nie". Minutes. Quarterly Meeting. 
Tses 27th April, 1954. SWAA 1436 - A 217/25 vol.2. WO Tses to NC, 
Keetmanshoop. 15th October, 1953. SWAA 1436 - A 217/26
151. Permanent Mandate Commission. 14th Session. 9th Meeting. Windhoek 
Advertiser. 10th July, 1929.
152. SWAP. Bethanie to Mag. Keetmanshoop. 9th June, 1938. SWAA - A 158/5.
153. Notule van ’n Algemene Vergadering. 10th December, 1938. LKE 3/1/50 
2/6/4.
154. WO Tses & Berseba to NC. Keetmanshoop. 12th January, 1945. SWAA 
A50/188/10
155. Minutes. Meeting of Tses & Berseba residents. 30th June, 1949. SWAA 
1435 - A217/25
156. "Die inwoners is ontevrede oor die pryse wat ons vir die bokke by die 
vendusie gekry het... Waarom kan ons nie skape buite koop nie ?" Hans Jager. 
Minutes. Quarterly Meeting. Tses. 24th September, 1956. BAC 44 - HN 1/15/4/14.
157. Inspection Report. Krantsplatz. 1952. SWAA 1282 - A 158/189/6.
158. ’Vee-Vandisie gehou op Kranzplatz 5 April 1944’ LMG 3/1/55 - 2/11/2/8
159. Mag. Warmbad to Senior Officer (Land Board) 14th August, 1934. LAN 11 
vol. 3.
160. NAAR. Tses. 1937. WO Tses & Berseba to NC. Keetmanshoop. 1st January, 
1938. LKE 3/1/50-2/6/5/1.
161. ‘Discussion with Additional Native Commissioner. Mr J.H. Allen’ 3rd 
December, 1948. KAP 1 - AC 6/1.
162. Minutes. Quarterly Meeting. Tses. 27th April, 1954. SWAA 1436 - A 
217/25 vol. 2.
163. WO Tses to NC, Keetmanshoop. 15th October, 1953. SWAA 1436 - A 
217/26
164. ARNA Warmbad 1942 LKW 3/4/2 - 2/16/3
165. ARNA. Warmbad. 1943. LKW 3/4/2 - 2/16/3
166. Annual Report. Super. Bondels. 1946. LKW 3/4/2 - 2/16/3
151
167. AR on SWA. 1941. Para 838. SWAA 912 - A 73/22.
168. NAAR. 1947. Mag. Keetmanshoop. 31st December, 1947. SWAA 477 - A 
50/188/12.
169. ARNA Tses. 1947 SWAA A50/188/10
170. WO Bondels to NC. Karasburg. 11th March, 1948. LKW 3/4/1 - 2/15/11. 
Minutes Annual Meeting Bondels. 14th March, 1950 SWAA - A158/26 vol. 6. 
Minutes Annual Meeting. Bondels. 4th December, 1950. SWAA - A158/108.
171. ARNA Warmbad. 1953. 9th January, 1953. LKW 3/1/7 - 17/14/2
172. ARNA Karasburg. 1953. 26th January, 1954. KSW 3/1/7 - 17/14/2.
173. WO Bondels to NC. Karasburg. 7th November, 1954. SWAA 419 - A 50/31
174. "Telkens is daar egter naturelle wat van hule werk dros en.dan die Reservaat 
onwettig binne kom. Dit is uiters moeilik om hulle op te spoor aangesien die 
inwoners besonder lojaal teenoor diesulkes is." Monthly Report. April, 1956. 30th 
April, 1956. BAC 58 - HN 1/15/6/3 vol.l
175. "Hier is byna daagliks Boers wat met lee hande van die Reservaat weggaan 
omdat die inwoners eenvoudig te kieskeurig is. Dit is met ’n soort leedvermaak dat 
jong naturelle vir jou se dat hulle vee van hulle vaders oppas hoewel die vaders 
heeltemal in staat is om hulle vee self te behartig." Monthly Report. May, 1956. 
WO,Bondels to Mag. Karas. 30th May, 1956. BAC 58 - HN 1/15/6/3 vol.l
176. Minutes. Meeting of Tses & Berseba residents. 30th June, 1949. SWAA 1435
- A217/25
177. Minutes. Meeting of Tses & Berseba residents. 30th June, 1949. SWAA 1435
- A217/25
178. AR Tses. 1949. SWAA 478 A50/188/1949
179. Mag. Warm to CNC. 17th March, 1924. SWAA A460/17
180. Monthly Report. Super. Bondels Reserve. 30th September, 1924. SWAA - 
A 158/26 vol.l
0181. List of Bondelzwarts contracted to the SA Railways. 29th August, 1924. 
SWAA A521/12.
182. ’C3 Tribe Doomed to Extinction’. The Cape Argus. 25th October, 1929. 
SWAA 1155 - A 158/26/1.
183. ‘Native Labour: Warmbad District’. Mag. Warmbad to CNC 22nd June, 
1938. Swaa A521/12.
152
184. ARNA. 1944. Berseba. 29th November, 1944. SWAA A50/188/10
185. Quarterly Return. WO Berseba. 31st March, 1945. SWAA 1433 - A 217/16 
vol. 1
186. Mag. Bethanie. to CNC. 30th September, 1948. SWAA 1122 - A 158/5
187. NAAR 1948 Bethanie 6th January, 1949. SWAA 478 - A 50/188/1949
188. NAAR. Bethanie. 1949 24th March, 1950. SWAA 478 - A 50/188/1949
153
CHAPTER THREE: THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF THE 
RESERVES, 1915 - 1955.
INTRODUCTION - THE CLOAK AND DAGGER OF TRADITION.
"To the white horse the zebra said ‘I am white too’ and to the black horse ‘I am 
really black’".1
The reserves of southern Namibia provided the arena for a range of political 
conflicts. The conflicts were an expression of the friction between different interest 
groups, within and without the reserves. The communities living in the reserves 
were in no way amorphous, but segmented along a number of fissures, which were 
used to mobilise politically distinct groups around issues of conflict.
Economic differentiation and aspiration provided the dynamo for disputes and 
actions, yet leaders could also utilise age, ethnicity, gender, religion and tradition 
as powerful tools for generating political support. Importance must be ascribed not 
only to the type of differences that mattered within a particular society, but also the 
chronology of when and why certain differences became politically significant. 
Political actions must be situated within the changing economic landscape charted 
in the last chapter.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the political dynamics of the reserves in terms 
of the economic interest groups involved, the issues that concerned them and the 
means by which they mobilised support. Economic change might be compared to 
the waters pressing on a dam, but local structures and circumstances must be noted 
to understand why the dam yields in a particular place at a particular time. The 
chapter will be divided into three sections. The initial task will be to consider the 
toolbox available to those seeking to mobilise support. The second section will 
consider some of the issues that created conflict within the reserves and place these 
within the context of the economic interest groups involved. The final section will
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consider two case studies in detail. The first will be the Bondelswarts Rising of 
1922 and the second, the events surrounding the deposition of Diedrich Goliath as 
the Captain of the Berseba reserve in 1938.
Tradition might be described as the anachronistic re-creation of the past, but should 
not be dismissed as an innocent recreation. Tradition can be used to rationalise 
the maintenance of a certain social hierarchy, acting as a legitimising cloak for 
those in power. In the period under consideration the pre-colonial and German 
colonial past might be used to justify the continuance or revival of certain practices 
or to legitimise the hereditary descent of positions of leadership. Yet it is important 
that the cloak of tradition does not obscure the economic structure which it 
enveloped. The assumption of roles of leadership in southern Namibia remained 
strongly dependent upon the wealth of the office holders and their consequent ability 
to support those of their followers who were in need.
The legitimisation of ‘traditional’ structures of authority and nepotism might draw 
strength from the extensive literature that exists linking pre-colonial ‘primary 
resistance’ to subsequent anti-colonial nationalist struggles. The link is, however, 
problematic. Alexander has pointed out that leaders were often engaged in a 
process that might more accurately be described as ‘primary collaboration’, rather 
than resistance.2 Foreign intrusion and colonial regimes provided not just a 
challenge, but also an opportunity.
Foreign involvement was a new factor within the equation that produced the balance 
of power within and between elites within ‘traditional’ power structures. Actions 
and reactions may be interpreted in terms of the relationships between a local elite 
and their followers, rather than simply symptoms of ‘proto-nationalism’. The 
politics of the reserves within southern Namibia reflected external and internal 
tensions.
The colonial period severely disrupted the social and political structure of black 
communities. Black leaders sought to preserve those structures upon which their
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own personal wealth and power were based. Colonial structures which preserved 
and fossilised the local power base of leaders were acceptable, yet could also place 
limits on the geographical and political extent of those powers. The advantages 
gained by official sanction of a leader’s position had to be balanced against the cost.
Beinart found, in his work on Pondoland, that the consequence of colonisation was 
not the total destruction of the existing order in rural communities. In Pondoland:
Pre-colonial forms of rank and authority ... were to some extent translated 
into a new context.3
In southern Namibia local elites were incorporated into the new reserve board 
structures. The dichotomy between resistance and collaboration therefore becomes 
more opaque, at times reflecting more a difference of strategy, than of aims.
The political influence of community leaders in southern Namibia was directly 
linked to their stock wealth. The economic crisis that they faced due to the 
application of the land settlement and reserve policies created a consequential crisis 
of authority and control for leaders deprived of their economic base. Leaders had 
an interest in emphasising a local dynastic ‘tradition’, whilst seeking to use their 
new relationship with the administration to preserve and extend their powers over 
the locality.
The translation of old elites into new administrators carried risks for the black 
leadership. The colonial administration expected that community leaders would use 
their influence to enforce colonial regulations or run the risk of losing official 
recognition and the subsequent financial support for their position. The political 
dilemma that this created for community leaders in South Africa was apparent:
The blurred nature of the position meant that headmen manoeuvred between 
the narrow sphere of divided loyalties. Frequently success at avoiding the 
official censure of the local magistrate, who was empowered to appointed
156
(sic) and dismiss headmen, would only be achieved at the cost of offending 
the community.4
Whilst walking this political tightrope, leaders might invoke ‘tradition’ as a way of 
‘explaining’ resistance to the demands of the colonial state, a means of seeking 
greater personal powers within the context of the state apparatus or as an ideological 
weapon to mobilise resistance to unpopular new policies. Tradition could be used 
as a dagger to disembowel rival administrative bodies.
The ability of reserves to serve as an effective political base upon which leaders 
could build their authority was flawed. The economic inadequacies of the reserves 
reduced their effectiveness as vessels of control (or strength as bases of opposition 
to the administration). Two points illustrate the way in which the economic context 
within which the reserves were set fostered divergent interest groups. In the first 
place, reserves were designed to serve as the domain of the elderly with the able- 
bodied youth departing to satiate the labour demands of the white community. The 
consequence was a distorted age distribution within the reserves. Politics would 
reflect differences between the political priorities of the, frequently absent, younger 
workers and the more elderly residents with pastoral responsibilities.
Secondly, the fact that women were not included in the pass laws until 1955 meant 
that young women were able to leave the reserves and evade the authority of the, 
typically, elderly male leadership. The attempts made by many women to move to 
urban areas or (especially in the 1920s) to live with their families on neighbouring 
farms placed them beyond the boundaries of effective control by their community 
leaders. The absence of women in the ‘traditional’ leadership or on the reserve 
boards should also not be taken as grounds for ignoring the political role of women 
within the reserves. Women in Berseba were, after all, allowed to vote in elections 
years before women in Britain !5
Leroy Vail has suggested that the threat posed to men by women acting 
independently played an important role in the formulation of twentieth century
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ideologies of distinct ethnic identities:
... an emphasis on the need to control women and a stress on the protection 
of the integrity of the family came to be intrinsic to both ethnic ideologies 
and the actual institutional practices of indirect rule.6
The rise of ethnicity in southern Namibia was also clearly linked to the increase in 
economic competition and strain experienced by communities during a period of 
rapidly diminishing resources.
Ethnicity was a banner that was raised and evolved in reaction to (and to define) 
particular socio-economic threats. Ethnicity was one of the instruments used to 
mobilise support during particular disputes - to provide the ‘smugness of belonging’ 
and parameters of inclusion and exclusion which are central to politics. The next 
section of this chapter considers some of the issues of dispute within the reserves 
of southern Namibia over the period 1915 - 1955. A central theme of the section 
will be the means by which opponents and supporters of a particular position or 
activity were defined and activated.
THE STRUGGLE OF LEADERS FOR AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY.
The German colonial moment in Namibia was brief, barely thirty years, and came 
comparatively late. Community leaders in southern Namibia at the time of the 
South African conquest were generally the sons of men who had acted as 
independent rulers. A significant number of these community leaders had been 
imprisoned or living in exile from their supporters since their defeat in the 1904- 
1907 War against Germany. It was inevitable that their return after a prolonged 
absence and following the military defeat of the German forces would raise 
expectations that local systems of authority could be revived and the imposed burden 
of colonial legislation removed.
The point can be illustrated with two examples. Joseph Fredricks the accepted
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leader of the people in the region surrounding Bethanie ruled from 1868 to 1893. 
His eldest son, Paul, took over the leadership upon Joseph’s death, but was one of 
many prisoners who died amongst the squalid conditions at the prisoner-of-war camp 
on Shark Island (off Luderitz) during the 1904-1907 War. Paul’s brother, Edward, 
became the new leader, but was kept in internal exile as a prisoner in Damaraland 
for a decade. Edward Fredricks returned to the Bethanie area in December, 1915.7
Isaac Witbooi, the son of the famous guerilla leader, Hendrik Witbooi provides a 
further example of the clear German policy of removing rebellious leaders from 
their communities. Isaac was deported to the West African German colony in the 
Cameroons during the 1904-1907 War. Isaac was one of the few deportees who 
survived the experience, but upon his return he was not permitted to return to his 
people. Isaac was kept in northern Namibia, and eventually held at the German 
military station at Okanjanda (near present day Otjiwarongo), like Edward Fredricks 
only returning to his power base at Gibeon in 1915.8 Jacobus Christian the 
hereditary leader of the Bondelswarts likewise remained in self-imposed exile in the 
Cape Province of South Africa for over a decade.
The intention of the returning leaders was clearly to re-establish their authority over 
their followers within their previous geographical sphere of influence. The 
cartographical limits to the authority granted to them by the administration (over 
particular reserves or government farms) did not limit their ambition to revive past 
powers. It was reported that Isaac Witbooi was even establishing courts on white 
farms which would refer cases to his central court at Gibeon.9 The court 
specialised in cases of adultery and fornication with a normal sentence being 
reported as between ten and twenty lashes with a whip, and exceptionally up to 
fifty. However the application of blows was often avoided by the payment of an 
appropriate fine, payable in the form of goats, which were divided amongst the 
members of the court.10
The attempt to reconstitute the precolonial apparatus of authority was understandable
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and replicated by other community leaders. However the reason that so much detail 
remains of Isaac Witbooi’s efforts was that he was labelled an ‘agitator’, arrested 
(along with other court members) and charged with ‘incitement to rebellion’ in 
1918.11 Witbooi received an early and clear warning that the defeat of the 
Germans was not to be equated with the return of traditional black authority. Any 
attempt to revive and extend powers beyond the limits fixed by the administration 
would be treated as a threat.
The followers of Witbooi provided visible evidence of their awareness of the 
historical resonance of Witbooi’s attempt to assert his independent authority. One 
nervous farmer noted that:
As an outward sign of their attachment to Witbooi most of the men are 
suddenly wearing their old tribal badge: a white cloth around the hat ... 
There are very few inhabitants of Gibeon who did not observe that on the 
morning after the first charge was laid ... all those Natives who were not yet 
in gaol appeared with new white cloths around their hats; even those who 
wore caps had white bands around them. This impudent ovation for Witbooi 
is a marked example of the defiant insubordination of the Natives.12
The revival of the bandannas associated with the guerilla units of Hendrik Witbooi 
during the 1904-1907 War acted as a symbolic reminder of the community’s 
previous strength.
The senior official responsible for ‘Native Affairs’ at the time recognised that the 
symbolism was not intended to announce a return to an armed struggle, but was 
rather:
... purely and simply an agitation to secure for themselves from us a 
measure of self government.13
Leaders sought the revival of their previous authority on the basis of historical
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rights. Leaders in the Berseba and Bondels reserves could claim privileges inherited 
from the German period and agitated for their just application and interpretation. 
The popularity of the cause was also due to its association with memories of easier, 
less restricted access to land. The administration, however, remained hesitant about 
recognising pre-colonial titles and opposed any attempt to revive pre-colonial 
systems of self-government. The substitute that they offered was the creation of the 
reserve network with Headmen and the members of the reserve board acting as the 
officially recognised authority in each reserve and no national black forum. The 
only channel for black voices within the administration led to the senior white 
officials of the ‘Native Affairs’ Department.
The apparatus was attacked by black politicians as a distorted and diluted substitute 
for their earlier systems of government. The most common criticism made by 
members of the reserve boards was that they had been given positions, but not 
powers. A white official stationed in the reserve as a Superintendent or Welfare 
Officer in practice usurped many of the powers and rights that the headmen and 
board members felt should belong to them, such as the right to issue passes and 
decide how money in the reserve trust fund was spent. The consequence was that 
the struggle for authority within a reserve could became a highly personalised 
conflict.
The powers sought by reserve boards reflected the specific concerns of their 
constituency and their attempts to maintain a certain form of social order within the 
reserves. Meetings in the reserves called repeatedly for additional rights to 
intervene in cases involving adultery, immorality and drunkenness.14 The gender 
specific nature of the pass laws led to concern amongst the administration and the 
male reserve leadership about the drift of women to urban areas. The concern led 
to the superficially paradoxical spectacle of reserve leaders in the 1920s and 1930s 
demanding the extension of the pass laws to cover women, whilst protesting about 
the rigour with which they were applied to men.15 The elderly male leaders of each 
reserve sought the authority to resolve social problems that they perceived as 
resulting from the prolonged, repeated or total absence of young men and women
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from the reserves and the supervision of their elders.
One concrete example of this type of conflict can be found in a lengthy dispute 
between Captain David Witbooi, based at Krantzplatz, and Mr. F. Gerdes, the 
Welfare Officer based in the reserve at the time of the Second World War. The 
dispute centred around the extent of the authority exercised by the Welfare Officer 
in relation to the local black leadership. Witbooi objected, for example, to Gerdes’ 
arbitrary use of his authority when branding of stock was necessary within the 
reserve.16 The traditional authority of black leaders could be seriously 
undermined by such demonstrations of white managerial dominance and lack of 
respect for senior figures within the reserve hierarchy.17 In this case Witbooi’s 
persistent lobbying of higher authorities finally achieved its goal when Gerdes’ 
removal from the reserve was recommended by the ‘Chief Native Commissioner’ 
in 1945.18
Witbooi’s success, however, was atypical. Mr Neser, ‘Secretary for South West 
Africa’ argued ,in 1946, that:
"The Boardmen may or may not be (and very often are not) consulted by
Welfare Officers. They have no real sense of control over their Trust
Funds.19
The local authority granted to reserve boards and leaders was dwarfed by the 
shadow of the colonial state which seemed able at will to intervene in the domestic 
affairs of the reserves. The job descriptions of black leaders in the reserve sought 
to cast them as agents of the state and defuse their potency as representatives of the 
wishes of their communities.
The administration’s most powerful tool for manipulating the hierarchy of the 
reserves was its ability to remove and appoint headmen and reserve board members. 
Elected members who failed to carry out their official duties effectively or became 
‘overmighty’, could be removed from office. In 1939 one board member in the
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Bondelswarts reserve reported that a headmant Adam Witbooi, had complained that:
... I always reported people to the Welfare Officer and that he never did.20
Witbooi’s independent attitude was to be swiftly punished. In the following year, 
1940, Witbooi was one of two Headmen dismissed by the local magistrate, who 
commented that:
I think that by making the new appointments we will have manoeuvred 
ourselves into a strategic position of complete dominance.21
The Welfare Officer noted that one of the new men appointed was particularly 
suited ‘... by birth and upbringing for the position of Headman’, presumably a 
reference to the fact that the man’s father had been white.22 The administration 
consistently sought to advance candidates that would support their policies.
In the early years of the administration the authorities hoped to make use of dynastic 
rivalries. Joel Kasetura (described as ‘a son or son-in-law of Samuel Herero’) 
supported the cattle branding law and enjoyed official support when he separated 
from the local leader in the Tses reserve, in 1925, who opposed it. The 
administration’s failure to support an elected leader was justified because it served 
‘...the object of ‘divide et impera” .23 The danger for the state was that the 
employment of preferred state candidates and treatment of community leaders as 
merely minor employees undermined the legitimacy of the authority upon which 
their job relied.
Lord Hailey reported the view of Hahn, the ‘Native Commissioner’ in Ovamboland 
that the payment of the reserve leadership:
... gravely impairs their position with the tribesmen and makes them officers 
of government.24
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Yet in southern Namibia the difficulty the reserve leadership faced was their poverty 
relative to other black officials within the legislation. One could compare the wages 
of Gideon Matundu, a ‘headman’ at Tses reserve to those of Josua Morangua, the 
‘Messenger/Interpreter’ for the reserve’s white Supervisor. Matundu received an 
annual salary of £18, Morangua £60.25 Reserve leaders who had been disarmed 
of traditional powers and allotted a junior rank within the state hierarchy were 
forced to seek a new basis on which to gain popular legitimacy and status for their 
position.
The necessary qualifications for a position of leadership accordingly shifted from 
those giving legitimacy in terms of genealogy to those stressing educational qualities 
suited to the new role of reserve leaders. The residents of the reserves in southern 
Namibia were aware after 1938 (and the deposition of Diedrich Goliath as Headman 
in Berseba and Joseph Frederick as Headman in Soromas) that the role permitted 
to reserve leaders was no longer that of the authority within a reserve, but rather 
that of a mediator with the authority of the colonial administration.26
The explanation given for the election of Markus Koraseb as a Headman in 
Krantzplatz reserve in 1949 owed nothing to tradition and all to the fact that he was 
literate and could speak ‘die Witmense taal’(the white peoples’ language).27 
Koraseb found his position difficult as he lacked the authorative powers, the 
traditional status or the pecuniary strength necessary to add prestige to his position. 
The result was that he constantly sought increases in his powers from the 
authorities.28
Reserve residents, however, sought leaders who would articulate their grievances, 
rather than enforce colonial legislation. Position without power meant that reserve 
leaders like Koraseb found it difficult to obtain the obedience of the residents who 
had elected them into office29, but this was not the reason that they had been 
elected. Respect and loyalty would only come if the new educated leadership 
obtained concessions from the administration. The demolition of ‘traditional’ 
structures of authority had resulted in a reconstruction of the perceived role of
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leaders in the reserve.
Around the time of the Second World War it had become clear that authority could 
no longer be dependent upon tradition and stock wealth. Restrictions on entry to 
the cramped reserves and the more reliable payment of cash wages to farm 
labourers meant that young peoples’ aspirations to economic independence were no 
longer limited to the possibility of farming in a reserve. The prospects offered by 
the reserves were poor. The reserve leaders were faced with the possibilities of 
articulating the views and defending the interests of the minority of elderly 
stockowners and their families within the reserves or seeking to identify a broader 
constituency and a wider leadership role.
THE STRUGGLE TO MAXIMISE THE SIZE AND QUALITY OF THE 
RESERVES.
The establishment of the reserves and fixing of boundaries generated debate about 
the quality and legitimacy (when contrasted with memories of the size of the area 
previously utilised by the community for its pastoral activities) of designated 
boundaries. One of the primary incentives for black politicians during the period 
when the fixing of boundaries was being debated was to try and influence decisions 
about the size and location of reserves, yet official claims about the extent of 
consultation and negotiation were exaggerated. The exercise of delimitating 
reserves owed little to the wide ranging, constantly mutating pastoral domains of 
pre-colonial communities.
The pastoral communities of southern Namibia had considerable local knowledge 
about the watering points and grazing areas available in the region. The 
confinement or movement of communities to areas which they considered unsuitable 
in character or inadequate in size generated opposition. The Annual Report 
submitted to the League of Nations in 1925 carried the assurance that:
The natives were consulted as to the areas to be set aside as reserves and
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were also allowed to select the particular reserves they wished to live in.30
The reality, however was imposition, not negotiation.
Black stock owners opposed the move to Tses reserve in 1923 on the grounds that 
the reserve would have inadequate water and grazing to support all their animals.31 
A mounted commando of Hereros rode to Keetmanshoop in a demonstration of 
strength and to the alarm of the magistrate stayed for a week to protest.32 The 
addition of Vaalgraas (AKA Witbooisende) to the reserve was a victory for the 
Hereros, but the victory was soured by the rounding up of black stockowners 
scattered over land to the east of the new Tses reserve and their resettlement within 
it.
The subsequent militancy of the community of ‘Hereros’ under the leadership of 
Gideon Matundu and ‘Veldschoendragers’ at Namutoni can be linked to their 
experience of forced removal. The community were spread over a wide area that 
had not been divided up into farms and stretched from Namutoni up to Gocharas. 
The community put up a protracted struggle against the administration’s efforts to 
persuade them to move into the new reserve. Open hostility to other administrative 
measures coincided with renewed efforts by officials to persuade the community to 
move within the borders of their new cartographically defined reserve.33 The 
community were finally ordered to move to the reserve in January, 1926 or face 
prosecution under the anti-squatting legislation.34
The forced move confirmed the community’s worst fears and produced a dramatic 
reduction in the size of the community’s herds and flocks, with stock numbers 
falling even before the severe drought at the end of the 1920s (a few hired grazing 
in Rehoboth district). The confinement of stock into a smaller area with 
inadequately developed water resources at the start of a protracted drought posed a 
serious threat to their stockwealth and hence their autonomy.
The experience was viewed by the leaders as a clear example of preferential
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treatment being shown to white over black farmers. Isaac Tjazerwa, concluded in 
1930:
We are in great trouble, we have nothing to eat, as our stock has all died. 
The country is as bare as this yard. Where we used to be all the land now 
belongs to white people who have fenced it off. Some of the people who 
had a few head of stock went to their old place to live and the white people 
caught them.35
The desperate attempt by a few stock owners to reoccupy the land they had 
previously used was frustrated by the Land Settlement Policy which now marked 
them as trespassers.
The example of Tses can be compared with those of other reserves where the 
community retained rights to land that they had occupied during the German period. 
History was used as a witness when leaders tried to preserve traditional rights of 
access to water and grazing. The gradual enclosure of the reserves by white-owned 
farms meant that the definition of unfenced boundaries became concrete as new 
white owners impounded stock or claimed fees for the use of a water hole.
The residents of Berseba, for example, treated the farm ‘Petisie’ (also known as 
Besondermeid) as part of their reserve until it was sold to Mr. Koot Kotze in 1946 
who notified them that they would no longer be able to make use of the water 
springs on his land.36 Traditional use and occupation were no longer sufficient 
grounds upon which to assert land rights and claims that the farm was a part of the 
traditional Berseba territory fell on deaf ears.
Legal property rights to land had replaced traditional pastoral rights. Claims to land 
seemed to have a better prospect of success when they were based on the assertion 
of legal rights granted by the German colonial administration. The establishment 
of a reserve at Warmbad in 1953 followed an extensive lobbying campaign by the 
local community claiming that they had historic legal rights over the area. However
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the continuing importance of a popular consciousness of a pastoral past in which 
communities had laid claim to wide tracts of land should not be underestimated. 
Legally such pastoral traditions may have counted for little, but politically they 
maintained a popular feeling that white settlers and the state apparatus that 
accompanied them had appropriated land which local communities had rights to.
Nama-speaking communities south of the border in the North-West Cape were 
classified as ‘Coloured’ and the switch would have bought significant legal and 
economic benefits, yet in southern Namibia the communities fought to retain their 
classification as ‘Natives’.37 Fritz /Gariseb, an old man recalled the feeling that 
the change could have more than merely semantic consequences. /Gariseb explained 
that:
The whole idea was just segregation. Just because the Nama-speaking 
people are a bit light skinned they tried to include us as ‘Coloureds’. But 
we were too forward in our argument for the Government. We argued that 
once we had lost the dignity of being ‘Nama’ we would also lose our 
traditional rights to land in this area - as at that time ‘Coloureds’ were seen 
as people who had no history or inheritance.38
A ‘Nama’ identity was asserted because it incorporated particular claims to land in 
southern Namibia. Oral history, through its reconstruction of the past, allowed 
communities to keep alive hopes for a future that would enable aspirant pastoralists 
to transcend the confines of the reserves.
THE STRUGGLE OVER ETHNIC IDENTITY.
The link between the politics of ethnicity and land rights has been a strong one in 
southern Namibia. When the resources available in the reserves proved inadequate
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ethnicity was one key that could be turned by pastoralists seeking to exclude rivals. 
The state provided the legislative machinery from 1939 for the reconstitution of 
scattered black communities into broader ethnic groups.
The fact that Namibian historiography was dominated for many years by the work 
of Vedder means that an impression has been created of intense and innate ‘inter­
tribal’ conflict dating from the pre-colonial period. Vedder depicted pre-colonial 
Namibian politics as a series of bloody conflicts between monolithic tribes with the 
victors enslaving their victims. Vedder’s most widely published work, a history of 
pre-colonial Namibia in three sections, assembled the past in two of these under the 
headings ‘Namaland Against Hereroland’ and ‘Hereroland Against Namaland’.39 
The distortions and inaccuracies in Vedder’s texts have been exposed by the work 
of Lau and others40, but provided the ideological foundation for a process that 
culminated in the construction of Bantustans such as ‘Namaland’ and ‘Hereroland’.
The pre-colonial history of Namibia remains under-researched; however the most 
recent of the existing literature challenges Vedder’s composition of the past on two 
fundamental points. The first is his Hobbesian discourse of perpetual violence and 
conflict between pre-colonial Namibian societies. The evidence suggests that there 
were wars and disputes, but also internal trade and co-operation.
The second dubious point is Vedder’s assumption that ‘tribal’ identities were 
unchangeable and their elevation as the key determinant of pre-colonial Namibian 
history. Brigitte Lau argues that:
... conflicts in the pre-colonial period did not happen along ‘ethnic’ or 
‘cultural’ lines but always cut across such differences.41
The communities of southern Namibia joined alliances that offered mutual benefits 
and waxed and waned according to their economic and military strength. If all was 
not exactly flux, political identities were constantly evolving with political 
expediency sometimes bridging apparent ethnic differences. The pastoral landscape
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of southern Namibia in particular produced environmental constraints on economic 
and political organisation. The prevalence of small nomadic or semi-nomadic 
communities obstructed the emergence of a single ‘tribal’ unit with centralised 
structures of organisation and control.
The awareness of this pre-colonial pattern is important because of the continuity of 
these themes into the colonial period. In 1922 the South West African Police 
reported that Gideon Matundu, a Herero-speaking leader, was not to be trusted 
because of his political support for Nama-speaking communities in the region. 
Matundu was reported to have attended meetings convened to organise support for 
the ‘Bondelswarts’ in their opposition to the administration. Matundu also refused 
to give evidence when his neighbour ‘Chief Jan Hendrik’ of the ‘Veldschoendragers’ 
was taken to court with some of his supporters for refusing to pay his dog tax.42
Common interests produced solidarity spanning officially categorised 
‘difference’.43
The establishment of reserves did not in itself produce the geographical separation 
of different communities. Indeed the legislation as presented in Government Notice 
No. 44 of 1924 explicitly stated that the reserves were to be open to all black 
people, regardless of ‘tribe’. Staff from the ‘Native Affairs’ Department also made 
this point clear to residents at meetings in the reserves.44 The following two 
decades saw some ethnic sifting of reserve populations, but this should not be 
interpreted as a sinister form of ‘ethnic cleansing’, based on ancient animosities. 
Incidents were not the product of ancient animosities, but rather motivated by 
pragmatic political and economic considerations that were generated by the 
constraints of the system.
Krantzplatz reserve can be used to illustrate this point. David Witbooi voiced his 
objections to the entry of ten ‘Coloured’ families in 1931:
The Witboois are not friends of Bastards or Coloured people as we look
upon them as being nearer White than Native.45
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One might seek (and find) an historical reason for this hostility. David Witbooi had 
contributed to an oral history of the Witboois’ which described the assistance given 
by the Rehoboth Bastards to the Germans in their war against the Witboois.46 The 
families were from the Union, rather than Rehoboth, but one resident argued that 
the ‘Gebiet Bastards’ had originally come from the Union too!47
The opposition should also be framed within the immediate economic context and 
three particular points considered. Firstly, the reserve was suffering from drought. 
Resources were tight and the residents impoverished. Secondly, a stream of 
complaints were being received from comparatively wealthy relatives trying to 
maintain their flocks in the Rehoboth Gebiet stating that:
... they are dissatisfied with the excessive grazing fees charged by the 
Rehoboth Bastards.48
The news intensified suspicions and encouraged a compound image of 
‘Coloureds/Basters’ as wealthy and exploitative.
Finally, the prospective entrants were comparatively wealthy. On average each 
family possessed around 200 small stock and a number of large stock. A survey of 
the current residents in the reserve at the time showed that only three families 
possessed stock in comparable numbers. The entry of the families would have 
inserted a wealthy strata into the economic hierarchy of the reserve with the 
attendant political threat. The example is a minor one, but demonstrates the 
importance of seeking deeper economic and political currents beneath the surface 
of ethnic prejudice.
The reserve also provides a good example of the kinds of economic tensions that lay 
behind the early moves to remove ethnic groups from particular locations. The 
‘Herero people residing in Gibeon Reserve’ complained in 1939 that:
... we are being pressed upon by the Nama people to vacate from here and
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go to Aminuis.49
The authors pointed out that this apparent move towards ethnic segregation was 
contrary to their earlier impression of the administration’s reserve policy, noting 
that:
... the Chief [Courtney-Clarke] has never told us that this reserve is the
property of the Nama people or the Herero people.50
Zacharias, a spokesperson for the Herero-speaking community, pointed out that if 
property rights were to be linked to residency than he and several others had lived 
in the area for over thirty years51. The moral right of Zacharias to land was 
verbalised, but was not the central issue. The confrontation had been provoked by 
a basic economic ultimatum by the administration. The stockowners in the reserve 
had been accused of overstocking and given two choices. A group would have to 
leave the reserve with their stock or a quota would be imposed and wealthier owners 
forced to sell their surplus stock. The ultimatum left no space for an alliance of the 
wealthier stockowners, but encouraged political mobilisation on the grounds of 
ethnicity. The Herero-speakers were a sizeable minority within the reserve (31 
percent of the population), yet constituted a disproportionate percentage of the 
stockowners (42 percent) and the majority (75 percent) of those comparatively 
independent stockowners who owned over 200 small stock. Indeed the average 
flock size for the Herero-speaking community within the reserve in 1930 was 
204.52
Whilst Zacharias and a few others had lived in the Krantzplatz area for many years, 
the Herero-speaking population of the reserve had increased markedly during the 
1930s. It seems very likely that these consisted of some of those relatively wealthy 
stock-owners who had been able to avoid the move to Tses and/or gain access to 
better grazing within the Rehoboth Gebiet.53 The ‘Herero’ population of Rehoboth 
district in 1938 was only 7 percent of what it had been in 1926.54 The high 
grazing fees within the Rehoboth district and the efforts of the administration to
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eliminate ‘Kaffir farming’ meant that it was families that were used to independent 
pastoral farming that sought entry into reserves.
The efforts to remove the Herero stock owners from Krantzplatz had economic and 
political motives. The Herero were not targeted simply because of innate ethnic 
rivalry, but because they were associated with a particular wealthy strata of the 
society and represented an influx which was perceived as an economic and political 
threat due to their numbers and stock wealth. The local magistrate recognized that:
... the Hereros did not leave the Gibeon Reserve of their own free will but 
were ordered to do so at the request of the Witbooi Hottentots who wanted 
more grazing for themselves as well as their own kinsmen ... The Hereros 
were by no means willing to leave the Gibeon Reserve but they were ordered 
by me to quit.55
The Hereros complained that the reserve board’s decision to seek their exclusion had 
been held at a meeting from which all the Herero representatives (who formed half 
the board’s members) had been excluded.56 The forced removals drastically 
reduced the number of stock in the reserve. The number of small stock fell from 
15,677 in 1939 to 9,481 the following year. Ethnicity had become a political issue 
when the community experienced economic stress.
The reserves of southern Namibia were particularly diverse (more so than the 
predominantly ‘Herero’ reserves of central Namibia or ‘Damara’ reserve at 
Okambahe). The administration’s own statistics for 1945 stated that less than half 
of the residents of Gibeon reserve were classified as Nama, even after the mass 
expulsion of the ‘Herero’. On the other hand in Tses, which was perceived as a 
‘Herero’ reserve, only 39 percent of the residents were actually classified as 
‘Hereros’ !57
The position in Tses illustrates a further continuity in the history of ethnicity in 
southern Namibia and that is the fluidity of identity. The ‘Damara,’ the second
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largest ‘ethnic group’ in the reserve, underwent a mass metamorphosis. The 
‘Damara’ were consistently identified and counted as a separate group within the 
reserve, but by 1947 it was reported that they were now defining themselves as 
‘Herero’.58 One might assume that this was a case of cultural assimilation. 
However the experience of another reserve suggests that such changes were not 
politically unconscious. The ‘Damara’ residents of the Bondels reserve demanded 
to be reclassified as ‘Herero’ in 1949. Yet the reserve was predominantly classified 
as ‘Nama’ so an assimilation theory would presume a switch to that identity. The 
rejection of the ‘Damara’ name was explained by a spokesman as being due to the 
low esteem that was associated with that name, claiming that during a visit to 
Okombahe he had been told that ‘Damaras’ were derogatively known as 
‘KlipKaffirs’ (Stone Kaffirs).59 The timing of the changes may also have been 
significant. The series of meetings to discuss the incorporation of Namibia into 
South Africa as a fifth province took place during 1946 and Herero leaders were 
prominent in voicing opposition to the possibility. In contrast Koraseb and those 
seeking a broader mandate to represent ‘Damaras’ in southern Namibia supported 
incorporation. The decision of the ‘Damara’ to identify themselves with the Herero 
may have carried a political message.60
The barriers of ethnicity were permeable and over time the size of a group bearing 
a particular ethnic tag would increase or fall according to the associated benefits 
or risks. The residents of Berseba argued in 1956 that the common identification 
they shared with the reserve was more important than external ethnic categories 
being applied by the state. Lukas Kamatu argued that many of the ‘Herero’ and 
‘Damara’ families had lived in the reserve since their great-grandparents time and 
although there had been a second wave of ‘Herero’ entrants after the Second World 
War all the residents called themselves ‘Bersebaners’.61
Berseba was clearly described officially as a ‘Nama’ reserve, but the residents could 
adopt a flexible attitude as to what this meant.62 One ‘Nama Headman’ simply 
argued that:
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"We are a Nama Reserve and those that are bom here are Nama.63
The ‘Chief Native Commissioner’ was forced to argue that people could not change 
their ‘tribal’ identity and that those classified as ‘Herero’ would have to pay a Tribal 
Levy into the national Herero Trust Fund, not the local reserve fund for Berseba.64 
People were willing and able to forge common identities that transcended and 
amended ethnic divisions.
If the basis for political mobilisation is common interest than it was becoming 
apparent to some of the leaders in the reserves after the Second World War that 
there were important issues, that were not simply parochial, and that were being 
drawn on a wider canvas. In 1956 a leader from Gibeon reserve, H.S. Witbooi, 
argued that:
... Non-white people are just one nation ... We used to always meet
together, until the Pass Laws came.65
The administration sought to control the efforts of leaders to form coalitions beyond 
the parochial borders of their reserves, by creating a unified linguistically defined 
‘Nama’ tribe.
The series of national ‘Tribal Meetings’ sponsored by the administration throughout 
the 1950s struggled to build a sense of ethnic identity that could supplant both more 
localised identities and the threat of broader racial unity. Yet the meetings were 
widely spaced and the failure of the administration to reply to questions raised was 
strongly criticised by participants.66 Joshua Kamberipa from Tses was the first 
delegate from a reserve in southern Namibia to attend a ‘Tribal Meeting’ (held for 
‘Herero’ community leaders in 1949). Kamberipa’s contribution to the meeting 
was to demand to know why the representatives of the other communities within his 
reserve had not also been invited.67 One of the central demands made at the first 
‘Nama Tribal Meeting’ in 1950 was that people should receive voting rights and be 
able to participate in a national, rather than simply reserve or tribal, assembly.68
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The administration attempted to resurrect a ‘Nama’ tribe from an empty coffin. 
Distance and diversity meant that such a unit did not, and had never, existed. 
Political issues were perceived on one of two levels, of local or national 
significance. The ethnic machinery offered by the administration did not seem the 
most appropriate forum in which to deal with either. In southern Namibia, 
ethnicity, when it occurred, was a negative response to economic pressures, rather 
than a positive vehicle for political organisation and change.
THE EVASION OF REGULATIONS.
Opposition to the demands placed upon reserve residents by the state must be 
defined according to the platform from which it was launched as it exposed 
differences between economic interest groups. The relative lack of dramatic 
demonstrations and protests in rural areas and reserves in southern Africa has led 
to a considerable deficiency in the historiography analysing the nature of local 
resistance to external imposition. One might argue the antagonism of the poorer 
strata of rural communities to specific legislation was demonstrated by avoidance, 
rather than confrontation. The strategy of avoidance was seen to carry less risk and 
direct confrontation with the state only occurred when wealthier leaders and the 
poorer majority formed a coalition of interest.
One example of rural resistance to external imposition that has been documented is 
the opposition to the dipping and branding of stock in the Transkei, South Africa 
in the period 1908-1916. The case provides a useful comparative example of the 
disparate reaction of different sections of the community. The opposition to dipping 
was seen to reflect broader concerns amongst the elite about the loss of authority 
and autonomy. Yet dipping was also seen by many as an unnecessary and 
suspicious illustration of external interference.
The cost of dipping and the large number of stock deaths that it caused was 
particularly resented by the poorer members of the community. If animals were not
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dipped they could only be sold at low prices in the market, if at all. However stock 
owners who owned only a limited number of animals placed a greater priority on 
consumption, rather than production and marketing. The poorer members of the 
community sought to avoid, rather than directly resist dipping, a strategy that put 
them into direct conflict with leaders who were held responsible by the police for 
ensuring that dipping was carried out efficiently and comprehensively.69
The articulation of protest by leaders from the reserves could, conversely, reflect 
the opposition of wealthier members of the reserve to measures that were of direct 
concern to them. The political campaign launched in the 1930s by the Herero 
leadership in the reserves of central Namibia to replace grazing fees with a Poll Tax 
provides one example. Werner suggests that the proposals would have benefitted 
only the wealthier minority.70 Calculations demonstrate that any stockowner with 
less than 13 cattle would have been poorer under the Poll Tax. An analysis of stock 
owners in Epukiro reserve in 1933 reveals that 58 percent of stockowners owned 15 
or less cattle.71
The Native Stock Brands Proclamation (No. 15 of 1923) was a measure that 
generated considerable opposition. The legislation was seen to be discriminatory 
and the motivation for it viewed with suspicion. Izaak Witbooi felt that the 
legislation exposed the hypocrisy of the earlier promises of equal treatment and 
justice that had been provided by the new administration:
The law says all are equal. White shall not laugh and the black man cry, all 
shall be happy.72
Yet the branding laws clearly discriminated on the grounds of colour. Witbooi 
presented his case succinctly:
The white peopel (sic) buy their irons with their money and we also buy our 
irons with our money; why then are the irons given to the white people and 
our irons retained ?73
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Wealthier black stockowners who had purchased their own individual branding irons 
were forced to hand them in. Witbooi argued that if the administration was worried 
that privately owned branding irons might be used to brand and conceal stolen stock 
than the white stockowners should be treated with as much suspicion as black. 
Witbooi saw the legislation as symbolic of the administration’s lack of trust in black 
people.
The confiscation of the cattle branding irons owned by the wealthier black stock 
owners and their transfer to officials of the administration could easily be interpreted 
as the first stage of a second stock confiscation. The Hereros at Tses were 
particularly alarmed by the prospect. The elected leaders in the reserve (Gideon 
Matundu and Jan Appolis) argued that they were being asked to mark their cattle 
with ‘a Government brand’ and failed to produce any animals to be branded by the 
Superintendent as ordered on 24th July, 1924.74
The local magistrate visited the reserve to ‘lecture’ the residents and persuade them 
to see the error of their ways. A troop of 85 men armed with knob kernes and 
sticks marching four abreast listened to his speech, but again refused to allow their 
stock to be branded. The magistrate noted the particular hostility shown by women 
to himself and Gideon Matundu who urged obedience to the law.75
The administration acted to arrest those they identified as ringleaders of the boycott. 
Johannes Baha and five others were accused of having toured the reserve 
encouraging residents not to brand their animals.76 Baha and his co-accused were 
drawn from the wealthier group within the reserve, with three probably being 
amongst the wealthiest 10 percent of stockowners at Tses.77 However the issue 
was not just one that concerned the relatively wealthy, indeed it is possible that 
some of the accused were selected for arrest partly because they were ‘men of 
standing’ whose punishment would make a more significant impact. The measure 
was interpreted as an attempt to frustrate the accumulation of stock by black 
pastoralists and as part of a more general strategy to dispossess them of land and 
stock.
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The arrest of the six men could be seen as a challenge to the economic aspirations 
of the whole community and provoked an impressive demonstration of popular 
support:
A number of ringleaders were charged before the magistrate and convicted, 
but were forcibly rescued from the police by a large mob of natives before 
they could be lodged in gaol. After some negotiations between the 
authorities and the natives, in the course of which the latter adopted a very 
determined and defiant attitude, taking up the position that as they were all 
opposed to the provisions of the branding law they were all equally guilty 
with the prisoners, 97 men and 78 women trooped into the gaol. There they 
remained for three days, and it was only after they had been addressed by 
the Native Commissioner, who had gone down from Windhoek for the 
purpose, that they saw the error of their ways and undertook to carry out the 
provisions of the law.78
Measures that seemed to signal a repetition of the German policy of dispossession 
evoked strong feelings and resistance. Ironically the sentences were later squashed 
when the Review Judge held that people could not be compelled to brand their stock 
against their will.79 Gideon Matundu, realised the strength of popular feeling, and 
in 1925, renewed his opposition to cattle branding and the administration’s efforts 
to have all the cattle in the reserve inoculated against anthrax.80
The magistrate addressed the residents for a second time. However this time the 
address was timed to coincide with an impressive bombing display by South African 
airplanes.81 The spectacle served as a reminder of the devastating use that had 
been made of bombing raids against those resisting the administration’s policy a few 
years earlier in the Bondelswarts reserve. The bombing might be seen as a literal 
application of the philosophy that actions speak louder than words.
The show of military strength came just 20 days after the arrest and forced 
disbandment of the rebellious ‘New Raad’ in Rehoboth and might be seen to mark
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a turning point in the strategy of opposition from that of confrontation to that of 
evasion. Matundu explained to the Superintendent at Tses the way in which people 
were trying to avoid unpopular legislation later in the year:
If I tell them anything they do not like, they pretend not to understand.82
Residents also proved unco-operative with official attempts to monitor and control 
the accumulation of stock and wealth within the reserves.
Officials were highly sceptical that the widespread failure of residents to pay grazing 
fees during the late 1920s and early 1930s (described in greater detail in Chapter 2) 
was just due to poverty. The argument that non-payment was a political, and not 
just an economic, decision was backed by evidence that some of those who paid the 
least towards their grazing fees were also the wealthiest stock owners in the reserve. 
Yet the debtors justified their actions with the argument that they refused to sell off 
their animals at unreasonable prices in order to pay grazing fees.
Grazing fees were perceived less as a stick designed to beat pastoralists out of the 
reserve and into the labour market, and more as a hurdle preventing black 
stockowners from becoming prosperous commercial farmers. The simplest 
technique of tax evasion, given the rarity of official visits to the reserve, was to 
avoid any meetings at which stock were counted or more subtly to only present a 
portion of the stock to be counted. In 1928 the Native Reserves Commission waited 
for over a week for residents at Tses who had been sent to get their cattle for 
counting, but none returned and the Commission were forced to give up.83
The tactic was not restricted purely to Tses, nor was it limited to a particular 
historical moment. Police ordered the residents of Gibeon reserve to prepare their 
stock for branding a week before they visited the reserve in 1931, yet found no 
animals waiting for them when they arrived.84 The reliability of figures was 
doubted by officials even in the those reserves that seemed comparatively small and 
accessible. As late as 1953 the magistrate at Bethanie trying to count large stock
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in nearby Soromas reserve had to confess that it was ‘very difficult to say’ what the 
true figure was.85 The difficulties of calculating the total stock figures for a 
reserve were compounded when it came to obtaining figures for individual 
stockowners because stock was constantly entering and leaving the reserves or being 
redistributed amongst relations.86
The wealthier members of the reserve were able to evade the payment of grazing 
fees by distributing their stock. The dispersion of stock might help them avoid the 
higher tax categories on stock or surpass the limits on stock ownership set by the 
state. It could also have beneficial social and political effects, providing subsistence 
products to the poor and supporters for the rich. The 1928 Commission commented 
cynically that despite the legislative barriers to stock accumulation, any one black:
... stock-owner has however so many brothers, nephes (sic), sons and
cousins (all stock-owners) that he always remains on the safe side87
Statistical evidence of the degree to which evasion was practised over time is of 
course problematic since ‘successful evasion’ was, by definition, not recorded. One 
might, however, logically surmise that there was a direct correlation between the 
dwindling scope available for evasion and the increasingly dense level of land 
occupation by white settlers and improving capability of the police force.
One illustration of the way in which stock were distributed and disguised would be 
the case of Isaac Tjazerwa and Gideon Matundu, two wealthy stockowners in Tses 
reserve. Matundu had registered 11 cows, 52 sheep and 116 goats in 1930. Six 
young men (including one of Tjazerwa’s sons and two of Matundu’s ‘herdboys’) had 
also been issued with passes to go and work on a local farm. It transpired that only 
four worked for the farmer, the other two herded an unspecified number of stock 
on the farm belonging to Matundu and Tjazerwa.88 The ‘grazing for labour’ deal 
enabled the two men to disperse their animals, thus increasing their chances of 
surviving the drought and avoiding the payment of grazing fees.
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The poorer members of the reserve communities sought to avoid a different range 
of impositions. The most obvious example of this difference can be found in the 
efforts of the reserve leadership to recruit the poorer members of the community to 
work without pay on improvements to the reserve, supposedly for the communal 
benefit of the residents. The magistrate at Keetmanshoop noted, in 1932, that the 
‘aristocracy’ in Berseba reserve would not consider doing any manual labour 
themselves, but would encourage it to be done by ‘... members of the tribe of less 
standing’89 Yet many of the development projects which were introduced were of 
primary benefit to the wealthier community leaders with large flocks or were 
considered inappropriate schemes imposed upon the community by the white 
officials responsible for the reserve.
The realistic fear of the poorer reserve residents was that even if they provided the 
labour to build a dam or a borehole in a communal reserve, it did not necessarily 
mean that they could be assured that their stock would have free access to it. 
Peters’ work on Botswana demonstrates the way in which wealthier black 
stockowners were able to control access to water and hence grazing.90 
Administrative structures were used to channel development projects into areas 
where they would directly benefit the wealthier stockowners represented within 
those structures. Further research is required to establish the extent to which this 
pattern was duplicated in neighbouring Namibia, however there is clear evidence 
that wealthier stockowners did attempt to enforce exclusive rights of access to 
particular watering points or grazing areas.91
Opposition to the reserve work schemes took two forms. The workers neglected to 
carry out the work assigned to them, or refused to do the job unless they were paid 
for their labour.92 The wealthier and poorer stockowners of the reserves had 
diverging agendas of evasion. The primary concern of stockowners aspiring to 
become economically independent stock farmers was the evasion of measures 
designed to limit their accumulation of stock and to control the access of other 
stockowners to the limited resources of the reserve. The poorer majority sought the 
best possible conditions of employment and to retain a sufficient economic base
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within the reserve to allow them some discretion over the choice of employment. 
The dynamics of these differing and sometimes conflicting objectives led to a 
growing sense (especially from the end of the 1930s) that reserve structures were 
impotent or disinterested in addressing the problems of the majority of the residents.
THE STRUGGLE FOR A VOICE: THE AME AND THE UN.
The experiences of the 1920s and 1930s left residents of the reserves of southern 
Namibia feeling marginalised and unenthusiastic about the mechanisms available for 
articulating complaints. A significant change took place after 1945 with new 
channels being identified through which demands might be voiced and obtained. 
The emphasis on attempts to retain traditional powers by a dynastic elite was 
submerged or replaced by efforts to obtain new rights. The focus of struggle shifted 
from structures of authority within the reserve to wider platforms.
The awareness of powerful external forces that might be asked for assistance was 
not a new one. Garveyism had been popular in southern Namibia during the 1920s 
with the circulation of stories telling of planes flown by black Americans coming 
to the assistance of the communities.93 However it was in 1946 that the question 
of international involvement was bought to the fore within the reserves. The South 
African government ordered a ‘referendum’ that would enable them to ‘inform’ the 
newly launched United Nations whether the black population of Namibia supported 
their plans to incorporate Namibia within South Africa as a Fifth Province.
A series of meetings were held in the reserves at which the board and those 
residents present were asked whether they supported incorporation or not. The way 
in which the views of the black population were measured has been subjected to 
considerable criticism. In southern Namibia four out of every five black people 
lived outside the reserves within the ‘Police Zone’ in 1945. Yet it was only in the 
reserves that consultative meetings took place.94 The statistic in favour or against 
in each reserve was taken as the total population of the reserve (ie. including men,
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women and children) thus ignoring the likelihood of internal disagreement within a 
reserve.
The meetings held in the five reserves in southern Namibia led to the rejection of 
incorporation by three - Berseba, Tses and Soromas - and its acceptance in two - 
Bondels and Krantzplatz. The bizarre accounting technique of the administration 
meant that the figures produced suggested a 77 percent vote against incorporation 
in southern Namibia. The weight of the large block votes given to the leaders of 
communities beyond the ‘Police Zone’ meant that these votes did not prevent the 
South Africans obtaining the favourable vote that they sought. The hostility of the 
region’s reserves to South Africa at a time when the region was severely affected 
by drought and communities were seeking drought aid required some sort of official 
explanation.
The justification given by the responsible officials was that the communities had 
been influenced by external agitators. The official line was to blame the Germans. 
It was reported that in the largest reserve in the region, Berseba:
... it seems that for years before the war and also during the early months 
of it, the inhabitants of this reserve were subjected to intensive pro-German 
propaganda by certain missionaries and farmers in the vicinity... Not a 
singly Berseba native volunteered for military service and they were adamant 
in their refusal to contribute a penny to war funds.95
The Welfare Officer at Tses gave a similar diagnosis of the negative vote in that 
reserve:
They have apparently been fed on propaganda far beyond their limited 
understanding and the matter has gone so far that the Herero is discontented 
and consider that they are (sic) unfairly treated and have made requests that 
outside influence be used to bring pressure on the Administration.96
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The argument was that the reserves had rejected incorporation because they had 
been persuaded that a return to German rule would be preferable.
The evidence, however, suggests that the leaders of the reserves were clear that they 
wanted the country to be administered by the United Nations, and were critical of 
the means by which the administration engineered a vote rejecting the proposal. 
Lukas Frederick of Berseba reserve, for instance, stated:
"We think a lot about incorporation. We Namas look to one thing. We 
want five fathers of the United Nations... We want to be under the United 
Nations. We do not want to have to choose any other path. Namaland 
which begins at Ovamboland is full of natives. It is bad to ask every nation 
separately for their consent. It would be a good thing if all the leaders of 
all the natives came together at one place to give their decision on this 
matter.97
The ‘referendum’ gave the reserve leadership a unique opportunity to register their 
displeasure with South African rule on the international stage, but the vote also 
reflected local circumstances. The residents of Soromas resented the stock 
limitation measures imposed in their reserve from 1941, whilst Diederik Goliath a 
community leader from Berseba reserve was dying following his internal exile to 
Hoachanas reserve.
Evidence exists that the administration suggested that continued approaches to the 
United Nations might put promised drought aid at risk. The residents at Krantzplatz 
reserve were told:
Now a couple of your leaders sent a petition against the Administration to 
the UNO last year, through the pastor Michael Scott, and the Administration 
would be within its rights to allow them no help, but the Administration is 
forgiving ... (my translation).98
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Economic assistance was linked to political loyalty. The concern of Koraseb and 
the ‘Damara’ leadership of the reserve to distance themselves from Witbooi’s 
actions confirms that there were elements of the leadership which sought to co­
operate with, rather than challenge the administration.99 The challengers now 
sought legal justification from international, rather than traditional, law. The 
political divisions within the reserves that emerged during the debate over 
incorporation became more visible during the establishment of the American 
Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church in southern Namibia. Missionary activity in 
southern Namibia was treated with some scorn by the police throughout the 1920s 
and 1930s. Mission farms were seen as hostels for the idle, whilst church schools 
provided blacks with dangerously inflated aspirations. The opinions of the officer 
in charge of the Gibeon police district in his annual report for 1932 were typical:
The discipline of the natives are not too satisfactory, especially amongst the
Church Going community, as it would appear once they belong to the church
they equalise themselves with the Europeans100
The criticism of the Rhenish Mission Society (RMS) from the colonial establishment 
could be juxtaposed with equally strong criticism from some of the black members 
of their congregations.
Frustrations mounted at the lack of progress by black clergy within the RMS 
hierarchy and the limited educational opportunities provided to black children. 
Reforms were promised, but change slow. The internment of German missionaries 
during World War Two led to increased responsibility for black clergy and raised 
expectations. In September and October, 1945 ‘Die Burger’ published articles 
detailing the proposed transfer of the churches in southern Namibia to the 
Nederlandse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK).101 The lack of consultation with black 
members of the RMS and fears about the implications of the take over by the NGK 
with its powerful South African base led many of the more influential black 
members of the RMS church to review their loyalty and convene a crucial meeting.
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The meeting took place early in 1946 amidst the ferment of the gatherings about the 
proposed incorporation of Namibia within South Africa. It is surely no coincidence, 
given the chronological context, that the proposed incorporation of the RMS 
churches within the NGK was viewed with such suspicion. The meeting involved 
influential clergy such as Petrus Jod from the Maltahohe district and Markus 
Witbooi from Gibeon and, given the correlation between churches and schools, 
reflected the opinions of a new stratum of educated professionals. The meeting 
rejected the proposed merger vigorously:
Once and for all we will not remain in the NGK or any other denomination 
remaining under white leadership, and if we are to be handed over, we will 
turn it down. It has happened behind our backs that we are sold like live 
slaughter stock.102
The failure to consult black clergy over the proposal was seen as symptomatic of 
the more pervasive racism found within the church hierarchy. The meeting stated:
... we feel strongly that several of our missionaries treat the congregations 
under which they work with the same contempt that we always experience 
from whites ... We have spent the first, more or less, one hundred years 
under the spiritual guidance of the RMS, and yet according to the newspaper 
reports today we are labelled as incompetent, feeble and to top it all 
heathens. The question is ‘How long will it stay like this ?’ When will we 
become competent, strong and Christian ? (my translation).103
The meeting sought an alternative denomination that would treat black clergy with 
more respect and provide an independent platform to raise issues of concern.
The first AME Bishop was appointed in South Africa in 1898 and it had continued 
to operate without being suppressed by the state. The first AME church in southern 
Namibia, established in Luderitz in 1930, had also caused little concern.104 Yet 
the fact that it had been started by black Americans and led by black clergy meant
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that it offered a positive alternative image to the RMS. A mass meeting of black 
RMS schoolteachers a few months after the Gibeon meeting agreed unanimously to 
join the AME.105 The speed with which the church now spread alarmed the 
authorities.
At Tses two-thirds of the congregation had left the RMS church to join the former 
schoolmaster Zacheus Thomas by 1947, whilst Berseba reserve had an AME 
congregation of over 400 and it was reported to be influential throughout Karasburg 
district106. Officials feared a diabolic political motive lay behind the expansion. 
The Acting Director of Education wondered why one Protestant church should wish 
to supplant another and:
... whether Religion is not but a cloak to cover up something sinister.107
A policeman was ordered to note the contents of sermons delivered by an AME 
preacher. The local Justice of the Peace read the notes and made the classic 
colonial complaint that ‘... the natives are getting restless’.108 The group that was 
becoming ‘restless’ were identified as "... the younger non-Europeans". The new 
black mission-educated leadership challenged the existing authorities and the 
ideology of white supremacy, for instance both Simon Boois, the Headman at 
Soromas, and the JP complained that they were no longer treated with respect.109 
Local officials feared that the church was simply a mask for the ‘communist 
tendency’.110
The transfer of congregational loyalties led to several disputes over church property 
built by congregations that now spumed the RMS, yet over which the RMS claimed 
property rights.111 The position of the AME rebels who held positions as teachers 
in RMS schools was also difficult with reports that they were being discriminated 
against.112 The AME leadership’s background ensured that education was a major 
concern, namely the difficulties facing black children seeking an education above 
Standard Three.113
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AME leaders demanded control of schools in reserves and locations where the 
majority of the congregation had switched allegiance and the opportunity to study 
up to Standard Six. The prospect filled the magistrate at Keetmanshoop with alarm 
as:
If Non-europeans all have a Std. 6 education we will have no labourers on
the farms or in the towns.114
The campaign to gain increased funding for AME schools in particular and black 
education in general led the AME leaders to organise the first school boycotts in 
Namibia.
Statistics at the Department of Education show that between December, 1948 and 
15th February, 1949 the attendance at schools in Keetmanshoop and Maltahohe fell 
to just 31 percent and 16 percent of their former levels.115 The attendance at 
other schools fell less dramatically, but the decline was sustained and the boycott 
spread through the rural areas. A boycott of the RMS school at Gainachas in 
Berseba reserve was only launched in 1952, but quickly proved effective.116 The 
magistrate believed that it had been engineered by ‘... the agitator Joseph Kahuika 
(a strong adherent of the AME Church)’, who was also believed to be responsible 
for a letter demanding that Namibia be placed in the hands of the United 
Nations.117 Petrus Jod was reported to be travelling around the region in an AME 
car spreading ‘subversive propaganda’ amongst farmworkers, as were a number of 
women (unrestrained by pass laws). The ‘Suidwes-Afrikaanse Landbou-Unie’, the 
white farmers union complained that the black preacher spread communist dogma 
and created difficulties with farm workers and there were fears that they would join 
the action.118
The rise of the AME church in southern Namibia offered an educational channel for 
black aspirations. The boycotts forced the administration to reconsider its 
educational programme and may have contributed to its decision to take over control 
of the old RMS schools, whilst continuing to frustrate the efforts of the AME
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schools to expand. The Superintendent of the Gibeon reserve argued that theology 
was of only secondary importance to the AME church:
Gradually it has become obvious that the AME Bond does not want a church 
in the sense of the bible, but that it is busy playing the game of politics 
under the cloak of religion and corrupting non-whites with the bible.119
The remarks followed the tabling of a set of demands by AME leaders meeting at 
Gibeon (See Table 8).
TABLE 8: A SUMMARY OF THE THIRTEEN DEMANDS MADE 
AT A MEETING OF AME LEADERS AT GIBEON, 
28TH AUGUST, 1948.120
1. The right to vote.
2. The right to participate in the distribution and sale of 
land inside and outside the reserves.
3. The right to buy land.
4. Better provision for secondary and higher education.
5. The abolition of the pass laws.
6. Action to increase low wage levels.
7. The right to enter and be represented in Parliament.
8. Better treatment and service in the magistrate’s office.
9. Better sanitary conditions in town locations.
10. Better Hospitals for blacks.
11. Information about the powers and authority Captains and 
Raad members have in the reserves and locations.
12. Alcohol licences should be given to locals and not just 
outsiders.
13. Stronger laws should be introduced against drunkenness, 
especially concerning purchases from white people.
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The question of church allegiance within the reserves became the subject of heated 
disputes that far exceeded the theological importance of denominational preferences:
Those that stay in the Rhenish Mission Bond are branded as ‘White Foot’,
while labelled as traitors by some AME leaders.121
The AME church provided an opportunity for educated community leaders who had 
not been co-opted into the dministrative structure to develop an independent political 
agenda. The oppositional and populist nature of the AME church provided an 
alternative framework for political mobilisation. One example can be cited from 
Gibeon reserve. The defection of the headman, David Witbooi, to the AME church 
led a group to announce that they would no longer recognise him as their 
leader.122 The group, which mainly consisted of moderately wealthy, RMS, 
‘Damara’ may have been nervous at the confrontational nature of the AME 
programme, but also eager to challenge the aged headman for the leadership of the 
reserve and take advantage of the administration’s suspicions of the AME.
The group succeeded in having Markus Koraseb appointed as the representative of 
the ‘RMS’ congregation in Gibeon reserve123. Koraseb then sought permission to 
form an Association (‘Vereniging van S.W. A. Inboorlinge’) covering all of southern 
Namibia with himself as leader. The implication was that this would balance the 
AME network which was seen to centre around David and Markus Witbooi and 
Petrus Jod.124 The denominational split was one that mirrored and duplicated 
political differences, providing another ‘signifier’ by which political loyalties could 
be distinguished.
The growth of the AME church in and beyond the reserves was politically 
significant in three ways. It provided an alternative platform for the expression of 
concerns by the small educated professional elite whose aspirations were more urban 
and educationally orientated (eg. there was no demand for the return of traditional
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land in Table 8). The AME church also provided an opportunity to meet and 
organise independent of official reserve structures. Finally the spread of the AME 
church generated conflict that encouraged the reorientation of identities to transcend 
reserve boundaries.
CASE STUDY: THE BONDELSWARTS RISING OF 1922.
The events surrounding the ‘Bondelswarts Rising of 1922’ and its apparent causes 
have been well covered in the existing literature, but two important elements have 
been neglected - the internal politics of the rising and the significance of white land 
settlement. The broad economic threat posed by rapid land alienation in the 
Bondelswarts area was a major strain on their economy.
The political pedigree of the Bondelswarts leadership is one that a nationalist 
historian might find an ambiguous mixture of ‘collaboration’ and ‘resistance’. In 
1879 the Bondelswarts Captain, Willem Christian, helped secure the northern border 
of the Cape Colony ‘... by taking the rebels in flank and rear’. The magistrate of 
the neighbouring Cape district was confident that:
So long as the present Chief and his premier are alive I do not think we shall 
lose the proper influence we have in this territory.125
The Bondelswarts, however, are best remembered for their resistance to both the 
German and the South African attempts to colonise their country.
The defeat of the Bondelswarts by the Germans during the 1904-1906 War had four 
important historical repercussions. The defeat resulted in disarmament; Captain 
Johannes Christian surrendered in January, 1904 and was forced to hand in 289 
rifles126. Secondly, a large proportion of the Bondelswarts community (around 
600) crossed into the north-west Cape to avoid capture. The exiles worked mainly 
in the copper mines and fishing industry at Port Nolloth, but also on the local
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farms127. The work experience provided them with expectations regarding pay 
and conditions that would not be matched when they returned to southern Namibia.
The third significant point was that two key Bondelswarts leaders were amongst the 
exiles. Jacobus Christian had been the Captain of the Bondelswarts up to 1904 and 
Abraham Morris a guerilla leader during the war against the Germans. The absence 
of Jacobus meant that when Johannes died the administration was able to try and 
impose its own alternative candidates, alleging that the absent leader was only a 
collateral relative and not the legitimate successor (See Figure 2).128 The military 
administration appointed Abram Kaffir as ‘Headman’ in 1915 who, failing to obtain 
sufficient popular legitimacy, was replaced by Willem Christian, a young man, from 
the ruling family in 1918.
Reserve residents who wanted a more militant leadership sought the return of 
Jacobus Christian, the brother of the dead Captain and exiled military veteran. The 
large Bondelswarts community that had lived in the Cape for a decade or more gave 
Jacobus Christian an additional constituency of supporters who started to filter back 
after 1915. Within weeks of the German surrender the community were requesting 
the return of Jacobus Christian and Abraham Morris. The local ‘Native Affairs’ 
official supported the suggestion as it would be ‘under our control’.129 Yet 
Willem also had his own supporters in the reserve, creating the basis for rival 
groups.130
Finally, the terms of the Treaty of Submission that had been signed in 1906 (by 
Johannes and Jacobus Christian and Abram Kaffir) provided the Bondelswarts with 
particular legal rights. It granted the community free and exclusive access to five 
distinct localities. The agreement also involved the transfer of 300 sheep to the 
Captain as his ‘sole property’ (1,500 goats were shared out amongst the rest of the 
community).131 The Captainship was abolished with authority being invested in 
a German official. Community members with less than 125 goats or 10 cattle were 
forced to work by the Germans, a fact that may also partly explain the large 
migration south of the border.132 Conversely the introduction of exemption
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FIGURE 2: THE GENEALOGY OF THE BONDELSWART 
LEADERSHIP.133
* (Captains as recognised by the administration).
Willem ChristianWife lr
2 .1.
Abram Christian Johannes Christian Jacobus Christian
(Capt. 1901-1903) (Capt. 1924-1943)
Daniel ChristianJohannes Christian Willem Christian
(Died young) (Capt. 1918-1919) (Capt. 1944-
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certificates in 1915 for those with just 50 goats or 5 cattle must have also 
encouraged the return of exiles hoping to revive their fortunes as independent 
pastoralists. Jacobus Christian and Morris were not allowed to return as the 
administration feared that this would:
... lead to disturbances and friction with the present hereditary Chief of the
tribe.134
Yet it was clear that there was a significant section of the residents in the reserve 
who linked their campaign for the return of Jacobus Christian with more tangible 
and immediate demands. The leader of this group was a man called Abram Pienaar 
(aka. Adam Christian).
Abram Pienaar was critical of the failure of the appointed leadership to take up 
important community issues. Pienaar demanded that the community should receive 
compensation for the heavy stock losses that they had suffered during the Union 
campaign against the Germans.135 Pienaar also agitated against the prospect of the 
community having to pay for grazing and water, rather than being charged 10s. 
‘tax’ (for exemption certificates) and against the compulsory recruitment of ‘all able- 
bodied men’. The military magistrate dismissed the whole exercise as part of 
Pienaar’s political campaign to be elected as the Bondelswarts leader.136
Pienaar’s campaign was linked to demands that Jacobus Christian should be allowed 
to return and criticism of the Government appointed Headman, Abram Kaffir. The 
fact that it was officially admitted that ‘. . . a  great many people are dissatisfied with 
him’, suggests that Pienaar’s opposition had deeper roots than simple disappointment 
at not obtaining an official post.137 Pienaar himself claimed a popular mandate for 
his actions, claiming:
All the people here wanted Jacobus to come back to Warmbad and be
Captain.138
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The official response was to appoint Pienaar as an Additional Native Affairs 
Constable, receiving a salary of £1 10s. per month and being stationed, as the 
military magistrate put it, where I can keep an eye on him’.139 Abram Kaffir 
complained to the military magistrate as early as August, 1915 that ‘Adam was a 
stirrer up of muddy water and always making trouble’. Kaffir gave further evidence 
of Pienaar’s political agenda:
About August last Adam asked me when the English in their liberality were 
going to let them (Bondelswarts) have their country back again.140
The land issue and the problem of white squatters in the reserve was of major 
immediate importance. Yet the position of Abram Kaffir and a delegation 
(including Hendrik Schneeuwe and Willem Christian) that visited the Secretary for 
the Protectorate in 1917 was not that grazing should be reserved for the expansion 
of their stock, but that grazing fees paid by white stockowners should be given to 
the reserve foremen, rather than the government.141 The demand highlighted a 
difference between those who were appointed to official positions and saw this as 
a means of advancing and defending their own economic fortunes and the majority 
who opposed administrative legislation on a far broader basis and had their own 
local popular leadership.142
Pienaar as the foreman at Driehoek (since September, 1915) represented those 
people who had suffered most from externally imposed overstocking, having had to 
share their grazing with large numbers of the loot stock seized from the Germans 
during the Union campaign.143 The minutes of a meeting held in December, 1917 
recorded that:
Some people have complained about Dreihoek being used by Govt, for loot 
stock. There is larger number of stock there +  (sic) they finish off the 
grazing.144
The fact that ‘the English’ had arbitrarily filled the reserve with stock for over two
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years suggested that they would show little respect for Bondelswarts land rights and 
provided a clear provocation for a historically referenced appeal to leaders 
associated with resistance and the assertion of Bondelswarts’ rights.
The campaign for the return of Jacobus Christian to revive and take up the 
traditional post of captain was symbolic of the community’s wish to regain their 
independence and land rights. Timotheus Beukes explained that:
The Bondelswartz tribe wanted their own land ...The object of the tribe was 
to free themselves from the laws of the whiteman.145
The attempts of the administration to appoint leaders seems to have been 
counterproductive. Willem Christian was appointed ‘Headman’ in 1918 and from 
the administration’s view accepted because of his hereditary claim upon the 
captainship, however it emerged that in the same year the community held a secret 
meeting and unanimously elected the exiled Jacobus Christian as captain.146
Willem Christian’s death from influenza in 1919 reopened the debate over the 
leadership. The Bondelswarts petitioned for the return of Jacobus Christian, 
allegedly to block the election of Klein Willem Christian (aged 22) who was seen 
as heavily under the influence of Timotheus Beukes, the foreman in the 
neighbouring town of Warmbad. The administration’s tactic was to ‘enlist the 
services’ of Abram Kaffer to convene a meeting ‘... of old men and foremen’ which 
resulted in the appointment of Hendrik Schneeuwe as the new Headman.147
Schneeuwe was seen as a safe appointment by the local military magistrate as he had 
formerly been the ‘Native Constable’ in Warmbad.148 Maj. Herbst, the highest 
‘Native Affairs’ official was more sceptical of the benefits of the appointment, 
arguing that:
... the Administration’s man drew the money and the other man wielded the 
influence.149
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Jacobus Christian returned to Namibia in August 1919 and Hendrik Schneeuwe was 
deposed by the Bondelswarts as their leader following a meeting in March the 
following year. Schneeuwe was accused of corruption, but the local police and 
officials felt that it reflected ‘. . . a  Tribal desire for more active leadership’ in 
general, and the fruits of work done by Jacobus Christian and Timotheus Beukes 
to mobilise opposition to Schneeuwe who if he does not side with the majority, 
gives the game away’.150
The administration made one final attempt to block the appointment of Jacobus 
Christiaan as Captain following the removal of Schneeuwe in 1920. The claim was 
that Christiaan could not hold office as he was still under a two year suspended 
sentence for illegally entering the country in 1919. Instead Timotheus Beukes was 
appointed as the new ‘Chief although one senior official later wrote that Beukes 
had:
... struck me as having no desire nor particular ability for the position apart
from the fact of his being a Bastard and regarded as an alien whose
Hottentot wife had even left him, (my emphasis).151
Alienation from the local community was seen as an asset, perhaps because it was 
imagined that it would make the new ‘Chief more dependent upon local officials 
for support. Beuke’s power base was ‘. . . a  few adherents residing at Warmbad’, 
but these were seen as separate from those in the reserve and ‘... more enlightened 
by reason of residence close to the authorities and official support’.152 Beukes was 
aware of the weakness of his power base and once Jacobus Christian’s suspended 
sentence expired he tendered his resignation.153 The administration kept him in 
post, but locally he was perceived as the Under-captain to Jacobus Christian and it 
was this, more than his official position that gave weight to his authority. Hoemle, 
an anthropologist who spoke to Morris and others in 1913 noted that it was 
unconventional for the Captain to address his people personally, but that the ‘Under- 
captain’ and ‘Magistrate’ played key roles as his spokesmen.154 The residents of 
the reserve wanted leaders who would challenge the administration and raise their
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grievances. Two other candidates had stronger hereditary claims to the Captainship, 
yet Jacobus Christian was favoured because of his historical credentials, more than 
his genealogical ones.
Jacobus Christian’s position was itself far from secure if he failed to stand by his 
supporters. When his brother, Nicolaas Christian left Heib around October, 1921 
and travelled to the mountains to avoid the new dog tax it was seen as an gesture 
of defiance.155 However, Jacobus Christian reported those who attempted to join 
Nicolaas Christian to the police.156 One CID officer reported that, consequently:
... there is a movement on foot among the members of the Bondelswart 
Tribe, to depose their present Chief (Jacobus Christian) and elect this 
Nicolas Christian (sic) in his stead, on the grounds that they consider him to 
be an ‘Old Woman’ who is afraid to go against the Administration.157
Ernest Kaffir argued that the Bondelswarts actually listened far more to Adam 
Pienaar, Abraham Morris and Timotheus Beukes than they did to Jacobus 
Christian.158 Beukes described the authority of Jacobus Christian in 1922 as 
‘...merely nominal’, whilst Adam Pienaar went so far as to label him a 
‘Government sympathiser’.159
The reasons given in testimony for the conflict clearly demonstrated the frustrations 
of pastoral farmers trying to recover and prosper in a hostile economic environment. 
Timotheus Beukes articulated the community’s concerns at a series of meetings. 
The administration were accused of the ‘taking away of our land’, giving it to 
whites, failing to restore land seized by the Germans and evicting those ‘squatting’ 
on farms that the residents considered to be their grazing land.160 The meeting 
also condemned the prohibitive increase in dog tax, which threatened their ability 
to supplement their diet and income by hunting. Complaints were raised about the 
low prices offered for the resident’s slaughter stock, which made it difficult to pay 
for the compulsory purchase of branding irons.161
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The meetings picked up the ‘Pienaar agenda’; Timotheus Beukes used a meeting at 
Garuchas to denounce the fact that:
...we were not compensated in German & English war. The whiteman got
compensation but the black man does not get any compensation.162
The Bondelswarts were faced with the fact that the prospect of restored prosperity 
had been replaced with the reality of destitution. Economic pressures, accelerated 
by the rapid influx of white pastoralists into Bondelswarts territory, provided the 
motivation for open conflict whilst the attempted arrest of Morris on his return 
merely served as a catalyst.
The short sharp skirmishes that constituted ‘the Bondelswarts Rising’ left Abram 
Morris and Adam Pienaar amongst the dead. The posts of Headmen were abolished 
with the policy being that ‘...only carefully selected foremen be appointed’.163 
Jacobus Christian spent just two years in prison before emerging and taking up the 
recreated post of Headman, an appointment that showed the administration’s 
confidence that he posed no threat.164 Timotheus Beukes turned King’s evidence 
at the trial of Jacobus Christian and was unable to return to the reserve, being seen 
as a traitor. Ironically he became a prison warden in Keetmanshoop. The desperate 
struggle of the residents to fight for the possibility of economic recovery had been 
defeated and over the next twenty years the inhabitants were ground into poverty, 
with the younger generation aspiring to follow Beukes into urban employment. By 
1943 the reserve was described as ‘... virtually an old age home’, and its occupants 
as ‘carrying themselves like an army that had been defeated’.165 The heroes of 
the past had returned, but had been unable to rekindle the pastoral prosperity of the 
past.
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CASE STUDY: BERSEBA RESERVE AND THE RISE AND FALL OF
DIEDRICH GOLIATH. 1933-1938.
The Berseba community, like the Bondelswarts, claimed special privileges dating 
back to the German colonial period. The Berseba Captain, Diedrich Goliath had 
confirmed a ‘defensive alliance’ first signed with the Germans in 1885. The 
obligations placed on the colonial power were clearly spelled out:
... I expect from the white people that they will respect the laws, customs 
and uses of my country and that they will also pay the taxes which may be 
imposed in my favour by agreement between the German Government and 
myself.166
The size of the reserve meant that it was far more credible as a self-regulating 
society than some of its smaller counterparts, but the colonialists were involved in 
a continuous struggle to limit the powers of the Berseba Captain, a struggle which 
reached its climax during the Captainship of Diedrich Goliath. The task was 
facilitated by a domestic political power struggle within the reserve.
The economic basis of the dispute between the Isaacs and the Goliaths in Berseba 
was outlined in the previous chapter. The seizure of farms (previously given to the 
Isaacs) enabled Johannes Goliath, the Captain, to pay outstanding bills. However 
the deal also gave material substance to a political bond between the two groups. 
The fact that David Isaacs (sic) had trekked to join the ‘Witboois’ in 1896 was seen 
as a betrayal of that relationship. Johannes Goliath claimed that it meant David 
Isaacs ‘... became a Witbooi’, and forfeited his right to retain the farms given to 
him.167 The fact that Johannes Goliath remained the captain at Berseba until his 
death in 1925 meant that the details of this transaction remained a sensitive political 
issue.
In 1922 a senior police officer carrying out an inspection of Berseba reserve claimed 
that the ‘enmity’ between the two groups was such that ‘... Goliath is not quite safe
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amongst his own people’.168 The officer even referred to the two groups as rival 
parties. The split provides clear evidence that the image of reserves as uniform 
political units is a false one. Yet whilst the original dispute may have had historical 
roots, the parties quickly adapted new political motivations in response to change. 
The officer noted that:
... Goliath is loyal to the Government, but the Isaac’s are agitators and are 
dissatisfied. It is rumoured that a meeting was held in the Berseba reserve 
at the time of the Bondelswart Rebellion and that the Isaac’s and the younger 
people decided to help the Bondelswarts. It was only through the influence 
of Goliath and some of his followers that they were prevented.169
The parties had become a ruling party ‘loyal’ to the administration and a more 
radical opposition.
The police resources available to the administration to cover the vast area of the 
Berseba reserve were sparse, but they uncovered evidence of the internal apparatus 
of control and administration established by Johannes Goliath. As early as 1917 it 
was clear that Goliath had established his own system of police patrols to ensure law 
and order within his territory.170 A network of beacons was also established 
which could be lit to spread a warning of any approaching state police patrols.171 
The reserve police would take suspects to be tried by an elected black magistrate 
and the rest of the ‘raad’ (council).172 In 1927 the magistrate appointed 37 
foremen to supervise work carried out during the locust campaign.173 The captain 
was also issuing passes for residents who were leaving to search for work.174
The application of this local authority was allowed to continue during the period of 
Johannes Goliath and his successor Andries Goliath. However by 1933 the 
frustrations of senior administrative officers with the special privilidges enjoyed by 
the Berseba residents was becoming apparent. The Assistant Secretary scrawled his 
criticisms of the Berseba system on an Annual Report:
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So long as it is treated as the private property of the tribe we cannot enforce 
any discipline so essential to progress. Communally-owned native land is 
an anachronism with the progress of civilization.175
The retention of strong local powers was perceived as ‘a problem’; progress would 
require tighter control by the central state.
The death of Andries and election of Diedrich Goliath in 1933 [See Table 9] was 
accompanied by the appointment of a new Superintendent in the reserve. Mr Fuller 
had been a sergeant in the South West African Police for the previous thirteen and 
a half years.176 The time seemed ripe for the introduction of a more vigorous 
system of control and management within the reserve. However, Diedrich had a 
very clear conception of the use that could be made of traditional rights to fight 
current issues.
TABLE 9: THE CAPTAINS OF BERSEBA.177
Paul Goliath 
Jakobus Isaak 
Diedrik Goliath 
Johannes Christian Goliath 
Andries Goliath 
Diedrich Ruben Goliath
c. 1850 to 15.04.1869 
24.05.1871 to 12.12.1892
05.07.1894 to 01.07.1895
07.11.1895 to 05.11.1925 
24.12.1925 to 30.03.1933 
03.07.1933 to 30.09.1938
The application of grazing fees in the reserve had been strongly resisted with the 
residents only being persuaded to agree to pay them on a voluntary basis from 
August, 1928. Andries Goliath had accepted the fees reluctantly and shown little 
enthusiasm for encouraging residents to pay them. Diedrich Goliath demonstrated
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that he would go further and challenge the whole assumption that fees should be 
paid. The Superintendent explained:
I have endeavoured to collect grazing fees from those who I know can afford 
it but have been unsuccessful owing to him informing the people that they 
must not pay anything without first receiving his instructions to do so. The 
Kapitein is holding a meeting with his people to decide whether they should 
pay grazing fees or not.178
The Captain argued that there were sound economic reasons for the delay. The 
agreement to pay grazing fees had come just before the heavy drought hit the 
region. The collapse of stock prices during the period given the poor quality of the 
animals meant that the grazing fees could not be paid. The refusal to pay was 
widespread within Berseba, by 31st August, 1935 576 stockowners were in arrears 
with their payments, and the administration was forced to write off £2,155. 7s 4d 
in arrears.179 The measure failed to stir the enthusiasm of the residents to pay.
In the period 1st July, 1935 to 30th April, 1936 only 4 percent of the grazing fees 
due were paid.180 Diedrich Goliath argued that many of the animals were still 
young and the market remained depressed with their goats only fetching 4s. to 5s. 
per head. However an enquiry concluded that Diedrich had actively encouraged 
non-payment of grazing fees as:
...he supported them in their attitude of indifference towards their 
obligations.181
Goliath’s actions could alternatively be interpreted as fulfilling his obligations to the 
community to assist them rebuild flocks that had been decimated by the drought.
When given a platform Goliath clearly articulated the position that the low level of 
wages paid by white farmers and the uneconomic stock prices obtainable in the 
markets made it unreasonable for the administration to expect his community to
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meet their grazing fee obligations.182 The fact that the arrears due on many of the 
residents flocks was money due on animals that had subsequently died during the 
drought made the administration’s efforts to extract payment seem particularly 
unjust.
The powers assumed by Diedrich Goliath included the continued operation of a 
system of local justice. One thief had stolen 31 sheep. The Captain imposed a fine 
of 63 sheep on the broad principle that if anyone was found guilty of stock theft ‘... 
he must pay double’.183 The law included an element of flexibility that would take 
account of the circumstances of the accused and if they were poor, fines could be 
reduced to a ‘one for one’ basis. The court would take a share to cover the costs 
of the case (in the example given this share amounted to 12 sheep).
The appropriation of a portion of the fine to cover court costs formed the basis for 
a number of accusations of corruption against Diedrich Goliath. Accusations in a 
similar vein included a claim that he had retained dog tax refunds and claims that 
he was accepting recruitment fees from local farmers in exchange for ensuring that 
their farms were never short of labour.184 The accusations were primarily levelled 
at Diedrich Goliath by the Isaacs party who felt that they were being persecuted in 
a simple ruse to embezzle their stock.
The months of December, 1936 and January, 1937 alone saw 23 cases being tried. 
The majority of the accused it was alleged came from the Isaacs party. The 
sentences in 14 of these cases involved fines185. The Captain seems to have used 
his powers to target the internal opposition to his rule, for instance he lined one 
leader of the Izaak party, £30 for ‘working against the C hief.186 Goliath sought 
to use his position to defend and build the independence of his community, but also 
to strengthen his own position. Popular actions in defence of his community were 
undermined by the alienation of an important section of the Berseba residents.
Whilst the Captain was to be criticised for his autocratic manner and intolerance of 
criticism, it might be argued he used ‘traditional’ powers to radicalise a community
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that had previously been passive and loyal to the administration. Goliath scandalised 
the reserve Superintendent by treating him as an equal, so when spoken to as 
‘Goliath’, he replied using the Superintendents surname, ‘Fuller’, rather than the 
expected respectful title ‘Sir’.187 The ‘insult’ was seen as symptomatic of 
Goliath’s lack of respect for the administration.
The administration’s interpretation was that Goliath was assuming powers above his 
station as part of his lust to achieve absolute power within Berseba. The Welfare 
Officer responsible for the reserve was a major advocate of this theory arguing that 
Goliath’s:
... ambition was, and still is, to set up a dictatorship with sovereign rights 
over the Berseba Hottentot Territory and its residents to the exclusion of the 
Administration, and to eject the Isaaks and Damaras from Berseba.188
Yet whilst intolerant of opposition, Goliath often expressed opinions that identified 
the difficulties faced by the poorer members of his community and took action that 
would assist them.
One might conjecture that the Isaacs party represented those wealthier members of 
the community who felt excluded from their accustomed position of authority by 
Goliath’s populist actions. The party certainly included some of the wealthiest men 
in the reserve amongst its leadership (Isaak Izaak was acknowledged by officials as 
‘a big man’ and ‘Ou’ [Old ?] Eduard Isaac was the richest stockowner in the 
reserve).189 Goliath on his part dismissed the ‘Raad’ of elders who traditionally 
advised the Captain and replaced them with his own appointments.190
The issue of passes by the Captain was seen by white officials as a dangerous abuse 
of power, yet Goliath pointed out that the Superintendent was stationed 34 miles 
away from Berseba. The journey to obtain a pass from him could take five to six 
hours on a horse, and the majority of the residents did not own horses.191 The 
majority therefore faced a journey of two days or more, duplicated upon their
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return, to obtain a pass.192 If the pass was needed to leave the reserve to seek 
stray stock the prospects of retrieving it alive would diminish with each passing day.
The poorer members of a reserve were compelled in some reserves to carry out 
work without wages on development projects within the reserve, but in Berseba it 
was reported that Goliath:
... supported them in their attitude that they would only work if paid for
their labour.193
Finally when the reserve storekeeper, Mr Matz, refused to extend credit to residents 
it was Goliath who organised a boycott of the store and for goods to be purchased 
from an alternative store in the neighbouring Maltahohe district.194
The populist garments with which Goliath can be clothed may, however, prove ill 
fitting. Goliath also represented a segment of the elite that sought to use an 
interpretation of tradition to retain exclusive access to the mechanisms of power 
available to them. ’Ou’ Eduard Isaac was reported to have become so angry about 
his exclusion from the decision-making process that, by 1938, he was openly talking 
of war against the Goliath party.195 The war proved unnecessary, as within a 
week Goliath had narrowly lost a vote of confidence in a reserve meeting (116 to 
133).196 Goliath’s deportation from the reserve was recommended to prevent him 
becoming involved in political organisation against a new leadership and as a 
salutary lesson to the residents of Tses reserve whose leaders were also ‘... inclined 
to defy the authority of the Government’.197 Goliath was forced to pack up his 
belongings and move with his family to the small Hoachanas reserve to the north 
in the Rehoboth district, arriving there on 23rd November, 1938.198
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CONCLUSION.
The chapter has used specific examples to reveal the manner in which political 
struggles within the reserves were fragmented in a manner which confounds the later 
composite ‘tribal’ images associated with the reserves. The colonial state sought to 
hijack the traditional hierarchy within the reserves and conscript traditional leaders 
as junior officials in the administration. The perspective of the residents of the 
reserves was different: They looked to tradition to support their campaign to restore 
previous freedoms and rights, and to provide leaders for these campaigns.
Reserve leaders who failed to represent popular grievances lost legitimacy and 
authority within the reserves. The period up to World War Two saw the defeat of 
the efforts of the more active traditional leaders, such as Jacobus Christian and 
Diedrich Goliath, to restore and defend their traditional authority, land rights and 
communities. After World War Two the emphasis switched towards the election 
of reserve leaders who had the qualifications to operate most effectively within the 
administrative system.
The political struggle, meanwhile, moved onto broader fronts and to less parochial 
arenas. The transformation reflected the economic defeat of the autonomous black 
pastoral option in southern Namibia and the increasing transfer of economic 
ambition to urban aspirations in recognition of the severe limitations of the 
reserves. The reserves were gradually to become political backwaters in which 
black leaders sought to retain exclusive access to the dwindling resources available.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WHITE FARMING COMMUNITY 
IN SOUTHERN NAMIBIA. 1915-1955.
INTRODUCTION
The history of the white commercial farming community in southern Namibia in the 
period 1915-1955 can be broken into two phases. The chapter will focus on the 
first of these, a period of sustained crisis, lasting twenty years, from 1915 to 1935. 
The intervention of the state played a crucial role during this period in preventing 
many of the new white immigrants being driven from their farms by debt, drought 
and depression. The twenty years that followed saw the consolidation and further 
expansion of the white farming community in the region, supported by the karakul 
boom and the utilisation of contract labour on the farms. The opening section of 
this chapter will provide an overview of the pattern of change within southern 
Namibia and place it within the context of the comparative literature.
One of the neglected areas of Namibian history is the environmental impact of 
changing farming practices and policies. Lau and Reiner have recently assembled 
some material, but surprisingly ignore the role of small stock, and work from the 
premise that only the ‘German era’ was ‘beneficial to the development of the 
country’s agricultural resources’, focusing on the external direction of the economy 
by Germany and the Union.1 One of the difficulties that emerges is that the 
archive material may provide better evidence about the official perception of change, 
than the real impact of changes. Yet whilst it is difficult to quantify environmental 
change historically, the attempt to empiricise changes in land use and farming 
practise invites complimentary studies that would examine further the environmental 
impact of these changes.
The pattern of land settlement in Namibia can be contrasted with that which evolved
223
in the Cape. In many parts of the Cape the initial tendency was for white ‘settlers’ 
to trek rather than settle. The trend was one that was actively encouraged by the 
land policy introduced by the Dutch. Low rents encouraged farming practices in 
which land was leased on a temporary basis. Once the grazing was exhausted the 
stock owner would simply hire a different area of land and move to fresh fields. 
The pattern of mobility amongst white pastoralists in the Cape was thus akin to that 
pursued by black pastoralists. However, the availability of land was an important 
prerequisite for this type of pastoral practice. The continuing influx of white settlers 
entering the colony and seeking land made reform necessary and the land settlement 
pattern began to change after 1813 with the development of a more sedentary white 
farming community.2
The chronology of land settlement in Namibia was different. Formal colonisation 
came comparatively late, with the establishment of a German colony in 1884. 
German rule and attempts to encourage settlers from Germany inhibited the flow of 
settlers which might otherwise have entered the territory from the Cape. Whilst 
large scale land appropriation took place following the 1904-1907 War there had 
been comparatively little land settlement, least of all in southern Namibia.
The defeat of the Germans in 1915 was followed by a period of uncertainty about 
the future form of administration of the territory. The large influx of white 
immigrants entering Namibia in this period were thus unable to gain security of 
tenure to land. The lifestyle of the new immigrants hiring grazing on short term 
leases was marked by mobility and consequently a disinclination to develop fixed 
assets on the land such as buildings and boreholes.
The willingness of immigrants to accept this inconvenient lifestyle reflected their 
hopes that they would eventually secure permanent tenure to a farm. The rate of 
immigration significantly increased after the Union secured a Class ’C’ Mandate 
over Namibia in 1919 and introduced its Land Settlement Programme in 1920. The 
majority of the new settlers came from the Cape. The Carnegie Report of 1932 
noted that the ’European’ population of the border districts of the north-west Cape
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(such as Calvinia, Clan william, Kenhardt and Namaqualand) had risen constantly 
throughout the period 1911-1921, but then fallen over the next five years.3 The 
Cape was also alleged to be the region of South Africa which had the most 
significant ’poor white’ problem. In 1916-17 it was estimated that there were 
54,051 whites living in poverty in the Cape. A range of different types of ’poor 
whites’ were identified which included:
... persons of nomadic type, like the poor ’trek’-farmers of the Cape North-
West, who still retain some pioneer forms of life.4
It was these poor farmers, abusively termed ‘bokboers’ (goat farmers), who formed 
a large proportion of the new arrivals in Namibia.
The claim has been made that there was no more open land available for new 
settlers in the Cape after the 1870s.5 Once this position was reached the price of 
land was likely to become increasingly prohibitive for the poorer aspirant farmer. 
The ripples of movement that took these settlers to the periphery in search of access 
to land struck a barrier at the Orange River which marked the international border 
between the Union and German territory. The German colonial regime’s policy was 
to reject applications from non-German settlers unless they possessed a substantial 
amount of capital. The defeat of the Germans in 1915 was a breach in the dam.6
The poverty of many of the new farmers meant that they were particularly 
vulnerable to the threat of competition from black pastoralists. The new 
immigrants would seek state intervention to destroy any prospect of black pastoral 
rivalry in the marketplace. The new immigrants were less likely to be able to afford 
private investment in the development of the infrastructure of their farms, buying 
high quality stock or investing in new technology. The new farmers were therefore 
anxious to obtain cheap labour in order to compete with established farmers in 
Namibia and South Africa. The white farms provided the interface upon which a 
struggle took place between two potentially viable farming communities. The 
struggles of the black pastoralist for mobility and access (or as Keegan writes of
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South Africa ‘...struggles for primitive accumulation and against dispossession’) 
were entwined with the struggle of white settlers to make their farms commercially 
viable on foundations laid by a state-led infusion of development capital.7
The rapidity and naivety of the initial settlement programme also bore an 
environmental cost. The attempt to maximise the number of settlers gaining access 
to land meant that the farms allocated tended to be smaller than was economically 
and environmentally desirable. The shortage of private capital meant that there was 
little money available to provide fencing or sink the necessary additional boreholes. 
The lack of these led to a tendency for the overconcentration of stock on farms. 
The Drought Commission of 1919 provided evidence that farms in South Africa 
with an inadequate number of waterholes had also suffered the most conspicuous 
environmental damage as animals trampled out the grazing around those that 
remained.8
The rapid division and alienation of land into a patchwork of privately owned farms 
meant that areas that had traditionally been available as reserve grazing in times of 
drought were no longer accessible when needed. Werner’s verdict on the 
devastating impact of the drought of the early 1930s on central Namibia is damning:
The severity of the drought ... was as much a result of the Union’s ill- 
considered land settlement policies as of insufficient rainfall.9
The damage created by forms of farm management that fuelled land erosion was not 
unknown to contemporaries; indeed the, often highly visible, damage was the cause 
of great concern.
The Report of the Drought Commission of 1919 had warned that the continuation 
of contemporary farming practices could lead to only one ‘logical outcome’. This 
would be " .. .‘The Great South African Desert’ uninhabitable by Man".10 The 
Commission’s opinion of commercial white farmers in South Africa was cutting:
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... they start farming with the set purpose of wringing out the life blood of 
the farm in order to make a quick profit11
The Land Settlement Programme in Namibia which gave settlers access to loans to 
buy stock, and the large influx of farmers with stock from the Cape produced a 
rapid escalation in stock numbers in southern Namibia in the 1920s. The increase 
placed a heavy strain on the existing resources and a similar threat to the 
environment. The problems created by the overstocking of land became particularly 
apparent during periods of extensive drought. The relentless drought that struck 
Namibia in the early 1930s gripped South Africa with equal venom. The number 
of woolled sheep in South Africa was reduced by a quarter (13 million) during the 
period 1931-1934.12 The Carnegie Commission’s Report of 1932 made a direct 
link between these heavy losses and the environmental negligence of farmers:
Not drought so much as man’s reckless use of the veld, causing erosion, a 
quicker run-off of rain water, and a lowering of the water level, brought 
about this decreased power of resistance of the land against drought.13
The concern led to measures in both South Africa and Namibia that sought to 
encourage commercial farmers to seek enhanced profits through the pursuit of 
quality, rather than quantity, in their flocks and herds.
The extent to which farms in southern Namibia were ‘overstocked’ was estimated 
with reference to some calculation of the ‘carrying capacity’ of the land. The 
‘carrying capacity’ can be defined as the:
... average acreage of pasture land which is capable of maintaining an 
animal for an indefinite period without deterioration of the pasture.14
The concept is a loaded one that is problematic for two reasons. The first is that 
it contains an assumption of sustainability and predictability that is inappropriate in 
the dryland environment of southern Namibia. Contemporary development workers
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still disagree by factors of four or five over the stocking rate of a given 
rangeland.15 Secondly the concept assumes a ‘Eurocentric’ concern with the 
commercial exploitation of the land. The difficulty of using it as the basis for 
comparisons between black and white stockowners is that it contains no concept of 
the value of stock in terms of social relationships or the flexibility of boundaries. 
The evidence suggests that the survival of white farmers flocks also depended less 
on the ‘carrying capacity’ of their farms, than the mobility of their flocks.
The prevalence of small stock farming in southern Namibia during the period under 
study is one of the principle features giving homogeneity to the region. It would 
be useful to draw comparisons with similar districts in South Africa over the same 
period. The problem, as Beinart recently pointed out is that:
The history of the sheep farming districts in the 20th century, has still to be
written.16
The sheep industry within South Africa was dominated by the market for wool. In 
1913 there were 28 million woolled sheep in a total small stock population of 47 
million. A decline in numbers during the war years was followed by expansion 
from 1921, reaching a peak in 1931. In that year the number of woolled sheep 
stood at 45 million in a small stock population of 60 million. Beinart suggests that 
the expansion did not relate directly to the prices available, as wool prices fell 
between the wars. However links with the development of the pastoral economy in 
southern Namibia can be made. The failure to market merino sheep successfully 
from southern Namibia must be linked to the expansion of numbers in South Africa 
and their closer proximity to the major markets. The pattern of small stock 
expansion in southern Namibia was also markedly different to that in South Africa. 
Small stock numbers in southern Namibia continued to increase throughout the 
1930s. The difference conforms to the staggered nature of land settlement in 
Namibia.
The problem facing the commercial farming sector in Namibia, as in other white
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settler colonies, was that it was not founded purely on commercial grounds. The 
land policies were settlement policies in which incentives were provided to 
encourage white immigration. A generous system of loans and advances attracted 
and bolstered new settler farms in southern Namibia during the 1920s. State 
support for commercial farmers in Namibia and South Africa was such that several 
writers have doubted whether the sector could have survived without it. De Kiewiet 
commented in 1940 that:
South Africa is not an agricultural country ... Without subsidy and under 
conditions of free competition much of the land would not be economically 
cultivated, and many of the agricultural and pastoral products could make no 
headway against the products of New Zealand, Canada, the Argentine, or the 
United States.17
The internal political debates of the period however, focused, not on the viability 
of the commercial farming sector as a whole, but rather on complaints about the 
competence of its poorer members. The Van Eck Commission of 1941 commented 
that in South Africa the governments policy:
... often merely keeps inefficient farmers on the land and perpetuates or even 
accentuates unhealthy farming practices.18
The view was echoed in the Legislative Assembly in Namibia where it was 
complained that:
... the state was subsidising a large section of the community at the expense 
of the remainder of the population.19
This debate reflected a conflict of interest within the farming community itself 
between the wealthier farmers and their poor neighbours. Keegan, writing of the 
Orange Free State at the beginning of the twentieth century, noticed a clear 
correspondence between the size of a farm and the position of the farmer regarding
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‘squatting’. Large farms attracted a permanent labour supply by offering grazing 
rights. In a competitive labour market farmers without surplus land lost out. It was 
therefore these same farmers who sought measures that would lead to an ‘equitable 
distribution’ of labour.20
The district Farmers’ Associations could provide stages upon which the debate over 
labour policy could be fought. Keegan recorded the clear conflict between rich and 
poor farmers within the Upper Klip Rivers Association.21 These Associations were 
generally controlled by the most powerful and, by definition, wealthiest farmers in 
the area. After the mid-1930s and the expulsion of most workers’ stock, wealthier 
farmers began to see that wage differentials between farms could be used to secure 
a stable labour force, whilst poorer farmers still offered grazing or stock as payment 
in kind. The division in South Africa was thus one in which:
The larger farmers, who controlled the provincial and national agricultural 
unions, were more willing to accept progressive state initiatives against 
sharecroppers and tenancy agreements.22
Yet all farmers retained a common interest in uniting to protect their supply of 
labour in the face of rival interests.
The capitalisation of white farms, exclusion of black-owned stock and 
impoverishment of the reserves created a clear economic gap between the 
commercial white farmer and the majority of prospective black stock farmers. The 
period after 1935 might be seen as the ‘period of transition in capitalist agriculture’ 
in southern Namibia.23 The shift in the economic fortunes of white farmers and 
the levels of surplus capital available within individual farming units had significant 
consequences. The most important of these were the form of labour relations and 
the level of political and economic power exercised by the farming community at 
an individual and group level.
The political objective of both Germany and South Africa was to secure their
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possession of Namibia in an uncertain international environment. The mechanism 
for achieving this goal was to be white settlement. Once white settlers had become 
established on the ecologically fragile farms of southern Namibia they formed a 
powerful lobbying group within a sparse white community and sought to ensure that 
they retained their privileged access to state provision. Schmokel has dismissed the 
image of the successful commercial white farmer in Namibia as a ‘myth’, arguing 
that they were:
...perhaps the most extreme case of an economically unviable, politically 
dependent settler agricultural system ... [and] ... an essentially parasitical 
phenomenon.24
The validity of this verdict of the white farming community will be tested with 
reference to southern Namibia.
THE PATTERN OF GERMAN LAND DISTRIBUTION.
The system of land tenure that had been established by the German colonial 
authorities attempted to prevent land speculation or the accumulation of vast areas 
of land in the hands of a few wealthy farmers by limiting farms to 20,000 hectares 
in size. Each farm that was given out had to be personally developed or at least 
managed by a ‘European’. The provision was made that the conditions placed upon 
purchasers could be amended by the German Colonial Office, but few farmers 
seemed prepared to go through the bureaucratic process necessary to achieve 
revisions to the terms of their purchase. The rules lacked flexibility - the most 
visible symptom of this being the concern with geometrical symmetry. Farms were 
to be rectangular, regardless of the natural boundaries or prevalence of water 
sources. However, as long as there was little fencing and large areas of open land, 
the constraints proved more cartographic than real. Many of the rectangular 
German farms were mapped neatly in the middle of a large area of unproclaimed 
land.25
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The distribution of land was primarily intended to consolidate the territory as a 
German settler colony. German citizens were charged roughly half the price of 
others wishing to buy farms.26 The constant black resistance to German rule and 
the high cost of transporting expeditionary forces from Germany meant that 
preferential conditions for farm purchases were offered to those liable to military 
service. Farms of up to 5,000 ha. were made available to this special category of 
German settler for just 30 pfenning (about 3 l/2d) per hectare. Many of the 
German soldiers who travelled to Namibia to fight in the 1904-1907 war took the 
opportunity to obtain land.
The purchase price of a farm provided under the land settlement scheme for 
Germans was divided into instalments. On the day of purchase an initial payment 
of l/15th of the purchase price had to be made, but no further payments were 
required over the following five years. The idea being that this time would be used 
to construct farm buildings, open up water supplies, build up sheep flocks and cattle 
herds and generally develop the farm into a profitable commercial enterprise. 
Applicants for farms (as opposed to ‘closer settlements’) were expected to possess 
at least 20,000 marks (£1,000) capital of their own.27 Settlers were provided with 
cash advances of up to 6,000 marks (£300) to help meet the cost of improvements. 
After the five years grace had expired the remainder of the purchase price was to 
be paid off in fourteen annual instalments. Purchasers who did not qualify for the 
special offer were still entitled to the five years grace after making an initial 
downpayment. However, the period of time allowed for the payments was 
considerably shorter, resulting in higher rates. Farmers produced 1/10th of the total 
purchase price on the day of purchase. The other nine instalments had to be paid 
annually following the expiry of the five year development period. A few 
prospective farmers who lacked the necessary capital to purchase farms under either 
scheme were permitted to obtain a lease agreement, either on a short (up to 5 years) 
or a long-term basis (up to 18 years).
The generosity of the terms of purchase offered by the German government meant 
that nine out of every ten farms occupied by white stockowners were held under a
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purchase agreement. Statistics show that as of 1st April, 1914 1,331 farms were 
in private possession, whilst only 118 were held on lease agreements.28 In the 20 
years up to 1907 only 480 farms had been sold, but in 1907 alone a further 202 
farms were sold, whilst in the six year period from 1907 to 1913 851 farms were 
sold. The statistics give clear evidence that the rise in the number of land settlers 
had been directly promoted by the demobilisation of troops shipped in to fight in the 
1903-1907 War.29 Yet many of the purchases were speculative and it was 
estimated that as late as 1915, there were only ‘about 600 settlers’ actually living 
on the land (a statistic which suggests the fragility of rural control over the black 
population).30
The extent to which land appropriated by the German government remained 
unoccupied can be shown by an examination of the statistics for land ownership in 
April, 1913. Maltahohe district was calculated to be 2,480,000 hectares in size, of 
which 1,937,000 was classified as government land suitable for farm use. Yet only 
60 farms covering an area of 917,000 hectares had been sold.31 The amount of 
land not occupied by white settlers was supplemented in Warmbad and 
Keetmanshoop districts by the surviving ‘reserves’. At the time of the South 
African invasion the majority of government land remained vacant.
The raw statistics illustrate the scale of land alienation during the German 
occupation, but also the brevity of the period of white residence on many of the 
farms prior to World War One. The facts show that much of the occupied land had 
been alienated for little more than a decade. Settlers lacked deep historical roots 
to legitimise their occupation of land and alienation remained a recent memory to 
black residents when South African troops crossed the border in 1915.
FARMERS WITHOUT FARMS: WHITE LAND USE. 1915-1918.
The new military administration was sceptical of the agricultural ability of many of 
the German farmers:
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A large part of the community consists of ex-soldiers who, after their 
periods of Colonial service had expired, took their discharges here and 
received farms on easy terms. They lacked experience of Colonial farming 
conditions and knowledge of the natives.32
The new administration felt that the wave of immigrants that they anticipated from 
the Cape would have the experience necessary to be successful farmers in Namibia 
and bring prosperity to the country.
The white farming sector in Namibia was thrown into considerable disarray by the 
brief struggle following the South African invasion. As the German forces retreated 
north farms were abandoned or left under the supervision of women and children 
who found the black work force deserting on mass. Enlisted German farmers found 
themselves interned at the prison camp at Aus or operating many miles away from 
their farms. The disruption of normal farming activity was absolute. The early 
Union occupation of the south and tendency for both sides to requisition stock to 
feed their soldiers meant that the south suffered more than any other region in 
Namibia. A small minority of German farmers were deported (only seven German 
farmers in Maltahohe district for example), and these did not leave until 1919.33 
The treatment of the German farmers confounded the expectations of the local black 
population who had anticipated that defeat would automatically entail dispossession.
A survey of Maltahohe district at the end of 1915, less than six months after the 
surrender of the German forces shows that there were a total of 50 farms with white 
inhabitants. The differences between them were considerable. Nomtsas covered an 
area of 380,396 acres and supported a family of eight whites and a black location 
of 118 inhabitants. The farm had been substantially developed and contained a dam 
and 26 wells to provide scattered sources of water for stock. None of the other 
farms in the district were as large or as well developed as Nomtsas. Sixteen of the 
farms were less than 60,000 acres in size. Poortjies (at 52,849 acres) one of these 
smaller farms, was more typical, with just a single well it supported a small 
population of 10 whites and 6 blacks.34 The war created problems for these small
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farms, but also for the more ambitious landowners who had been reliant upon a flow 
of capital from other commercial ventures in Germany.35
The hope was that the economic difficulties faced by the over-extended and 
disrupted farming sector could be solved by the arrival of a new wave of immigrants 
from the Union who could provide the necessary boost to the ailing agricultural 
sector. The farmers of Maltahohe were reported to be in a particularly poor 
condition in 1916 due to the combined impact of the war and a serious local 
drought.36 The price of goods in the shops in Maltahohe had almost doubled since 
1913. A sack of meal which could be bought before the war for 58 marks cost the 
equivalent of 95 marks by 1916, whilst a sack of flour had risen in price from 32 
to 62 marks.37 Yet the drought meant that farmers were unable to take full 
advantage of the higher prices being offered for stock.
The difficulty facing any new settlement programme was that farmers required a 
substantial amount of capital to develop a farm. A settler with sufficient stock 
would still have to find the necessary resources to develop permanent water sources.
Such large scale investment was unlikely so long as the future of the territory 
remained uncertain. The sale of farms was suspended whilst the outcome of the war 
and the future of the former German colonies was undetermined. The Union’s land 
policy was therefore to make land available to white stockowners, but without being 
able to guarantee ownership rights.
A system of monthly licences was established. Farms which had been surveyed and 
mapped but not sold were leased to farmers on monthly occupation licences, whilst 
unsurveyed areas of land could be used by obtaining a monthly grazing licence. A 
monthly license cost £1.10s 0 and gave the holder the right to graze up to 100 cattle 
and 500 small stock on the land. For higher numbers the owner had to pay 3d. per 
head for large stock and 2s.6d per 100 head for small stock per month.38 The 
evidence suggests, however, that the military magistrates used a considerable degree 
of discretion in the charges made for grazing within their district.39 The large 
number of immigrants from the Kenhardt and Upington districts of the Cape
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demonstrated their conviction that the new territory offered an enhanced opportunity 
to gain access to land.40
The reports of good rains and good stock-raising prospects of the territory provided 
one of the main attractions to new settlers. The district of Warmbad which lapped 
the northern border of the Cape Province was described in glowing terms in the 
Administrator’s Annual Report for 1916:
Stock thrives and the natural increase therefrom is in some cases truly 
phenomenal. The District is one of the finest in the Protectorate for stock 
raising. Excellent rains have recently fallen ... Game is abundant, 
particularly ’Springbuk’ (sic) which still exist in large herds it being no 
uncommon sight to see herds of 10,000 or more on a single farm.41
Hindsight might suggest that one of the primary reasons for the reported 
attractiveness of the district was the very fact that it was large and had a relatively 
low level of settlement.
Farmers trekked across the border with their stock in such numbers that by the time 
a census was taken in 1921 Warmbad district had the third largest white population 
in the entire country (after Windhoek and Keetmanshoop).42 An indication of the 
periodisation of immigration can be found in an analysis of the length of residence 
of all the white stockowners in the district in 1919. The district contained 181 white 
stockowners by 1919 of whom the largest number had arrived within the last five 
years, following the German defeat (Figure 3). An analysis of the statistics for the 
issue of grazing licences to European stockowners in 1918 reveals that the southern 
districts constituted six of the seven most popular districts in the whole territory and 
contained nearly three-quarters of all aspirant white farmers receiving grazing 
licences during the year.43 The military magistrate based at Warmbad judged that:
Most of the farmers belong to the poorer class who have for many years 
struggled in vain to acquire wealth in the Union.44
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The clear implication was that the immigrants lacked the necessary capital to acquire 
land in the Union, but hoped to benefit from a more generous land settlement 
programme in Namibia.
The farmers of southern Namibia were constantly forced to move their stock beyond 
the borders of their farms to find fresh water and grazing land for their stock. 
Bethany district received no rain at all from January to October, 1916. The 
Administrator reported that:
... as a consequence the pasture and water supply were so bad that farmers 
were compelled to be continually on the move with their stock in the search 
for grazing and water.45
Survival as a farmer necessitated movement. Farms had not developed sufficient 
water sources to maintain their stock during a dry year and the highly localised 
nature of precipitation in southern Namibia meant that farmers often had to move 
their stock to areas where it had rained, rather than wait for the rain to come to 
their farm. The granting of monthly grazing licences allowed white farmers the 
flexibility to move their flocks to a new farm once the resources available on 
another had been exhausted:
A European may remove livestock from any farm to any other farm in the 
District without a pass ... A native is not allowed to remove any stock 
without a permit.46
Mobility was essential to the survival and prosperity of pastoral communities and 
the system provided European stockowners with a substantial advantage. When 
good rains fell in a particular part of the district white licensees were able to move 
their stock to a vacant area and then apply for a license to stay there. In contrast 
black stockowners had to apply to the magistrate for permission before moving their 
stock.
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The main concern of white farmers was not that black pastoralists might become 
black farmers and rivals, but that their black workforce would gain sufficient 
economic wealth under the new regime to be able to withdraw their labour. The 
petition presented to Lord Buxton by the Farmers Associations of Gibeon in 1919 
expressed fears that were typical of the farming community:
The stock owned by natives has increased to such an extent during the last 
few years that the greater percentage of natives do not work. In the near 
future the wealth of the native population will have become so great that if 
they are further allowed to keep stock it will be impossible to get labourers 
for the farms...[The ’Native’]... having once more attained his former state 
of wealth and prosperity he will buy and get back his independence [my 
emphasis].47
Farmers sought the re-introduction of stock restrictions on black pastoralists:
He should not be allowed to keep large stocks, only a certain numbers, about 
fifty head of small stock or about five head of cattle. He should be made to 
work on farms.48
The administration was not prepared to take such drastic action - indeed they viewed 
50 small stock as the minimum number that were necessary to allow a black 
stockowner to be economically independent. To use this figure as a maximum 
would have been tantamount to officially denying the right of any black stockowner 
to be economically independent. Yet whilst refusing to impose such draconian stock 
limits the administration’s land settlement and reserve policies restricted the access 
of black pastoralists to land.
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LAND SETTLEMENT. 1919-1930.
The land settlement programme was activated immediately Namibia became a ‘C’ 
class mandate under Union control. The large scale dispersal of monthly grazing 
licences to Union immigrants had in many ways anticipated this announcement. The 
influx, combined with the military involvement of Union forces, strengthened South 
African claims over the territory. Hindsight, perhaps, blurs the many other 
contemporary possibilities such as a form of direct British rule like that operating 
in neighbouring Bechuanaland (Botswana). Large-scale settlement from the Cape 
bolstered Union claims for territorial expansion through the absorption of Namibia 
as a ‘Fifth Province’. Settlement would also act as a political balance to the resident 
German population whose loyalty to the new administration was considered suspect.
The advertisement of farms awaited the approval of the Union as the mandatory 
power for Namibia on 17th December, 1920, but the establishment of the necessary 
apparatus had pre-empted this. Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles signed on 
28th June, 1919 had contained a renouncement by Germany of all its rights over its 
colonies and triggered the establishment of the Lands Board in Namibia in 1919.49 
Whilst monthly grazing or occupation licences had been granted by the local 
magistrates, the Lands Board was to provide a centralised system for the 
delimitation and distribution of farms to purchasers. The pattern of white settlement 
facing the newly constituted Board was complex.
The scattered patches of farming areas that were owned or leased by established 
white farmers were surrounded by large areas of land that were vacant or filled by 
a shifting group of black and white stockowners holding temporary grazing licences. 
The white farming community accordingly displayed a considerable degree of 
internal differentiation. An analysis of the 181 white stockowners living in 
Warmbad district in 1919 reveal that they possessed 142,503 small stock. Fifty- 
one of the white stockowners actually owned less than 300 small stock, whilst 
another fifty-one owned flocks of over 1,000 animals. The richest stockowner in 
the district, P. Le Riche, living on ’Stinkdoom’ not only owned flocks of 4,500
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small stock, but also a herd of 600 cattle.50
The correlation between wealth and longevity of residence was not absolute, but it 
is noticeable that the six wealthiest white stockowners in the district had all lived 
there for over a decade.51 The stockowners were scattered over just 58 farms, 
suggesting that on average there were more than three white stockowners on each 
farm. The duplication was partly due to the distinction made between stock owned 
by different members of the same family, such as father and son, but also because 
of the tendency for the poorer farmers to form partnerships to share the cost of 
grazing licences.
The Lands Board took over responsibility for the administration of lease and sales 
agreements that had been drawn up between farmers and the German 
Administration. White farmers in the territory were still making repayments on 522 
farms that had been purchased during the German period. A further 119 were still 
held under German lease agreements.52 The new administration was anxious to 
institute a scheme to enable the new immigrants from the Union to acquire more 
secure land rights. After the award of the mandate for ‘South West Africa’ to the 
Union the implementation of this scheme became possible.
Prospective settlers would apply for farms advertised in the Government Gazette and 
local press. The successful applicant would then receive a five-year lease. The first 
year would be granted rent free, the second and third at a rent of two percent the 
value of the farm and the fourth and fifth years at three and a half percent of the 
farm’s value. At the end of the five years the leaseholder would be given the option 
of purchase, but this would only be granted if improvements that were the 
equivalent of, at least, a quarter of the value of the farm had been carried out. If 
the occupant had failed to carry out sufficient improvements the lease might be 
extended for a further five years. If the farmer(s) wished to buy the property they 
would be obliged to pay in six month instalments over a twenty year period and be 
subject to a four percent interest charge.53 The development of the farming area 
was thus to be dependent upon the amount of private capital that the new settlers
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would invest in their farms.
The Lands Board was responsible for the surveying and valuation of new farms, but 
its early efforts were to be criticised later. The value placed upon farms were 
inflated and bore little relation to the income that might be derived from the land 
given the many difficulties facing new farmers in the territory. The blame for this 
misjudgment was placed on the fact that no ‘old farmers’ with any lengthy 
experience of farming conditions in the territory were invited to join the Board. In 
fact:
The first Land Board was composed entirely of farmers from the Union who
knew little of local conditions.54
Values which might have been appropriate in the context of the Union were to prove 
excessive in the difficult years that lay ahead for the enthusiastic new settlers. 
Namibia had been grafted onto the Union bureaucracy which was unwilling to take 
the paradoxical action of co-opting the German farmers they had previously 
criticised so heavily.
The number of white stockowners who had entered the territory in the hope of 
gaining land was apparent as soon as the first new batch of surveyed farms were 
advertised for sale. The first year’s sales were heavily concentrated in the south. 
Eighty of the 169 farms advertised in 1920 (the first year of the new settlement 
programme) were located in Keetmanshoop and Warmbad districts alone. The 
Lands Branch claimed that for every application they received for a farm in the 
north, they received fifty for a farm in the south.55 The first batch of 76 farms 
was more than ten times oversubscribed with between 800 and 900 applications 
being received. The large number of farmers operating under temporary licences 
in the south must have been the main reason for the high level of interest. It was 
reported that some farms were shared by as many as sixteen white families.56 
Such families were often as poor as their black counterparts. J. Kotzee, for 
example, was living in March, 1920 on ‘Neu-Onis’ in Maltahohe with his wife and
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seven children between the ages of one and ten. The only stock they possessed 
were 5 cows, 20 sheep and a flock of 175 goats.57
The Lands Branch significantly reduced the amount of capital that a settler needed 
to acquire a farm by half, from the £1000 demanded by the German administration, 
to £500. The level of subsidies was less than under the German regime, but the 
financial barrier that had to be hurdled to enter the scheme was substantially 
lowered. The difference reflected the fact that they were aimed at distinctly 
different target groups. The priority of the new settlement scheme was not to 
encourage private investment, but rather to facilitate land ownership for a particular 
group of poor white stockowners from the Cape. The stimulation of settlement by 
this group would also provide a useful intervention in the delicate internal power 
balance within the territory between the recently defeated Germans and settlers 
originating from the Union. The most prominent similarity between the two 
schemes was race: only applicants of ‘European descent’ were considered as lessees 
and applicants were warned that leases would be cancelled:
... in the event of lessee marrying or habitually co-habiting with native or 
coloured woman.58
The conditions of allotment for leases contained the provision that applicants should 
be prepared to personally occupy and develop a holding. The condition was a clear 
effort to avoid capitalist land speculation.
The financial hurdle to obtaining land was lowered even further over the next few 
years down to the ‘nominal’ figure of £250. Little detailed attention was given to 
the prospective farmers list of assets upon which the assessment was made. The 
Secretary for South West Africa admitted that:
It was not too carefully scrutinised. As a rule, a settler would make up a 
statement that he possessed so much stock. When he fell short of the 
amount fixed, he just made it up by furniture and farming implements.59
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The land settlement policy thus had a clear internal contradiction. The success of 
the farms was dependent upon initial private investment by the new settlers on a 
large scale. On the other hand the group provided with preferential access to the 
land lacked this capital. The implication was that the state would provide the 
necessary development capital.
The landless were given preference over those who already possessed a farm or 
were considered sufficiently wealthy to obtain land privately from others. The state 
was operating a political, rather than purely commercial agenda. Mr Ballot, an 
influential member of the whites-only Executive Assembly argued that:
If the eventual cost to the state , in terms of capital lost, is £300,000 to 
£400,000, and in the result 1,000 families are settled on the land and making 
good - 1 question if the project would prove uneconomic for the state.60
The consequence was that many of the white farmers granted land were poor and 
dependent upon the support of the state to help them develop the land and build up 
their flocks. The Senior Officer at the Lands Branch, acknowledged that:
... the basis of land settlement is really an attempt to settle the poor white 
question.61
The new settlers found themselves faced by two immediate difficulties. The first 
was securing a reliable source of water on their new farms. The Lands Branch 
advertised and allotted 169 holdings in its first year of operation to 203 settlers, but 
owned only 9 drills which could be used to dig boreholes. Many of the new farms 
(of 10,000 hectares or more) only had one functioning borehole The problem was 
that unless farmers were able to locate disparate sources of water their stock would 
be restricted to within daily herding distance of the borehole and trample out the 
surrounding pasture.
The second major problem was finding a market for their stock. The small
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population of the territory meant that the domestic demand was minimal, and the 
main markets were found in the Union. The markets could only be reached by the 
single railway line that stretched from central Namibia south to the border. The 
high cost of transport to the principal stock markets at Johannesburg and Maitland 
in the Union meant that low prices might leave an unfortunate farmer barely 
breaking even.62 The long journey to the market proved expensive and reduced 
the quality of the animals. Oxen could lose as much as 2001b in weight during the 
train journey. The final burden was that goods sent to the Union were liable to an 
export tax. The tax in 1920 ranged from 20 shillings (£1) per head for slaughter 
cattle to 2s.6d per head for sheep.63
The disadvantages faced by settlers were compounded by the fact that many of the 
goods they required had to be imported along the same route. The magisterial town 
of Maltahohe contained stores that provided goods to farmers throughout the district, 
but as it was not served by the railway all the goods had to be hauled by cart from 
the railway station at Gibeon. The local magistrate estimated that this meant that 
prices in the stores were double those in towns sited along the railway line. A lib 
bag of ‘Boer meal’, for example, cost 7s. 2d, rather than 3s. 4d.M
The magistrate of the neighbouring district of Bethanie noted that whilst the major 
market for stock from the district was the Johannesburg Meat Exchange the cost of 
transporting the animals there was extinguishing any profits. Farmers complained 
that ‘the Railways are throttling business’.65 Farmers in Maltahohe protested that 
the lack of profitability in the export trade was aggravated by the price control 
mechanisms operated by ’Meat Rings’ in the Union.66 Yet the complaints must 
also be seen in the larger economic context of falling stock prices in the post-war 
period and the poor condition of stock following a drought.
The impact of the drought can be measured by looking at its impact in Maltahohe 
district - losses here were calculated as amounting to 19,811 sheep, 4,010 goats and 
491 cattle during 1920.67 The figures represented seven percent of the district’s 
cattle, eighteen percent of its goats and forty-six percent of its sheep. The farming
245
industry was far from thriving in the first years of the mandate. The statistics also 
reveal the greater vulnerability of the sheep introduced by the settlers to drought and 
disease in comparison to goats, the small stock preferred by local black pastoralists. 
The new settler farmers found themselves joining a community which was struggling 
to compete, or even survive, economically.
The administration was forced to intervene in a number of ways to bail out the 
struggling farming community. The assessed value of farms was reduced by 25 
percent and a remission of the rent due for the first period of lease agreements 
approved. A moratorium on debts had been declared at the outbreak of war and the 
Debts Settlement Proclamation of 1920 gave the administration the power to grant 
a further five year extension to the period before the second instalment of the 
payment of a farm became due. Proclamation No. 36 of 1923 enabled the 
capitalisation of arrears.68 The measure was obviously designed to assist those 
who had settled on the land during the German period recover from the problems 
of the war and remain on the land.
Action was also taken to assist farmers gain profitable access to markets for their 
stock. An early initiative of the new administration was the construction of cold 
storage facilities at Walvis Bay to enable overseas exports of meat. The difficulties 
of competing in the overstocked Union markets were recognised and the export tax 
on stock was lifted from 1st July 1921. Efforts were also made to improve the 
quality of stock. A Sheep Division was set up by the administration and 28 
inspectors waged a campaign against the most common disease preventing the export 
of sheep - scab. However the post-war depression was such that the expense could 
not be maintained and the functions of the sheep inspectors were transferred to the 
police from November, 1921.69
White farmers continued to claim that the measures, whilst necessary, were 
insufficient. Farmers were unable to compete economically with their rivals in the 
Union who were generally able to invest more capital in their properties and could 
serve local markets. By 1922 the magistrate at Maltahohe considered that the
246
majority of farmers in his district were on ‘the verge of bankruptcy’ and only able 
to survive because of the extended lines of credit granted them by banks and 
storekeepers.70 One farmer from Gibeon district exported 250 hamels and 25 
kapaters to the Union. Yet (despite the abolition of the export tax) he claimed that 
once the charges made by the railway, the auctioneer’s commission and the costs 
of dipping and loading the sheep had been deducted he was actually left with a loss 
of £21. 11s. 3d.71 Such experiences encouraged farmers to form or join Farmers’ 
Associations and use these as vehicles to lobby the administration for more direct 
state intervention in support of the farming community.
Farmers Associations were sometimes used as marketing co-operatives, but still 
suffered losses and individual members were liable for the losses of their 
association, even if their own stock had not been involved in an unsuccessful deal. 
The formal marketing function was matched by the important informal functions that 
they provided - the control of prices on the local stock market. By 1934 there were 
at least nine different Farmers Associations operating in southern Namibia, generally 
operating on a district-wide basis (such as the ‘Bethanie Boere Vereeniging’).72 
The restrictions on the movement of black-owned stock and their exclusion from the 
Farmers Associations meant that black stockowners were only able to sell their 
produce through the mediation of local white farmers.
The operation of local networks of credit and support for white farmers were 
replicated at the national level by a generous array of loans and advances. The 
Land Settlement Act of 1920 provided for two types of advances. Section 17 
advances covered ‘permanent improvements’ such as housing, dipping tanks and 
boreholes. The only limit placed on the size of these advances was that a settler 
could obtain no more than £400 towards the cost of their dwelling. Advances were 
added to the purchase price of a farm and therefore repayable over a period of 
twenty years.73 The payment of advances of up to £750 to buy stock were also 
provided for under Section 44 of the Land Settlement Acts. Repayment of these 
advances could be made after five years in the case of large stock or eighteen 
months in the case of small stock with interest being charged at 4.5 percent.74
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The repayment period related to the time period necessary before newly bom stock 
could be profitably sold.
The scale of state advances amounted to £1,557,488 in 1920 alone. The magnitude 
of these advances can be conceived more easily if an individual example is 
provided. The leasee of ‘Plattfontein’ in Maltahohe district owned 13 sheep in 
1923, but had 400 others which had been purchased with an advance and buildings 
with materials obtained from a further £200 advance provided by the authorities.75 
State support may also be analysed at a district level (see Table 10). The figures 
can be put in some sort of context by comparison with the amount invested in the 
development of the Gibeon reserve over the same period. Up to and including 1930 
a total of £173 had been spent on the development of the reserve and this had all 
been taken from the fund accumulated by the payment of grazing fees.76 The 
spending priority in the reserve had been the maintenance of effective dipping tanks 
for small stock, whilst white farmers were encouraged to increase the quality and 
quantity of their flocks.
The administration also recognised the importance of ensuring that£-|| 832$forted 
under the land settlement programme had a reliable source of water. In 1922 the 
principle was adopted that no farm would be advertised unless a permanent water 
supply had been identified. Ironically the difficulty was that the boring machines 
used to drill for water themselves used large amounts of water whilst they were 
operating. The expense of paying a drilling team was thus increased by the need 
to build tracks to the drilling site and cart water as much as 10 kilometres.77 The 
provision of sufficient watering points was crucial if farmers were to bring their 
stock through periods of drought. If a farm had an inadequate number of watering 
points stock would have to trek further and further afield in search of sparse grazing 
during a drought, but return to the same point to drink. If pasture was only found 
ten or fifteen kilometres from the water, weaker stock would not be able to 
withstand a twenty or thirty kilometre daily trek. The consequences of insufficient 
watering points could then be devastating. In 1922 some farmers lost over half their 
stock in less than two months.78
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TABLE 10 - ADVANCES MADE TO SETTLERS IN GIBEON 
DISTRICT UNDER THE LAND SETTLEMENT ACT AS OF 3RD 
MARCH, 1931.
Boring and Dams. £ 28,164
Windmills and Reservoirs. £ 17,612
Houses and Camps. £ 16,136
Dipping Tanks, Wells etc. £ 1,342
Section 44: Stock and Equipment. £ 35,825
TOTAL £ 99,079
The drought that struck southern Namibia during 1922 and early 1923 was followed 
by floods and a ‘pla§ue of locusts’. The shortage of watering points and grazing 
meant that freedom of movement remained the key to stock survival. The Drought 
Investigation Commission noted that farmers who opposed fencing were generally 
those whose land adjoined:
... open land from which he naturally has no desire of being cut off.79
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The drought^ as also serious in the Union with the result that those farmers who 
were able to keep their animals alive and relatively healthy by utilising the available 
land were able to obtain good prices for them at the markets.80 Sheep farmers in 
the south were reported to be obtaining excellent prices for their animals, by the end 
of 1923 sheep were being sold at Maltahohe for between 10s and 16s 6d.81 
Whilst the wealthier farmers may have been able to take advantage of high market 
prices, over half the farmers in Maltahohe district remained heavily in debt to the 
local storekeepers and had been unable to retain the quality of their stock at the 
level necessary to market it in the Union. If the success of the farming community 
was to some extent dependent upon market forces over which it had little control, 
the success or failure of individual farms hinged to a large extent on decisions taken 
by individual farmers and the manner in which they utilised their capital.
A comparative analysis of the change in stock composition on the 56 farms of 
Maltahohe district in the period 1924-1925 reveals the extent to which farmers 
responded to changing market forces. The statistics for 1924 showed a substantial 
increase in the total and average size of both cattle herds and flocks of sheep and 
goats since 1917. Settlers had been able to use loans to acquire animals, even 
though the increase in the quantity of stock was probably not matched by an 
increase in quality. In 1917 the average number of large stock per farm had been 
105, whilst the average number of small stock had stood at 873.82 The size of 
both had increased by 1924 with the average number of large stock on each of the 
56 farms rising to 153 and small stock to 1,482.
The German administration had advocated the introduction of merino sheep, and the 
first flocks to survive and prosper had been established at Nomtsas in Maltahohe 
district in 1897, but only two farms in the district retained flocks of these sheep by 
1924 due to the disappointing prices that had been obtained for the wool (although 
one of these had around 10,000 merino sheep).83 The administration continued 
to believe that the region’s future prosperity would rest on its potential as a wool- 
producing region and, for several years, preferred to give cash advances for the 
purchase of merino sheep.84 Three other farms experimented with karakul sheep
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(which produced high quality furs obtained by the slaughter of karakul lambs soon 
after their birth), but karakul sheep represented just 5 percent of the small stock in 
the district in 1924.85 The economic potential of karakul farming was, however, 
soon apparent. The pelts reached an average price of 12s in 1924, and by the 
following year this had risen to 15s (Figure 4).86 The pelts were sold for the 
equivalent of a slaughter sheep, yet a karakul sheep was able to produce a number 
of lambs. The farmers responded rapidly to the new opportunity, by 1925 13 of the 
56 farms had introduced flocks of karakul sheep and they made up 11 percent of the 
total small stock population.
The statistics suggest that the purchase of karakul sheep may have been sponsored 
through sales of cattle. The average number of cattle on each farm in 1925 dropped 
to 102 (lower than the average for 1917), whilst the average number of small stock 
rose once again to 1,647. The stock changes on individual farms confirm this 
pattern. Niederhagen Farm had disposed of its herd of 105 cattle, but had an 
increased number of small stock which included a new flock of 205 karakul 
sheep.87 The obvious implication was that farmers were finding that the region 
was better suited to small stock than large stock farming and were selling their cattle 
in order to buy karakul or breeding stock. The innovative use of karakul sheep was 
restricted to the white farming community. The farms of Maltahohe contained 108 
white stockowners and 138 black stockowners in 1925, but the black stockowners 
did not own a single karakul sheep between them.
One of the principal difference between black and white stockowners was the ease 
with which they could obtain access to land and the price that had to be paid for that 
land. The Official Gazette advertised a batch of farms for sale on 2nd November, 
1925. The prices varied according to the valuation placed upon the farm, based 
primarily on its distance from towns and transport routes and the strength of its 
water supply. Whilst the figures varied, the terms of the purchases were identical.
Zukois in Keetmanshoop district was a surveyed farm of 16,683 hectares and had 
been valued at £725. The buyer would have to pay nothing in the first year of 
purchase, £7.5s 2d per annum in the second and third years and £12.14s Id in the
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fourth and fifth years. The remaining money was to be paid in thirty annual 
instalments of £20.17s 8d.88 The payments can be usefully contrasted with those 
made by contemporary black stockowners in nearby Gibeon reserve. In 1925 there 
were 74 black stockowners in the reserve.89 The reserve was 39,190 hectares in 
size and the following year the residents paid £146 in grazing fees. One might 
argue that even if this money was provided solely by the stockowners (without any 
support from family members working outside the reserve) the payments worked out 
at under £2 per head, in contrast to the larger payments being paid by a single white 
farmer for Zukois.
The analysis looks somewhat different if one considers that access to a sufficient 
area of land was the key to successful pastoral farming in the dry climate of 
southern Namibia. Even in the years when the farmer buying Zukois was paying 
the full instalment of £20.17s 8d the calculations work out that this would have 
given him access to 3.3 hectares for each penny that he spent. In contrast black 
stockowners only gained access to 1.1 hectares for every penny that they 
contributed.
A further point that should be emphasised is that whilst Zukois was less than half 
the size of the Gibeon reserve it was bought by a single farmer who was able to 
utilise the entire area of the farm for the expansion of his livestock, without 
competition. Zukois was certainly larger than many farms and other farms were 
sometimes operated as partnerships. The amount of land available to white farm 
purchasers was substantial. In 1926 20 new farms were sold in deals involving 24 
white farmers. The total hectarage of these farms was 207,753 ha, meaning that the 
total amount of land available on average to each farmer was 8,656 ha.90
In contrast, the amount of land available to each black stockowner in the reserve 
was just 530 hectares in a region where the minimum size for a viable farm was 
estimated to be 12,000 - 15,000 hectares. Wealthier black stockowners who tried 
to obtain licenses to graze their stock on vacant farms (a first step towards possible 
land ownership) found their licenses cancelled from 1926.91 The frustrations faced
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by black stockowners contrasted with the opportunities provided for white 
stockowners, however white farmers also faced difficulties in their efforts to become 
commercially competitive, as can be seen by the contemporary evidence collected 
by the Farm Industry Commission.
The Farm Industry Commission toured the country in 1926. It was a direct 
response to the considerable difficulties being reported by the white farming 
community and had a brief to enquire into the condition of the farming industry and 
the means by which the administration might provide further assistance. The 
Commission invited oral evidence, but also distributed a six page questionnaire to 
every white farmer in the country. Farmers in southern Namibia returned 99 
completed forms and whilst these may well have excluded responses from pre- 
literate farmers, they do provide a fairly good ‘indication’ of the range of difficulties 
facing farmers at the time.92
J.C. Johannesson ran Klipdam, a farm of 12,808 hectares in Aroab district. The 
stock consisted of a herd of 207 cattle and oxen, and flocks of 1050 sheep and 150 
goats. The fact that the farm was 105 miles from the nearest station on the railway 
line created marketing difficulties. The farm, for instance, produced 6001b of butter 
each year, but had to rely on the demand of the weak local domestic market for 
sales. Johannesson was largely dependent upon sales to local buyers, supplying, for 
instance, meat to a school hostel. Once every month or two Johannesson would 
travel by ox wagon to the railway to pick up supplies or to deliver some of the 
twenty to twenty-five oxen that he sold every year. Whilst the farm’s income 
fluctuated, the financial demands remained constant. The case of Klipdam reveals 
the significance of labour costs in the farm budget. Johannesson estimated that it 
cost him £3.10s. to pay and feed a black worker on his farm each month, and 
claimed that he would be willing to pay up to £1.10s. (30 shillings) per month for 
a worker and provide free food. Johannesson calculated that his labour costs could 
be cut by 40 percent if he fenced his farm which would allow him to reduce his 
black work force from 5 to 3 workers.93 The lure of loans for structural 
improvements to farmers like Johannesson is obvious.
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The precarious financial condition of the farming industry can be illustrated by 
considering the income and expenditure of Klipdam. The main source of income 
listed was the sale of large stock which provided an annual income of £100-£125. 
The sales of 6001b of butter a year provided a further £45. However, the estimated 
cost of five black labourers was £210 per year, and in addition to this Johannesson 
would have had to find money for additional supplies and the annual payments 
towards the cost of the farm.
From Johannesson’s figures at least 50 sheep per year would have to be sold just 
to cover the labour costs. The alternative was to negotiate a reduction in the cash 
payment made to local workers in exchange for the accommodation of some of their 
stock. The evidence suggests that this may have been the case with the workers 
keeping 30 donkeys, 4 cows and a flock of 136 goats on the farm.94 The budgets 
of farmers like Johannesson were evidently extremely tight, and their problems 
carried implications for both the administration and black workers.
The Commission summarised the unanimous view of the farming community as to 
the dual cause of their crisis as:
Solve our native question and give us means of reaching a market at
reasonable cost.95
The narrow profit margins of the white farming community and low amounts of 
capital available to the new settlers meant that the development of farms and farm 
stock was largely dependent upon state support, whilst farmers were constantly 
seeking ways of cutting their labour costs. The Commission noted the large amount 
of money that had been advanced to settlers and farmers within the first six years 
of the mandate. The largest amount (£ 783,059) had been spent on land valuations. 
A further amount (£ 611,725) had been paid to settlers as advances by the Land 
Bank. Money had also been granted to farmers towards the cost of drilling for 
water on their farms (£ 200,851), purchases of stock (£ 153,311), to provide loans 
for the building of fences (£29,600) and for other miscellaneous improvements (£
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102,271). The total amount of support that the administration had advanced to 
farmers by 31st March, 1926 added up to £ 1,880,817.96
The most blatant example of the preferential treatment provided to white settlers 
involved the case of the ‘Angola Boers’. The small group of 291 ‘settlers’ (defined 
as the heads of households) and their families were provided with a special scheme 
that left them in possession of 195 farms. Gibeon district was one of the those in 
which the Angolan immigrants were settled. The poverty of the immigrants was 
such that a high proportion (14 of the 35 farms given to the Angolan settlers in the 
district) were established as partnerships between two families, where one could 
support the other.97 The former Secretary for South West Africa was able to 
express his concerns about the scheme after he had been transferred back to South 
Africa:
A farm was promised to every Angola trekker - good, bad or indifferent, 
irrespective of his prospects of making a success, regardless of the fact that 
he might not be a farmer at all and was probably a mason, hunter, transport 
rider, or a person of no fixed occupation. Some of them were widows who 
had never farmed, who did not possess a sou, and who did not have children 
of an age to assist them in their farming operations.98
The widows and their families were generally placed into partnerships and cash 
payments made to the settlers to enable them to buy stock.
Settlers from the Union who had entered the territory and purchased land often 
found themselves shuffling a package of debts. Loans and advances had to be 
repaid to the Land Branch for the purchase of their farms, but also to the Land Bank 
and the Irrigation Department. Settlers were able to obtain a generous line of credit 
to receive advances from the administration to build fences, stock camps and kraals, 
reservoirs, dipping tanks and houses. But the administration had no effective 
machinery with which to supervise the work carried out by the farmers and much 
of the work was unlikely to bring a return on the investment made. The
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construction of farm houses was the most obvious example of state investment in a 
non-productive project.
The desire to emphasise the difference between the white farmer and his black 
employees by raising the living standards of ‘poor whites’ seems to have informed 
a policy that required settlers to spend a substantial sum on the construction of a 
farm house that met agreed minimum standards:
Settlers are compelled to incur heavy expenses in the building of dwelling 
houses under threat of cancellation of their leases."
The encouragement of loans to build homes was typical of a policy that led to the 
over-extension of white farmers surfing on a wave of credit opportunities. The flaw 
was that such advances were doing little, if anything, to increase the productive 
capacity of the farm. Debts, rather than productivity rose. Poor semi-nomadic 
white farmers were given the opportunity not only to settle and obtain land, but to 
transform their lifestyle and farming operation. The early benefits of karakul 
farming were, however, restricted generally to wealthier farmers who could afford 
to take a risk. Yet the development of many farms was built on a credit bubble that 
was to be rudely burst by the depression and drought that gripped Namibia towards 
the end of the 1920s.
DROUGHT AND DEPRESSION.
The rapid escalation of stock numbers within a fragile ecosystem during the 1920s 
was risky. The difficulties of locating secure and permanent water sources meant 
that during periods of drought farmers were reliant upon being able to move to new 
areas. The more densely populated the region became the more difficult it was to 
locate vacant areas which could be utilised in times of need.
One of the most useful sources of information on the impact of the drought are the
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statements presented by farmers to the Land Settlement Commission that toured 
southern Namibia in July and August, 1934. Much of the information in the 
following section is draw from the minutes of the Commission’s hearings at which 
187 farmers from the region gave verbal statements.
The impact of drought varied both regionally and at a local level. In the two years 
of 1926 and 1927 a severe drought in parts of the Union helped increase the price 
of stock being exported from Namibia. The severity of the drought actually led to 
an influx of trekkers from the Cape Province seeking pasture.100 Yet whilst the 
rain was well distributed throughout the central and northern parts of Namibia, the 
south was gripped by a slow strangling drought that prevented them taking full 
advantage of the improved prices for stock.
In 1927 Keetmanshoop district had reportedly already been suffering from constant 
drought for the last three years.101 The magistrate at Bethany noted that over the 
period 1927 - 1929 his district had received in total the rainfall it would normally 
expect to receive in just one year.102 The magistrate at Warmbad concluded that 
the south was unsuitable for European farmers. The poverty of the farmers in 
Warmbad district was particularly apparent:
Ninety per cent of the people are not as well off as a Bywoner in the Union. 
They live in fifth-rate brick houses and some in huts under conditions that 
would shame a respectable coloured man in the Cape.103
The magistrate considered the situation to be hopeless and suggested that European 
farms should be exchanged for land in the Transkei. The drought was longer and 
harder in southern Namibia than in any other part of the country.
The seasonal distribution of rain was also of significance. The pattern of rainfall 
usually meant that stock in Namibia was at its best during the months of September 
and October, when stock in the Union was in poor condition. It was one of the few 
ways in which stock from the territory were able to compete in the Union markets,
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however the drought meant that by 1929 the stock tended to be of poorer quality 
than that of their competitors in the Union and unsaleable.104
The drought dashed the optimistic predictions of earlier officials. Trains bringing 
farmers and stock from the Union were banned from unloading south of Rehoboth 
in an attempt to protect the remaining natural resources. Magistrates reported drops 
in sales, despite rising prices because the quality of farmers stock had deteriorated 
due to the difficulties in finding sufficient food and water. The magistrate at 
Warmbad drew a pessimistic picture of the prospects for his district, pointing out 
that:
Warmbad has not in years produced a single farmer of means.105
The state would be forced to intervene to prevent the farmers’ flocks being totally 
wiped out by the drought. In 1929, five of the six districts of southern Namibia 
were officially declared ‘drought-stricken’. The declaration triggered the 
establishment of special rail rates to allow stock to be railed cheaply to the Union 
to find grazing or for lucerne to be bought in to feed animals where the pasture had 
been virtually exhausted. The poor condition of stock had a decimating impact on 
the local economy. In 1928 farmers in Keetmanshoop had been able to export 
20,612 small stock to the Union, but in the following year only 1,298 could be 
exported.106 By the end of 1930 the magistrate of the sixth district in the South, 
Gibeon, was warning that:
... unless we get good rains within a month or two the majority of stock
owners will be doomed to a state of poverty and starvation.107
The intensity of the drought was caused by the fact that the region experienced a 
series of consecutive years of poor rainfall. Farmers had mechanisms to allow them 
to cope with a poor rainy season. Sheep farmers could kill their lambs and save 
their ewes, for instance. However the strategy would only work if a poor season 
was followed by a normal one which allowed the ewes to recover. A three year
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long drought would be particularly serious because it would not only damage the 
productive capacity of a flock, but also its reproductive capacity. Farmers who had 
capital could hire alternative grazing on Crown Land and travel by trek or train in 
search of grazing. However consistent drought created an intolerable strain on both 
the environment and the financial reserves of the farmer.
The magistrate at Gibeon reported that in 1930 over 15,000 small stock and 300 
large stock trekked beyond the boundaries of the district in search of food and 
water.108 In Maltahohe 14 farmers hired grazing on other farms at the rate of 4s. 
to 10s. for every 100 small stock per month, a considerable drain on their financial 
resources with few sales to replenish them.109 The purchasers of some farms 
claimed that they were so dry that they spent more time off than on them. The 
purchaser of ’Wellenberg’ claimed that for eight years (from 1925 onwards) he had 
not stayed on the farm, but had lived on neighbouring farms, as his was too 
arid.110 Such farmers must have questioned the wisdom of their purchases as 
they ran out of capital and hope. Farmers who were still determined to save some 
of their stock went so far as seeking work as farm labourers on the more lushious 
farms in exchange for the right to bring their stock to graze on the farm. The 
charitable efforts of some farmers to help their colleagues was, however, reported 
to be resulting in overstocking and escalating consumption of the remaining veld. 
The lack of farm fencing and tendency of wild game to flock to areas which 
received rain aggravated the environmental crisis. Once all the survival options 
available to farmers had been exhausted the stock losses were sudden and, 
sometimes, absolute.111
The impact of the drought was most severe upon those farmers who had taken 
official advice to concentrate on the production of wool from merino sheep. The 
sheep not only proved more vulnerable to drought, but wool prices even failed to 
adequately compensate for the costs of production:
The merino farmer is the hardest hit. The prices he is able to realize for his
work is inadequate to cover costs of production and freight charges to
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markets. Merino hamels or skins are practically unsaleable, and there is no 
demand for either the sheep or the skins.112
The cost of railing a sheep from Keetmanshoop to Johannesburg market in 1931 was 
6s. without adding any of the additional expenses such as the auctioneer’s 
commission, the dipping fee and the cost of getting the sheep from the farm to 
Keetmanshoop in the first place. The ground had become so barren within a 
hundred mile radius of Keetmanshoop that farmers from further afield were unable 
to reach the station with their stock at all.113 The trek to the station could often 
be too much for weak stock. The journey for stock driven from ‘Klipdam’, for 
instance, to the nearest railway station (Ariamsvlei) took eight days with cattle and 
two weeks with sheep.114
The satisfaction of farmers that were able to export their stock would have been 
short-lived when they found that prices had been practically slashed in half. The 
Administrator confirmed the dire state of the Union stock markets in 1931:
A farmer who can get now from 8s 6d to 10s for slaughter sheep which a 
couple of years ago would have realised 15s or more is fortunate.115
The collapse in prices meant that at times over 70 percent of the sale price of a 
sheep would be absorbed by the railway charge for getting it to the market. The 
unreliability of the market for Merino sheep contrasted with the steady price that 
could still be obtained for karakul pelts and acted as an incentive for farmers to 
convert their flocks. The member of the Legislative Assembly for southern Namibia 
(a farmer) considered that although karakuls had been bred in the country since 
1907, the industry had only taken off in 1933.116
Farmers who sold their animals locally also faced depressed prices (as the 
purchasers then had to carry the cost of the transportation of the stock to the 
Union). The Farmers Association of the Kalk Plateau in Gibeon district complained 
bitterly that the prices had fallen so low that they were unable to meet the cost of
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living. Mnr. Liebenberg of ‘Auros’, sold 400 sheep for £92, the equivalent of less 
than 5s per head.117 The depletion of farmers’ capital meant that they were forced 
to sell stock at whatever price they could obtain.
The poor quality of the drought-stricken stock was not the only reason that farmers 
found it difficult to sell their animals in the Union. The abandonment of the gold 
standard by the British in 1932 (whilst the Union remained tied to it up to 28th 
December, 1933) resulted in a collapse in the price of goods purchased in the Union 
for export as a 40 percent gap was created in the exchange rate.118 The principal 
victims of this gap were the wool farmers who found their product virtually 
unsaleable on the Union market. The state was forced to intervene to provide 
support, once again, for the farming community as the distance from its main 
markets continued to undermine the competitiveness of its products.
SURVIVAL STRATEGIES AND STATE SUPPORT.
The administration provided export subsidies in an attempt to support production, 
but these were inadequate. The subsidy for wool, for example, was fixed at only 
25 percent. The administration were also forced to recognize that the cost of freight 
was making exports unviable. A subsidy was introduced to help meet the railway 
fares, the rate being fixed at 10s per head for cattle and 2s per head for sheep.119 
Vacant Crown lands were made available to white farmers at ‘reduced or nominal 
rates’, the administration guaranteed promissory notes for the railage of stock to 
fresh pasture and lent boring machines to farmers to drill for water.120
The degree to which farmers were reliant upon state subsidies for survival led even 
some loyal officials to question the commercial viability of the farming sector. 
One magistrate confessed in 1933 that:
I am pessimistic as far as the future of the present farmers of the 
Keetmanshoop, Aroab and Bethanie Districts are concerned.121
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He pointed out that farmers were not only receiving poor prices for their produce, 
but were also unable to remain on the land that they were leasing or purchasing. 
The result was that many farmers had ‘uitgeboer’ (failed as farmers) and had only 
a few goats left. A second group:
... own nothing of their own, everything in their possession is the property 
of the Lands Department... they are occupying government land and living 
off the flocks, in fact, the Administration is maintaining them.122
The farmers’ investment capital could be calculated in terms of the number of 
animals that they were able to keep alive. The hire of additional grazing land at the 
cheapest available rate (2s. 6d per hundred small stock per month) meant that 
farmers would have to sell at least 6 out of every 100 animals just to pay for their 
grazing - quite apart from the repayments due on loans or the payments due for 
their own farms.123 The arithmetic did not make commercial sense, especially 
as the original purchase of the animals themselves had often be achieved through a 
loan. The scale of farmers arrears steadily expanded and they were forced to extend 
their credit or find ways of evading or reducing their debts.
The magistrate at Mariental claimed that many of those classified as ‘in the employ 
of the settler’ to help in building or making improvements to a farm were in fact 
white squatters evading the payment of grazing licence fees.124 The evidence of 
police patrols added credence to this claim. The patrol covering the Gochas area 
reported, for example, that a Mr Maritz had grazed 16 large stock and 1,200 small 
stock on Zonderput for over six months without paying. The owner claimed that 
free grazing had been offered in return for help in making a garden and looking 
after the windmill, a claim that the police saw as incredulous.125
The freedom of movement enjoyed by white farmers and their stock gave them an 
advantage over black pastoralists, but also contained dangers. News of rainfall 
would lead farmers to concentrate in a particular locality with their stock putting 
excessive strain on the available resources and facilitating the dissemination of
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diseases:
Farmers flocked in hundreds to snatch up the available grazing in other 
parts, with the result that the congestion was so great that even the water 
supply failed... The indiscriminate trekking has virtually infected the whole 
of the South with scab.126
The only major effort to control the movement of farmers and their stock was linked 
to the vetinary campaign to control the spread of diseases.
The threat of disease could lead the authorities to forbid the movement of stock 
from one district to another or even to the restriction of a farmer’s stock to his 
farm. Mnr. F.J. van der Merwe’s attempts to save his stock by trekking into the 
Kalahari were thwarted five times during the drought because of the administration’s 
fears that the animals might be infected by an outbreak of foot and mouth disease 
which had taken place in Bechuanaland.127 An outbreak of foot and mouth 
disease at Gobabis led to the closure of the entire border between Namibia and the 
Union from 3rd October, 1934 (although a concession was made that allowed small 
stock from southern Namibia to continue to be exported) and the restrictions on 
movement not entirely removed until September, 1935.128
The dipping of stock was a prerequisite for the movement of animals in an infected 
area, but could lead to heavy losses amongst weak animals. Mr W.A. van Vreden 
claimed that he had lost 500 of his 1,700 sheep during a dipping operation by police 
in Bethany district.129 The cost in terms of delay and stock deaths could be 
high, whilst the financial cost of paying for the dipping added to the obstacles facing 
poorer farmers trying to move their stock.
The extreme mobility of the early farmers is evident from statements made to the 
South West Africa Commission in 1934. ’Schonau’ in Warmbad district had been 
obtained by Mr A.G. Viviers in July, 1921, but within two months the water had 
dried up and Viviers was forced to buy water from his neighbour and pay 5s. per 
month for every hundred small stock that he watered there. The next year he left
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the farm with his stock and trekked around the district only returning in September, 
1923. Once again the water on the farm failed and he had to water his animals on 
two neighbouring farms and pay for the privilege. In May, 1924 Viviers left again 
and trekked to Aroab only returning at the end of November. Viviers was able to 
spend both 1925 and 1926 on ’Schonau’, but in 1927 he moved into the 
Bondelswarts reserve and stayed there until April, 1928 paying 2s.6d for the use of 
water and grazing within the reserve. Viviers was able to stay on his farm for the 
next couple of years by hiring additional grazing land as needed from his 
neighbours, but in September, 1930 he was forced to move once again - this time 
south into Namaqualand. Viviers returned at the end of the year and managed to 
hire some Crown Land for six months, before returning once again to his farm. 
After three months Viviers was trekking again, spending one month with a grazing 
licence on another farm and moving between his farm and Namaqualand.130
The frequent and repetitive moves made by Viviers suggest a seasonal migration 
with the farm only being adequate during the ‘rainy’ months around Christmas. 
Schonau was a large farm (11,819 hectares in extent), yet Viviers was forced to lead 
a highly mobile lifestyle. The suspension of the settlement programme in 1931 
partly reflected the difficulties of selling farms during the drought, but also 
demonstrated the administration’s awareness of the importance of keeping land 
available to those whose own water and grazing resources were exhausted. The 
administration sought to maximise the amount of Crown Land available as ‘reserve’ 
land during the drought and thus prevent the bunching of farmers and stock.
No farms were given to settlers during the period 1931-1934, and one of the 
recommendations of the Report of the Land Settlement Commission in 1935 was 
that blocks of farms should be kept vacant as a permanent reserve to be used by 
white farmers in times of drought. The movement of stock could make the 
difference between their death and survival. The magistrate of Warmbad claimed 
that only farmers who had moved across the border into Namaqualand had been able 
to save their stock in any significant numbers.131 However not all farmers were 
willing or able to move such great distances. Farmers at Stamprietfontein
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complained that the exodus of men with their animals left women vulnerable on the 
farms:
In the South the men have to trek with their stock. The women sit alone on 
the farms and have no means of transport whatsoever at their disposal. 
Danger and hunger lurk at their door [My translation].132
Not all women complied with this image. Ms. G. Steenkamp trekked south with 
her stock, but due to an outbreak of ‘Brandsiekte’ [Scab] was forced to dip her 
animals three times before she was allowed to cross into Namaqualand.133 The 
stock of other farmers were simply too weak to endure the long journey, but the 
majority of those that stayed were reduced to total dependence upon the state.
PROBLEMS AND PRIORITIES FOR RECOVERY.
Whilst black stockowners faced regulatory obstacles to movement many white 
farmers faced financial barriers. Wealthier farmers were able to transport their 
entire flocks by train to areas with better pasture, but the costs were prohibitive to 
the majority of farmers in southern Namibia. One farmer faced a bill of £89 10s.3d 
for sending his sheep from Grunau to Mariental.134 The higher concentration of 
poorer white farmers in southern Namibia and length of the drought in the region 
meant that its impact was severe. The magistrate at Warmbad estimated that 80 
percent of the white farmers in his district had been ruined by the end of 1933, 60 
percent of them were actually relying on pauper’s rations issued by the police. Mr 
W.A. Kotze of ‘Fettkluft Suid’ in the district claimed to have lost 1,400 out of his 
flock of 1,700 sheep and Mr B.J. Van Der Hoover of ‘Swarthoek’ was left with just 
100 Merino sheep from his original flocks of 2,055135. Losses of eighty or ninety 
percent were typical amongst farmers who had been unable to move their stock in 
time. The local magistrate drew a picture of extreme poverty:
If it hadn’t been for the clothing and material sent from the Union a large 
number of the European Population would have been absolutely naked today
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and the children would not have been in a position to attend school, owing 
to lack of clothing.136
The District Surgeon in Warmbad reported that the diet of white settlers had 
deteriorated to such an extent due to poverty that many cases of scurvy were being 
diagnosed.137 A senior official in the administration provided an explanation for 
evidence of malnutrition amongst the white population:
The people in the South had no ready cash, they had no credit at the stores; 
vegetable were absolutely unobtainable, and even their stock was absolutely 
uneatable, and the people were glad to get a little mealie meal.138
The resurrection of white farmers reduced to the status of paupers would only be 
possible if the state were to provide the funds necessary to help the impoverished 
farmers replace their lost animals.
The Administrator toured the drought-stricken farming regions and faced a barrage 
of protest that focused on two issues. One was the encouragement that had been 
given by the administration to settlers to farm with merino sheep and the second the 
strictness with which the administration continued to demand the repayment of debts 
during the drought. The farmers argued that they spent considerable amounts of 
their own money developing their farms and that the investments they made, for 
example, in sinking boreholes, were financially risky and should be treated with 
sympathy. An indication of the costs involved can be gained by looking in some 
detail at the expense incurred in developing a single farm.
Mr. A. Hite provided the South West Africa Commission with a summary of the 
work he had carried out on his farm, ‘Bossis’. The first priority had been the 
provision of a permanent water supply. Hite had sunk five boreholes, four were dry 
failures, but had still cost £299 to drill. The fifth had struck water at a depth of 150 
feet and had cost a further £90. The problem was that the successful borehole was 
tightly located in a comer of the farm with limited access to grazing. Hite claimed
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that in total he had spent £612 in opening up water on the farm, but had been unable 
to find water of sufficient quality or quantity to sustain his animals throughout the 
year. Every year he was forced to trek with his animals to seek water and grazing 
(which he had to hire). Two reservoirs and a dam were constructed on the farm in 
an additional attempt to secure water throughout the year. The construction of these 
cost a further £114. 10s. Pumping machinery had to be provided for the borehole 
and this cost £178. 15s. The building work on the farm continued with the 
construction of a four room farmhouse, five outhouses, and a stone kraal and 
dipping tank for the animals. The total amount that Hite claimed to have spent on 
his farm was £1,185. 5s.139
The extent to which construction and stock purchases were paid for by advances and 
loans meant that many farmers had substantial debts in addition to their annual 
instalments towards the purchase price of the farm. Mr. Kuhn of ’Zandvliet’ 
calculated that he was obliged to make repayments to the administration amounting 
to £108 per year.140 Yet like black farmers the wealth of white farmers at this 
time was often based on the capital assets represented by their livestock and the 
income that they could derive from this.
Livestock losses removed the ability of farmers to repay their debts.
Mr. J.C. Oberholzer of ’Eenzaamheid’ in Aroab district had built up a flock of 
about 1,500 sheep with an advance from the administration. The drought left him 
with just 28 straggly sheep and no prospect of being able to repay the original loan 
with which he had purchased his stock.141 The flocks of many of the farmers had 
been purchased or built up on the basis on loans from the administration.142 The 
extension of generous lines of credit had provided the new settlers with a distinct 
advantage over their black rivals. When the drought wiped out many of the animals 
which had been bought with borrowed money, farmers expected the administration 
to provide them once again with the financial means to acquire stock. A meeting 
of the farmers of Maltahohe district in 1934 unanimously supported a resolution 
calling on the administration to provide further loans of £200 - £500 to help them 
replace the stock that they had lost during the drought.143 After the drought a
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supplementary advance of £60 was made to every farmer to help them buy 
replacement stock.144
One of the greatest topics of complaints for farmers was the cost and frustration of 
drilling for water. A boring machine would cost £6 per day to hire with the farmer 
also having to pay for the petrol that was used. The machine could, on average, 
drill 15-16 feet per day.145 Sixteen days work on one farm cost the farmer £180, 
of which £84 was for petrol.146 Whilst the cost involved might be considerable 
there was no guarantee that the borehole would produce sufficient or suitable water. 
One farmer complained:
I have sunk no less than 26 wells on the farm and have only obtained any 
water from the last, but the water is insufficient for my purposes [My 
translation].147
The farmer was left with more debts than water, owing £1,610 to the Land Bank 
plus substantial rent arrears. Farmers were forced to make such risky investments 
in drilling extra bore holes for two reasons. Firstly, it was stated that farms were 
only sold once a secure source of water had been located, but the Irrigation 
Department was judged to have "drilled indiscriminately". The consequence was 
that there was a lack of foresight in the sinking of boreholes with the Department:
... in numerous cases actually drilling on or near the boundary or in the 
comer of the farm, so that the main portion of the farm could not be used 
for grazing.148
Secondly a farm could only be utilised efficiently if stock could be constantly moved 
from one part to another to allow the pasture time to recover. The lack of sufficient 
watering points would result in overcrowding and environmental deterioration of the 
veld.
The value that had been placed upon farms presented another source of financial
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difficulty to farmers. The value provided the basis upon which the size of the 
annual repayments was calculated. The evidence of farmers to the Land Settlement 
Commission consistently claimed that their farms were worth no more than 3d-6d 
per hectare. The values placed upon farms were far higher than this. ‘Spes Bona’ 
in Warmbad district was valued at £942 - a value of almost 2s. ( Is .lid )  per 
hectare.149
The Commission criticised the inconsistency of farm valuations and the inflated 
demands that these placed upon many farmers:
The values assigned to the farms are inexplicable, and it also appears that 
these values increased in proportion to the increase of the demand, for it is 
found that farms of good quality near a town were allotted half as cheaply 
as farms more remote, of inferior quality and allotted at a later date.150
The Commission’s recommendation was that all the farms in the southern districts 
(south of Rehoboth and Gobabis) should be revalued and priced in the range of 3d 
to 6d per hectare.151
The revaluation of properties was supplemented by a package of further recovery 
measures that cost the administration an additional £144,733. The charges made by 
the Irrigation Department for the sinking of boreholes was reduced and the 
administration agreed to write off outstanding debts for wells that had failed to reach 
water. Advance payments of up to £400 were made to farmers to allow them to 
replace their lost stock ie. sufficient to purchase a flock of 700-800 sheep.152 
Proclamation 205 of 1932 suspended the payment of arrears of interest and rent 
which had previously had to be paid off as a precondition to the granting of a 
Freehold Title.153 The Settlers Relief Ordinance (No. 12 of 1935) wrote off rent 
and interest due on farms for the period 1932-1934 and converted any payments that 
had been made into credits. A breakdown of the figures for Gibeon district put 
these measures into context. Whilst rent and interest payments of £2,658 had been 
made over the period 1932-1934, debts of £10,483 remained. A further £2,649 in
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charges for the drilling of boreholes was written off and £13,737 due as arrears 
dating from before 1932 placed in a suspense account.154 The administration also 
agreed to the remission of all rent due for the first five years of a lease and a further 
remission of rent to cover the period 1932-1934. The writing off of payments due 
for a period of up to eight years was a substantial concession, but was linked to a 
radical revision of the value of farms. The value placed on improvements and 
buildings on farms dating from the German period was reduced by 50 percent and 
the land value revised.155 The value of ’Nimerrust’ in Aroab district, for 
instance, was altered from 9d to 6d per hectare.156 The greatest assistance to the 
farmers came however from an economic recovery that took place from 1935, an 
economic recovery which, in southern Namibia, was largely linked to the expansion 
of the karakul industry.
THE CONVERSION TO KARAKUL.
Drought and depression had demonstrated the vulnerability of merino sheep and the 
inability of the territory to compete with wool producers in other countries. The 
period following the drought saw an emphasis on specialisation and breeding 
amongst sheep flocks. Farmers of southern Namibia switched rapidly and 
extensively to karakul farming.157 The novel prosperity that the white farming 
community experienced at the end of the thirties was particularly important as it 
provided them with the means to secure alternative sources of farm labour. The 
growing concern with the quality of livestock was followed by a second wave of 
land settlement. The transformation of the composition of small stock flocks in the 
South can be illustrated by a simple comparison of the small stock on
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white farms in Gibeon district in the years 1933 and 1937 (Figure 5).158 Whilst 
in 1933 karakul sheep made up only 19 percent of farmers’ flocks, within five years 
this had increased to 59 percent and the majority of small stock in the district were 
karakuls. The pattern was replicated in other districts in the South. Of the 165,406 
small stock on farms in Maltahohe district in 1935, 91,403 (55 percent) were 
karakul and only one of the seventy farms in the district did not have a flock of 
karakul sheep.159
The incentive for the massive increase in the size of the territory’s karakul flock was 
the price that could be obtained for karakul pelts. The average price in 1935 was 
18s. 7d. for a young lambs pelt, and a karakul ewe would produce several. Exports 
of karakul skins to the Union had stood at 97,000 in 1931, by 1935 this had risen 
to 514,000. The following year the figure had jumped by over 300,000 to reach 
814,561 (see Figure 6). The export of karakul skins gave a massive boost to 
farmers’ incomes and particularly benefited those who had invested in karakul 
flocks.160 In contrast the prices obtained for other sheep in Warmbad district in 
1936 ranged from 10s. to 15s.161
The building up of a karakul flock was an expensive business, with a karakul ram 
for breeding purposes costing £15 in 1934.162 However, many of the farmers 
were able to use the stock advances provided by the administration to invest in 
karakul breeding stock. Mr van der Merwe of ‘Quarzriff (sic), for example, 
obtained an advance to buy 250 karakul ewes.163 The magistrate in Warmbad 
recommended advances for restocking on 24 farms in his district in 1934 alone.164
The advances played a major role in metamorphosising virtually destitute farmers 
into karakul farmers, and widening the chasm of marketing opportunity that existed 
between white and black stockowners.
The fact that large amounts of debt had to be written off following the drought 
provoked severe criticism of the extravagant policies pursued by the administration.
It responded by suspending the payment of any further advances for stock, housing 
or
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other extraordinary expenses. The burden for the continuing development of the 
farming sector was to be placed firmly on the shoulders of the individual farmer.
The land settlement scheme was resurrected and new farms allotted once again in 
1936, however a stricter policy was now enforced.
WORLD WAR TWO AND THE SECOND WAVE OF LAND SETTLEMENT.
The karakul boom fuelled the revival of the land settlement programme, although 
in some districts there was already little suitable land still available. As early as 
1937 the magistrate at Warmbad felt that:
Every farm of any worth in the District is now fully occupied.165
World War Two led to a virtual halt in the land settlement programme for five years 
with only 23 farms being allocated during the period 1941-1945. A significant 
improvement in the price obtained for karakul pelts during the war 
encouraged increases in flock size and hence the demand for labour. The 
recruitment of black workers for military purposes squeezed the labour force 
available for the farms and seems likely to have improved the bargaining position 
of those that remained. The five-year period immediately after World War Two 
(1945-1949) saw more farm land given to settlers than had been given out in the 
previous fifteen year period. Farm land covering an area of 5.4 million hectares 
was allocated in the period 1950-1954, more than in any other five year period other 
than 1920-1924.166 The pace and extent of the land appropriation were so severe 
that by 1952 the Land and Agricultural Bank were warning that farmers who had 
not adopted a system of paddocks nor kept their flocks at a sustainable size could 
no longer rely on being able to trek to fresh pasture on vacant land when the 
resources available on the farm became inadequate. Farms set aside in the past as 
reserve grazing areas had largely been given out to new settlers and even marginal 
land bordering the Kalahari Desert to the east and Namib Desert to the west had 
been given to settlers.167
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The second wave of settlement at the end of World War Two took place when 345 
returning soldiers and 184 others were provided with farms under the Rehabilitation 
and Land Settlement Scheme and 338 new farms settled (Figure 7).168 One of the 
aims of the second wave of land settlement was the abolition of the strata of white 
farmers who utilised and, it was alleged, manipulated the system of grazing licences 
to their advantage. Gibeon district, for instance, contained 397 ‘holdings’ in 1946 
of which 122 were still only hired.169 The constant movement of some farmers 
around Crown Land made it difficult for the police to keep a check on their stock 
and it was alleged that:
A favourite way of getting round the Administration is for one man to take 
out a grazing licence for a few hundred head of stock and then to allow 
others to graze stock on the same farm ... When the patrols arrive at the 
farm one or two flocks are seen while the other flock is kept at some remote 
outpost.170
The karakul boom, which was to earn it the name ‘black gold’, had two major 
consequences. It led to a rapid increase in small stock numbers and a growing 
demand for black farm labourers (and a renewed concern about the ‘labour 
shortage’) .171 The power of the farming lobby was at its height during World 
War Two, reflecting the economic significance of the sector. Only 15 percent of 
Namibia’s export earnings in 1925 had come from agriculture, but by 1945 it 
contributed 75.4 percent of the total.172 The massive increase in the numbers of 
small stock on the land was accelerated by farmers seeking to gain the maximum 
benefit from the high prices for karakul pelts. The result was overstocking on some 
farms and a more widespread and vigorous attempt to exclude workers’ stock from 
competing for the precious grazing on their farms. The distribution of land to 
returning soldiers (and estimates that a further 550 farms would be created) renewed 
concerns about labour shortages and it was speculated that an additional 3,850 
workers would be needed.173
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ALIENATION, 1920-1954.
The number of small stock in Maltahohe district, for example, rose continuously 
from a total of 98,119 in 1933 to 176,324 in 1935 and 251,169 by 1938.174 A 
brief drought in 1941 revealed the extent to which farmers had sought to utilise 
every part of their farm and failed to leave any reserve grazing. The Land Bank 
noted:
... the tendency of farmers generally ...to increase the size of their holdings 
rather than to reduce the numbers of their stock.175
The study of white pastoral farmers in southern Namibia shows in this, as in many 
other instances, that their farming practices bore a closer parallel to those of their 
black counterparts than they would have cared to admit.
DROUGHT AND RECOVERY.
The serious and lengthy drought of 1945-1946 was even more devastating because 
of the closer occupation of ground. The drought thus had a magnified impact, 
forcing the mass movement of stock to the east and south into Namaqualand. A 
total of 229,669 small stock were moved into the Karoo districts of the Union 
(virtually the equivalent of the whole small stock population of Warmbad district) 
and there was massive internal movements of livestock.176 However it was 
estimated that, despite this mobility, nearly 13 percent of all large stock and a 
quarter of all small stock within the Police Zone died during the drought.177 
Some farmers who had been unable to find any alternative grazing land were 
reported to have been forced to sell their entire flocks once the grazing on their own 
farms became exhausted.178
The administration once again responded to the heavy livestock losses suffered by 
white farmers with the provision of generous advances to assist in the purchase of 
new animals. A total of £200,000 was set aside for the scheme and a limit of
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£1,000 was set on individual advances. By the end of March, 1949 £170,165 had 
been awarded as grants and used to purchase 55,700 small stock and 1,000 head of 
large stock.179 The scheme was aimed at farmers who had completed the 
payments on their farms, whilst those still holding farms under the Land Settlement 
Scheme received additional assistance.180
The drought of 1945-1946 finally seemed to convince farmers that it was better to 
invest in quality, rather than quantity of stock. By the end of 1949 the farmers of 
Maltahohe had reduced their small stock to just 118,960, but 83 percent of these 
animals were high grade karakul sheep.181 The importance of southern Namibia 
to the territory’s karakul industry was demonstrated by the fact that whilst the six 
districts contained only 3.7 percent of Namibia’s large stock, they accommodated 
42.6 percent of its karakul sheep.182 The karakul industry itself had taken a 
commanding position in the agricultural economy. Whilst in 1936 karakul pelts 
contributed 39 percent of the value of all agricultural production, by 1946 over 56 
percent of the total value came from karakul pelts. The value of the next largest 
category, cattle exports, was less than a third that of the karakuls.183
The policy was to produce select flocks of highly marketable animals in preference 
to large flocks of low-grade sheep that would be unsaleable on the competitive South 
African markets. The danger that cross-breeding would reduce the quality of a 
karakul flock provided a powerful new motive for farmers to exclude or isolate their 
workers stock. Specialisation in karakul farming once again served to exclude black 
pastoralists who were effectively denied access to karakul stud stock. Werner cites 
the fact that as late as 1945 when there were nearly two and a half million karakul 
sheep in the territory, virtually none could be found in a black reserve.184
Stock numbers fell (the peak for karakul was reached in 1943), yet the profits to be 
gained from the trade in karakul skins were still blamed for environmental 
vandalism. It was said that they tempted:
... the speculative and selfish farmer to enrich himself by overstocking his
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land to a degree which can scarcely be comprehended. This and not the 
karakul, has created desert islands far beyond the reach of the actual 
desert.185
The allegation was that some farmers were more interested in making quick profits 
which they could invest in other sectors such as mining, rather than in farming in 
a sustainable fashion. Proclamation No. 339 of 1948 activated a law that new 
settlers would have to satisfy a twelve month ‘probationary’ period, during which 
they would have to demonstrate their commitment to develop the farm and ability 
to make it a successful commercial enterprise. The ‘Character System’ as it became 
known was not found in neighbouring South Africa.
A danger of concentrating on the initial years of the South African land settlement 
scheme in Namibia is that one might underestimate the significance of the second 
wave of land settlement that followed World War Two (Figure 7). In 1946 nearly 
5,700,000 hectares were still being used under annual grazing licences by 740 
licensees. During the period 1946-1950 two out of every seven small stock were 
still grazing on government land for temporary periods or even the whole year and 
paying grazing fees.186 The existence of this land provided reserve grazing for 
those who had been allocated land, but also maintained a floating population of 
farmers who were technically ‘landless’.
The second period of rapid expansion in the white commercial farming sector did 
not prevent agriculture being overtaken as the largest source of revenue within the 
primary sector. Agriculture was deposed by the resurgence of the mining industry 
(Figure 8).187 State support for the sector was less extravagant than in earlier 
days, yet more interventionist. Mechanisms continued to exist to ensure the survival 
and commercial development of white farmers. The 1952/53 financial year, for 
instance, saw a total of £127,960 provided to farmers for the purchase of breeding 
stock and a further £100,000 set aside to provide advances of up to £600 for 
farmers who
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were hiring grazing from private land owners for over a year.188 The significant 
difference was that loans and advances were now often linked to a condition that 
farmers should take advice from the administration (such as the Soil Conservation 
Department) on ways of improving their farming techniques. The white farming 
community of southern Namibia, whose position had seemed so precarious in the 
early 1930s, had by 1955 established itself as specialist karakul producers and 
considerably widened the economic gap between themselves and black pastoralists.
CONCLUSION.
The significance of the changing fortunes of the white farming community in the 
context of southern Namibia was twofold. Firstly, the privileged access of the 
community to state subsidies and advances helped to facilitate and consolidate white 
land settlement at the expense of a possible black pastoral alternative. The rate of 
land alienation was, however, less significant than the effectiveness of white 
occupation and policing of land. The overcrowding of the reserves meant that the 
pastoral alternative appeared increasingly unrealistic to young black stockowners.
Access to land became dependent upon a labour agreement with a white farmer. 
After 1935 the growth of the karakul industry and more concentrated settlement of 
the land meant that these farmers were increasingly reluctant to accommodate 
workers stock in any significant numbers.
The second point is that a significant shift in the basis of labour relations can be 
associated with the capitalisation of farms after 1935. It became possible to replace 
informal labour tenancy arrangements with single contract workers. The simplicity 
of this model was, however, complicated by three factors. One, the demand for 
farm labour fluctuated and reflected the changing rate of land settlement at a 
national and local level. Two, the existence of large numbers of farmers who 
occupied land on temporary licences, rather than owning or leasing it maintained a 
degree of internal differentiation within the farming community. The range was 
reflected in considerable variations in the scale and form of payment that they were 
able to offer. Finally the ebb and flow of the small stock farmer’s fortunes were
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weighed against those of other sections of the economy with which ultimately the 
farmer had to compete for labour. The patterns of change within the farm labour 
market will provide the focus of the final two chapters.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE DYNAMICS OF THE FARM LABOUR 
SYSTEM, 1915-1925.
INTRODUCTION.
The negotiation of contracts between a farmer and a worker in white settler colonies 
reflected their respective strengths and weaknesses over time. The history of the 
farm labour force in Namibia is thus a reflection of the declining bargaining power 
of local black pastoralists and the decisive intervention of migrant workers from 
beyond the Police Zone in the commercial agricultural sector. Conversely as the 
acreage under white settlement expanded and the strength and efficiency of the 
colonial administration increased farmers were able to impose greater restrictions 
on their workers. The aim of this chapter is to focus on the initial decade of the 
South African occupation during which the ability of local black pastoralists to 
negotiate the conditions of their employment was most apparent.
The disruption of the German farming community that resulted from World War 
One had left opportunities for scattered families to attempt to regroup, gather 
animals and try to re-establish self-sufficient communities. In the years immediately 
after the arrival of Union forces the relatively sparse martial administrative 
structures and the uncertainty about the future of the territory provided some space 
in which the local black population in southern Namibia were able to revive their 
own systems of economic and political organisation. The decade was a period of 
tension between farmers who sought to retain the maximum degree of control over 
the black workers and their workers, who sought to utilise agreements to revive 
their own pastoral ambitions. If they needed cash farm labour was undesirable, if 
they needed grazing for their own flocks it might be a suitable option. If 
unregulated by contracts black stockowners would move on and off white farms not 
simply in a direct response to the financial impositions placed upon them, but also 
in a manner that reflected seasonal and regional variations in precipitation patterns.
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The existing historiography on labour relations in white settler colonies in east and 
southern Africa has already suggested the importance of pastoral incentives in 
securing farm labourers from aspirant pastoral societies. The importance of grazing 
rights for workers on a farm remained a ‘pervasive’ factor in the decision-making 
process of farm workers in South Africa in the early 1930s.1 Where workers were 
able to exercise a degree of choice they sought farms which offered the most 
generous pastoral benefits. Yet the discrimination shown by farm workers was 
countered by measures which eroded the ability of workers to demand beneficial 
conditions within informal agreements. The history of the black farm worker and 
the changing terms of employment on South African stock farms remains under- 
researched, but the evidence produced by Keegan suggests that there were increased 
pressures for the removal of farm workers’ stock during the late 1920s and early 
1930s.2 By 1937 a South African Commission reported that on average a farm 
worker was only allowed to keep five or six animals, although a few still had small 
herds of up to twenty.3
In Kenya early white settlers were also able to offer land in return for labour. 
‘Squatting’ was seen as a means by which an undercapitalised farmer could use the 
offer of grazing on surplus land to secure a labour force. Efforts were made to 
regulate this type of agreement into a form of labour tenancy. An Ordinance passed 
in 1918 decreed that any ‘squatter’ over the age of 16 would be obliged to work for 
the farmer for a minimum of 180 days.4 The willingness of white farmers to offer 
grazing land to their workers was a mark of temporary weakness. Once the 
alternative means of gaining access to land had been sufficiently reduced, evictions 
and stock restrictions were introduced. The Kikuyu squatters evicted from farms 
during the 1930s frequently found that they could no longer take the option of 
gaining access with their stock to the limited grazing available in the reserves.5
Chronological shifts in the power of the farm worker were accompanied by regional 
variations relating to the range of economic alternatives available to workers. 
Johnson describes the negotiating strength of black farm workers in Zimbabwe:
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The real problem for the farmers, which they often acknowledged, was the 
fact that Africans were not completely dependent on wage labour for their 
reproduction. Their incomplete separation from their means of production 
meant there was some scope for exercising choices as to whether one did or 
did not engage in wage labour, and if one did, at what time of the year, and 
for how long.6
The alternative might be other, more rewarding, forms of waged labour or peasant 
accumulation in a reserve. Access to a reserve was a major determinant of the 
wage levels fixed for farm workers. In South Africa:
Wages ... were far less likely to rise for those who lived permanently on the 
farms and who were less able than men in the ‘reserves’ to choose 
alternative employment.7
The dynamics of farm labour involved workers as active participants in the shaping 
of labour relations and was not just a crude equation based on the extent and 
efficiency with which the state apparatus placed financial obligations upon black 
pastoralists. Black pastoralists were constrained, but retained some economic 
options and a more comprehensive analysis of changing labour patterns can be 
obtained when local economic and environmental factors are also taken into account. 
The provision of farm labour did not occur within a ‘closed system’, despite the 
blatant hopes of the architects of the reserves of southern Namibia. The ebb and 
flow of labour did not therefore correspond directly to demand; it also reflected 
changes in the conditions of supply. Black pastoralists exploited the temporary 
advantages to revive their pastoral pursuits and deploy their flocks over a wide area, 
including land that was to be designated for the white settlement scheme.
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DEFINING AND DEFYING LABOUR AGREEMENTS. 1915-1925.
The military operations in southern Namibia disturbed the hold of farmers over their 
labour force in a number of ways. Many Germans left their farms to enlist with the 
military forces (the policy of encouraging troops who had fought in the 1904-1907 
war to settle meant that many farmers would also have been experienced soldiers). 
The absence of the farmers and the confusion generated by the war facilitated the 
clandestine departure of their conscripted black workforce. The war loosened the 
bonds that tied the black labour force to the white settler farms, but also created 
new wage earning opportunities as the advancing South African forces engaged 
workers to assist with transportation.
The hope that the German defeat would free farm workers from their obligations 
was shortlived. Few German farmers were deported, although some were detained 
whilst the war reached its bloody conclusion in Europe and one of the first actions 
of the military magistrates who took office in each administrative district was the 
registration of farm labour. Registration was an attempt to stem the flood of black 
workers who were deserting from farms. Workers were reported to be ripping off 
the hated brass tags carrying their pass number, which had been a compulsory 
accessory under German law, in an effort to ‘escape identification’.8
Registration was presented as the first stage of the police and monitoring operation 
by which the new administration would end the alleged brutality shown by farmers 
towards their workers under German rule. The political motivation behind this 
policy was apparent at the highest level. The first Administrator reminded the 
South African Prime Minister that:
... a clean record in this matter was essential if we wanted to use the 
German maltreatment of the natives as a reason for keeping this country.9
However the records of the military magistrates suggest that the new administration
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was implicitly involved with the attempt by farmers to maintain existing pay and 
conditions.
The registration process involved the wages and conditions being explained to 
workers ‘in the master’s presence’. Despite the intimidatory presence of the farmer 
and officials it was considered that:
If the boy makes no remarks, it can be taken as acceptance of his pay.10
One official remarked that it was not his policy to inform farm workers of their 
right to quit provided that they gave thirty days notice on the grounds that ‘they are 
fully aware of this’. However the same official admitted that the second reason for 
his reluctance to inform farm workers of their rights was the fact that when he did 
so workers would ‘frequently’ give in their notice to quit, a fact which seems to 
undermine the credibility of his first statement.11
The production of a written contract whilst legally clarifying a situation was also 
open to abuse in a largely pre-literate society. Klaas Plaatjie, a worker engaged by 
Mr Junius on Nuzinabes Farm was prosecuted for desertion in 1918. Junius 
claimed that Plaatjie had left his service before he had completed the full duration 
of his year long contract. Plaatjie’s counter claim was that he was only aware of 
an oral agreement which had made no mention of a year’s commitment. The 
process by which the written contract had been drawn up was then described by 
Junius:
I sent a boy to Narubis to get the contract produced made and you agreed 
to the terms. Neither you nor I were present when the contract was made. 
You never said you and I were to be present when the contract is made. I 
gave you a copy of the contract.12
Plaatjie was unable to prove his assertion that the verbal understanding he had 
reached with Junius had been substantially different to that contained in the written
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contract.
The rigid application of laws regarding notice was one of the ways farmers 
attempted to retain workers. Workers had to keep ‘calendar conscious’ if they were 
to be allowed to leave their job within the parameters of the law. Notice could only 
be given on the first day of each calendar month. If this date was missed the 
worker was obliged to work another month before having another opportunity to 
give notice. One British farmer who had lived in Namibia since 1903 claimed that 
farm workers had been kept as virtual prisoners by unsubstantiated contracts:
... the contracts are usualy (sic) for one year the natives having to give one 
month’s notice at the end of the 11th month, if they did not give the notice 
exactly on the 1st day of the last month they have been obliged to work for 
another year, by this means some men have been able to retain these boys 
for years some up to 9 years, this is the case of most natives who are at 
presant (sic) old servants on the farms.13
Farm workers sought to escape the bonds of legalistic contracts by seeking monthly 
contracts which would give them the freedom to move on, without hindrance.14
Geographical location played an important role in the negotiation of contracts. The 
areas in which local black stockowners were able to gain access to land enabled 
‘straddling’. Workers sought to ‘straddle’ two economic sectors and entered the 
labour market with specific short-term aims. Farm workers sought the necessary 
cash to meet the financial demands placed upon them by the authorities and to 
increase their flocks to the level at which they could sustain themselves as 
economically independent black pastoralists. The position of farmers was different; 
they sought a form of contract that would ensure that the farm had a stable labour 
force.
One farmer in the Gibeon district boasted of the long service that had been provided 
by his workers. The farm workers were provided with one year contracts, yet all
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had been on the farm for over three years and some for as many as fifteen. An 
explanation of the process of contract renewal suggests that it was not loyalty to 
their employer that had kept the workers on the farm for so many years:
... if notice had not been given by either side one month before the 
expiration of the contract, such contract has by silent consent been 
renewed.15
If the farmer enforced the first of the month rule, it meant that there was only one 
day in the year upon which his workers had the opportunity to end their employment 
contract. The farmer created a stream of correspondence to the magistrate when his 
‘faithful’ workforce all deserted, a move that, given his policy, surprises the 
historian less than it did the farmer.
The case is unusual only so far in the honesty with which the farmer documented 
the manner in which he exploited the absence of written contracts to exercise control 
over his labour force. However the case also illustrates the most significant feature 
of the initial period after 1915, namely the manner in which workers took advantage 
of the slackening of the apparatus of control. The first evidence of this was the mass 
desertion of workers from white farms following the German defeat and the second 
the reoccupation of land and attempts to reconstruct family units and communities 
that had been dissipated during the German period.
The mass exodus of black workers from farms during and immediately after World 
War One provides a powerful statement about the unpopularity of farm labour. 
The Administrator for the Territory informed General Botha in 1916 that ‘Natives 
have deserted in considerable numbers from their former German employers’ and 
noted ‘. . . a  distinct disinclination’ on their part to return to work.16 Yet, whilst 
the majority of farmers were German and the wave of desertions provided useful 
propaganda for the aspirant Union administration, the desertions should be seen as 
part of a more broadly based movement by farm labourers.
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Mass desertions and ‘farm strikes’ were often a conscious assertion by farm workers 
of their right to liberty, in defiance of the presumption of some farmers that workers 
could be forced to remain permanently in their employ. A patrol in Maltahohe 
district in 1918 investigated a ‘strike’ of workers on Kudis Farm. Mr Berner, the 
farmer, complained that:
... all his natives refused duty and want to leave his employ.17
Berner’s efforts to prosecute his workers for ‘disobedience’ were misguided as when 
their (fortunately) written contracts were checked it transpired that they had all 
expired and that the workers had, in the words of the local Military Commander, 
‘... the right to choose new masters’.18 Yet it had only been the direct action 
taken by the workers that had brought their case to official attention.
The case provides an illustration of the inability of the administrative system to 
adequately police and monitor the recruitment and terms of engagement of local 
workers on farms. A further irony of the system was that a farm worker wishing 
to leave a farm and travel to the district magistrate’s office to complain about pay, 
conditions or ill treatment could only legally do so if he obtained a travel pass from 
the farmer. If a farmer refused permission and a worker left the farm anyway, he 
was likely to find himself arrested for ‘desertion’ before he reached the Magisterial 
Seat in a pre-emptive move by the farmer.19 The fact that workers tended to 
desert rather than seek redress through official channels suggests not only the 
difficulties of gaining access to the system, but also a lack of confidence in the 
system.
The case of a farm worker called Fritz Karari provides an example of workers’ 
perceptions of the local judiciary. Karari started work on Korab Farm in Maltahohe 
district in 1921 under a verbal agreement. However when he sought to make a 
complaint he travelled to Windhoek to speak directly to the Officer-in-Command of 
Native Affairs in Windhoek. The officer informed the local magistrate that Karari
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... was only working there for about one week, and had to leave on account 
of being illtreated by the Dutchman with whom he had no written contract, 
and further stated that he was afraid to report to you as when you sent him 
to work for this Dutchman, you told him that if he did not do his work 
properly you would have him sjamboked.20
Farm workers seeking to escape undesirable labour contracts and dubious of the 
legal system were cast between the Devil and the deep blue sea. The trek of Kahari 
to Windhoek to lodge his complaint was exceptional; the easier option was to 
‘disappear’.
The Blue Book published in 1918 listing cases of the ill-treatment of the black 
population by German soldiers and farmers was to provide a notorious catalogue 
against which the new administration’s approach would be positively juxtaposed. 
The military administration was keen to point out that 310 cases had been heard 
since 20th September, 1915 in which ‘Masters’ had been prosecuted for the ill- 
treatment of servants.21 However the Report should not be allowed to conceal the 
fact that the majority of cases heard in the local military magistrates’ courts in 
southern Namibia consisted of complaints by farmers against their workers and the 
majority of convictions made by those courts were of farm workers, not farmers. 
The magistrate’s court at Keetmanshoop, for example, convicted 231 people during 
1919, of these 209 were black. None of the 34 convictions made under the 
‘Masters and Servants’ were of whites, whilst only 1 of the 13 convictions for 
assault involved a white person.22 Despite the pretensions of the Blue Book the 
judiciary system remained essentially a tool of control for the farmer, an extension 
of the sjambok.
The files of the military magistrates became clogged with letters of complaint from 
farmers alarmed at the cripplingly high rate of desertions. A typical case was that 
of a farmer on Harichas in Maltahohe district who sent letters listing a stream of 
desertions from his farm. Over a ten-month period (from April, 1916 to January, 
1917) individuals or families absconded on eight separate occasions and a total of
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12 adults and 17 children left the farm without the farmer’s permission.23 Workers 
sought to recreate themselves as pastoralists by rebuilding their stock and farmers 
who wished to retain or attract workers had to allow workers’ stock to run on their 
farm. The shifting pattern of distribution did not, however, correspond directly to 
the level of grazing available to workers stock. Internal migration suggested that 
individuals also sought to impose their own order on the distribution of workers 
within a given farming community for social reasons.
The mass desertion from certain farms was accompanied by attempts to rebuild 
communities on vacant Crown Land and in the temporary reserves. Where the 
circumstances were conducive, communities also formed on white farms, but the 
clumping here was related to the benefits available on those farms. At the end of 
1915 there were 54 farms occupied by white settlers in Maltahohe district and 
eighteen of these had communities with more than 20 black adults. The farms with 
the greatest hectarage, which were able to offer more generous grazing rights for 
black residents contained the largest communities. The largest two farms in the 
district, Nomtsas and Duwiseb, had black/white adult populations of 118/9 and 79/9 
respectively.24 The farms provide examples of a wider phenomena.
A few farms in each district became foci for the growth of communities. The 
attraction was often the lack of local stock control on the farm. Duwiseb, for 
example, was owned by a German who had been killed on the Western Front and 
control was reported to have slackened during his absence. Heirachabis in 
Warmbad district, another farm which saw the growth of a community, was the seat 
of a mission station which allowed black residents to retain a comparatively large 
number of stock on the land. The reconstitution of larger family units facilitated the 
revival of political organisation in rural areas with many of the larger farm 
communities recognising one of their members as a leader and spokesperson. By 
1917 returns showed that farms such as Duwiseb had appointed headmen, and that 
even the small adult community (sixteen in 1915) found on Sandhof had chosen a 
leader.25 Evidence also emerged that a network of these organised communities 
was being formed and efforts being made to make them responsible to the
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revitalised ‘traditional’ dynasties that were trying to re-establish their regional 
authority.
The emergence of a shadowy parallel hierarchy to that being constructed by the 
military administration was perceived as a threat, particularly by the farming 
community. The efforts, for example, of Isaak Witbooi to extend his influence and 
authority over the black occupants of white farms provoked an official investigation 
in 1918. Fritz Korosiep gave evidence that he was responsible for a ‘Company’ of 
ten or twelve men on Kleinfontein farm and had been appointed the ‘Foreman’ by 
Witbooi. Korosiep had been given the responsibility of punishing ‘wrongdoers’ on 
the farm. Korosiep received his instructions from another Captain (Mahererop) who 
was based at Rooikop farm and gave evidence that another ‘Company’ existed on 
‘Kutes’ Farm.26 The network provides an interesting parallel to the activities of 
the ‘Truppenspieler’ movement which the authorities feared was being used to 
organise rural Herero communities at the same time.27
Further evidence of the ability of communities to regroup during this period can be 
found in the ‘ethnic’ analysis of the black occupants of farms in the Maltahohe 
district. The black adult population of Duwiseb and Naudaus farms in 1917 was 78 
and 71 of these were classified as ‘Herero’. Yet, in contrast, on the neighbouring 
farm of Gorab and Magnams there were 53 and 26 adult black residents, none of 
whom were classified as ‘Herero’.28 The statistics suggest a strong degree of 
selectivity in the movement of people between farms aimed at restoring links broken 
during the arbitrary distribution of labour practised by the German authorities. The 
statistics also reveal that the communities on the farms consisted of families and 
contained a large number of women. On Duwiseb and Naudaus 56% of the black 
residents were women or girls, whilst on Magnams the figure was even higher, at 
65 %. The residents of the larger black farm-based communities were not all farm 
workers. Of the 53 black residents of Gorab, for instance, only 11 men and 6 
women were officially employed by the farmer.29
One of the assumptions of the German farm labour system had been that the women
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in family units containing male employees would also be liable to work for a 
farmer’s family. The Native Reserves Commission of 1921 claimed that women 
were still used extensively for domestic and light farm work.30 The evidence 
suggests that farmers had difficulties, after 1915, persuading women that voluntary 
work for the farmer was a responsibility in any way linked to their right to reside 
on the farm. Work would now necessitate payment. In one early case two women 
described how, after working for a farmer for 10 years without pay or stock in lieu, 
they had demanded payment and been offered a single goat in settlement.31 Only 
a minority of the waged workers listed on any of the farms in Maltahohe district in 
1920 were women and extracting work from the unwaged proved, understandably, 
difficult.32
The ability of workers to move onto farms with their families and for women 
frequently to evade the imposition of labour obligations demonstrates the relative 
strength of the workers’ bargaining position at this time. The magistrate at 
Maltahohe described the experience of white farmers who recruited local male 
workers during 1922:
Almost invariably the boy (sic) brings his wife and family with him, they 
settle themselves in a pondhoek (sic) on the Employer’s farm, the family do 
no work or attempt to assist the farmer in any way yet at the same time 
expect to be fed.33
The Farmers’ Association for the Warmbad district complained bitterly that:
95% of the females refuse to perform any kind of work on the farm.34
Women demanded the right of residence, whilst resisting any imposed obligation to 
work. The struggle between farmers and farm workers revolved around the 
negotiation of a form of labour tenancy. Yet the absence of written contracts often 
made these informal in nature and dependent on a number of local factors which 
influenced the balance of concession and control within each working relationship.
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The farmer sought the labour of the local male worker and his family, whilst 
workers sought access to grazing land for their stock.
The frequent complaint made by farmers during this early period was that recruiting 
local workers also meant sharing their land with the workers’ animals. One farmer 
att ‘Hanaus’ in Gibeon district dismissed two workers because they had accumulated 
370 head of small stock on his farm, only to discover that the four local workers he 
recruited in their place arrived on the farm with a flock of 800.35 The perspective 
o f much of the potential workforce was that they sought to accumulate stock and 
recover lost lands, thus farm labour was acceptable only as a temporary measure, 
i f  it assisted them in obtaining this goal.
Farmers that attempted to prevent farm workers bringing their flocks with them 
found recruitment difficult. Farmers complained that it was the ‘invariable practice’ 
o f black pastoralists seeking work on their farms to enquire whether they would be 
able to bring all their own flocks onto the farm.36 One farmer explained that those 
who attempted to prevent their workers bringing their flocks with them found 
recruitment difficult in a competitive labour market:
If a farmer were to refuse to take a native’s stock on to his farm, the native 
would refuse to work for him, and it would probably be found that his 
neighbour was quite prepared to take the native with his stock.37
Individual agreements could turn on the ceiling set for the number of workers’ stock 
that a farmer would provide access to. Baron von Essebeck agreed to employ two 
local men on his farm at Kachas in Gibeon district in 1918 and to let them graze a 
flock of 200 of their own animals on the farm, but when the workers arrived they 
were driving a flock of over 500 small stock. The Baron turned them away and so 
lost his two workers.38
Farm workers commonly not only looking after their employer’s flocks, but also 
significant flocks of their own, or those of friends and relatives. The Drought
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Investigation Commission of 1924 quoted the suspicions of officials regarding the 
ownership of animals accompanying freshly recruited farm workers:
... that many of these goats are ‘boarders’ belonging to other natives (ie. not 
servants of the farmer). Needless to say, any hire paid for the grazing will 
not go to the owner of the farm.39
Farm workers were alleged to be seeking the maximum communal benefit from 
their agreements. Once grazing fees were being imposed on those renting grazing 
on Crown Land and in reserves the advantages of distributing animals to those who 
had employment arrangements that provided for free or cheap access to grazing land 
became obvious.The presence of younger members of the family on the farm could 
mean that they would be able to take responsibility for these animals. Farm 
workers were obviously reluctant to admit that they were keeping animals belonging 
to relations amongst their flock on a farm. The Court Records however present 
circumstantial evidence that this was a fairly common practice.40 The distribution 
of stock was a fairly standard pastoral device and it seems likely that farm workers 
sought to utilise their new bargaining power to gain access to fresh grazing areas 
as a condition of employment.
The transient period of optimism that followed the South African invasion stirred 
memories of pastoral independence amongst the black stockowners of southern 
Namibia. Farm workers were economically ambitious to establish themselves as 
independent stock farmers with their own farms. The perspective of the workers 
is typified by the notes provided by a trooper sent to investigate an apparent ‘strike’ 
by farm workers on Kutel Farm in Maltahohe district:
... about 7.30am on morning of 22nd January, 1918 I rounded up all natives 
on farm, and asked them any complaints, answer no so I ask them why don’t 
they work, their reply was we don’t want to work any longer as we are now 
Rich, and want to start our own farming, on Swartsrand.41
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The Swartsrand was an inaccessible area to the north-west of Berseba reserve which 
had yet to be settled by aspirant white farmers. The existence of this vacant area 
gave credibility to the farm workers’ ambitions that would be harder to sustain a 
few decades later when almost all the land with pastoral potential in southern 
Namibia had been alienated.
The ability of black stockowners to find alternative grazing land on vacant Crown 
Land, in the established and temporary reserves and within the Rehoboth Gebiet 
strengthened their bargaining position. The options available, though limited, meant 
that farmers were competing for workers in the labour market and those with 
surplus grazing areas were perceived to have an advantage in attracting workers. 
Local circumstances, namely the local alternatives to moving stock onto a particular 
farm, were crucial in the thousands of interpersonal negotiations that took place. 
The evidence suggests that is some cases black stockowners were able to obtain an 
arrangement to stay on a farm with their flocks without working for the farmer, but 
by paying a monthly grazing fee or on the understanding that younger members of 
the family would provide labour.42 The laws against ‘squatting’ meant that this 
type of relationship was seldom openly admitted to, but was sometimes uncovered 
during court cases. Goliath Swartbooi, a farm labourer in Keetmanshoop district, 
explained his relationship to the farmer on whose land he lived in February, 1918:
I do not work for Mr Wache. I live on his farm. I do not work. I have 70
goats. I pay 5/- [shillings] pm. to live there. I work for no one.43
Klaas Isak lived on Springputz in Warmbad district in 1920, but had no contract 
with the owner and received no pay. Yet Isak kept a flock of around 200 small 
stock on the farm.44 The implication was that Isak either paid to stay on the farm 
or provided labour on a irregular basis when required in return for his access to 
pasture.
The condoning of ‘squatting’ provided a means by which farmers attempted to fix 
a parochial labour force that could be employed as necessary on brief contracts - a
309
system which given the cash poverty of many of the immigrant white farmers must 
have seemed an appealing prospect. A circular distributed by the military 
administration in July, 1918 confirmed uniform rates for grazing and squatting fees 
on Crown Lands which had been introduced in December, 1915. Large stock were 
charged at 3d per head and small stock at 2s.6d per 100 head.45 The farmer who 
wanted to attract labour in an area where Crown Land was available to black 
stockowners therefore had to undercut these rates.
The mutual convenience of an informal agreement in which local black stockowners 
attempted to achieve a balance between squatting and casual labour, the informal 
oral nature of early contracts and the frailty of the new state apparatus suggests that 
such deals were more widespread than was officially admitted. The promulgation 
of Native Administration Proclamation No. 11 of 1921 provided legislation dealing 
directly with ‘squatting’ and ‘kaffir farming’, yet the evidence suggests that there 
remained a considerable gap between theory and practice. A witness at the Farm 
Industry Commission in 1926 articulated a widespread scepticism:
The law prohibited native squatting, but it was not being carried out. Many 
farmers had native families considerably in excess of those allowed squatting 
on their farms.46
The evidence of the previous chapter would suggest that the practice reflected not 
only the relative bargaining strength of a labour force in a period of increasing 
labour demand and mobility, but also the financial weakness of many of the new 
white settlers. Land was one of the few assets that many of them could offer in 
order to secure a labour force.
Statistical and narrative evidence of the relative prosperity of black stockowners 
during the period of stock recovery following 1915 can be found in abundance. 
One indication of this would be the number of grazing licences that were issued to 
black stockowners to graze their flocks on Crown Land unoccupied (by white 
settlers). The Register of Grazing Licences for Keetmanshoop district revealed that
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in March 1918, 139 black stockowners were registered as having made payments 
(officially dubbed ‘Squatters Fees’). Many of these had been paid for a period of 
over two years, eighty-eight dating from 1st January 1916. The flocks of many of 
those listed were of a considerable size. An analysis of the flock size of licensees 
is provided in Table l l . 47
TABLE 11: An Analysis of the size of flocks owned by black 
stockowners issued with grazing licences in Keetmanshoop District 
(01.01.1916 to 01.01.1918).
Size of flock. No. of Stockowners.
None 13
1-99 32
100-199 38
200-399 34
400-799 16
Over 800 6
TOTAL 139
The category that are listed as ‘None’ consisted of those whose licences had been 
cancelled when they left a farm or those who owned only large stock. The statistics 
reveal that virtually three-quarters of those with small stock flocks had more than 
double the number required to obtain an Exemption Certificate (the mean average 
flock size of licensees with small stock flocks was actually 239). The wealthiest 
recorded black stockowner in the district, Frederick Hinta, obtained a licence on 4th 
March, 1918 to graze 1,500 small stock and 34 large stock on Waterfall Farm. 
Hinta was expected to pay £2 6s. every month in fees.48
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Whilst comparative statistics for white settlers in Keetmanshoop district in the same 
year were not obtainable, a comparison can be made with those in the neighbouring 
district of Maltahohe in 1917. A few examples illustrate the fact that the white 
settlers flocks were often of a comparable size to those of their black licensees. 
Count von Luttichau at Niederhagen Farm tended a flock of 200 sheep, P. A. Smit 
at Amub Farm ran a flock of 243 and in total 14 of the 47 white stockowners listed 
possessed flocks of 500 or less animals. Whilst the average flock size of the 
farmers was 886, the statistics suggest that there was a (significant) minority whose 
livestock holdings were little more substantial than those of the black pastoralists.
The bargaining power that the accumulation of stock provided black stockowners 
who were able to gather a flock of over fifty small animals, and thus qualify for an 
Exemption Certificate, was recognised by local officials:
Very few natives are obliged to work for a living ... on several farms the 
natives own more stock than their employers. This class of servant is 
inclined to neglect his master’s work in order to look after his own stock.49
The correlation between the difficulties of certain farmers in obtaining labour and 
the proximity of Crown Land available for hire was noted in South Africa and 
similar problems faced farmers near reserves or other accessible land in Namibia.
The state intervened to remove larger black stockowners with grazing licences from 
‘unoccupied’ farms by giving black licensees an ultimatum to sell stock or move to 
a ‘native area’.50
Statistics of black stock ownership cloak differences in the quality of stock and 
questions concerning access to markets; but it is apparent that the expanding flocks 
of black pastoralists in southern Namibia were perceived as posing a direct threat 
to the supply and control of black farm labour. The Farmers’ Association for the 
Kalkfeld area passed a resolution in 1920 which attempted to standardise the value 
of grazing offered to workers. The Association recommended that workers should 
pay Is. per month for each individual large stock and Is. per month for every ten
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small stock.51 The alleged average monthly wage of 12s. would thus be totally 
consumed by the payment of grazing fees for 120 goats. The charges were six 
times heavier than those that had been made in most of the reserves and locations 
at the beginning of 1918. The resolution was obviously not aimed at preventing the 
exploitation of workers, but rather at eliminating competitive differentiation in rates 
between farmers by setting them at an universally exorbitant level that would drive 
workers’ stock from the farms. The Association and its like were never able to 
enforce a standardised rate of value for grazing rights successfully, but many 
farmers continued to use informal grazing fees as a means of reducing wages. By 
1923, however, it was clear that many farmers were enforcing restrictions on the 
number of stock that a worker was allowed on a farm. The Secretary for South 
West Africa reported the allegations of black stockowners that:
... in many cases farmers will not permit labourers to bring their stock on
to farms with them.52
The alternative that farmers were to offer was to be the straight payment of wages 
in cash.
WAGE LABOUR
One of the first actions of the military administration had been an attempt to 
introduce a uniform scale of wages for farm labourers. The move was probably 
part of the broader campaign to demonstrate to an international audience that Union 
rule would be more beneficial to the black population than a return to German rule. 
Paragraph 12, Section IV of the ‘Memorandum on Native Affairs’ issued on 3rd 
August, 1916 required all military magistrates to set minimum wages. The military 
magistrate for Gibeon subsequently wrote to farmers detailing the decision that he 
had reached for his district:
... in accordance with instructions from the Secretary for the Protectorate I
have drawn up a scale of minimum wages for the District. According to this
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scale the minimum for a farm labourer is 12s/6d per month +  (sic) the 
various Police Posts have been instructed not to contract labourers for less 
amounts.53
The official definition of the minimum wage failed, however, to stem the flow of 
black labour from the farms. The farmers of Maltahohe district suffered the 
greatest difficulties in obtaining farm labour. The local Farmers’ Union argued that 
farm workers were deserting and moving to the neighbouring district of Bethanie 
and into the reserves at Berseba and Rehoboth.54 The military magistrate at 
Maltahohe was flooded with so many complaints of desertion, in 1918, he circulated 
a letter throughout the whole of the Police Zone. The letter promised that local 
farmers would pay ‘Not less than £1* (ie. more than 20 shillings) to workers 
prepared to travel to the district and also make provision for their families to travel 
and live on the farm.55 Yet there is no evidence that this scale of wages was 
applied or that the offer generated any significant response, and the general level of 
wages in the region was far lower. The military magistrate of Keetmanshoop 
district estimated that the average wage paid to farm workers in his district in 1918 
was 12s. per month plus food.56 The potential for stock accumulation was of far 
greater importance than the level of wage promised to local farm workers. The 
population drain from Maltahohe can be directly linked to the absence of a suitable 
reserve or vacant land upon which grazing licences could be obtained.57
The promise of adequate wages on paper was easy enough, but the reality was also 
very different. Farmers were able to subvert the official dictate or contractual terms 
in a number of ways. The substraction from (or even substitution for) wages of 
grazing fees has already been noted. Farmers were also able to utilise formal and 
informal networks to prevent competitive wages being offered and claim deductions 
and payments in kind to reduce the hypothetical pay statement to a negligible or 
even negative sum.
The meetings of the local Farmers Associations provided a ready mechanism for the 
exchange of information about local wages and passage of resolutions carrying
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recommendations about wage levels. Farmers who were not organised within an 
Association would meet on other occasions, such as social events and markets. The 
Administrator recognised in his Annual Report for 1922 that:
All seem to act in concert to keep down the wages of selected labourers. An 
alert farmer could to-morrow (sic) drain his neighbours of his best labourers 
by offering quite ordinary inducements, which the farmers combine at 
present not to offer (my emphasis).58
The short-term goals of local labourers entering the labour market made the control 
of wages the major factor inhibiting the recruitment of farm workers. The resident 
black stockowners of the Berseba and Bondels reserves were not obliged to pay 
grazing fees and could therefore enter the labour market with greater flexibility than 
others. In 1925 an estimated 250 of the younger Berseba residents were working 
outside the reserve, but they were working in Keetmanshoop, on the railways and 
at the Luderitz diamond fields - not on the neighbouring farms.59 Equally in the 
Bondels reserve it was reported that most of the absent men were working in the 
mines and only 14 were employed on farms in the district.60
Farm work was the least desirable of a range of contemporary wage earning 
options. A labourer with the South West Africa Railways could earn between ls.9d 
and 2s.6d per day with rations in 1920 and a ‘House Boy’ £1 to £1. 10s. per month 
with food.61 Cash wages were more reliable in urban employment and the hours 
more regular. A letter to the Windhoek Advertiser in 1924 signed by ‘Farm 
Workers’ emphasised the link between poor pay and an unenthusiastic workforce:
We have heard it said that natives are lazy - We would respectfully submit 
that Farms servants are woefully underpaid.62
The receipt of payments could also be erratic in regularity and amount (as variable 
deductions were made for rations, grazing and goods).
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The paucity of capital reserves with which some of the new settlers arrived meant 
that some claimed to be too poor to even pay the meagre wages given to farm 
workers. The Administrator expressed particular concern about the problem in 
1924:
In the districts of Gibeon and Maltahohe cases have come to light where 
farmers have resorted to the practice of paying their servants wages by 
means of IOUs, which they have failed to redeem upon the termination of 
the contracts.63
The payment of wages to farm workers in southern Namibia was particularly 
unreliable due to the large numbers of new settlers, their initial emphasis on capital 
investments and a localised drought that hit the region during 1924.
The great distance, in terms of time and space, between many of the outlying farms 
and the nearest market town meant that farmers were also able to control the access 
of their workers to consumer goods:
Once he [the labourer] is on the farm his master can rarely spare him, rarely 
if ever he gets a chance to come to buy what he requires at the stores. The 
master usually does the purchasing - and great dissatisfaction usually 
follows.64
The problem was not simply one of taste. Workers were often left unclear as to 
what items were included in their pay or deducted from it and at what cost:
The grievance appears to be that after they have worked for some months 
and wish for a settlement, the farmer produces a book and informs them that 
they have nothing to come, as they have bought certain articles from the 
master during the time employed and that they really owe the Master 
money.65
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The fear expressed was that farm labour could prove a trap, rather than an 
opportunity. The comments raised the spectre of ‘debt bondage’ in which the 
contracts of local farm labourers would have to be endlessly extended in response 
to the escalating debt of the worker to their employer. Life and hope reduced to a 
treadmill.
The most evident source of confusion lay in the way in which basic rations and old 
clothes might or might not be included in an agreement. The form that such fringe 
benefits would take was often left vague in agreements. A typical example was a 
courtroom claim by one farmer that he had agreed to employ a worker for four 
months at a wage of 10s. per month plus ‘food and old clothes’.66 But when it 
came to a final settlement workers might find the cost of a shirt or pair of trousers 
deducted from their wages.67 One ‘Ovambo’ worker, Moses Hangula, claimed that 
he had been offered a verbal contract in 1921 to work on Gorab Farm in 
Malthahohe district for a year at a wage of 20s. and food. Hangula claimed that 
once he started he was told that the cost of his food would be deducted from his 
wages.68 The Maltahohe special offer had strings attached to it. The payment of 
wages in kind could also confuse the question of wages. If a goat was given to a 
worker at the end of a month should he consider it a gift, his meat ration or his pay 
? Payment in kind was common throughout the region.69
A shepherd working for a Mr Badenhorst on Godas Farm in Keetmanshoop district 
in 1915 described the method of payment used by his employer during a Court 
Case:
I receive 15/0 a month from my master, also my food - if I don’t get paid
for two months my master gives me three goats.70
The payment of wages in stock created two persistent difficulties. One was the 
calculation of the value of the animal being offered as a cash substitute. The local 
‘Native Affairs’ official of the day estimated that the market value of ‘an ordinary 
breeding goat’ was in fact only 5s. to 10s.71 The Administrator explained, in
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1922, that:
... the system of giving stock for long periods of service is being 
discouraged as this not only leads to disputes but owing to the great 
depreciation in values, results in inadequate value being paid for work 
done.72
The language of the market (‘depreciation’) is misleading as the primary aim of 
farm workers at this stage was the accumulation of stock to achieve the economic 
strength that would allow them to enter the labour market with greater discretion. 
But what number of animals should be considered just compensation for a month’s 
labour? The payment of one or two goats each month could be weighed against the 
average increase in flock size over a twelve month period. An annual ‘salary’ of 
12 goats would be exceeded by the natural increase of a flock of 20 goats in a good 
year (a fact that underlines the importance of grazing rights and stock access in 
labour agreements). Farm workers in Maltahohe district suffered as much from the 
devaluation of their labour through payment in kind as those in neighbouring 
districts:
Very frequently... the servant never sees any money for months at a time for 
instead of being paid in cash he is paid in kind by a sheep or a goat which 
method of payment invariably causes a dispute as to the value of the animal 
tendered in payment.73
The fact that payments in kind became increasingly common during periods of 
drought meant that the animals offered in payment were often in poor condition and 
would be consumed by a worker’s family as a supplement to inadequate rations.
The second difficulty attached to payment in kind was the dangers inherent in the 
accumulation of stock by a farm worker. On farms where workers received 
sufficient rations and were paid with animals of good quality, payment in kind might 
assist a worker’s efforts to enlarge their own individual flock. However, ironically,
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the success of their efforts could have severe consequences in relation to their access 
to grazing land. The Administrator warned in 1922 of:
... the undesirability of assisting natives to accumulate animals for which 
there is no accommodation, and the farming community itself objects as a 
rule to natives acquiring stock in spite of many of its members giving them 
the opportunity to obtain it.74
The aspirations of local farm workers that access to farm land could revive their 
pastoral fortunes were to be quickly shattered.
CONCLUSION
Farm labour was not a good choice for black stockowners who wished to raise cash 
to pay grazing fees or buy consumer goods in the decade after the defeat of the 
German forces. Black stockowners could benefit, however, if they were able to 
obtain access to grazing for their flocks at a rate preferable to any other convenient 
alternatives. The initial poverty of many of the new settlers and uncertainty about 
the distribution of land meant that black pastoralists found they were able to 
negotiate grazing concessions in return for their labour. The dynamics of farm 
labour recruitment were, however, to be fundamentally transformed by the 
devastating drought that crept over the region from the late 1920s and ushered in 
the era of the contract farm worker from northern Namibia.
319
NOTES - CHAPTER FIVE.
1. Union of South Africa. Report of the Native Economic Commission. 1930- 
1932. Government Printer. Pretoria. UG. 22. 1932. p54.
2. Keegan, T. Facing the Storm: Portraits of Black Lives in Rural South Africa. 
David Philip. Cape Town. 1988. p i8.
3. Union of South Africa. Native Farm Labour Commission. 1937. p i 87.
4. Van Zwannenburg. R. Colonial capitalism and labour in Kenya. 1919-1939. East 
Africa Literature Bureau, Kampala. 1975. p241.
5. Van Zwannenburg. 1975. p270. Kanogo, T. Squatters & the Roots of Mau Mau. 
James Currey. London. 1987. p61-62.
6. Johnson, D. "Settler Farmers and Coerced African Labour in Southern 
Rhodesia, 1936-46" JAH vol. 33 (1) 1992.
7. Wilson, M. & Thompson, L. The Oxford History of South Africa, vol 2. 
Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1971. pl23.
8. O/C NA. Omaruru to Commandant, Omaruru. 1915. NAK 2.
9. Gorges to Smuts. 9th June, 1918. SWAA - A 239/1
10. O/C NA. Omaruru to Commandant, Omaruru. 1915. NAK 2.
11. O/C NA. Omaruru to Commandant, Omaruru. 1915 NAK 2.
12. Rex vs. K. Plaatjie LKE 1/1/3 - 145/18.
13. Evidence of J.G. Muller, Manager of Aldershorst (aka. Nam) in Maltahohe 
District.Rex vs. Chanibib. LMA 1/1/2 - 63/16.
14. See for example evidence in Rex vs. W. Vries. LKW 1/1/1 - 36/16.
15. Brandt to Act. Mil. Mag. Gibeon. 12th June, 1918. LMG. 3/1/7 - 40/18/8.
16. Administrator’s Report to General Botha. 1st April, 1916. ADM 137 - 6.
17. Statement J. du Rand, Trooper 1st MC. Maltahohe. 31st August, 1918. LMA 
3/1/3 - 30/18
18. O/C 1st MC to Mil. Mag. LMA 3/1/13 - 30/18.
19. See for example the statement of Paul Wariep of Nieuwerust Farm whose 
efforts to protest about the non-payment of wages were repeatedly frustrated by the 
refusal of his employer to issue him with a travelling pass. Statement. 1920. LMA
320
3/1/20 - 2/19/20.
20. O/C Native Affairs, Windhoek to Mag. Maltahohe. 14th November, 1921. 
LMA 3/1/27 - 2/4/23.
21. Report on the Natives of South-West Africa and their Treatment By Germany. 
HMSO. London. Cd. 9146. 1918. p7.
22. Record of Convictions for the year 1917. LKE 3/1/4 - 57/17/6.
23. H. Sauber to Detached Ass. Mil. Mag. Maltahoehe 10th January, 1917 and H. 
Sauber to O/C Police, Maltahoehe, 10th March, 1917. LMA 3/1/6 - 17.
24. Calculations based on statistics contained in ‘Policing of the Protectorate’. 
SWAP to Mag. Maltahohe. 22nd December, 1915. LMA 3 /1 /7 -5 4 .
25. ‘Return of Locations’ 1917. LMA 3/1/13 - 27/18.
26. ‘Interrogatories answered by Fritz Korosiep at Windhoek Gaol’ 12th August, 
1918. SWAA 1851 - A 396/8.
27. A Circular on the subject was distributed to all Military Magistrates and Native 
Commissioners in 1917. See Werner, W. " ‘Playing Soldiers: The Truppenspieler 
Movement Among the Herero of Namibia, 1915 to ca. 1945." JSAS. vol. 16 (3) 
September, 1990. p 483 fn. 37.
28. See ‘Duwisib & Naudaus: 1 April 1917’ ‘Gorab’ 4th April, 1917 and
‘Maquams’ ADM 23 - 87/2.
29. See ‘Duwisib & Naudaus: 1 April 1917’ ‘Gorab’ 4th April, 1917 and
‘Maquams’ ADM 23 - 87/2.
30. Report of Native Reserves Commission. 1921. plO.
31. Officer i/c NA. Keetmanshoop to Protectorate NA. Dept. 3rd December, 
1915. NAK 1 P.
32. See the data in loose manuscript form in the ‘Census of the District of
Maltahohe Farms.’ 1920. LMA 3/1/23 - 17/27/20.
33. ‘Pondok’ was the name given to the huts built by the workers and their families 
to provide shelter. AR Mag. Maltahohe. LMA 3/1/39 - 17/1/2/1.
34. Warmbad Farmers Association to Chair (Native Reserves Commission) 12th 
February, 1921. SWAA 1119 - A 158/1.
35. Torman to ‘Regierungsrat Kastl.’ 19th August, 1916. SWAA 1851 - A 396/8.
36. Military Magistrate Gibeon to Sec. Prot. 14th October, 1916. SWAA 1851 - 
A 396/8.
321
37. Farming Industry Commission. 14th December, 1926. p6.
38. ‘Native Labourers’. Mil. Mag. Gibeon to NCO i/c Police, Mariental. LMG
3/1/7 - 40/18/8.
39. Kreft quoted in Report of the Drought Investigation Commission of South West 
Africa. June, 1924. Pretoria. WB 600/5/49. Para. 300. AP 5/7/11.
40. Evidence of Isaac Libic of ‘Big Kabas’. Rex vs Allen Green. LKE 1/1/1 - 
204/15.
41. Statement. J du Rand, Trooper 1st MC. Maltahohe. LMA 3/1/13 - 30/18.
42. Keegan, T. Facing the Storm. David Philip. Cape Town. 1988. p l5 .
43. Rex vs. Goliath Swartbooi. LKE 1/1/3 - 34/18.
44. Rex vs. J.v.R. Coetzee. 14th February, 1918. LKW 1/1/2 - 87/20.
45. Circular No. 58. 23rd December, 1915. SWAA 3/1/1 - Circulars 1-61. 1915. 
and Circular No. 137 7th July, 1918. ‘Annexure to Circular 182’. SWAA 3/1/3 - 
Circulars 169-188. 1918.
46. Report of the Farm Industry Commission. 1926. p5.
47. ‘Squatting’ on private farms had been declared illegal by Circular No. 58 of 
1915, however Licences of ‘a temporary nature’ were permitted on Government 
Land although the occupant could be evicted at any moment if the land was needed 
for ‘other purposes’ ie. land settlement. The Statistics quoted are derived from 
Grazing Licenses. Monthly Returns. District of Keetmanshoop. March, 1918. LKE 
7/7/1.
48. Grazing Licenses. Monthly Returns. District of Keetmanshoop. March, 1918. 
LKE 7/7/1.
49. AR. Mag. Gibeon. 1919. ADM 108 - 3370/4.
50. When Jan Stephanus a wealthy black stockowner with a grazing licence died, 
the Secretary for SWA. ordered that his heir could receive a further two-year lease 
near Verdwad Farm, but must then move to a Reserve or sell his animals. Sec. 
SWA to Senior Officer (Lands Branch) 19th August, 1921. LAN. 25 35.
51. Minutes. Farmers Association Kalkfeld 13th November, 1920. ADM 117 - 
4060.
52. Circular No. 3823/3 Sec SWA, Smit. to All Mags. LMG 3/1/15 - 2/83/23.
53. Mil. Mag. Gibeon to Baron von Essebeck. 2nd February, 1918. LMG 3/1/3 - 
32/1915.
322
54. Resolutions of the Maltahoehe Farmers Union. 3rd April, 1916. ADM 117 - 
4060 vol. 2.
55. Mil. Mag. Maltahohe. Circular Letter to other Magistrates. LMA 3/1/13 - 
33/18.
56. Mil. Mag. Keetmanshoop to Sec. Prot. 17th January, 1918. ADM 106 - 
3370/2.
57. In 1918 only 12 grazing licences were issued to black stockowners in the whole 
of Maltahohe District in contrast to the 790 issued in the neighbouring District of 
Gibeon. ‘Return of Leases and Grazing Licences: Issued during the year 1918’ 
ADM 139 - 3370/3.
58. AR. Administrator. 1922. p21.
59. NA AR. 1926. Tses & Berseba. 24th December, 1926 LKE 3/1/42.
60. NA Report 1925 (Bondels Reserve) 21st November, 1925. LKW 3/1/3 -2/6
61. See the ‘Schedule of Wages to be Paid to Native’s Keetmanshoop and District’ 
although the ambitious level of wages set by many of the initial colonial officials 
perhaps reflected the contemporary rates prevalent in the Union, more than the 
reality of actual payments in Namibia. 1920. ADM 44 - 567/2 vol. 4.
62. Windhoek Advertiser. 8th November, 1924.
63. AR. LoN. Administrator. 1924. p 22.
64. AR. Hofmeyr Police Post. 28th December, 1925. LMG 3/1/21 - 17/16/23.
65. NA. AR. Superintendent. Reserve.Warmbad. 18th November, 1924. LKW 
3/1/3 - 2/6.
66. Rex v G. Cloete. LKW 1/1/3 - 58/21.
67. The Magistrate at Maltahohe reckoned that in 1920 a farm labourer would need 
a months wages to buy a shirt and two months wages to buy a pair of trousers. 
Mag. Maltahohe to Sec. Prot. 12th January, 1920. ADM 108 - 3370/4.
68. Statement. Moses Hangula. 12th December, 1921. LMA 3/1/27 - 2/5/23.
69. ‘In the district of Warmbad most farmers are compelled to pay wages in kind 
owing to their having no market for their stock on account of the drought’. AR. 
LoN. 1924. p22.
70. Rex vs. C. Bloom. LKE 1/1/1 - 58/15.
323
71. farmers engage boys at 15/- per month, and when paying them off, they 
give them the equivalent in stock. The equivalent of a goat usually being 15/- ... 
I need not point out that 15/- is much in excess of the value of an ordinary breeding 
goat, which is worth from 5/- to 10/- according to size’. NC. Keetmanshoop to 
NC. Windhoek. 25th November, 1915. ADM 509.
72. ARLoN. 1922. p21.
73. NA. AR. Maltahohe. 1922. 15th January, 1923. LMA 3/1/27 - 2/1/1923.
74. AR. LoN. 1922. p21.
324
CHAPTER SIX: THE RISE OF THE ‘INDISPENSABLE’
MIGRANT FARM WORKER.
" The Ovambo herdboy is the doyen o f the karakul labour corps and his 
services are indispensable". [Report of the Long Term Agricultural Policy 
Commission, 1950].1
INTRODUCTION.
The double blows of drought and depression marked a decade of deprivation and 
dispossession for the black stockowners of southern Namibia. The period 1925- 
1935 decisive. The bargaining power of black pastoralists seeking access to land 
distributed to white settlers was dramatically reduced and the expulsion of black 
flocks from farms accelerated the desolation of the black pastoral economy. It was 
to be a period from which black pastoralism in southern Namibia never recovered.
After 1935 the boom in the karakul industry bought relative prosperity to the white 
farmers of southern Namibia and a dramatic expansion in the use of migrant 
workers on farms. The bargaining strength of local labour was undermined at a 
time when it might have been reviving as they were displaced by mainly adolescent 
migrant workers. The period 1935-1945 might be seen as one in which black 
pastoralists were transformed into a black proletariat. Yet the terms upon which 
black pastoralists were incorporated into the system were still negotiated to some 
extent, as they were able to exercise a greater degree of choice than the adolescents 
sent south in cattle wagons by the labour recruiting organisations. The recruiting 
organisations merged into a single organisation in order to respond to the 
accelerating demand for recruits. Whilst Hayes has examined the ramifications of 
the contract labour system in the north in the period up to 1935, little has been 
published on the link between the recruiting system and the supply of farm labour
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in the subsequent period. This will therefore be dealt with at some length.
The adaption of the migrant labour system to meet the vocal demands of the farming 
lobby failed to resolve the ‘labour problem’. The post-war decade was marked by 
a continuing and growing ‘farm labour crisis’ as migrant workers also sought to 
escape the farming sector. Local and migrant workers developed a common 
aversion to farm labour and sought to detach themselves from the grip of the white 
farming community. The state was forced to consider a more interventionist 
strategy in order to secure a reliable supply of labour to the farms, whilst changes 
in technology and livestock produced modifications in the labour requirements on 
the predominantly karakul sheep rearing farms of southern Namibia. Prosperity and 
specialisation led to increasing differentiation within the farm labour force and the 
emergence of three distinctive groups of workers - permanent, short-term contract 
and migrant.
THE DECADE OF DESOLATION. 1926-1935.
The drought which heralded the ruin of the black pastoralist on white farms hit early 
in southern Namibia, squeezing the water and stock from many farms during 1924. 
The period that followed saw twin combines reaping the black pastoralist. The 
rapid land alienation of the 1920s reduced the flexibility in the pastoral system and 
removed much of the more accessible alternative grazing land. Closer occupation 
led to closer control. However the contest for land and resources was sharpened 
by the environmental and economic crisis that gripped the region. The drought of 
1924 exposed:
... the insecure position in which native servants who have grazing rights 
upon their master’s farm find themselves when a drought occurs or when 
their stock begins to show a substantial increase, for their employers under 
such circumstances are forced to dispense with their services and they are 
then at a loss to know where to go.2
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The accommodation of worker’s stock was a symptom of the temporary economic 
weakness of white farmers. An increase in a farmer’s flocks or decrease in the 
grazing and watering resources available on a farm inevitably put pressure on the 
worker to reduce or remove their flocks. In addition, the official proclamation of 
Gibeon reserve in 1924 had completed the formation of a district network of 
reserves in southern Namibia where the ‘surplus’ stock of black farm workers could 
be concentrated. The Administrator was clear that the pastoral initiative of farm 
workers was doomed:
To anyone looking ahead it is patent that with the closer settlement of the 
country native squatters who at present are tolerated and even welcomed on 
private farms as labourers, even though they have a lot of stock, would 
become a burden to the real owners at a later date when the natural increase 
in population and stock would make it impossible for the land to carry both 
European and native on the ground of the former.3
The expanding area of land occupied by white settlers provoked calls for stronger 
measures to end competition by black stockowners for land and pasture.
The establishment of the reserves, and cheaper grazing fees charged within them, 
served to concentrate black stockowners who were unable to obtain an acceptable 
agreement giving access to white farmland. The restrictions on the entry and 
movement of black pastoralists on Crown Land were also tightened. The 
Administrator ruling in 1926 that even stockowners who were classified as 
‘Coloured’ should not be given grazing licences if this bought them into ‘conflict 
with European farmers’.4
The Farm Industry Commission of 1927 used the discourse of modernisation to 
justify proposals to place a limit on the number of livestock that could be kept by 
a farm worker. The fact that the majority of the animals held by black stockowners 
were goats provided an additional environmental rationale for the reduction of 
flocks. Goats were seen as particularly damaging to foliage because of the
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thoroughness with which they grazed. The Drought Investigation Commission of 
1924 had succinctly concluded that ‘Goats are a menace to the Country’, and urged 
drastic action to deal with the scourge and allow the white farmer ‘the utmost use 
of his land’.5 The dilemma facing farmers was that the offer of grazing remained 
the most effective means of attracting workers. Eight families who had left Tses 
reserve during 1926 had reportedly been attracted by the offer of free grazing for 
their combined livestock of 1,112 small stock and 77 large stock.6
The Farm Industry Commission proposed the introduction of a rigid limit on the 
number of stock that an individual worker might keep on a farm. Each worker 
should only be allowed to keep up to 5 head of cattle and 20 head of small stock on 
a farm. The number might be increased with special permission, but should never 
exceed a total of 20 head of cattle or 100 small stock.7 Such rigid stock restrictions 
would have generated a massive expulsion of stock from farms and consequent 
haemorrhage of farm labour. The statistics available on the number of animals 
owned by black stockowners on white farms in Bethanie district in 1925 can be used 
to project the impact of stock restrictions. The district contained 25 farms 
accommodating black stockowners. The 65 black stockowners possessed 7,701 head 
of small stock, giving an average flock size of 118 - well over the absolute 
maximum of 100 proposed by the Commission. A more detailed analysis of the 
statistics reveal that only 3 of the stockowners fell beneath the recommended 
maximum of the Commission and over half of all the stockowners (30 of 65) owned 
flocks of over 100 animals.8
The introduction of legislation proved initially impractical and ultimately 
unnecessary. The first point was that the financial difficulties of many of the white 
settlers introduced to the territory in the 1920s and the fierce competition for labour 
meant that the restriction of grazing rights would emphasise the differences between 
those farmers with the capital to pay cash wages and those (the majority in southern 
Namibia) who were not able to. The reality of the 1920s remained that, so long as 
they were environmentally sustainable, grazing rights were the collateral used to 
secure labour.9 The second point was that the spreading drought which reduced or
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totally terminated the carrying capacity of farms forced farmers to expel workers 
stock in an effort to save their own. The drought, rather than the state, provided 
the motivation for the reduction of workers’ stock.
The periodisation of the drought (as discussed in Chapter Four) suggests that the 
whole of southern Namibia experienced a succession of years of inadequate rainfall 
between 1929 and 1935, a period far longer than that applied nationally to date the 
drought (1931-1933).10 The erratic distribution of rainfall meant, however that 
drought conditions prevailed in some areas at an even earlier date. The pattern of 
stock evictions was therefore linked to local differences in the timing of the crisis 
as water and grazing resources became exhausted and individual farms became 
unworkable.
Farm workers who were made redundant during the drought lost their access to the 
water and grazing available on the farm and suffered devastating losses as a 
consequence. The magistrate for Keetmanshoop noted in 1932 that:
During the continued drought the grazing has been depleted and farmers 
have had to dispense with the services of the natives, who have had to 
remove into reserves with their stock as they were unable to find
elsewhere.11 A=j] ccomm
The concentration of farm workers’ stock in reserves whose resources had already 
been overstretched led to devastating losses (as demonstrated in Chapter 2).
The drought significantly reduced the size of flocks owned by black farm workers.
A comparison can be made between the stock statistics for black farm workers in 
Bethanie district in 1925 and 1935. The white farms of the district contained 65 
black stockowners owning 7,701 units of small stock in 1925. By 1935 the number 
of black stockowners on farms in the district had risen to 112, yet the number of 
small stock units had fallen dramatically to 3,668. The average flock size per 
worker had accordingly dropped from 118 in 1925 to just 33 in 1935.12 The
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drought impoverished black stockowners who had previously been able to profit 
from labour tenancies that included grazing rights, but the impact of the drought 
was not limited to changes in flock size, it also affected pay levels.
The real value of the wages paid to farm workers was gnawed away during the 
period of the drought. The magistrate at Keetmanshoop reported that in 1932 the 
wages paid to farm workers in the district ranged from ‘5/- to 15/- value per month 
and food’(my emphasis).13 Fifteen years previous, in 1918, the magistrate for the 
district had described the average wage for farm workers as 12s. per month plus 
food. The official wage level of farm workers had remained static, but the 
replacement of cash wages with payment in kind meant that in real terms wages fell 
during the drought. Workers commonly received neither the benefit of a cash wage, 
nor that of free extensive grazing rights.
The drought led to a growing number of reports from magistrates of cases in which 
young farm workers were receiving merely food for work. The payment of wages 
in kind made it difficult to distinguish between wages and rations. The magistrate 
at Mariental described the ‘pay’ provided to farm workers in 1934 as:
.... the barest necessities and 2 or 3 slaughter goats and their skins per 
month, but (preferably) animals which have died or become useless to the 
employer.14
Farmers would also withhold wages to compensate for stock losses for which a 
particular shepherd was blamed.15 The payment of wages in kind meant that the 
loss of an animal might result in the forfeiture of the monthly goat ‘payment’ to 
compensate the farmer for the loss.16 The fact that shepherds could be prosecuted 
under the Masters and Servants Act for negligence if they lost animals meant that 
complaints against such deductions seemed futile. None of the court cases in the 
local magistrates courts in the period up to 1935 resulted from workers’ complaints 
about unfair deductions from their wages.
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The explanation of the large increase in the number of stock theft cases that 
occurred during the period of the drought becomes evident in the context of farm 
labour relations. It would be overstating the case to view stock theft as ‘resistance’ 
(with the implications of organisation that this implies); however the majority of 
cases did involve farm workers consuming animals in their charge. The ‘thefts’ 
were generally limited to a single animal and statements in defence frequently 
referred to hunger and the inadequacy of rations. The consumption of a goat might 
thus rationally be justified as covertly claiming wages due.
The consequence of these changes was a shift in the composition of the labour force 
on white farms. The only motive left for working on many farms was the fact that 
farmers provided basic rations during a period of hunger. Farmers argued that the 
rations provided were actually more valuable than the cash wages offered. On 
average workers would receive 21b of meal per day as the stable part of their diet. 
The prices prevailing in the dtore at Gibeon in 1926 suggest that, if a farmer bought 
a 2001b sack of meal, the monthly ration would cost him 8s.l2d.17 The meal 
would usually be supplemented by a slaughter goat, tea, milk, coffee and sugar in 
varying quantities - suggesting that the total ration would indeed have cost roughly 
the equivalent of the average wage.
The implication was that the herder-worker was replaced by the hungry worker 
during the drought. Farm workers with stock resources who were expelled from 
white farms would draw on their flock for subsistence in the reserve; only once the 
flock had been destroyed would they be forced to seek-11 ork on a white farm to 
avoid starvation. Farm labour became the preserve of the poorest sector of the local 
black population, whilst the wealthier stock owners attempted to keep their stock 
alive in the inadequate reserves and/or gain the more reliable cash wages offered 
through urban employment.18
The eviction of black stockowners from farms and the deficiencies of the reserves 
meant that the movement from rural to urban areas became more pronounced 
throughout the Police Zone towards the end of the 1920s. The black urban
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population increased by almost 11 percent between 1928 and 1930, whilst the black 
population of white farming areas began to steadily decline.19 White residents 
expressed concern at the sudden black influx whilst the depression meant that many 
whites began competing for jobs that would normally have been done only by 
blacks. The consequence was Proclamation No. 4 of 1932 which extended the 
provisions of the Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation of 1924 (which had only been 
applied to Windhoek) to all the major urban locations. The enforcement of this 
Proclamation had an immediate impact and by the end of the year the number of 
black residents in urban locations had slumped to 19,683.20 Conversely the black 
population in rural areas began to increase again for the first time in 193321. The 
evolving pattern of population distribution can be clearly seen in Figure 1 (page 
59).22
THE INTRODUCTION OF LONG DISTANCE MIGRANT LABOUR.
The difficulties that white farmers had in obtaining compliant and stockfree local 
black workers had fuelled a number of schemes to import labour from further 
afield. The Germans were reported to have been considering the possibility of 
importing South African or Chinese labour to replace the workforce that had been 
decimated during the 1904-1907 War before they were overtaken by events.23 The 
famine that gripped northern Namibia in 1915, the year of the South African 
invasion, revealed the potential of the region as a source of labour.
A massive southwards movement of population could be linked to the assault of 
Portuguese forces on communities in southern Angola and the serious famine that 
hit the region in 1915. Many of the refugees walked south in search of food, 
hundreds reportedly dying along the way. The newly installed Resident 
Commissioner for Ovamboland noted that the recruitment of these migrants by the 
administration had caused ‘a glut ... in the labour market’.24 The nature of the 
migration meant that the bulk of the workers sought work in the most northerly 
districts of the Police Zone.25 The extensive distances involved made it difficult 
for many of the new influx of farmers to southern Namibia to afford the transport
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costs required to obtain these early migrant workers. However, there is evidence 
that, as early as 1917, some Oshiwambo speaking families were established on 
farms in southern Namibia. Two married ‘Ovambo’ couples were employed, for 
example on Urikos Farm and another on Duwisib Farm in Maltahohe district.26
The evident movement of women to the south contrasts with later restrictions 
preventing them from entering the Police Zone. A few of these early migrants 
settled, but the majority merely remained for a temporary period of six months. 
Hayes has demonstrated the extent to which this flow of migrant labour from the 
north reflected fluctuating environmental, social and economic pressures rather than 
a direct response to distant demands in the labour market.27 The mass of the early 
migrant workers sought work in the mining industry and the initiative to form 
recruiting organisations to enhance labour recruitment came from the mining 
companies. A death toll of 457 in 1924 (an appalling rate of 74.2 per 1000) had led 
to drastic decline in recruits in 1925 and the organisation of a conference that 
brought together the main employers of migrant labour (the administration, the 
railways and the mines).28 One of those who attended the conference described its 
outcome succinctly:
At the Conference in 1926 when the so-called ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ was 
entered into, the recruiting areas of the different organisations were so 
defined that there should be no overlapping. Competition was eliminated.29
The two recruiting organisations established at the conference co-ordinated their 
activities and effectively operated a monopoly that could be used to control the 
distribution and remuneration of migrant labour throughout the territory. Contracts 
were standardised at twelve months, with the worker having the opportunity of 
renewing the contract for a further year with either the same or a new employer and 
fixed wage scales drawn up.
The conference established the notorious ‘ABC’ classification system for workers. 
Letters were used to categorize the medical fitness of each recruit. ‘A’ and ‘B’
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grade recruits were considered fit enough to work in the mines, whilst ‘C’ grade 
recruits were considered fit, but underage for mine work (ie. under 18).30 The ‘C’ 
grade consisted therefore of teenage boys (women were not considered by the 
recruiting organisations) and were regarded as capable of light farm work, whilst 
grade ‘B’ workers were recommended for heavier work. However it was the ‘C’ 
grade workers who were to be most sought after by the farming community.
The advantage that farmers could gain from employing the younger recruits was that 
the wage levels set were significantly lower. One woman recalled that:
The farmers preferred workers from the North because they were cheap ... 
Local people tried to live in the town where life was better. Life on the 
farms was very hard.31
The starting wage for a ‘C’ grade worker was initially fixed at 8s. per month for 
the first 4 months of a contract, whilst a ‘B’ grade worker would have to be paid 
20 percent more at 10s.32 The employment of grade ‘C’ young migrant workers 
as shepherds would significantly undercut the wages demanded by local blacks and 
would provide workers unaccompanied by dependents or bestial baggage.
The formation of the two recruiting organisations did not provide the solution to the 
labour problem in southern Namibia. The records showed that 1,171 out of the 
3,927 workers recruited in 1927 went to work on farms. Yet most of these went 
to farms to the north of Windhoek. The mining industry continued to absorb the 
majority of labour recruits up to 1935, but the early geographical concentration of 
recruits was also due to specific reasons.
The poverty of farmers in southern Namibia made it difficult for them to pay the 
cash wages required, a fact that destroyed a plan to import labour from the north­
west Cape.33 Farmers who were wealthy enough to pay the wages were also 
those most likely to have sufficient land to attract local workers with the offer of 
grazing. The payment of a recruitment fee and the obligation that the farmer had to
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pay for the return journey of migrant workers were additional pecuniary 
deterrents.34 Geography dictated that those farmers least able to obtain hard cash 
were faced with the most prohibitive rail fares. Only economic prosperity would 
allow the white farmers of southern Namibia to take advantage of the opportunity 
presented by migrant labour.
RECRUITING MIGRANT WORKERS AS KARAKUL SHEPHERDS.
The growth of the karakul industry following the drought was dramatic as farmers 
switched to the one product that had demonstrated an ability to retain its value. The 
collapse of other commodity markets meant that by 1933 karakul pelts constituted 
an incredible 82 percent of the export earnings for the entire territory.35 The 
absolute number of karakul sheep in the territory trebled between 1934 and 1939, 
reaching a peak of over three million in 1943.36
The impact of the transformation of the commercial small stock sector on labour 
requirements can be demonstrated for a specific district, Mariental. The police in 
one patrol area of Mariental district monitored stock levels on 64 white farms. The 
number of small stock running on these farms increased from 96,091 in December, 
1933 to 183,589 four years later. The demand for ‘herdboys’ had correspondingly 
increased by ‘almost a hundred percent’.37 The change in the quantity and quality 
of the small stock on farms in southern Namibia had two immediate effects. The 
first was to increase the demand for migrant labourers and the second to change the 
terms of engagement of local black workers employed on farms.
The number of migrant workers supplied to the farming sector exceeded those sent 
to the mining industry for the first time in 1934; by 1937 62 percent of all recruits 
were sent to work on farms, and from 1940-1946 over three-quarters of all migrant 
workers were being distributed to the farming community. The growing importance 
of the migrant labourer in the farming sector in the period 1927-1945 can be seen 
in Figure 9.38 The evidence shows that part of this expansion consisted of migrant 
workers who were used to meet the increased labour demands created in the
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southern districts. The magistrate at Mariental reported in 1938 that migrant 
workers were relieving the major labour difficulties faced by farmers in the 
district.39 A total of 958 migrant workers were working on the farms of Gibeon 
district by 1939.40 The karakul industry even paid for an influx of migrant 
workers into the distant and impoverished district of Warmbad. One police patrol 
area in Warmbad district reported a steady increase in the number of migrant 
workers employed on farms under their supervision. In 1939 only 14 were 
employed, the following year the figure had risen to 41 and by 1943 the farms 
employed 101 migrant contract workers.41 The statistics, however, concealed a 
high turnover amongst the workforce on farms.
Migrant workers were recruited on the basis of a twelve-month contract, which 
(following Proclamation No. 20 of 1939) could then be extended for a further two 
periods of one year each. The maximum period a migrant worker could remain in 
the Police Zone was therefore set at three years. The workers had the freedom to 
remain with their original employer or move to a new job at the end of each year. 
The reality was that few sought to renew their farm contracts and it was realised 
that farm labour was viewed as the necessary price of a ticket south. Farm workers 
who renewed their contracts sought more lucrative work with the Public Works 
Department or the Railways.42
The Farm Labour Commission of 1939 identified the deduction made by farmers 
when stock were lost and the withholding of luxury ration items (such as sugar and 
tobacco) as two of the major causes of migrant workers’ dissatisfaction with farm 
labour. Migrant workers seeking to accumulate wages to return to the North were 
unlikely to renew a contract with an employer who paid little or no wage. The 
Commission also reported that the awareness of ‘C* grade workers that their 
compatriots in the mining industry worked a fixed number of hours for a higher 
wage, led some to object to the longer hours that they were often asked to work on 
white farms.43 The Assistant Native Commissioner recognised that:
Farm labourers with their lower wages work harder and longer than mines
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and urban areas natives. As a rule they do not get Sundays off.44
The reasons for the reluctance of migrant workers to remain on farms beyond their 
initial contractual obligation were clearly understood.
The administration’s proposed solution to the high turnover of migrant workers was 
to extend the duration of the initial contract period. Sheep farmers argued that the 
training of a specialist shepherd took time and that the initial contract should be for 
two years so that farmers gained a just return for the effort involved.45 But the 
poor wages and conditions associated with farm labour discouraged young workers 
from volunteering for two year contracts, and the efforts of the Recruitment Officer 
to find volunteers in 1939 were fruitless:
We have many orders from the farmers in the South for Contracts for two 
years. Yesterday arrived a batch of 50 boys in Tsumeb, but only one agreed 
to a two year contract.46
No volunteers at all were found in second batch of 58 recruits.47 The conspicuous 
opposition of the recruits to longer farm contracts and the concern of community 
leaders in the north about the prolonged absence of young men forced the 
administration into compromise. The maximum period of contract in the Police 
Zone was reduced in 1940 from three to two years with the initial contract period 
of twelve months being retained.48
One of the primary motives for farmers in southern Namibia 
to demand an extension of the initial contract period was the high percentage of the 
recruitment fee that was absorbed by the railage. The standard charge for a grade 
‘C’ farm worker in 1938 was 10s., to this was added 2s.6d to cover the cost of a 
medical examination and a ‘distributing charge’ of 3s.3d.49 The total recruiting 
fee was then rounded up to 16s., however the farmer was also responsible for 
paying for the cost of the return railway journey to the nearest station. A reduced 
‘umfaan’ rate applied from 1938 to 1940 to the young recruits travelling on the
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railways (providing an added incentive for farmers to prefer adolescent to adult 
workers), however this was abolished in September, 1940 and new uniform rates 
applied.50
The relevance of this can be judged by considering the standard charges made in 
1941 for these journeys. The fare to Otjiwarongo in central Namibia was 13s.8d, 
the fare to Mariental 39s.lid  and the fare to Warmbad in the far south 49s.5d.51 
The fee due from a farmer in Warmbad district would thus be treble the basic 
recruiting fee. Indeed the total payment would be the equivalent of more than the 
first six months wages of a new recruit. The further away from the recruiting area 
a district was located the more likely it was that only the wealthier farmers would 
seek to recruit migrant workers.
Once farmers in southern Namibia had reached a position of financial liquidity there 
were obvious advantages to be derived from the employment of migrant workers. 
Three in particular should be highlighted. Migrant workers were not accompanied 
by their families. The difficulties farmers had experienced in extracting additional 
unwaged labour from black women on farms meant that families were perceived as 
a burden, rather than an asset.52 Migrant workers were also unaccompanied by the 
bestial baggage associated with local workers, an important point given the 
increasing pressures on resources created by the rapid growth in the size of farmers’ 
flocks. Finally migrant workers created a more stable and pliable workforce - 
contractually bound for a minimum of twelve months - whilst local workers could 
move in response to new opportunities in the neighbourhood. Migrant workers 
could also provide a means of meeting the labour needs of farms which had 
difficulties in attracting local workers due to the harshness of pay and conditions, 
their isolation, or the refusal of the farmer to accept stock.
Farmers felt that, for a number of reasons, migrant workers were more likely to be 
obedient and less likely to desert. Migrant farm workers were extremely young: In 
1937 the Native Commissioner in Ovamboland estimated that their average age of 
was sixteen.53 Ovambo workers travelling to the far South entered a region in
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which the bulk of the local workforce spoke Nama, a linguistically very different 
language. The workers in the far south were also a vast distance from their homes 
and the prospects of deserting and successfully returning to the north slim.
The advantages of employing migrant workers were such that there were a stream 
of reports in the late 1930s that they were being used to displace local workers. 
The residents of Krantzplatz reserve complained at their AGM in 1938 that:
... more Hottentots (sic) are coming to the Reserve because the farmers 
don’t want them with their stock and get Ovambos.54
The widespread replacement of local stock-owning farm workers with migrant 
workers was confirmed by the local magistrate.55 It should be noted however that 
the rapid increase in stock in the late 1930s and consequent demand for labour that 
fuelled the importation of migrant labour also created opportunities for local black 
stockowners to gain grazing rights on certain farms once again.
THE CONTROL OF FARM WORKERS STOCK.
Contracts in Gibeon district for local workers in the 1940s normally contained a 
clause which allowed the worker to have free grazing for a certain number of 
stock.56 The difference was that local black stockowners who sought to renew 
their employment contracts on white farms after the drought discovered that they 
could no longer obtain grazing concessions as generous as those that had previously 
been available, and that contractual limits on the number of stock that could be 
grazed were rigidly enforced. It was also noted that where workers did build up 
their flocks the lack of alternative spaces for them to move their animals to left them 
vulnerable to overcharging for grazing.
The magistrate for Windhoek estimated that 16 percent of farmers charged very high 
grazing fees:
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... ranging from 3d to 1/- per head of large stock in most cases the charges 
are 6d and upwards, and from 4/-8 to 8/-4 per hundred of small stock 
(mostly at 8/-4 per hundred), which cases compare most unfavourably with 
those charged by the Lands Department to Europeans for grazing on 
Crownlands, namely: - 3d per head for large stock and 2/-6 per hundred for 
small stock.57
The charging of such heavy grazing fees provided a mechanism for reducing the 
number of stock, yet also exploited the weakened bargaining position of workers. 
The accommodation of workers stock was no longer an obligation imposed on 
farmers, but a privilege for which workers might pay heavily.
The success of black farm workers in building up their stock could be perceived as 
an obstacle limiting the expansion of karakul flocks. The achievement of black farm 
workers in Maltahohe district (which only contained the pitifully small Neuhof 
reserve as an alternative space for black stockowners) in rebuilding their stock after 
the drought met a predictable stumbling block. A large reduction in the number of 
black-owned stock on white farms in the district between 1938 and 1939 was 
attributed to the insistence of farmers that black residents reduce their flocks of 
goats.58 Once stock levels reached the limit the ‘surplus’ would have to be sold 
(often to the farmer) or the worker would be asked to leave.59 The stock balance 
varied from farm to farm, yet the increase of the karakul flocks progressively 
squeezed out other animals. The importance of preserving the purity of the breed 
also led farmers to be less tolerant of the presence of any animals that might cross­
breed with and spoil the purity of their karakul flock.
The mass evictions of black stock from white farms during the 1930s and 
subsequent distress led the administration to order the police to monitor the 
accumulation of black stock and residents on white farms more efficiently and 
encourage lower limits.60 The difference now was that farmers also had an 
economic incentive to co-operate with the Administration’s request. The 
impoverishment of local black stockowners as a result of the drought (described in
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chapter two) meant that farmers were able to recruit a number of local workers who 
due to their extreme poverty were forced to accept far more restrictive conditions 
of employment.
The heavy stock losses in the reserves and the stricter restrictions on the 
accumulation of stock by workers on white farms resulted in the re-emergence of 
a strata of farm labourers who had been propelled into farm labour by hunger. 
Once in employment the low wages and difficulties of maintaining the family 
without the previous pool of domestic stock led many of these families to fall into 
the farmer’s debt. The operation by the larger farmers of small stores increased 
the grip of farmers over the poorer workers on their farms. Debt bondage 
presented these workers and their families with the real risk of becoming trapped 
on the farm.
The deteriorating provisions for farm worker’s stock and the continuing paucity of 
pay did not result in the capture of all local workers as ‘debt slaves’. It was 
officially recognised that there was a general movement of local workers and their 
families away from farms and into the urban areas and the reserves.61 The broad 
shift in population distribution within the Police Zone is evident in Figure 10 which 
contains a comparison of population distribution in the years 1936 and 1946.62 
The pattern was replicated in southern Namibia. The population of the black 
location in Keetmanshoop virtually doubled between 1934 and 1946 and the 
population of the reserves in the region grew steadily.63 Urban employment for 
black workers offered benefits such as rights to sick pay and days off that were 
unknown to farm labourers.64
THE LAUNCH OF SWANLA.
The shift in the balance of economic power between the agricultural and mining 
sectors that followed the drought was reflected in the political decisions being taken 
about labour recruitment. The mining industry had provided the main contribution 
to Gross Domestic Product in the period from 1920-1931, but following the drought
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the agricultural sector became economically dominant. The mean average annual 
contribution of agriculture in the period 1936-1945 was the equivalent of 7,220,000 
Rand in contrast to the 179,000 Rand contributed by the mining industry.65
The priority given to the agricultural sector is most evident in the arrangements 
made for obtaining military recruits for the ‘Native Military Corps’. Guidelines 
were issued that military recruitment should not be actively undertaken in ‘the 
southern half of the territory’, nor ‘on farms’.66 Recruitment was also to be 
restricted to grade ‘A’ and ‘B’ workers, leaving the supply of ‘C’ grade, used 
exclusively as farm labour, unaffected. The recruitment of large numbers of 
recruits into the army was one of the first tasks of the newly formed South West 
Africa Native Labour Association Ltd. (SWANLA) which was launched following 
the merger of the NLO and SLO on 16th November, 1942.67
Two incidents can be used to demonstrate the political strength of the farming 
community towards the end of World War Two and the manner in which it was able 
to keep the wages paid to both migrant and local farm workers low. The 
introduction of the ‘Native Minimum Wages Proclamation’ which was to come into 
force from 1st January, 1944 sent shock waves through the farming community. 
The farmers concern was less with the concept of a minimum wage, than with the 
clause in the Proclamation that made it illegal for farmers to make any deduction 
from a worker’s wages to compensate for the value of grazing provided for the 
worker’s stock.68 The fury of white farmers was such that the administration 
never dared enforce the Proclamation.
The second example was the way in which the farming community and SWANLA 
combined to manipulate the ‘ABC’ system to keep the wages of farm workers low. 
Hahn, the Native Commissioner at Ondangua, complained in 1945 that some ‘C’ 
grade recruits were being marked fit only for ‘light’ farm labour.69 The original 
agreement had been that all ‘C’ grade workers were supplied for light farm work, 
with ‘B’ grade workers being available for heavier jobs. A study of recruitment 
figures demonstrated that in the previous two years not a single ‘B’ grade worker
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had been recruited.70 Hahn’s conclusion was that the younger recruits were being 
used by farmers to carry out heavy farm work cheaply. The fact that SWANLA 
had requested that the administration lower the medical standards of the examination 
taken by recruits seemed to suggest that they were seeking to increase their 
recruitment of the most popular (‘C’ grade) recruits in order to satisfy the farming 
community.71
An additional inference that can be made from the evidence is that migrant workers 
were sought to carry out particular roles on the farm cheaply. The reasons for this 
were apparent. The youth of the grade ‘C’ workers meant that by very definition 
they lacked previous work experience. Migrant farm workers seldom renewed their 
contract on a farm or returned to the same farm twice. One of the ironies of the 
contract labour system was that the preference of farmers for grade ‘C’ labourers 
meant that they failed to obtain the experience of those who had previously 
completed a previous contract on a farm, but due to their increased age were more 
likely to be categorised at a higher, less desirable grade. The migrant farm workers 
also aspired to escape the farming sector and enter other higher paid sectors of the 
labour market. Finally it was evident that they came from a very different 
agricultural and environmental background to that found in southern Namibia.
Farmers were more likely to find specialist stock skills amongst the local black 
workforce, whilst giving unskilled work to the lower paid migrant workers. The 
use of the migrant worker to perform particular tasks created an ethnic element to 
the stratification within the workforce. The structure of the labour force on a 
particular farm would normally place the local worker at a social and economic 
advantage with a greater knowledge of the farm and tasks required and of the local 
languages used on the farm (such as Nama, Afrikaans and German). The lack of 
control that migrant workers had over their destinations also meant that they could 
be used to supply farms that were boycotted by or unpopular with local workers.72 
Local farm workers alleged that farmers with bad reputations would also ask the 
police to force local people to work for them.73
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THE DROUGHT OF 1946.
The final decade of the period under review opened with another drought that 
devastated the flocks of black and white stockowners. The combination of the 
drought and the pastoral implications of extensive fencing signalled the final demise 
of the black stockowner on the farms. Local farm workers were expected to 
maintain no more animals than were necessary for subsistence requirements and 
farm ceased to provide the opportunity for accumulation of stock. Local 
stockowners sought to secure a specialised niche in the labour market as skilled 
seasonal workers seeking seasonal employment, for instance, as sheep shearers.
The use of migrant workers was central to the efforts made by the farming 
community to keep their labour costs low. However the disillusionment of migrant 
workers with farm labour meant that migrant workers, like local workers, tried to 
detach themselves from the farming sector. The farming lobby sought to use the 
recruiting organisation, SWANLA, to maintain their labour supply. Yet the 
diversification of the Namibian economy over this period increased the range and 
importance of vocational opportunities available to migrant workers and diminished 
the economic influence of farmers. Less than half of all the migrant workers 
recruited by SWANLA in 1949 were assigned to farms (the dominance of farm 
destinations had been previously unbroken since 1933).74 The dominance of 
agriculture over mining in the primary industrial sector of the economy also ended 
in 1951.75
The impact of the drought of 1946 demonstrated the consequences of the exclusion 
of the stock of local workers from farms. The number of small stock owned by 
black farm workers on farms in the Keetmanshoop district was more than halved 
between 1934 and 1946, whilst the numbers in the two large reserves within the 
district trebled. Whereas in 1934 30 percent of small stock owned by blacks were 
found on farms, by 1946 the figure had fallen to just 5 percent. When the 1946 
drought struck, the overstocking and closer settlement of ground around the reserve 
meant that reserve residents suffered significantly heavier losses than those farm
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workers who were able to trek with their employer.76 It was widely claimed that 
the losses of stock experienced by both black and white stockowners during the 
1946 drought were far heavier than in the previous major drought due to the lack 
of reserve grazing and difficulties of mobility due to the high levels of stocking and 
land alienation.
THE ENGAGEMENT OF LOCAL FARM WORKERS. 1946-1955.
In Warmbad district the residents of the Bondelswarts reserve sought to build up 
their flocks of sheep which were more marketable than goats. By 1946 43 percent 
of their small stock consisted of sheep, however only 6 percent of the farm workers’ 
flocks running on the surrounding farms consisted of sheep.77 The vast majority 
of the animals were goats, reflecting the farmers perception of the workers’ flock 
as a source of milk and meat, rather than an autonomous commercial enterprise. 
One local farm worker recalled that during nine years of working on the same farm 
(1940-1949) he was only allowed to keep 10 goats, 5 sheep and 2 donkeys.78 The 
prospect of local workers building up their own flocks of karakul sheep was still 
being actively discouraged in the south in 1948 ‘... because it might influence the 
overseas market adversely’.79 Farms no longer provided a viable route to pastoral 
prosperity for farm workers, instead there was evidence of a growing number of 
isolated local workers being kept in debt bondage on farms. One magistrate 
admitted in 1948 that:
The majority of farmers are notoriously bad bookkeepers - most keep no 
books at all - and some I regret to say are unscrupulous in their financial 
dealings with their native employees. Some have shops of their own and 
others purchase foods for their native employees and charge more then they 
actually paid. I have had cases where recruited and other natives were so 
much in debt to their employers that they have been forced to enter into 
further contracts of service after the first term has expired. Some farmers 
make use of this method to ensure having servants.80
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Debt could also be a powerful way of forcing migrant workers to renew a contract 
on a farm for a second year, rather than leaving after twelve months.
Differences in opportunity can also be related to the differing scale of urban 
development within the districts. Whilst none of the districts covered experienced 
major industrialisation, the scale of urban development with each district did have 
a considerably differing impact. In Keetmanshoop only 52 percent of black waged 
labour worked on farms in 1953, whilst in the neighbouring district of Maltahohe, 
containing a small town and a small reserve, 82 percent of the waged workers were 
estimated to be on farms.81 The lack of incentives for local workers to seek 
employment on farms fuelled the continuing drift to urban areas throughout the early 
1950s.82
The spread of the ‘camp system’ (which allowed for the rotation of flocks around 
a series of sub-divided areas) and jackal-proof fencing after World War Two 
reduced the labour requirements of the karakul farms of southern Namibia, yet the 
post-war settlement scheme intensified the labour problem facing farmers during the 
1950s.83 The strategy of local workers to escape the farming sector or only enter 
it conditionally contributed to the ‘problem’. The workers in Bethanie district were 
reported to be trying to avoid permanent farm labour preferring to work in groups 
as sheep shearers for just three months of the year.84 In February, 1951 42 of the 
52 Work Passes issued in Tses reserve were for sheep shearing teams travelling to 
the surrounding farms.85 The South West Africa Native Labourers Commission 
of 1948 found that generally local workers:
...were adverse to entering into any contract other than a monthly one.86
The resistance of local workers to farm employment led farmers to demand greater 
labour control by the authorities. Allegations were even in Maltahohe district that 
the police were trying to prevent local workers from selecting their employees 
according to the pay and conditions offered.87 The accusations fuelled wider 
claims that the police were dictating the distribution of labour to individual farms
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throughout southern Namibia and it was one of the issues raised at the ‘Nama Tribal 
Meeting’ held later that year.88 The state sought to restrict the freedom of choice 
which gave local workers their, very limited, strength in the labour market.
SYMPTOMS OF RESISTANCE BY CONTRACT FARM WORKERS.
The failure of the local workforce to meet farmers requirements led them to place 
greater expectations on SWANLA. In 1946 it was estimated that over 50 percent 
of all farm labourers were migrant workers.89 However the prolonged resistance 
of the farming community to any improvements in the pay and conditions of migrant 
farm workers meant that SWANLA also had rising difficulty in sustaining the 
supply of recruits. The opposition of migrant workers to farm labour took two 
tangible forms. The first was desertion and other actions by those employed and 
the second the refusal of fresh recruits to accept farm work.
Hahn, the Native Commissioner for Ovamboland received many letters from 
migrant workers complaining about the pay and conditions on the farms of southern 
Namibia and expressing the workers frustration at the failure of the legal system to 
hear or address their grievances. Attempts to complain through local channels all 
too often resulted in charges of ‘desertion’ against the complainant. When 
Valentinus Sacheus and Malenga Tsikalepo complained about rations and the 
number of hours they were forced to work on a farm in Keetmanshoop they claimed 
they were simply told to return. When they refused they were allegedly beaten and 
when they still refused sentenced to two weeks in prison before being returned to 
their original employer.90 The case was typical of the many that led to the 
deteriorating reputation of farm labour.
Johannes Shalie was arrested three miles outside of Warmbad whilst trying to lodge 
a complaint about his employer. Shalie claimed that the farmer had refused to issue 
him with a pass and then, when he left the farm, gone ahead and arranged his 
interception and arrest for desertion. Shalie made the valid point that ‘owing to the 
long distance, we will not desert’, but claimed that the farm workers had gone on
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strike in protest instead. The sheer distances involved meant that desertions were 
comparatively low on the farms of southern Namibia. One worker, for example, 
took one month and sixteen days to walk from his a farm in Bethanie district to the 
Okavango border post at Karakuwiza, another recalled that during a three-month 
escape he lived on food supplied by other farm workers along his route.91 One 
device that workers used to make the term of their contract more tolerable were 
unauthorised nocturnal visits to neighbouring farms, to seek food and company.92
The case is also revealing in the extent to which it reveals the blurring of the 
distinction between the powers of the authorities and those of the farmer. Shalie 
was sentenced to two weeks in prison or to a £3 fine. The fine was paid by Shalie’s 
employer who then expected Shalie to work for nothing for the next three months. 
The ease with which court sentences were converted into deductions from the pay 
packet must have made it difficult for workers to discern the limits of a farmer’s 
power to make deductions from wages for petty offenses.93
The estimated number of desertions from farms within the Police Zone over a 
period of twelve months ending in 1947 was 600. At the end of this period 297 
arrests had been made within the Police Zone and 21 beyond, but 282 of those who 
had escaped remained free. It was also claimed that migrant workers might desert 
‘in sympathy’ with one worker who had suffered injustice and that this action might 
even spread to neighbouring farms.94 The success of the deserter and the police 
was related to the distance that had to be covered by those seeking to return north. 
Whilst 39 of the 40 deserters in Keetmanshoop district were recaptured within the 
Police Zone, only 27 of the 81 deserters from Outjo district in the north had been 
recaptured at all.95 The police admitted that ‘only an insignificant number’ of 
those that made it to Ovamboland were ever punished and suspected that they 
simply recontracted under a different name96
The administration recognised the clear link between desertions and the growing 
reluctance of recruits to accept farm labour up to 1948 when it became a 
prerequisite to a contract on the mines. The Deputy Commissioner for police
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explained that:
... for no apparent reason, natives have refused to go to employers to whom 
they have been contracted ... It would appear that the natives keep one 
another informed of the conditions under which they work at the various 
employers.97
The surprisingly detailed community knowledge about the conditions on individual 
farms was accompanied by a more general aversion to farm labour. The situation 
had reached crisis point by 1948. The Report of the Native Labourers Commission 
published in that year cited the example of a recruiting parade at Ondangua attended 
by 500 hopeful able-bodied recruits. Work in the mines was offered to less than 
100 of the prospective candidates, whilst the rest were offered the opportunity to 
volunteer for farm labour, but:
...the only boys who stepped forward were about a dozen youths aged 14 or 
15 years. An adult boy who was about to come forward was laughed at by 
his companions to such an extent that he shame-facedly retired into the 
ranks.98
The classification of labour and differentiated scale of wages had created a stigma 
around farm labour. Officials were themselves also aware of the evidence that the 
young recruits supplied to farmers were often the victims of physical assaults that, 
given their youth, verged on child abuse.99 The use of child labour on farms is 
a subject which deserves further research. The work of shepherding flocks on 
isolated camps must have been particularly lonely.100
The difficulties of recruitment were such that by 1948 SWANLA were reported to 
be three months in arrears with the supply of farm labourers having orders for 754 
shepherds and 1,240 general farm labourers outstanding.101 At the end of 1950 
SWANLA reported that many workers would ‘rather remain at home than accept 
farm work’ and noted the fact that:
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... many class A recruits prefer Urban Area work at class B wages to farm 
work at the considerably higher scale of remuneration.102
Recruits that agreed to accept a contract as a farm labourer seem to have done so 
on the basis that it was the only way to obtain a ‘passport to the south’ and the 
possibility of urban employment.
The ban on the employment of migrant workers in urban areas had been relaxed 
following the recommendation of the Farm Labour Commission of 1939.103 The 
power of farming interests and concerns about the assumption that the lifestyle of 
towns would be a corruptor of youth ensured that ’C’ grade labourers remained 
officially ineligible for urban work. However it was reported to be common 
practice for workers to ‘break their journey’ during repatriation in a town and then 
to seek work. Migrant farm workers hoped to be able to leave the farm and take 
up employment in an urban area for the second year of contract.104 The operation 
of a network of mutual support in the North was evident in the discovery by the 
Manager of SWANLA that recruits:
... frequently .. carry letters issued to other Ovambos, impersonating 
them.105
The ruse was aimed primarily at helping migrant farm workers to obtain the higher 
paid urban wages. Work selection by migrant workers was evidently more 
sophisticated than a crudely determinist correlation to wage levels. The provision 
of higher wages was not deemed a sufficient motivation for migrant workers to 
volunteer for farm work. One reason for this may have been a credibility gap 
between the paper promise on a contract and the reality of mysterious deductions 
narrated by returning farm workers. The practice that farmers followed of making 
migrant labourers on a year’s contract work a‘thirteen month year’ was one major 
cause of discontent. The extra, apparently unpaid, final month’s work was 
supposedly to allow the farmer to pay for the return rail fare of the worker. One 
farm worker claimed that he was only paid for 20 of the 25 months he spent on a
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farm in Karasburg as five month’s pay was deducted to cover the expense of the 
return journey to the north (the deductions may have actually included other 
expenses, but the perception of injustice remained).106
SWANLA’S CONTROL OF FARM LABOUR RECRUITMENT.
The promise of good wages did not persuade workers to travel to farms, but the 
prospect of an increase in the number of jobs in the mining industry was seen as 
diverting workers from the farming sector. In 1949 more migrant workers were 
employed in the mining industry (including through WENELA) than on farms for 
the first time since 1931, and by 1951 the local Namibian mining companies 
employed more migrant workers than the farmers (Figure 11). The recruitment of 
workers for the Witwatersrand mines in the Union from 1947 (by WENELA) was 
a particular cause of concern to the farming community. The aversion of migrant 
workers to farm labour contracts meant that efforts to secure a more stable 
workforce through the encouragement of voluntary two year contracts were doomed 
to failure. SWANLA told the Commission that over the last nine months not a 
single recruit had been prepared to accept a two year farm labour contract.107
The failure of voluntary measures led SWANLA to adopt a more coercive approach 
to help it meet the demands of the farmers. The response to the informal boycott 
of farm labour was that after 1948 it was decided that all new migrant workers 
would have to spend at least one contract as a farm worker before they would be 
able to travel to the mines.108 A letter to Hahn written in Afrikaans and signed 
‘The Contract Farm Workers of SWA’ complained bitterly about this imposition. 
The letter described the new regulation as a form of slavery and demanded the 
freedom for recruits to choose the nature of their employment.109 The following 
year it was announced that WENELA, the recruiting organisation for the Union 
mines, would only be allowed to recruit ‘Angolan’ immigrants.110 The measures 
merely encouraged the metamorphosis of many identities, rather than the 
recruitment of many more farm workers.
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The most effective measure in the package designed to improved the flow of 
migrant farm labour was introduced in 1949 when the minimum initial contract 
period for farm workers was extended from twelve to eighteen months as a direct 
result of pressure on the administration by the farming lobby and contrary to the 
advice of SWANLA themselves or the evident wishes of the recruits.111 The new 
contracts could be renewed with the same or a new farmer for a further six months 
and the two year maximum period was retained.112 The change in the regulations 
stopped short of the two year contract favoured by many farmers, yet served to 
stabilise the migrant farm workforce through the extension of the minimal contract 
period, rather than an improvement of the inducements. The measures sought to 
control, not coax.
The adaption of the recruitment system to enhance the distribution of farm labour 
reflected the farmers’ view that greater powers of control and coercion could be 
used to resolve their labour problems. However officials in the ‘Native Affairs’ 
Department were aware that the problems of supply continued to be linked to the 
pay and conditions found on farms. The failure to enforce the minimum wages 
proposed in the legislation of 1944 led the Chief Native Commissioner to declare 
angrily in 1947 that farm workers were ‘not getting a square deal in wages’.113 
Wages had remained static whilst farmers had enjoyed up to 200 percent increases 
in their profits, and it was argued that the failure to improve the scale of farm 
wages by 80-100 percent meant that the migrant workers were ‘being 
exploited’.114 The ‘Native Labourers Commission’ of 1948 recommended a 
minimum wage of 25s per month for a shepherd and 20s. per month for a general 
labourer during the first year of contract.115 Yet any attempt to increase wages 
modestly met strong resistance from the farming community.
The failure to improve pay was accompanied by a failure to address the criticisms 
made by farm workers of the conditions under which they worked. One District 
Surgeon claimed in 1948 that 50 percent of the farmers in the district he covered 
only included meat in their worker’s rations when an animal died and that 
malnutrition was affecting the performance of farm workers.116 The dereliction
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of diet on farms was complemented by a neglect of basic standards of 
accommodation for farm workers. The police post at Ariamsvlei reported in 1950 
that:
Even at farms where natives are expected to reside permanently, little huts 
built of sticks, bits of sack, and cut-open jam tins, and cardboard boxes, are 
supplied, the farmer simply flatly refusing to contribute anything of value 
towards building of proper accommodation.117
The inadequacies of accommodation for farm workers were aggravated by the camp 
system. The movement of flocks between paddocks meant that herders were obliged 
to spend long periods alone at distant outposts away from even the crude housing 
available and sometimes without any shelter or even water.118
SWANLA reported that by 1949 they were being forced to offer wages for farm 
workers above the recommended scale in an attempt to address the recruitment 
problem. Yet the results remained ‘largely disappointing’ and SWANLA was 
unable to attract recruits in ‘adequate numbers’.119 The date, 1949, is important 
in understanding the reasons for this problem when put in the context of the role of 
‘Extra-territorial’ workers within the migrant labour system. The Native Labourers 
Commission suggested that, in 1946, as many as 48 percent of the SWANLA 
recruits originated from Angola.120 Angolan migrant workers played a crucial role 
in the farm labour system, yet the attempt to restrict WENELA’s recruitment to 
Angolans in 1949 must have increased the number seeking contracts in the Union 
and reduced the inclination of these workers to seek contracts as farm workers. The 
increasing reluctance of workers from Northern Namibia to agree to farm work 
meant that the supply from Angola was essential to meet the particular labour 
shortage on farms and it was argued that a pay increase was essential to maintain 
this supply.121
SWANLA argued that the best opportunity for solving the farm labour problem in 
Namibia was to increase recruitment from Angola.122 The administration even
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gave financial support to a ‘goodwill’ journey to southern Angola in 1953 by Mr 
Cope, SWANLA’s recruitment officer in Ovamboland.123 SWANLA also 
improved pay. The decision was made that from 1st August, 1949 the practice of 
obliging workers to work a thirteenth or twenty-fifth month on their contract (in 
order to ‘pay’ their own fare back to the north) would end.124 New pay rates 
eventually came into force from 1st May, 1951 with a special rate of increase for 
workers who renewed their contract for the designated extension period with the 
same employer. The link between urbanisation and difficulties in recruitment were 
further addressed by the establishment of Committees to fix quota limits for the 
black urban population of each district.125
The year 1955 saw the South West Africa Agricultural Union passing a resolution 
requesting the introduction of 30 month contracts for farm workers and the 
agreement that unmarried farm workers would be able to extend the length of a two 
year contract by a further six months.126 Farmers still preferred proposals that 
helped them keep and control existing labour for a longer period. The preference 
partly reflected the gradual evolution of a labour policy on the farms of southern 
Namibia that favoured a smaller, more experienced and skilled workforce. A 
survey revealed that by 1958 farms in Gibeon and Warmbad districts had, on 
average, less that 3 farm workers each.127
CONCLUSION.
The spreading ripples of labour recruitment over the period 1915-1955 represented 
the continuing failure of the farming industry to offer competitive wages in the 
labour market. Farmers faced the initial difficulty of ‘capturing’ local black 
pastoralists and converting them into a rural proletariat. The destruction of the 
black pastoral economy failed, however, to result in the wholesale conscription of 
the local labour force. The replacement of pastoral priorities with a precedence for 
pay resulted in a movement of workers to towns, rather than farms.
The rapid increase in labour demand after 1935 led to the increasing use of migrant
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workers, but the adversities associated with farm labour made the regulation of this 
supply also problematic. By 1955 the Land and Agricultural Bank were reporting 
that the labour crisis and difficulty of obtaining herders was forcing some farmers 
to convert their small stock flocks into cattle herds whilst others were once again 
forced to grant grazing concessions to secure the services of those few local black 
stockowners who maintained a pastoral economic base within a reserve.128
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CONCLUSION.
The aim of this dissertation has been to present a study of economic change and its 
consequences within a rural region. The actions and responses of one group of 
actors to the process of land alienation and labour recruitment influenced others 
operating within the system. The dynamic of change was not simply the translation 
of legislation - the impact of change varied according to important vertical and 
horizontal differences within and between communities at the local level. The 
environmental constraints of southern Namibia meant that the emphasis was placed 
on the relationship between land and labour within a pastoral economy and the key 
importance of mobility has been emphasised.
The regional experience of southern Namibia was, where necessary, placed within 
the broader national context. The most obvious example of this was the 
importance of migrant workers from northern Namibia and Angola within the 
commercial farming sector. Local experiences have therefore been used to provide 
a window into more general patterns of change during a period that is neglected in 
the existing historiography.
The focus on southern Namibia sought to explore a region that is interesting because 
of its virtually exclusively pastoral economy, but also because the reaction of the 
black population to colonialism during the period covered has been neglected. 
Historians may prefer to write about explosive acts of resistance to colonial rule, 
but the experience of black pastoralists in southern Namibia is equally important in 
understanding the structuring of the regional economy. The legacy of the period 
was the establishment of a clear division between dispossessed black pastoralists and 
a commercial farming sector dominated by the families of white immigrants. There 
was nothing inevitable about this division, without the intervention of a 
discriminatory state; however it seems inevitable that those who gained preferential 
positions within the regional rural economy of southern Namibia will resist any 
efforts to restructure it.
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INTERVIEWS.
The following list provides the name of the individual interviewed, the date of the 
interview, the place where the interview was carried out, the date of birth of the 
person and the main topics covered in each interview.
Ruben Hendricks (01.10.1990 Keetmanshoop)
Bom. 1939. Politics of Berseba Reserve, 1940s and 1950s.
Dirk Kooper (02.10.1990 Keetmanshoop)
Bom. 1908. Pay and conditions on farms in Keetmanshoop District.
Paiilus Van Der Westhuvzen (03.10.1990 Keetmanshoop)
Bom 1940. Pay and conditions on farms in Keetmanshoop District.
Karl Bock (03.10.1990 Keetmanshoop)
Bom 1940. Pay and conditions on farms in Keetmanshoop & Karasburg Districts. 
Rebecca Dierstan (26.10.1990 Warmbad)
Bom 01.01.1917. The genealogy of the leadership of the Bondelswarts. The 
Bondelswarts Rising of 1922. Life in Bondelswarts Reserve. Pay and conditions 
on farms in Karasburg District. Odendaal Plan.
Anna Christiaans (27.10.1990 Karasburg)
Bom 06.02.1939. ‘Kaptein’ of the Bondelswarts. Life in Bondelswarts Reserve. 
Odendaal Plan.
Ernst Kaffer (27.10.1990 Guichabis)
Bom 22.01.1930. The Bondelswarts Rising of 1922. The meeting of 1946 about 
incorporation. The Odendaal Plan. Life in Bondelswarts Reserve.
Jan A. Laberloth (28.10.1990 Karasburg)
Bom 22.05.1918. Administration and politics of the Bondels Reserve. History of the 
Bondelswarts Community. The Bondelswarts Rising of 1922.
Angula Andimba (21.11.1990 Olulongo)
Bom 1916. Former contract farm worker from Onantsi in Ovamboland. Migrant 
labour system. Pay and conditions on farms in Mariental, Tsumeb and Omaruru 
District. 1941-1946. Problems leaving one farm.
Jasordu Nime (21.11.1990 Olulongo)
Bom 1912. Former contract farm worker from Angola. Migrant labour system. 
Pay and conditions on farms in Karasburg and Windhoek Districts.
Mateus David (21.11.1990 Olulongo)
Bom 1921. Former contract farm worker from Oshali in Ondonga. Migrant labour 
system. Payu-|| ndonditions on a farm in Karasburg District.
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Gideon Nalukaku (21.11.1990 Olulongo)
Bom 1921. Former contract farm worker from Okaloko. Migrant labour system. 
Pay and conditions on farms in Outjo, Windhoek and Mariental Districts.
Samuel Amukugo (21.11.1990 Olulongo)
Bom 22.09.1939 Former contract farm worker from Okatana in Uukwambi. 
Migrant labour system. Pay and conditions on a farm in Tsumeb District (1958- 
1960).
Johannes Kafula (21.11.1990 Olulongo)
Bom 1920. Former contract farm worker from Eengwena in Uukwanyama. 
Migrant labour system. Pay and conditions on a farm in Maltahohe District.
Sakaria Nahole (21.11.1990 Olulongo)
Bom 1921. Former contract farm worker from Iinongo in Ondonga. Migrant
labour system. Pay and conditions on farms in Okahandja, Outjo and Karasburg 
Districts.
Simson Darius (21.11.1990 Olulongo)
Bom 1930. Former contract farm worker from Onathinge in Ondonga. Migrant 
labour system. Pay and conditions on a farm in Gobabis District.
Tomas Walaula (21.11.1990 Olulongo)
Bom 1939. Former contract farm worker from Onkuni in Ondonga. Migrant
labour system. Pay and conditions on a farm in Tsumeb District.
Festus Teotold (27.11.1990 Eheke)
Bom 19.12.1923. Former contract farm worker from Okatale in Ondonga.
Migrant labour system. Pay and conditions on farms in Otjiwarongo, Grootfontein, 
Okahandja and Karasburg Districts (1944 - c.1950)
Thomas Michael (27.11.1990 Eheke)
Bom 10/1944. Former contract worker from Enkono in Ondonga. Migrant labour 
system. Pay and conditions on a farm in Outjo District (1962 - c.1965).
Silas Mashina (27.11.1990 Eheke)
Bom c. 1922. Former contract farm worker from Onamungundo in Ondonga. 
Migrant labour system. Pay and conditions on farms in Grootfontein District (1956 
- c.1960)
Jacob Awene (27.11.1990 Eheke)
Bom c. 1923. Former contract farm worker from Onekaku in Ondonga. Migrant 
labour system. Pay and conditions on a farm in Bethanie District.
Abed Ashipala (27.11.1990 Eheke)
Bom 24.12.1923. Former contract farm worker from Oniipa in Ondonga. Mig V-j-nt 
labour system. Pay and conditions on a farm in Keetmanshoop District (1942- 
1944).
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Cornelius Frederick (21.12.1990 Kosis)
Bom 25.12.1917. Youngest son of Josef Frederik (‘Headman’ of Soromas Reserve. 
1927-1938). Stock limits in Soromas Reserve. Pay and conditions on farms in 
Bethanie District
Pastor Paul Peters (22.02.1991 Gibeon)
Bom 26.07.1912. The establishment of the AME Church in Southern Namibia. Pay 
and conditions on farms in Maltahohe & Gibeon Districts.
Rev. Willem. Moses Jod (21.02.1991 Mariental)
Bom 1919. The establishment and work of the AME Church in Southern Namibia. 
Sabina Joseph (19.02.1991 Maltahohe)
Bom 1923. Stock limits and local impact of World War Two in Maltahohe District. 
Miriam Hanze (19.02.1991 Maltahohe)
Bom 1928. Pay and conditions on a farm (1946-1948) in Karasburg District.
Fritz IGariseb (19.02.1991 Maltahohe)
Bom 15.09.1925. Identity and land rights.
Jesias Izaak (19.02.1991 Maltahohe)
Bom 31.10.1916. Gibeon Meeting (1946) regarding incorporation. Rhenish 
Mission and education.
Johannes A. Peterson (19.02.1991 Maltahohe)
Bom 26.06.1923. Reputation of local farmers. Controls over movement in 
Maltahohe District. Contract workers from north.
Christina Appolus (15.02.1991 Mariental)
Bom 1938. Childhood on farm in Keetmanshoop District and forced removal from 
farm. Experience of 1946 drought in Berseba Reserve.
Gertze Swaartbooi (15.02.1991 Mariental)
Bom 1929. Pay and conditions on a farm in Karasburg District (1940-1949) and 
a farm by the Orange River (1949-1967). The Odendaal Plan. The causes of the 
Bondelswarts Rising of 1922. The treatment of Bondelswarts prisoners in 1922.
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